CAMPAIGNING

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL (JAWS)

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Mission

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School produces graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational / strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of Defense.
Welcome to another edition of CAMPAIGNING. This edition is very exciting and we have been quite fortunate, yet again, to have world-class authors submit exceptionally relevant articles for this quarter’s edition. Before I introduce the authors and their contributions contained in this edition I would like to first give you an update on CAMPAIGNING. This edition is the fifth journal we have written. To date we have received contributions from across the world, as well as various agencies within the interagency, non-governmental organizations, private citizens as well as many senior level military officers. Our journal is posted on the internet and continues to receive a high volume of “hits”. We have an electronic distribution system that distributes our journal worldwide and a growing readership. All of these accomplishments are very impressive for a publication that just recently celebrated its first anniversary. A special thanks to all who have helped with these achievements.

This edition of CAMPAIGNING is full of articles which are invaluable to joint planners at the regional combatant commands and Joint Staff. Lieutenant General Sharp has provided an extremely insightful interview regarding many aspects of joint planning and the current dynamic nature of planning. His thoughts are particularly important based on his current position which requires him to oversee the management and review of joint operations plans for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our good friend Fred Hof has provided an extremely insightful piece on Lebanon based on his many years of regional expertise. Fred’s Thinking about Lebanon is a “must read” for anyone who is involved in any type of planning for this region. Another friend, Major General Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, who we are proud to report, has recently been assigned as the Director of the Romanian General (Joint) Staff. We are extremely grateful for his continued support of our journal and wish him all the best in his new appointment. Robert Kemp has provided an extremely important work, based on his experiences with Provisional Reconstruction Teams in the Khost Province in Eastern Afghanistan. Robert has done a masterful job with this work and has provided a very valuable contribution to this extremely important function of interagency cooperation at the pointy end of the spear. Dave Gardener, who is currently a JAWS student, managed to find time to submit a worthwhile piece on the importance of end state development within the context of the Vietnam War.

The continued success of CAMPAIGNING is dependent upon the quality of articles submitted for publication to continue the debate on planning issues at this critical time in history. If you would like to be placed on the electronic distribution list for CAMPAIGNING or would like to submit an article or comment on an article contained in this edition, please email your submission or comments to bollenbergc@jfsc.ndu.edu.

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Joint Operations Planning in the 21st Century

By

Lieutenant General Walter Sharp

The Joint Operational War Plans Division of the Joint Staff, J-7, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, conducted an interview with the Director, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Sharp. The interview focused on LTG Sharp’s observations and thoughts regarding the ongoing “revolution in planning” taking place within the Department of Defense and to a lesser degree throughout the United States government. As Director, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Sharp oversees the management and review of joint operations plans as well as all of the Department level processes that intersect with joint operations planning, most notably Global Force Management and the Chairman’s Readiness System. He is also the co-chair of the Adaptive Planning Executive Committee.

Question: General Sharp, what are the most significant changes or trends in joint operations planning you’ve witnessed since 9-11?

That is quite a broad question, and it’s interesting that you pose 9-11 as the break point for our ongoing revolution in planning. I would say that the attack against the United States on 9-11 gave us the psychological shock needed to break with our old model but it wasn’t until the physical realities of Operation Iraqi Freedom that we truly recognized the shape that change needed to take. It’ll be helpful to discuss the pre-9-11 era first. Not too long ago, military planning focused on one adversary; the Soviet Union, its satellites, surrogates and allies. The Threat generally acted in predictable patterns which allowed US planners to focus on set-piece war plans to directly counter our adversary’s intentions. We had years to develop the plans in great detail and we assumed that the forces in our plans would be ready and available if or when we were called upon to execute the plan. To the extent a unit wasn’t available, it was because the unit was participating in a major training exercise or deployed to the Sinai for a Multi-National Force Observer’s rotation. The adversary was formidable but consistent, and correspondingly our plans were complex, but static.

As a result, once complete, we euphemistically placed war plans “on the shelf” ready for use if necessary, and we’d update them every few years as required. All our DoD systems for force management, readiness reporting, risk assessment, and budgeting were designed in context of this model for planning joint operations.

Even after the end of the Cold War we didn’t recognize the need to significantly change the way we planned joint operations. The Cold War was replaced by global, regional and national threats not necessarily linked directly to nation-state confrontations. Concurrently, the rise of non-state actors including transnational terrorist organizations, and the advent of new forms of non-traditional warfare demanded different planning considerations. So in effect, by 9-11 we found ourselves in a new strategic environment that implied the need to change the way we think about planning Joint Operations. Now, post OIF and QDR we find ourselves in a period of rapid
change dominated by a shift from a static to a dynamic planning environment, from plans for major combat operations to plans for irregular warfare or plans designed to prevent war and from plans designed to confront challenges from single countries to regional and global plans to confront transnational problems. And increasingly we’re recognizing the need for plans that require early involvement on the part of interagency and coalition partners and even requirements for plans in which the military only plays a supporting role to other government agencies.

In order to meet these challenges I will highlight three of the most important changes to operations planning. The first is the “living plan” concept which involves the way we create and maintain operational plans. Second is the emergence what I call, “non-traditional” war plans to include plans that are primarily focused on deterrence, engagement and shaping. Finally, I want to speak on the impact that ongoing operations are having on resource and force availability assumptions for operational plans.

Perhaps the most fundamental change is the concept of “living plans.” One of the fundamental lessons learned from OIF is that we can no longer let plans sit static “on the shelf.” Changes in strategic guidance, threat assessment, available forces, and readiness must be reflected in the plan. To that end, the Joint Staff has institutionalized the IPR process in which Combatant Commanders periodically do an azimuth check with the SecDef and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to make sure the plan stays relevant with regards to guidance, assumptions, threat, forces, and associated risk. Following the SecDef/CJCS IPR, plans are refined, adapted to changing circumstance, or perhaps even terminated because they are no longer needed. The IPR process ensures Combatant Commanders develop and maintain plans in full consultation with the CJCS and SecDef.

Planning is really the confluence of all Department activities when one looks at everything that planning touches such as readiness, force availability, intelligence, strategic guidance, and resources. To make a plan “living” all of these activities need to come together under one umbrella. That’s why the Joint Staff developed Adaptive Planning and links to other processes, such as Global Force Management, Defense Readiness and Reporting System, Intell Campaign Planning, and the resourcing and budgeting world.

Another significant change is the shift from traditional to non-traditional war plans. Now, what do I mean by that? A review the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan shows several planning tasks which on the surface are very familiar, traditional military battle plans that appear to demand a planning effort consistent with previous cold war planning practices. However, careful comparison of plan requirements versus real world circumstances and events raises concerns about the effectiveness of traditional planning for the traditional fights, but I will talk more on that in a minute.

Beyond these traditional war plans, there are several new planning tasks that transcend Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundaries regionally or globally that do not address specific conventional military nation-state threats. For instance, the United States is engaged in a Global War on Terrorism. The GWOT is a campaign plan that links Global operations within time and space to
focus on a common goal, making it fundamentally different than any plan previously produced. Pandemic Influenza and Cyberspace are two additional examples of long term threats requiring a global solution. These global campaign plans must be coordinated within the interagency to ensure actions are consistent across the United States Government (USG) and that US influence and effort are properly focused to achieve national strategic objectives.

Within the global campaign construct, regional campaign plans frame the strategic landscape which guides development of specific operations plans. This strategic framing provides broad USG policy alignment and guidance which must be fleshed out in operations plan development early in the planning process and not as an afterthought. The dynamic and highly complex nature of USG policy means a plan that sits on a shelf will quickly grow stale, outdated, and ineffective. Effective plans fall within campaign guidelines and are tied directly to USG policy and ongoing operations.

Another new type of operations plan has been created with primary emphasis on shaping, stabilizing or engagement within a region in support of USG policy. Like all operations plans, these involve military activities, but the planning is conducted in concert with interagency counterparts and jointly developed to best conform to the USG policies and goals.

Question: Is this where the six phase planning construct comes in?

Yes. A year ago the four phase planning construct was replaced with a six phase planning construct incorporating a shaping phase designed to be in execution at all times. The shaping phase provides a direct link between current operations and operations plans. The result is an operations planning process that ensures plans are current, relevant, and quickly adaptive to changes in USG policy; in short, “living” plans. The threat of decisive combat operations is the ultimate stick, and it must remain the backdrop reinforcing USG resolve, but it is only effective if it supports and is aligned with current policy executed through the connected shaping activities within the operations plan.

My final point is that an operations plan must be in context of current military commitments and ongoing operations. Our forces are no longer in garrison waiting for the call to respond, they are spread across the globe executing joint operations designed to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. The cold war and peacetime assumption that forces in our plans will be available and ready to meet required time lines must be continually reexamined. As force availability changes, the plans must change as well to mitigate shortfalls and highlight increased risk to senior leadership. This is one of the foundations of Adaptive Planning and another critical piece to a “living” plan. We are not there yet, but I am excited that it will become a reality in the very near future. New programs in development, including Collaborative Force Analysis, Sustainment and Transportation (CFAST) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System, when ultimately connected to the military readiness databases, will provide the planner with a real time view of the forces that would be available. Planners will have the opportunity to evaluate risk, develop a mitigation strategy, and inform higher authority of the new risk involved.
This type of system responsiveness has two effects. First, it significantly improves the senior leadership’s confidence in the ability to execute not only the operational plan but also our armed forces’ ability to execute the overall national military strategy. Second, an operational plan which is responsive to the actual forces available does much to eliminate the traditional divide between crisis planning and contingency planning. Software advances and database connections will soon make this example a technical possibility and our future planners must become familiar with these products in order to capitalize on technology and improve planning effectiveness.

**Question:** Highly responsive plans will better inform the combatant commander of the risks associated with the execution of individual plans. However, isn’t it difficult for the commander to ensure complete operational plan alignment with the overall USG policy?

Each plan must project a strategy which is in alignment with the USG policy and in a dynamic and changing world - that is tough, but the larger issue is ensuring plans are consistent across AOR boundaries. Informally, this concern is mitigated through periodic Defense Senior Leadership Conferences where all the Combatant Commanders return to Washington for a collective conference. These meetings offer a venue for the highest level of our military to sit with civilian leadership and conduct discussions on strategic topics. While certainly effective, these opportunities do not completely eliminate cross regional disconnects. Consistency within an individual plan and consistency between all plans across the globe is captured through “early and often” senior leader involvement in operational plan development and review. This is the heart of the Adaptive Planning process.

I’d like to return here to the IPR process mentioned earlier because I think it’s important. Top priority plans are reviewed with the Secretary of Defense and CJCS twice during plan development, once for final approval, and then a minimum of every six months thereafter. These reviews give the commanders the opportunity to periodically update senior leadership on any concerns or changes in risk from the previous briefing. Equally, the briefs provide senior leadership a formal opportunity to evaluate plans against current USG policies, Department of Defense objectives, other department operations plans, and provide direction for plan adjustment, possible branches or sequels. The bottom line is plans that are current and aligned with USG policy, better understood by both the combatant commander and senior leadership, and more executable. Combined, these advantages limit the time and changes necessary to move from contingency planning to crisis planning.

**Question:** Clearly operational planning has a bright future. Your comment about aligning operational planning strategy with USG Policy is taught at every war college, yet at the planners’ level, it does not appear to be a great strength of the military. Do you agree?

Interesting - there are two areas which are particularly relevant to this discussion, interagency coordination and coalition planning. While I agree we have more significant work ahead to improve the interagency working relationship, I disagree that interagency coordination is not a great strength of the military planner. Interagency coordination comes in two basic categories,
Department of Defense support plans to other USG agency plans, such as homeland defense, and second, where a Department of Defense plan supports a USG policy in a particular region.

A Department of Defense support plan to a government agency with USG lead responsibilities is a relatively new phenomenon but is really not all that different than development of a military plan designed to support another country’s military. However, issues such as the material and personnel resource mismatch, the inconsistent planning culture, and mistrust across agency lines present significant stumbling blocks. The challenge is not in the planning, but in sidestepping the stumbling blocks and developing close relationships with cross-agency counterparts such that planning can be conducted uniformly. We are universally recognized as exceptional planners – a well deserved reputation, yet this same reputation can be an unspoken roadblock to detailed and frank interagency discussion aimed at developing the best possible solution. Planners must remember their own military strengths and weaknesses, understand the strengths each agency brings, and work to support lead agency requirements.

Department of Defense plans have traditionally been developed to support USG policy, yet plans were designed as the stick, encased in glass, and to be used only when diplomacy failed and the National Security Counsel demanded military action. That is a cold war dynamic and as I mentioned earlier, the model of a plan on a shelf ready for execution is not effective or responsive to the dynamic strategic environment in today’s world. The shift to the six phase planning construct and institution of an adaptive planning strategy is recognition of this fact and is the military’s effort to be more responsive to the dynamic environment. The shaping phase is key and must directly link and synchronize USG policy and the operations plan. IPRs, senior leader discussions, and other reviews provide opportunities for leadership to check the progress of planning, but the rubber really meets the road at the planner level. The planner must fully understand USG policy and have a solid working relationship with interagency counterparts such that they all work as a team to ensure that all USG actions, including the military shaping actions, are mutually supportive, aligned and adaptable to changes in the strategic landscape.

Both plan types demand a planner who is willing to listen and work hand-in-hand with the interagency to build and execute a plan that provides the necessary support in terms of future combat operations while concurrently executing well defined and coordinated shaping operations that fully support USG policy.

Coalition planning presents a layer of complexity to the job of a planner beyond the interagency concerns I addressed. Challenges not withstanding, coalitions will continue to be preferable to unilateral action. In that vain, every plan must be developed to account for coalition forces participation and many plans must be build, modified and updated with coalition forces as a critical component of the plan. This is perhaps the most challenging planning environment a planner will confront. The planner must develop a plan with coalition partners that is in alignment with USG policy, partner nation policy, and effectively assimilates US and coalition forces without overwhelming partner nation capabilities or appearing to dominate partner nation desires. This can be a daunting task given the comparative and often overwhelming capabilities of the US military but it must be given maximum attention in order to foster long term success. As with internal interagency coordination, coalition coordinated phase zero operations are
critical and enduring aspects of the planning process which focus all participants on using available resources to best immediate advantage with one eye towards the long term requirements and goals of the plan and coalition policy.

**Question:** Sir, your comments have been both enlightening and informative. As a final question; what advice would you like to give to our military planners?

First, to your current JAWS students, Congratulations. Not many people have the opportunity to attend JAWS so it is quite an honor to be a graduate. The accolades also represent a burden of responsibility you must shoulder as you rejoin the planning community.

Second, are some general comments to the entire Joint Operations planning community; Planning today requires the talents of our most competent, experienced military professionals. Military planning is in fact the application of general professional knowledge to solve specific strategic or operational dilemmas, the hallmark of any profession. Today, more than ever, planning requires individuals with education and knowledge across a broad spectrum of disciplines. It requires individuals who can think and act outside the traditional boundaries of Joint and combined military operations to create plans that are inherently interagency and / or combined in nature. In addition to the more traditional military disciplines, I challenge each of you to continue your professional development as planners by pursuing advanced education in related academic disciplines such as economics, political science, international relations, public administration, regional or cultural studies to name a few. I also challenge you to take the time to understand the principles behind the Department’s Adaptive Planning initiative and actively work to apply those principles within your organizations. Finally, advances in technology now offer great potential not only to accelerate high fidelity planning but also to enable rapid changes to plans as the situation dictates. It is vital that we aggressively use this technology so that we can inform spiral development efforts to more quickly to meet the needs of planners at all levels.

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Thinking about Lebanon

By
Frederic C. Hof

The war of July-August 2006 between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah reminded those of us who focus professionally on the Middle East that it’s not all about Iraq. While the consequences of an imploded Iraqi state may roil the region for many years to come, the implications of a Lebanon in which a state corresponding to the country’s boundaries has never existed will likewise keep diplomats and military planners very busy indeed for as far as the eye can see.

We found in the Iraqi context that it is important how we think about a country, particularly before we find ourselves owning it and trying to hold it together. It would be well worth our while to understand and appreciate some basics about Lebanon even if we never (again) deploy a single soldier or marine there. Our failure to grasp the basics cost us 241 deaths in a single unconventional assault in October 1983. Failure now, while perhaps not as catastrophic, could nevertheless lead to mistaken military advice and serious policy errors.

Indeed, the events and the missteps of this past summer brought to mind time spent in 1984-85 as a student in what was then called the Armed Forces Staff College, when the author was putting the finishing touches on a book subsequently published under the title Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984. This was a study of the political and security consequences of the 1920s partition of a region called “Upper Galilee” between Palestine/Israel and Lebanon. Near the end of the book one may find the following words: “. . . there will be no peace for Galilee without a real government for Lebanon.” The absence of Lebanese state authority “can only lead to the kind of widespread turbulence and violence that may once again oblige Israeli Galileans to live in bomb shelters while Lebanese Galileans die in large numbers.” This is precisely what happened in the summer of 2006. The purpose of this article is to acquaint readers with aspects of Lebanon – especially its non-state status – the author deems essential for military and policy planners to take into consideration.

The Lebanese “Non-State”

On the morning of July 12, 2006 the military wing of Hezbollah – the Lebanese Shiite organization dominating the politics of southern Lebanon, the Biqa’ Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut – launched a diversionary shelling of some Israeli border villages. The main event was a dash across an undisputed stretch of boundary to grab two Israeli soldiers. When a unit of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) plunged across the border in a rescue attempt, it was ambushed and casualties were taken. Israel’s reaction was swift. It launched air assaults on Lebanese infrastructure (initially bridges) to try to keep Hezbollah from moving its captives and to demonstrate to the Government of Lebanon (GOL) and the Lebanese people the high cost of tolerating Hezbollah’s “state within a state.” Hezbollah responded with rocket attacks on Israeli populated areas. Although both sides engaged military targets during the conflict, it was Lebanese and Israeli civilians who bore the brunt of injury, death, destruction and terror.
From Israel’s perspective it made sense to hold the GOL fully responsible for the unprovoked breach of an undisputed sector of a boundary verified by the UN in 2000 – the so-called “blue line,” or “line of Israeli withdrawal.” Indeed, Israel’s frustration with the GOL was nothing new. As far back as 1968 Israeli officials had warned that Israel would not “relieve the Government of Lebanon for acts of sabotage organized on Lebanese soil with governmental encouragement.” [Galilee Divided, p. 72.] In fact, GOL ignorance has been the general rule when the sovereign prerogatives of the pseudo-state have been usurped and exercised by others. While there may be defensible political, diplomatic and legal reasons to hold the GOL “responsible” for the cross-border acts of gunmen, the reality is that there is no state in a practical sense.

The sad truth is that the GOL had never exercised effective authority in the country’s south and was not about to start in 2006. The republic created by France after World War I was really a fragment of the shattered Ottoman Empire from which it had been cut. But this living piece of the Ottoman past lacked one essential piece: a ruling sultan. Urban notables, feudal families and sectarian leaders were the country’s real sources of political power and influence; there was no power pyramid and no actual ruler. A “government,” complete with officials and quasi-institutions, gave Lebanon the appearance of statehood. But it was illusory. Not only were key positions (including the presidency, premiership, speaker of parliament and armed forces command) assigned by sect, but during times of conflict between Lebanon’s local powers the “government” and its armed forces faced a stark choice: remain intact by standing aside or join the fight and split asunder. It is a tribute to the Lebanese people that they were able to develop a remarkably free press and a country-wide passion for democracy from the bottom-up, despite (or perhaps because of!) the absence of state authority.

Nowhere was the non-state more invisible than in the largely Shiite south, where it did as little as possible to establish a presence, much less alleviate the region’s chronic poverty. As the inheritors of an Ottoman tradition that had little or no regard for Shiism, the Christians and Sunni Muslims dominating the ersatz GOL had little objective use for the south of Lebanon beyond its abundant water resources. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s the resulting stateless vacuum filled up with Palestinian fighters intent on harassing Israel. They brought with them clinics and other services provided neither by the GOL nor by local Shiite feudal leaders. When Palestinians, Israelis and Lebanese militiamen turned the border area into a free-fire zone, the GOL was a spectator.

In June 1982 Palestinian fighters were routed by Israel from southern Lebanon, only to be replaced shortly thereafter by an infinitely more capable, home-grown resistance organization supported by the clerical regime in Iran: Hezbollah. By the time Hezbollah’s resistance to Israeli occupation reached its climax in 2000, Lebanon had, at long last, acquired a sultan, albeit a non-Lebanese ruler: the President of Syria. Syrian suzerainty in Lebanon had incubated during Lebanon’s civil war of 1975-1990. But the Damascus-based sultan was banished in early 2005 after being blamed by many for the assassination of Lebanese ex-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February of that year. There was no one to take his place except, ironically, in the predominantly Shiite sectors of Lebanon (the south, the southern suburbs of Beirut and parts of the Biqa’ Valley). In these places Hezbollah was already (and remains) the sultan. Hezbollah, in areas where its supporters dominate, is the state.
Lebanon is not a “failed state.” Hezbollah is not a “state within a state.” Lebanon is a non-state, a political-geographical expression within which Hezbollah performs state functions – chief among them protection and social services – for its constituents. Statehood in Lebanon is not something to be restored; rather it and an underlying sense of national citizenship transcending sectarian self-identification are things awaiting creation.

On July 12, 2006 the dangers of a “state within a non-state” became manifest, just as they had during the 1968-1983 period when the Palestinian resistance movement filled the stateless vacuum in areas it occupied and set the stage for a ruinous civil war. This latest episode in the perils of non-statehood featured an exercise of sovereignty by Hezbollah, committing on its own authority an act of war by breaching the “blue line” at a place not disputed by the government in which it participated and to which it purportedly owed its allegiance. Ironically the episode came to a temporary close when the prime minister of the non-state’s government in Beirut, driven to the point of desperation by the ferocity of Israel’s aerial campaign, offered to dispatch 15,000 Lebanese soldiers south of the Litani River to supplement a UN peacekeeping effort. This thoroughly unexpected gesture by a helpless bystander broke a diplomatic deadlock and eased the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting (at least temporarily).

Keeping the “Resistance” Alive – “Shebaa Farms”

The stage for the events of July and August 2006 had been set six years earlier. In May 2000 nearly 18 years of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon ended when Israel, to the utter consternation of Hezbollah and Syria, unilaterally abandoned the battlefield. Although the IDF had not been beaten tactically, constant fighting and rising casualties had drained the occupation of public support within Israel. Arguably the most popular thing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak did during his brief incumbency was getting out of Lebanon.

But the break was not as clean as Israel supposed it would be. In June 2000 the UN confirmed that the IDF’s withdrawal had been total; there were no Israeli soldiers left on Lebanese territory. But the GOL, instead securing at long last the southern boundary and providing state-like services, bowed to its Syrian suzerain. Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud proclaimed that Lebanon would not serve as Israel’s “border guard.” Thus instead of Lebanese soldiers and police Hezbollah fighters manned the border. This was exactly what Hezbollah and Syria wanted. More ominously, Syria obliged Lahoud to claim (notwithstanding the UN certification of Israel’s complete withdrawal) that Israeli troops remained encamped on Lebanese territory. Why was this last-minute maneuvering so important?

Syria wanted to maintain – albeit from Lebanon – a measure of military pressure on Israel to remind the Jewish state that its occupation of the Golan Heights would not be without cost. Palestinian raids and later Hezbollah resistance had provided the desired pressure from 1968 until 2000. Damascus had hinted at giving Israel a peaceful Lebanese frontier in return for full Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory occupied since June 1967. But the transaction was thwarted by the collapse of Israeli-Syrian peace talks in January 2000 and Israel’s subsequent unilateral withdrawal in May.
Syria was not about to allow Israel to deny it a Lebanese pressure point. Damascus forced the GOL in mid-2000 to claim that a small strip of “Lebanese” territory containing some 14 orchards, pastures and fields remained “occupied.” Old deeds owned by Lebanese from the village of Shebaa were cited to “substantiate” the claim. But Lebanese and Syrian maps clearly showed the land to be within the occupied Golan Heights, not Lebanon. The UN brusquely dismissed the claim as bogus, but Lebanon’s pro-Syrian president, after initially signaling acceptance of the “blue line” between Lebanon and the Golan Heights, promptly and obligingly reversed course at the direction of Damascus.

*Hezbollah* was completely in step with Syria, but it had its own reason to want the “occupation” kept “alive.” Put simply, if there were no “occupation” there could be no “resistance.” So long as it “resisted occupation” the organization’s armed status would be upheld by the 1989 Ta’if Accord, which had officially ended the civil war and restructured the Lebanese political system, creating a potential pathway toward a modern state. From the point of view of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his small leadership cadre, Hezbollah’s arms protected the Lebanese Shiite community (from Israel, Palestinians and other Lebanese), projected the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran into Lebanon and, most importantly, provided Iran a deterrent to an Israeli or American assault.

A believer in the revolutionary Iranian Shiite doctrine of *velayat e-faqih* (clerical rule) and a graduate of theological studies in Iran, Nasrallah is an important part of Iran’s “Islamic revolution.” He is *not* an Iranian stooge, spy or employee. He is a trusted (if junior) colleague of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Although virtually all of Hezbollah’s rank-and-file members and supporters define themselves politically as Lebanese Shiite Arabs, Hassan Nasrallah has not hidden from them the source of Hezbollah’s heavy arms and the money it has received for its extensive social welfare system: Iran. What he is understandably reluctant to tell his constituents is that the primary purpose of Hezbollah’s arsenal is to provide Iran a deterrent. Israel’s mid-2000 withdrawal was a crisis for Nasrallah. He desperately needed a justification to perpetuate his “resistance” and avoid Hezbollah being defined as a “militia” subject to disarmament. The “Shebaa farms” claim filled that need.

**Pressure to Disarm: UNSCRs 1559 and 1680**

After four years of desultory shelling and kidnapping operations targeting Israeli forces in the “farms,” Hezbollah suddenly faced an unexpected political-diplomatic challenge to its armed status. In July 2004 Lebanon’s young Syrian “sultan” ordered the extension in office of President Emile Lahoud, a move bitterly opposed by Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The UN Security Council adopted in August 2004 Resolution 1559, which called for free Lebanese elections, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, resulting in massive demonstrations followed by the withdrawal of Syrian troops and parliamentary elections producing an anti-Syrian majority. All that remained to fulfill the terms of 1559 was the disarmament of Hezbollah. The international community was no more persuaded of Hezbollah’s “resistance” status than it was of the validity of the “Shebaa farms” claim. From the viewpoint of the UN Security Council, Hezbollah was a militia.
Yet Hezbollah was not about to disarm. Nor was anyone capable of making it do so. A UN special envoy (Terje Roed-Larsen) tried mightily to implement 1559, but the muddled politics of the non-state frustrated him. General Michel Aoun, after some 15 years in exile spent denouncing Syria, returned and promptly aligned himself and his mainly Christian supporters with Syria and Hezbollah. Hezbollah then burrowed itself into the Lebanese government by accepting cabinet posts for members and supporters. Until recently, one of the more curious aspects of the Lebanese “non-state” was the presence of five “opposition ministers” within the cabinet!

UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (May 17, 2006) repeated the “disbanding and disarming” formulation of 1559, but carelessly threw Hassan Nasrallah a lifeline by failing specifically to require Syria and Lebanon to delineate jointly, on a map of sufficient scale, their proposed adjustment to the “blue line” in the “Shebaa farms” area. The UN special envoy had been pushing Syria and Lebanon to submit a map. His request had two purposes: to see if Hezbollah and Syria would actually contemplate a peaceful territorial transfer that might end the “resistance;” and to define the potential scope of the adjustment, as no universal consensus on the precise size and shape of the “disputed” area exists. But Resolution 1680, instead of requiring specific action, used vague language about delineation in areas “where the border is uncertain or disputed,” leaving Syria free to say that there was nothing uncertain or disputed about the “Shebaa farms” being Lebanese.

In fact, Secretary-General Nasrallah was and is the last person on earth to want the “Shebaa farms” claim honored. On this tiny sliver of windswept acreage astride the slopes of Mount Hermon rests his entire pretense to “resistance.” Nasrallah feared that defining the territory would be the first step toward making the organization useless to Iran by facilitating an Israeli pullback, ending the resistance and disarming Hezbollah. If Nasrallah was the last person looking for a transfer of territory to Lebanon, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad was right in front of him. The wording of Resolution 1680 – which ironically may have been influenced by an Israeli government not eager to do a further withdrawal of any kind – let Hezbollah and Syria off the hook.

The Summer War: Preface to Statehood?
The fighting of July and August 2006 began with Hezbollah breaching the blue line far removed from the “Shebaa farms” and ended with Hezbollah in an ambiguous position. On the one hand Israel’s failure to win decisively, the bombardments to which its cities and towns were subjected and the beatings its ground forces reservists took near the war’s end gave Nasrallah a heroic image in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. Still, Hezbollah had been ejected from its border positions (including those abutting the “Shebaa farms”) and a new UN Security Council Resolution (1701) authorized an expanded UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) supplemented by Lebanese soldiers. While neither UNIFIL nor the GOL would seek to disarm Hezbollah, they appeared to be significant obstacles to Hezbollah’s ability to resume its resistance kabuki in and around the “Shebaa farms.” Moreover, the UN Secretariat took upon itself the task of defining the territorial dimensions of the farms.
It is far from certain that the UNIFIL/Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) impediment to Hezbollah “resistance” activities can be sustained. The expanded UNIFIL is essentially in the business of assisting the GOL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This is hardly a firm foundation. Despite the professionalism and sound leadership of the LAF, Lebanon’s non-state status offers the prospect of a trap door being sprung with jarring suddenness on international peacekeepers, a prospect that no doubt contributed to a marked lack of enthusiasm by potential troop contributing nations. Lebanon’s prime minister, who put in play the sizeable deployment of LAF soldiers to the south, is vulnerable both politically and physically. Lebanese politics customarily consume those who try to make the GOL play a role consistent with real statehood. Indeed, in October 2006 Hezbollah and its allies withdrew from the cabinet and, along with former General Aoun, called for a “national unity government” that would in fact tie the GOL in knots and eliminate even the illusion of statehood.

Can the trauma of July and August 2006 offer Lebanon a real shot at statehood? Hassan Nasrallah himself told the Lebanese newspaper *As-Safir* on September 6, 2006 that Hezbollah had merely “filled a government vacuum,” adding that once “a strong and steadfast government capable of providing guarantees and protecting the people is established, then this could constitute a step toward determining the fate of Hezbollah’s arms.” That such a revolutionary development merely “could constitute a step” toward disarmament instead of making it happen reflects Nasrallah’s ongoing priority for the security of Iran over the welfare of his constituents.

Yet if the summer war is to be the preface to Lebanese statehood, the first priority must be to prevent the resumption of Israeli-Hezbollah combat. Resolution 1701, an expanded UNIFIL and the deployment of the LAF south of the Litani River are all potentially sound first steps. Still, a broader Lebanese-Israeli détente is needed to pacify the frontier and permit Lebanon’s leaders to resume a “national dialogue” without the threat of renewed war.

Lebanon’s non-state status makes formal peace negotiations with Israel impossible until the Israel-Syria “track” is reestablished and nearing conclusion. But a package deal between Lebanon and Israel short of treaty can be pursued: one drawing on the legitimacy of Lebanon’s Ta’if Accord and addressing the security concerns of both sides. The package could include a resurrected and updated Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement (with a revived Mixed Armistice Commission), a full exchange of prisoners, the incorporation of the 14 “Shebaa farms” within Lebanon, the collection and neutralization of all Hezbollah heavy weaponry and a formal declaration by the GOL ending the “resistance.”

Restoration of the 1949 armistice is a key tenet of the Ta’if Accord – a fact studiously avoided by Hezbollah, because the terms of that armistice exclude from the frontier all arms except for those of official forces. The armistice (renounced by Israel in 1967 and in need of significant amending) upholds the inviolability of the territory of both parties. From 1949 until 1967 the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission met regularly under UN auspices, solved problems cordially and even demarcated the armistice demarcation line (boundary) for nearly its entire length.
Obviously the prisoner issue must be included in any package deal. The year 2006 is Hezbollah’s self-proclaimed “Year of the Prisoners.” The organization’s persistent efforts to grab Israelis to hold in exchange for Lebanese nationals incarcerated in Israel finally ignited a war, with disastrous consequences for Lebanese and Israeli noncombatants.

If properly delineated, an amended “blue line” might produce an Israeli withdrawal that would remove the basis for Hezbollah’s resistance. “Proper” in this context has two aspects: Syria and Lebanon should agree to a “blue line” revision that defines the territory in question; and the revision itself must engulf the “farms” into Lebanon without raising extraneous territorial issues. For example, Syria has made plain that the town of Al-Ghajar – southwest of the farms – is part of the occupied Golan Heights. Yet recent Lebanese maps crudely attempting to substantiate and depict the bogus “Shebaa farms” claim have inadvertently put Al-Ghajar inside Lebanon. This sort of complication can be resolved simply by looping a revised “blue line” tightly around the 14 “farms.” The UN is again actively (and directly) involved in trying to define the extent of the “Shebaa farms,” but Lebanese and Syrian consent will be essential.

With respect to Hezbollah’s weapons, until Lebanon builds a state capable of protecting all of its citizens, the literal “disarming and disbanding” of Hezbollah will not be possible. Even if they were to disapprove strongly of Hassan Nasrallah’s Iran-first agenda, Hezbollah’s constituents will not want the organization’s military wing quickly abolished. Too often Lebanon’s Shiites have been on the short-end of political chaos in the non-state. But Hezbollah’s missiles, rockets, field artillery and anti-aircraft weapons (as opposed to assault rifles and automatic weapons) play no role in intra-Lebanese matters. As part of a comprehensive package deal these would have to be identified, collected and neutralized by a credible, independent third party (which would conduct ongoing monitoring and reconnaissance, perhaps in a manner similar to “Olive Harvest” flights over the Golan Heights). Once all of the substantive pieces of the deal are in place, a formal declaration by the GOL ending the “resistance” would be in order.

If it is true that Hassan Nasrallah’s top priority is to defend Iran, then his opposition to such a package deal must be assumed unless tensions between the Islamic Republic and its adversaries subside. But there may be value anyway in obliging Hezbollah’s Secretary-General to make plain to his Lebanese constituents his loyalty to Iran. Yet even Israel’s interest in the approach described above cannot be assumed. Israel’s government is under severe and growing criticism for its conduct of the war. Its top priority is political survival and it may not be able or willing to engage in quiet, disciplined diplomacy. Moreover, even if Hassan Nasrallah were shorn of his resistance status and the weapons that terrorized hundreds of thousands of Israelis, he would surely claim “victory” upon the return of prisoners and the transfer of the “Shebaa farms” to Lebanon, subjecting Israel’s government to domestic criticism. Finally, there is no reason to assume that Syria would want to modify its policy of using Lebanese territory to harass Israel; an ineffectual practice whose perverse effect is to persuade Israelis at all levels that the Golan Heights must never be returned. Yet this is a cul-de-sac Damascus seems committed to pursuing.

If these hurdles were not enough, the ultimate goal of Lebanese statehood requires far more than a tranquil southern frontier and barriers to the return of Syrian suzerainty. In return for
ultimately saying “no” to Hezbollah leaders who see Lebanon principally as a disposable tool for Iran, Lebanon’s Shiites (perhaps 40 percent of the population) should be fully enfranchised by a system resting on the principle of one citizen one vote with no sectarian set-asides; a state and government dedicated to the welfare and protection of all of its citizens (especially the weak and poor). The state to be built (perhaps in accordance with the Ta’if Accord) would be based on democracy (including minority rights) and the rule of civil, secular law. While some Christians and Sunni Muslims will resist the elevation of citizenship over sectarianism and the retirement of sectarian set-asides, they might ask themselves what good has come from holding onto the presidency or premiership of a non-state routinely penetrated and periodically hijacked by foreign interests.

Serious thought about Lebanon must first take into account the fact that the country – while it has borders, a UN seat, a president, a prime minister and a parliament – is a non-state; a leaderless fragment of an otherwise dead empire. The one and only place where the concept of national unity – “One Lebanon” – has been consistently taught and stubbornly upheld is the Military Academy at Fayadiyyah. The only serious attempt at state-building took place from 1958 to 1964 when a Lebanese patriot and military commander-in-chief (Fouad Chehab) was elevated to the presidency. While military planners and diplomats must take into account that the LAF cannot be unleashed against any subversive actor in the absence of political consensus, they might also consider that this is the only institution in the country whose leaders are predisposed by virtue of their training toward real statehood. Risks notwithstanding, American weaponry and training for this army may be the only antidotes for years of toxic, unprofessional Syrian military influence and the only possible barrier to the return of Syrian suzerainty.

For all of their political and sectarian divisions, the Lebanese people may be close to unanimity on one point: Lebanon should have and should be its own “sultan.” The building of a modern, democratic Lebanese nation-state is a task for Lebanese to accomplish. Yet as long as this Ottoman relic remains stormed-tossed by ongoing Arab-Israeli disputes and Iran’s confrontation with the West, it will be difficult indeed for Lebanese and friends of Lebanon to provide the calm atmosphere required for a serious, protected and protracted state-building process.

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Re-learning the Lessons of History

By

Major General Mihail ORZEAŢĂ, PhD

Lessons learned express continuity with our history and the ability to use others’ experience in order to rapidly advance in accumulating knowledge and improving our skills. But lessons learned also have to be revised and updated in order to fit the requirements of future challenges of the strategic environment. Some lessons, considered already learned, have to be revised and updated because they have been partly forgotten or not well understood and applied from the very beginning. It seems that we have forgotten that the most probable answer for violence is violence and that the enemy is no longer separated from our own troops; it is amongst us and sometimes from our side. Democracy compels us to give the others a chance to have different opinions than ours without being considered an enemy.

Information - one of the most dynamic factors of change - has revolutionized our thinking, breaking knowledge barriers, thus making us give up the routine and plough into a permanent struggle with ourselves in order to overcome our own limits.

While accumulating more and more knowledge, we should not forget that this pyramid of information could fall at anytime if not "restored" through re-assessment and renewal of those parts which no longer fit to reality and its tendencies. In this context, lessons learned should be periodically re-assessed and validated within the vast patrimony of military science according to current requirements and especially to security-environment-related perspective requirements.

Violence Gives Birth to Violence

It is rightly said that a clever person learns from others' experience and a less clever one not even from his. For the purpose of this common law, "lessons learned" have lately been particularly emphasized with the focus of attention on organizations whose task is to collect, analyze and capitalize on those findings, concepts, structures, functions, and operation-related facts that are capable of adapting the military body to current and future security environment requirements.

As for the principles, the structures to learn lessons are appropriate, and the system to do this is operational. However, there are several question marks that exist concerning lessons learned efficiency, and particularly concerning the way they are understood and applied.

Since ancient times it has been a generally acknowledged fact that violence gives birth to violence and military occupation has almost always generated a repelling reaction in various forms: sabotage, riots, guerilla and partisan warfare, liberation wars etc. Nevertheless, the most frequent solution currently adopted to settle conflicts is a military one. Moreover, although militarily peace enforcement has proved a non-lasting approach because of its temporary and short-term characteristic, troops are sent to enforce peace in different regions worldwide.
The decision to employ the military for peace enforcement is to a great extent reminiscent of the Cold War, its responsive mentality, and the balance of terror, respectively. Examples of this use of the military are numerous, frozen (chronic, dormant) but not terminated, where peace is kept (read defended) or monitored by UN forces. Conflict in Kashmir for example has lasted since 1947 and has been under UN observation since 1949. Another example is Cyprus where conflict ended with the separation of the Turkish and Hellenic communities. Since 1964, UN observers there have monitored the peace process in the region. Beginning in 1974 their tasks have been extended to provide both a zone of separation between the two communities and to conduct humanitarian operations. As yet another example; most of the UN Security Council resolutions and three peace operations have been generated as a result of the conflicts in the Middle East: UNTSO in 1948 to monitor fire ceasing between Israelis and Palestinians; UNDOF in 1974 to monitor fire ceasing on Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, and UNIFIL in 1978 to monitor fire ceasing between Lebanon and Israel and nowadays is again in place with about 15,000 troops to keep peace. To the list may be added: MINUSRO – Morocco 1991; MONUC - Congo 1999; UNMIK-Kosovo 1999; UNMEE - Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000; UNMIL - Liberia 2003; ONUB – Burundi 2004; UNOCI - Ivory Coast 2004; MIMUSTAH – HAITI 2004; etc.

The terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 against the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. convinced everybody, forever, we think, that a responsive attitude cannot be an efficient approach in the fight against terrorism. The position of those who advocate unconventional warfare was strengthened.

The solution chosen by the greater powers of the world and some regional powers - preventive measures - is also based on violence and the result is what we see in Afghanistan and Iraq: military confrontation has been won but not the peace. It is difficult to foresee how stabilization and reconstruction will end. The conclusion reached by President George W Bush is rather meaningful: "this will be a long and tough war."

In order to learn again the lesson of violence causing violence, we must free ourselves from the anathema put on us by the ancestors whose strong belief was that the very core of human nature is violent (homo homini lupus) and, therefore, for the human being, "destiny is to immolate himself."

Better Know the Enemy

The reason why we should know our enemy is something we all are aware of but it was Sun Tzu who gave one of the most comprehensive answers: "That one who knows both his enemy and himself will not be in danger in a hundred of battles. That one who does not know his enemy but knows himself will sometimes gain victory. That one who knows neither his enemy nor himself will be immutably defeated in any battle."

The need to know as much as possible about an enemy has resulted in concepts and development of a large and extremely sophisticated range of devices for collecting, processing and transmitting information, from a simple observation with optical equipment to permanent surveillance and registration of visual and infrared data by means of satellites. Moreover, to
avoid surprise and maintain data veracity, specific equipment for almost real time transmission is used. However, camouflage and deception are still efficient measures as the Gulf War, Kosovo and, partially, Afghanistan proves.

Competition between reconnaissance equipment and concepts on one hand and camouflage and deception concepts on the other hand will continue either successfully or unsuccessfully for both sides. The NATO objective of gaining information dominance as part of the concept related to supremacy over the whole spectrum of armed operations will lead to a better coordination of all forces and capabilities designated for enemy surveillance and reconnaissance.

Nevertheless, current concepts related to data collecting equipment employment are, to a great extent, dependent on conventional warfare where enemy and friendly forces are separated by a "front line." The emphasis has been at looking outward for the enemy. Potentially tragic failure has been emphasized by several security incidents (unauthorized landing of a commercial aircraft in the Red Square in Moscow; unauthorized intrusion of an aircraft in the airspace over the White House and its crash in the garden of the US presidential residence, etc.), but it appeared dramatically acute on the 11th of September, 2001. After this tragic event, an American military specialist bitterly admitted that the outwards-oriented defense system proved ineffective for such terrorist attacks.

The events before and after the terrorist attack against the United States in September 2001 have demonstrated that the enemy is among us. Most of those who attacked the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. studied either in the United States or in other Western countries, or traveled at least once to the United States. Also, many of the former or current sponsors of terrorism studied in Western countries or, like Ayatollah Khomeini, they were granted asylum there.

Another factor that should make us act more decisively to adjust the lesson about knowing the enemy to unconventional conflicts and asymmetric threats is the surprising, and uncomfortable, conclusion that the enemy could be one of us. Surprising is not the fact that betrayal occurs; this has always happened and it is likely to happen again and again. But now it is our warriors' breach of international laws that may cause serious damage to a military conflict. This was what happened as a result of the events which occurred at Abu Ghraib prison, which inflamed international public opinion and led to increased hostility of the indigenous population and Muslims worldwide towards the multinational coalition in Iraq. While there have been numerous breaches of international law in past centuries, now, as a result of mass-media active participation in monitoring the conflict areas (the so-called "CNN Effect"), news is broadcast world-wide within minutes or hours, triggering a negative reaction that might be crucial to political decisions. It is worth recalling that the war in Vietnam ended in a peace process not in victory because the American public opinion brought pressure on the political decision-makers to withdraw the troops and stop the war against North Vietnam.

When it is a war against terrorism and for human rights, the shock is even greater if those involved in fighting for such an important cause commit abuses of prisoners. Coming back to Sun Tzu, we can see how much “self-knowledge” weighs, before facing an enemy.
Who is not with us is not necessarily against us

Samuel Huntington’s famous theory—the clash of civilizations—predicts the “replacing of the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.” This gloomy perspective is intensified by some religious extremists who aim at gaining political power and, taking advantage of the precarious social and economical conditions in which most of the followers of other than Christians live. They accuse “globalization, Christian world and Jews” of causing this situation while promising a better life and a fight to defend their faith against those who bear the responsibility.

There are people who believe the West has replaced missionary work for spreading the Christian Faith with the “rhetoric of universality, human rights, democracy and market economy” as another way to extend its influence and dominance. Cultural differences generally should not lead to other clashes, except the ones between ideas, in a debate aimed at finding a commonly accepted conclusion or at least one which is not rejected, does not offend others' sensitivities, and leaves the door open for dialogue in order to bring positions closer.

The clash of civilizations should not be understood as a fight of “who against whom” but a competition to attract as many followers as possible. That is why labels such as “cultural superiority,” “cultural underdevelopment,” or “dominant culture and... inferior culture” should not be used. Hierarchies are not suitable as far as culture is concerned; they cause tensions that may be escalated through emotional involvement of their promoters and followers.

Differences between civilizations have always existed and will continue to do so as long as humankind exists. Mao's attempt to “homogenize” through “cultural revolution,” imitated by Ceausescu, Gaddafi and others ended lamentably. It is true that the milestones of our contemporary civilizations are not the same as those of our ancestors. It is also a historically registered fact that several civilizations have disappeared. Under the pressure of globalization and integration, part of existing civilizations' features is likely to disappear too, but this process takes time, offering people the right to choose. Trying to dictate a higher tempo, will most likely cause a rejection reaction as is currently happening in Saudi Arabia and rest of the Middle East, a reaction which may tend to spread across the whole Muslim world. Another clash, partially destructive, is occurring between Hinduism and Islam in India, a country which is about 15% Muslim.

Attempts promoted by Western countries to extend globalization in Asia also meets with China’s rejection, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 90s asked: "How is it possible that the United States with a 200-year political tradition can teach a nation with a 4000-year tradition?"

Among the main differences between the East and the West is the way we place our existence on a time scale. As we know, for most Westerners “time is money,” which increases the importance of the motto “faster is better” in evaluating the efficiency. For Asians, time has no limits and seems to solve any problem even though it might take days, years or generations until the expected event happens; Hong Kong and Macao provinces coming back to China again after hundreds of years are significant examples. These different attitudes may cause problems but
they are not insurmountable, and time could be our ally or that of our enemy, depending on the extent to which we keep informed and take account of our partners' cultural characteristics. One who has a different opinion from us is not necessarily our enemy. It is up to us to a great extent to determine if an international player stays neutral, or becomes an enemy or our ally. Even though we are right in following a certain cause, it is our task to persuade our partners and invite our enemies to dialogue in order to better know each other's views. Better mutual knowledge may and should lead to increased confidence and help us to avoid conflicts.

It is easy to respond to differences with conflict, but using force solves the problems only temporarily. Cooperation and confidence are ways to a safer world.

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8 x x x *Notebook of a Terrorist*, in Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, pp.37-38.
Civil – Military Operations in Khost Province, Eastern Afghanistan: A Civilian Perspective

By
Robert Kemp

Khost Province as well as other provinces of eastern Afghanistan faces considerable challenges that will take decades of effort to resolve. The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) has limited capacity to govern and provide services to its citizens, the economy remains weak, insurgents operate from sanctuaries in the border regions of Pakistan, and infrastructure is lacking.

In Khost during the period 2004 – 2005, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) elements, including conventional maneuver battalions, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a Brigade Command and Special Operations Forces carried out a largely successful counterinsurgency. As a result, the local economy expanded, the GoA increased its reach and capacity, two successful elections were held, and the insurgents were unable to make significant inroads. This counter insurgency effort was based on three pillars: security; economic and strategic reconstruction; and governance and justice.

These OEF forces worked with a variety of actors: the GoA and its security services; U.S. Government civilians from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture; U.N officials, contract workers engaged in election preparations; and unofficial actors including tribal elders and mullahs. Cooperation and communication between these various players was critical, and was a major factor in the counter insurgency effort.

The PRT concept is a success, and has already made a significant contribution to stability in Khost and eastern Afghanistan. The test will be how, over the next ten years, PRTs are replaced by GoA capacity, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral donors, and foreign direct investment. At the same time, the degree to which the Afghan security forces are able to replace the OEF and NATO maneuver battalions will be a litmus test for these forces. NATO will continue to be a key player, and the commitment and staying power of troop–contributing and assistance-providing nations will have a strong influence on the future of Afghanistan.

Introduction

The regions along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the setting of a low-intensity war, pitting forces of the GoA and the Coalition (and recently, NATO) against a variety of insurgent forces, including the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other fundamentalist groups. During 2004 – 2005 a key element of a relatively successful counter insurgency effort was effective cooperation between Coalition military and civilian elements. At the same time, these elements were able to work effectively with the many sectors of local Afghan society. The following pages will describe how counterinsurgency efforts were carried out, look at what went right, and examine areas for improvement.
**Khost Province: Culture, Economic and Security Situation**

Khost is a relatively small province roughly 120 air miles south of Kabul, with a population of less than 700,000. To the east and north lie the North Waziristan and Kurram agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Khost’s population is almost entirely Pashtun. A strong tribal structure remains, with a complex and shifting network of rivalries and alliances.

Khost’s society is evolving rapidly, as its traditional, insular culture is exposed to new ideas and technologies. Expatriate workers and former refugees are returning, bringing with them a broader view of the world. However, Pashtun culture remains strong, including the obligation for revenge and hospitality, as well as the high value of personal, family and tribal honor. Tribal law is still widely followed, intermingled with conventional law. Women’s rights remain very restricted, and traditional mores are harshly enforced.

The center of the province is an elongated valley, surrounded by rugged hills and mountains. Streams provide sufficient water to keep the valley bottom irrigated, and farmers grow wheat, rice, sorghum, fruits and nuts, and raise livestock. During the period 2004 – 2005, poppy production was minimal. Khost has always lacked sufficient infrastructure, and 25 years of war have degraded what existed – roads are poor, and the health and education system is weak or nonexistent in some places. The electric system is based on private generators. In 2004, the economy was largely tied to Pakistan, although by 2005, with the improvement of roads and the growth of the Afghan economy, this was changing.

During the period 2004-2005, U.S. Army and Marine units provided the vast majority of Coalition forces, with support provided by aviation units, including attack aviation, medical evacuation and logistical flights. Afghan security forces included the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). In Pakistan, the under-funded and poorly trained Frontier Corps was deployed along the border. The Pakistani Army was increasingly active in Waziristan, carrying out sweeps against some insurgent groups, particularly those with foreign fighters, and providing security in support of Afghan elections.

After appearing largely defeated, the Taliban and associated insurgents amplified their operations in Khost beginning in the spring of 2005. In particular, IED attacks were more frequent and more sophisticated, possibly reflecting tactics brought from Iraq. The insurgents also increased coordinated attacks on patrols, indirect fires on bases, propaganda campaigns, and attacks on pro-government and pro-coalition Afghans. They also carried out operations to destroy Coalition-funded projects. The Haqqani network apparently based out of the North Waziristan town of Miram Shah, claimed responsibility for many cross-border attacks and IED attacks. Al Qaeda previously used Khost as a training and staging area, and may have been involved in some operations. Other cross border attacks may have been carried out by foreign jihadists, including Uzbeks, Arabs, and Punjabis, or were “graduation exercises” for radical madrassas. Despite this complex and serious security situation, the PRT was able to operate effectively, and lead civil-military operations in the province.
Military and Civilian Components in Khost Province

1) Coalition and Afghan Military Components

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
Operation Enduring Freedom had a fairly complex chain of command, including Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), based in Kabul, and the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), based at Bagram airbase. While these two command levels were not present in Khost, they nevertheless provided a strategic framework for the operational and tactical levels.

According to its mission statement, CFC-A “conducts full spectrum operations throughout the combined joint operations area to defeat al-Qaeda and associated movements, establish an enduring Afghan security structure and reshape its posture for the Long War in order to set the conditions for long-term stability in Afghanistan.” This command mandated three main lines of effort for OEF: security; economic and strategic reconstruction; and governance and justice. These three “pillars” provided the basis for Coalition operations in Khost. The desired end-state of CFC-A was, “A moderate, stable and representative Afghanistan capable of controlling and governing its territory.”

Regional Command – East: Brigade Command
Regional Command – East (RC-East), located in Khost, was subordinate to CJTF-76. It was commanded by a full colonel, supported by a complete staff and augmented with liaison officers from subordinate and SF units. The Deputy Commander, a lieutenant colonel, had overall responsibility for the PRTs. The brigade command was key in the coordination of PRT and maneuver battalion activities in RC-East, determining priorities, assigning resources and assessing progress.

The brigade staff included a senior officer advising the commander on civil military operations, who was responsible for the day-to-day management of the PRTs. This officer assured the commander’s intent was followed, facilitated logistical, technical and personnel issues, and compiled metrics of PRT efforts. A State Department political officer was assigned to the brigade HQ in the fall of 2004, followed shortly by AID and USDA representatives. While each of these civilians focused on their area of expertise, their duties were roughly similar – advising the brigade commander, providing input on PRT operations at the regional level, and acting as a conduit between the military and their respective agencies.

Khost Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
Of the eight RC-East PRTs, the Khost PRT was one of the smallest, with between 80 and 100 soldiers and civilians, plus a number of Afghan employees. Most
PRTs were commanded by a lieutenant colonel, but during most of 2004 – 2005 Khost was commanded by a very able reserve major, an investment banker in civilian life. The Khost PRT mission statement, similar to that of other PRTs, read “conduct Civil Military Operations to improve security, facilitate reconstruction, and promote economic development in order to extend the reach and legitimacy of the central government and to create an environment conducive for a successful parliamentary election.” While a seemingly simple statement, in fact this resulted in a wide spectrum of activities – the PRT became a “Swiss army knife,” reacting to the situation on the ground as needed.

As with other OEF PRTs, Khost had two main civil-military components: a Civilian Affairs Team – Alpha (CAT-A) and a Civil – Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CAT-A, headed by a captain, focused at the district level, maintaining contacts with district sub-governors, tribal leaders, police chiefs and mullahs. These engagements identified immediate impact projects as well as potential reconstruction and development projects. Most projects were small – less than the $25,000 Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) limit. The CAT-A team’s activities had the added benefit of providing presence patrols, which strengthened the confidence of local people, supported the district government, and restricted the ability of insurgents to set up shadow governments.

The CMOC, located in a compound in the center of Khost town and headed by a senior NCO, had multiple responsibilities. It provided a point of contact for locals who wanted to approach the PRT (although many went directly to the PRT headquarters instead), acted as a contracting office for PRT projects, and provided a venue for meetings with GoA officials. The CMOC had a colonel from the Ministry of Interior permanently assigned to it, providing liaison with the local police forces.

Khost Maneuver Battalions
During the period 2004 – 2005, three maneuver battalions operated in Khost – the 3/3 Marines, 2/3 Marines, and the 2-504 battalion of the 82nd. These units also had Paktia and Logar provinces in their areas of operation. In contrast to the lightly-armed PRTs, which only engaged in combat operations when forced to by enemy action, the maneuver units were geared for combat operations. Maneuver units also supported the GoA during emergency operations, including riots, armed tribal disputes, floods, and the periodic influx of large numbers of Afghan refugees after camps in Pakistan were closed.

In Khost, considerable effort was put on counter-insurgency in a few border districts, as much of the province away from the border was fairly stable, including the town of Khost. Security operations usually took the form of patrols, cordon and search operations, and the establishment of temporary “patrol bases” to provide an extended presence. In areas with active insurgencies, larger
operations were carried out, sometimes using helicopter-borne troops to block insurgent movements. Units also engaged in counter-IED operations, and seizures of weapons caches. These efforts also helped to secure the “humanitarian space,” providing enough security that the PRT, and to some extent the GoA were able to operate effectively.

Aside from air support and heavy artillery, the maneuver units were largely self-supporting, with a TOC separate from the brigade command, and a full staff. Request for aviation support were channeled through the brigade command. The maneuver battalions were lead by a lieutenant colonel, whose duties often extended into political and civil-military affairs, dealing with governors, ministry officials, and tribal leaders.

While their primary focus was counter-insurgency, the battalions also had modified “CAT-A” civil-affairs units, and a CERP budget for small projects. These projects often targeted populations in areas with active insurgencies, with the aim of demonstrating the benefits of supporting the GoA and the Coalition. Battalion officers also contributed to political development; the commanders were often in close contact with governors and police chiefs, in some cases acting as de facto advisors. In addition, company commanders – usually captains - worked at the district level, developing relations with sub-governors, mullahs and tribal leaders.

**Special Forces Units**

The Special Forces had an Operational Detachment B (ODB) at Khost, with Operational Detachment – A (ODA) deployed, including at several Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). These units engaged in direct action, foreign internal defense, psychological operations and reconstruction efforts. At times, these forces cooperated closely with the battalions and PRT efforts, which complemented the limited manpower of the ODAs while bringing a high level of expertise to shared operations.

**Afghan Security Forces**

The GoA deployed three main security forces in Khost: the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Subordinate to the ANP were the Highway Police and the Border Police, although these units were not present in many areas.

Of these forces, the ANA was overall the most effective, and the most respected by the populace. However, the ANA was deployed in significant numbers in Khost until the spring of 2005. The ANP was often lacking in equipment, funding and morale; they were also perceived by much of the population as being corrupt in various degrees. In general, relations between the Afghan forces and the PRTs and maneuver units were cooperative.
Informal Afghan Forces
In addition to the formal security forces, there were a variety of informal units present. In the Pashtun areas there still existed the tradition of “alberkai”, tribal militias raised to provide security for specific events or emergencies. These were mustered for both the presidential and parliamentary elections, and performed well at the village level. Several tribal and local strongmen still controlled their own informal militias, but by the end of 2005 these had mostly been disbanded. In some areas, existing militias were endorsed by the GoA and Coalition until the ANA could take over; an example where this worked well was the 25th Afghan Militia Force, a battalion-sized unit, based in Khost.

2) Civilian Components

U. S. Department of State Political Officers
The State Department assigned political officers to both the PRTs and the Brigade headquarters in Khost, assigning them four main tasks. First, and most importantly, they were responsible for helping the nascent GoA govern effectively. Second, they were reporting officers, tasked with providing information on political, political-military, economic and social trends to the Embassy in Kabul. Third, they were conduits of information for the military, on various topics – what USG, State Department and the Embassy policies were, what was happening in Afghanistan at the national level, and providing information on developments in Pakistan, a very relevant topic for the border provinces. Fourth, they were charged with promoting USG policies to the provincial government. The political officer traveled with the commanders, meeting with political leaders (usually the governor) as well as military leaders.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of Agriculture
USAID officers, designated as Field Program Officers, were assigned to both PRTs and Brigade commands. These officers were responsible for administering USAID projects at the provincial level; advising military officers on development issues; advising the GoA on long-term reconstruction and development strategy, and reporting back to AID headquarters in Kabul. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) officers focused on providing agricultural advice to the GoA, and to a lesser extent to individual farmers.

Government of Afghanistan
On paper, the Afghan government is a strongly centralized system, with power mostly flowing from Kabul. In practice, the central government had limited influence in much of the AO, due to lack of financial and human resources, corruption and inefficiency, and the inherent difficulty of governing the border regions and its people.
The PRT and maneuver battalion officers’ primary contact was with three levels of Afghan government officials: ministerial, provincial and district. Ministries in Kabul had representatives at the provincial level, who reported back to Kabul. At the provincial level, the governor was the lead politician, and the Coalition’s principal interlocutor. At the lowest level, each district was administered by a sub-governor. Provincial councils and members of parliament were elected in September 2005, and were not in office during this time frame.

Unofficial Afghan Political Components
Government at the provincial and district government levels were so weak in some areas as to be nonexistent, especially in border areas. A variety of unofficial players filled these gaps in the power structure. Particularly strong in some areas were the tribes, which had both internal councils, called shuras, as well as leaders who represented the tribe externally. These tribal structures and their shuras were the de-facto government in many areas, and a counterpart of government in others. Mullahs had gained more political influence over the last ten to fifteen years, and increasingly saw politics as one of their areas of influence. Strongmen and militia leaders, while gradually being weakened as the GoA and Coalition provided alternative poles of power, were still influential in some areas. Officers in the Afghan security services carried political weight, and some had considerable influence. The Taliban probably exerted limited political influence in Khost during 2004 – 2005, but was not a significant actor.

International Civilian Component - UNAMA
The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) had hub offices at Gardez that covered several provinces, including Khost. UNAMA officers had a wide mandate, dealing with conflict prevention and resolution, monitoring of human rights, promotion of elections and building GoA capacity. The lead political officers worked closely with USG political and military officers.

The “Three Pillars” in Khost: Security, Economic and Strategic Reconstruction; Governance and Justice
In accordance with the “three pillar” counter insurgency strategy established by CFC-A, and with guidance from the brigade command, the Khost PRT focused on security; economic and strategic reconstruction; and governance and justice. While this was a complex effort involving many actors, the following section focuses on the PRT’s role.

1) Security
Improving security was one of three main “pillars” of the Khost PRT’s mission statement, but in the end maneuver battalions and other actors, provincially and regionally – eventually including the ANA – were the driving forces in this area. The PRT’s efforts could be divided into three main areas: police training and assistance;
support for disarmament and reconciliation programs; and a weakly defined but important role as an “honest broker” in provincial security affairs.

Police Technical Advisory Teams (PTATs) were the primary security training effort of the PRT. These teams were manned by reservists who were police officers at home, or by regular Military Police officers. They provided practical training to ANP and ABP officers on basic police functions – patrolling, searching people and cars, crowd and riot control, collection of evidence, administration, and weapons. The SF ODAs and conventional maneuver units reinforced the PTAT training during their patrols in the districts. The PTATs taught much-needed classes on ethics, in hopes of countering rampant corruption of the police, and reducing the abuse of citizens by the police. They were also the mechanism for using CERP funding to provide radios, facilities, fuel and vehicles.

The PRT also helped facilitate several GoA and internationally-backed security programs. The largest of these was the national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. In Khost, the focus of this effort was the 25th Afghan Militia Force, a well-armed unit of perhaps 500 local men, lead by the wily, Soviet-trained Gen. Kiel Baz. The PRT helped redeploy some of these fighters into other military units, or facilitated the reentry into civilian life of others. The GoA reconciliation program was active in Khost; the PRT worked closely with the governor to encourage Taliban fighters to peacefully reenter society, and with the tribes to assure their good behavior once back in civilian life – a strong incentive. By mid-2005, the national Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) was underway, with the PRT involved in disarming the few “warlords” who remained in the Khost area. All of these initiatives were done in coordination with the maneuver battalion, Special Forces and to some extent the brigade command.

The least defined, but most important and successful security role of the PRT, was as an “honest broker” within Afghan society. Khost suffered from numerous tribal and land disputes (aggravated by multiple, conflicting land titles produced under different regimes over the previous 25 years). PRT officers, working with Afghan and Coalition forces, were able to assist in defusing disputes between the heavily armed tribes, and in some cases helped delineate tribal boundaries. In addition, Afghan security forces lacked coordination, at times due to personal differences between commanders; the PRT was able to act as a “bridge”, and improve coordination between the ANP, ABP, and eventually the ANA. The PRT also shamed blatantly corrupt police officers, and pushed for the removal of the worst. Finally, by being a neutral player that could, as necessary, call on substantial Coalition military, economic and political resources if provincial affairs got badly out of control, the PRT provided an intangible but very real confidence booster to the GoA apparatus.

Analysis of Security Efforts
By late 2005, the security situation in Khost became more difficult, as the insurgents improved their coordination, and deployed more numerous and more sophisticated IEDs.
However, at the same time Afghan security forces were steadily improving, the lid was kept on tribal conflicts, and the insurgents were limited in what they could do. The efforts of PRT and maneuver battalion officers, closely coordinated, were a significant factor in these successes.

2) Economic and Strategic Reconstruction

Due to security concerns, NGOs and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank had almost no presence in Khost during 2004 – 2005. At the same time, USAID encountered significant problems in delivering on its planned projects, in part due to difficulties with its chief implementing partner, the International Organization for Migration. As a result, the CERP projects administered by the PRT and maneuver battalions took on considerable significance.

**GoA**

While the GoA ministry representatives tasked with reconstruction and development had good intentions, the Afghan government was severely strapped for funds, and lacked the capacity to carry out large scale projects or sustain projects funded by the coalition. PRT officers (including the AID officer) worked with these ministries to increase their capabilities. One important outcome was a five-year development plan for the province, which prioritized needs and assigned responsibility between the Coalition (including AID) and the various ministries.

**CERP**

The PRT and maneuver battalions both carried out an extensive program of small projects funded by CERP, with the PRT as the predominant player. Projects included schools, health clinics, water wells, the refurbishment of mosques and shrines, the improvement of market areas, improvement of roads (particularly a hub-and-spoke system to connect the districts to Khost town), and irrigation systems. The military’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (ODHACA) funding was used for a few larger school and hospital projects. State Department Economic Support Funds were utilized for an electric grid in central Khost town.

**Others**

Healthcare in Khost town was rudimentary at best and almost nonexistent in some rural areas. AID, in its most effective program in Khost, provided substantial support to the hospital in town. In addition, the PRT, maneuver units and Special Forces coordinated in an effective series of medical outreaches (medcaps) to the districts, where military doctors and medics would treat hundreds of patients.

**Analysis of Economic and Strategic Reconstruction Efforts**

CERP projects were a success story in Khost, filling a gap that traditional development players were unable to address, helping the Afghans, and providing a valuable counter insurgency tool. However, the province needed long-term
development assistance, to include large road, dam and electricity projects beyond the scope of CERP. In the end, this assistance must come from traditional players, including USAID, multilateral lenders such as the Asian Development Bank, and NGOs.

3) Governance and Justice
One clear success story on the both the political and public relations fronts were monthly meetings held with mullahs from throughout the province, attended by PRT, battalion and SF officers. These gave each side a chance to present their views on a variety of issues – forced entry to houses by security forces, the IED threat, elections, or corruption in government, for example. The meetings were held Thursdays, so that the mullahs could include what was discussed in their Friday sermons.

This concept was expanded to include separate meetings with ministry representatives, district sub-governors, tribal leaders, and businessmen. As with the mullah’s meetings, these provided an opportunity to transmit and receive information, mediate disputes, prod government officials to act or shame them to not steal public funds, or to support Kabul’s programs. The meetings were also useful for “damage control” if a Coalition operation went wrong and resulted in civilian casualties.

The brigade command, in conjunction with the PRTs, State and AID officers, hosted a series of governors’ conferences, pulling together the governors of Khost, Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika. These meetings were intended to build security and economic ties between provinces, discuss development priorities, increase the effectiveness of reconciliation efforts, and build ties between GoA officials.

Public relations were a factor in the success or failure of PRT and maneuver battalion operations and an area of struggle with the insurgents. In Khost, where much of the population remains illiterate, rumors spread quickly, and disinformation campaigns can quickly cause real damage to Coalition efforts. Radio was the chief means to counter Taliban efforts, given the lack of television and the limited availability of print media.

Case Study: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and the Integration of PRTs, MBs, GoA and the International Community
The Presidential elections, held in October 2004, and the Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections, held in September 2005, were complex operations, carried out over several months in challenging terrain, among a population still unfamiliar with democratic fundamentals, and in the face of threats from the insurgents to disrupt them. In the end, these elections were hugely successful, returning credible results and going off largely as planned. The Afghan people, through their enthusiasm for the elections, made them a success, but the detailed planning and execution of GoA and Coalition elements, coupled with those of the UN and contractors, enabled this success. Coordination between the various players began months before the elections, usually
through meetings held at the PRT, Governor’s compound, Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) offices, Brigade HQ, or in the field at polling stations or counting centers.

The Coalition made support of the elections one of its highest priorities. This support took many forms. The brigade command dedicated considerable manpower to planning security and support for voter registration, transport of ballots, security of voting and registration sites, interdiction of Taliban efforts, and security of counting centers. The maneuver units increased their operational tempo, keeping the insurgents off balance, and easing the workload for the Afghan forces.

One of the maneuver units’ most successfully conceived and executed operations were “governor’s tours”, where U.S. and Afghan forces escorted the governor throughout the province prior to the elections. These gave the governor an opportunity to explain the purpose and process of the elections (as the governor was appointed by Kabul, he was not running for office himself), while also extending the presence of the provincial government to the more remote districts.

The PRT played a major role at the provincial level, setting up a command center where all Afghan, Coalition and private contractors were represented. This center was the communication node on election day, and coordinated responses to breaking events. The State Department political officer was active in election preparations, advising the military on the mechanics of the electoral process, keeping abreast of political developments, participating in planning meetings, working closely with UNAMA and JEMB, and going on the “governor’s tours.”

**Analysis of Coalition Support for Elections**

Coalition forces, with their considerable resources, made a major contribution to the success of both elections. Particularly in the more remote districts and those with active insurgencies, their very presence reduced or precluded attacks on election workers, voters, candidates and counting centers. This was done while keeping the maximum Afghan “face” on security efforts – GoA forces, bolstered by “alberkai”, tribal militias, had the lead at all levels. In the end, security incidents were minimal across the region. An unanticipated but notable success was that the elections forced the Afghan forces – ANA, ANP and NDS – to coordinate. The Coalition helped make this happen, through organizing joint patrols, holding countless planning meetings in the run up to the elections, and hosting the provincial command centers.

**What went Right: the Foundations of Success in Khost**

During the period 2004 – 2005, Coalition elements in Khost were reasonably successful in their goals of extending the reach of the Afghan government, providing limited reconstruction and development, and improving the level of security. Many of these successes were paralleled at other RC – East PRTs.
Interagency Cooperation
During 2004 – 2005, coordination between the PRT, maneuver battalions, Special Forces, brigade command and USG civilians was quite good, and was a factor in Coalition and GoA successes in Khost province. This coordination extended into all three of the counter-insurgency “pillars” - security, development, and political. Personal relations between commanders were surprisingly important. This was particularly evident in the relationship between the PRT commander and the SF commander, who worked very closely together, meeting almost every evening. The presence of the brigade commander in Khost also smoothed relations, by providing an authoritative arbiter of any disputes over operations and responsibilities.

Acceptance of Coalition by Afghans
For any foreign force to have a chance of success (or survival) in Afghanistan, the locals need to accept their presence. Without this acceptance, history has proven how inhospitable Afghanistan can be. Fortunately, in 2004 – 2005 the local population was welcoming to coalition forces, for a variety of reasons. Most Afghans, after 25 years of war, were exhausted and looked to the Coalition as their last, best hope for a decent life, or at least as a bulwark against further anarchy. It is painfully obvious how limited Afghanistan is economically, and the international community – including OEF, the predominant international presence in RC – East – was seen as a potential savior, within the limits of Afghan pride.

American forces also had the advantage, in some Afghans minds, of being allies of the mujahaddin in the struggle against the Soviet Union. In addition, while the Soviets were viewed as atheists, Americans were viewed as religious people, albeit slightly misguided for not being Muslims. In these two great truths of Afghan life – religion and the fight against the Soviet Union – Americans were seen as being on the right side. At the same time, Afghans were aware of the chaos after 1991 (when civil war broke out), and in part blamed the U.S. for losing interest in Afghanistan. While this “abandonment,” as viewed from an Afghan perspective, was still a sore point, it also reinforced for both sides the need to work together, and the consequences of lack of cooperation. In fact, many Afghans were not concerned American forces might stay too long, but that they might leave too soon.

Increasing the acceptance of foreign troops (and thereby contributing to their success) was Afghan fear of Pakistani involvement in their affairs. OEF troops were seen as a buffer to Pakistani influence, as well as containing the largely unpopular Taliban and the Arabs of Al Qaeda. Coalition troops were also welcomed as impartial brokers in a fractured society, where tribes, government, warlords, and mullahs all pull in various directions. Importantly, U.S. officers benefited by being seen as neither corrupt nor corruptible.
Fast and Flexible Funding
The availability of CERP funding at the brigade, battalion and PRT level had a significant impact, and was a tremendous bargain for the USG. The projects funded by CERP generated good will among the populace, provided tangible results for the Afghan recipients, and in some cases lessened the influence of the insurgents in disputed areas. Where possible and appropriate, the GoA was given credit for these projects, bolstering its credibility. The speed and flexibility to carry out projects using CERP funding was a major factor in its success. Also, giving discretion to use these funds to field grade officers, who were the OEF officers most attuned to Afghan society and local needs, was a wise policy.

Picking Good Commanders
A key to the success of PRTs was the assignment of many exceptional commanders. In the end, personalities were a major determining factor in how each PRT ran, and how well it worked with its counterparts across the spectrum. These commanders were given a large amount of latitude to adjust to local conditions, within the guidance provided by superior commands. These superior commands – at the brigade, division and CFC-A levels – provided guidance that was generally relevant, drawing on the commander’s field experience (all traveled constantly to subordinate commands).

Superior Firepower Aids Mobility
In the final analysis, the availability of attack aviation, either as helicopters, A-10s or C-130 gunships was a major factor in the success of PRTs, maneuver units and Special Forces. Not only did this superiority give the coalition an advantage in any extend firefight, but the mere presence of attack aviation probably intimidated insurgents into not attempting many ambushes or assaults, greatly improving security, and as a result, mobility.

Suggestions on How to Build on Success

Good relationships between PRT commanders, combat commanders and USG officials is key
Coordination between the many players on the ground was a key to success of Coalition and GoA efforts in Khost. Much of this was ad-hoc, and depended on personal relations between military officers and civilians. Building relations between the key Coalition officers – PRT commanders, battalion commanders, Special Forces and USG civilians – before they are deployed may increase the likelihood of success.

Nation building requires greater USG participation
USG civilians were much too thin on the ground. More State Department and USAID officers should be deployed for full one or two-year tours, not only with the PRTs but where possible with battalions. A surge capacity should be developed to cover unusual circumstances such as elections.
Build a cadre of experienced officers
An effort should be made to rotate both military and civilian officers back to the same provinces for second and third tours. Too often, hard-won knowledge of local personalities, politics, tribal structure and insurgent tactics is lost when personnel rotate out.

An integrated strategy addressing Pashtun areas on both sides of the border is necessary for counter-insurgency and nation building
Although the Pashtun ethnic area is nearly equally divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, USG and international development and political efforts are not always coordinated to address the entire Pashtun “belt.” Cross-border coordination with Pakistani security elements could also improve. A more integrated, international counter-insurgency and economic development effort is needed.

Why not PakMil PRTs?
In a similar vein, the idea of PRTs run by the Pakistani military, in part funded by the international community, are worth exploring. These could help increase development in the FATA, while strengthening counter-insurgency efforts.

Improve the IO effort
Public relations and information operations remain a weak link in Coalition and GoA efforts. Both civilian and military officers must put more resources and effort into this area, not only to explain Coalition views and policies, but also to counteract Taliban disinformation campaigns. This should extend to assisting the GoA in putting out its message, and giving company-grade officers more resources to do IO campaigns at their level.

Empower civil military operations
The US military excels at combat operations, combining the world’s best leadership, equipment, soldiers, staff work and intelligence together for formidable results. However, civil-military operations sometimes seemed to be of secondary importance, after combat operations. At times the urgency of combat necessarily crowded out the more mundane, slower-moving civil affairs operations; but the overall orientation and operational tempo during 2004 – 2005 leaned towards kinetic operations.

Transition from CERP to major reconstruction
While CERP projects have been a clear success, the border areas need more large-scale infrastructure projects. These would include roads, electrical grids, hydropower, mining projects, and water systems. This requires that bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as NGOs, work out how (perhaps in coordination with NATO, Coalition and Afghan security forces) to operate in high-threat areas. Similarly, while CERP funding for
example can be used to build endless schools and health clinics, the real challenge is to rebuild the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health (for example). This is far beyond the scope of PRTs and maneuver units.

**Reduce GoA corruption, while building capacity**
Coalition and NATO units need to keep pressure on the GoA to improve its capacity, transparency and public face. Corruption is endemic, and a major source of tension between governed and government. Afghans embraced democracy, and expected results, and quickly – if tangible benefits of democracy are not apparent, the Taliban is strengthened. PRTs should help the GoA increase its customs revenues, to increase its long-term viability, and to reduce the need for international funding to sustain the government. At the same time, Coalition and NATO units need to exercise patience and avoid taking over tasks, in the name of expediency, that the GoA is able to carry out.

**Wider range of governance experts needed**
As the GoA develops, PRTs will increasingly need to be mentors in more mundane government tasks. These tasks could include improving accounting systems, record keeping, office management, human resources management, and tax collection. More technical areas could include rule of law, education, engineering (currently provided in some PRTs by the U.S. Corps of Engineers), administration, and finance. These “governance tasks” can best be mentored by experts outside of the military, including USG civilian agencies, the EU, and the UN.

**Counter narcotics issues vexing, but must be addressed**
While not a pressing issue in Khost during 2004 – 2005, counter narcotics will be a major concern for many PRTs and maneuver units for the foreseeable future. This will require solid policy from the international community, difficult commitments from the Afghan government, and deft handling by field commanders. Communities which depend on poppy for their incomes could turn against PRTs over drug eradication, undoing years of effort. At the same time, drug lords are a real threat to the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and must be controlled.

**NATO brings new opportunities**
The assumption of command of RC – East by NATO in the fall of 2006 may create new opportunities for the PRTs. More countries in NATO’s Partnership for Peace may now wish to send soldiers, development workers and funds to augment PRTs lead by other countries. This could have the advantage of involving more Muslim troops, and bringing in more development funds from the governments of the Persian Gulf. At the same time, NATO may be able to act as a conduit for funding from the European Union.

**Specialized counter insurgency brigade?**
While the OEF actors did a remarkably good job, in the future the USG may want to increase the likelihood of success in situations like that along the Afghan border by
forming a specialized brigade. This brigade would be heavy in civil affairs officers, MPs, public affairs specialists, engineers, medics, linguists, as well as State, Special Forces and AID officers on rotations. Of course, this brigade would need to have maneuver units to deal with low-intensity conflict and coordinate with indigenous forces.

**Conclusions**

The combined efforts of OEF units, USG officers, the GoA and international organizations made a significant difference in Khost in 2004 -2005. Overall, the economy expanded, the GoA increased its reach and capacity, two successful elections were held, and the insurgents were unable to make significant inroads. Numerous problems remain, including endemic corruption, rivalries between tribes, instability in Pakistan and attendant cross-border attacks, a more effective insurgency, low government revenues, and an overall low level of infrastructure. Decades of work remain, but a leap of progress was made during this time period.

A significant reason for this success was the coordination between the various players. This coordination was at times ad-hoc and informal, at other times (particularly within Coalition forces) very structured. To a surprising degree, people and personal relationships were a key to success.

While any “metrics” of success in such a complex situation will be difficult, there may be a few telltale signs for both Khost and all of eastern Afghanistan. If maneuver battalions become more important, the insurgents will be winning. In contrast, if PRTs, NGOs and Afghan ministries involved in development take the lead in more provinces, this will show the insurgents are failing. Similarly, the amount of battlespace the ANA can take over, and the degree to which it can secure the “humanitarian space” for NGOs, will be an indicator of how well this critical force is progressing. Afghans in border provinces realize their very survival often depends on being aligned with the stronger side. The proportion of Afghans siding with the GoA and coalition, or with the insurgents, will be a critical trend. At the same time, the average Afghans view of the government – if it is perceived as corrupt or honest, effective or ineffective, representative or predatory – will be an indicator of success. As in most countries, Afghans will vote their pocketbooks, and if they do not perceive tangible economic benefits and a hopeful economic future, they may not only throw out the Karzai government but the democratic model. Education indicators will also be telling. It is unlikely that democracy will flourish in the long term if Afghanistan does not reach some critical mass of educated voters. A negative indicator will be the number of parents sending their children to madrassas, particularly across the border in Pakistan.

Particularly in the Pashtun areas, Pakistan and Afghanistan are inextricably linked. What happens in Pakistan, especially in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province, will have a profound impact on Afghanistan. The current tense relations between these two neighbors hinder cooperation, and many Afghans doubt the sincerity of the Government of Pakistan.

Obviously, NATO will play a key role in the border regions for years to come. By the summer of 2006 it was apparent that its forces will need to engage in protracted combat operations against
the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Part of the battle will be to convince European publics of the need for long-term deployment of forces to Afghanistan, and to prepare these publics for casualties and the expenditure of significant sums of money.

The Afghan border region is undergoing radical changes, many imposed from outside. Globalization, technological changes (evident in the widespread and rapid adoption of cell phones), the effect of radical, Sunni Islam in the area, the return of an Afghan diaspora displaced by years of war, the growth of towns, and the presence of considerable numbers of foreigners is rapidly changing this part of Afghanistan forever. The area still lives in several centuries, from the rural, tribal societies which have changed little, to the slowly modernizing society of Khost town. In the end, how Khost and Afghanistan evolves will be determined by the Afghans themselves, but the efforts of PRTs, maneuver battalions and other players will be critical in setting the conditions for their success.

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The views represented in this paper are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the State Department or the U.S. Government.
As critics and supporters debate U.S. reasons for, and conduct of, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), it is inviting to draw parallels to, and cite lessons from, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. However, in the interest of finding parallels, the very complex American involvement in Vietnam is often over-simplified. This paper warns against one such over-simplification: that the approach to Vietnam was military-centric and oriented on attrition-based metrics, rather than an effects-based interagency approach to war.

An effects-based approach “calls for thinking differently about how best to employ national instruments of power...a broader and deeper understanding...a systems perspective of the operational area (OA). This understanding and thinking includes how to use the military instrument beyond just force on-force campaigns, battles and engagements.” Further defined in the July 21, 2006 draft of Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, “Joint operation planning uses measurable desired effects to relate higher-level objectives and effects to component missions and tasks.” Therefore, although there have been many different effects-based approaches in U.S. military history, emerging joint doctrine has settled on the aspects of the approach best suited to operational design and campaign planning.

When making the case for an effects-based approach, the irrelevant winning of every battle in the Vietnam, while losing the war, seemingly lends itself as evidence for what happens when such an approach is not considered. However, this conclusion would fail to recognize that the Vietnam War experienced at least three disparate, albeit overlapping, periods of conditions in the operational environment over the 20 years of American involvement: a period where the South Vietnamese government was plagued by popular legitimacy issues while communist insurgents worked to increase their base of support (1955-1965); a period of continued insurgency, aided by North Vietnamese regulars waging conventional and guerilla attacks into the South, while the South Vietnamese Government’s institutions and popular support improved (1965-1968); and, with a drastic decrease of insurgent capability after the Tet Offensive, a transition to largely conventional conflict (1968-1975). Failing to recognize this complexity leads to overlooking two key lessons. First, it fails to appreciate the importance of end state development and periodic assessment for relevance, especially in the changing conditions associated with long wars and conflicts. Second, broadly judging the U.S. approach to the Vietnam conflict as attrition-based, because of its infamous body-count metrics, or as a failure of effects-based

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2. This choice of timeframe defines the beginning of American involvement as 1955, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, to the 1975 surrender of South Vietnam.
operations, due to a lack of success with graduated pressure, ignores a critical lesson: an effects-based approach will only be as sound as the end state its effects are oriented toward creating.

Proposed Framework for Nesting Objectives and End States

Within U.S. joint doctrine, an objective is “the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed”\(^{iii}\) and an end state is “the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.”\(^{iv}\) Recalling Clausewitz, the purpose of war is to impose one’s will on one’s enemy.\(^{v}\) Understanding that one’s enemy will not permit this while he still retains power, the aim of the application of force should be to render the enemy powerless to resist the imposition of will.

Finding some agreement in the above definitions, and considering the vast body of theory which has been written on such topics, the objectives and their required end state together form the goals, or “ends,” of any strategy. Furthermore, an end state may be considered the future vision of conditions in the operational environment which assure objectives will be achieved. As most writings have considered “effects” to be changes in conditions, a desired effect may be described as a change in one or several conditions in the current operational environment to some future condition(s) required by the end state. In the aggregate framework, effects are generated to change conditions to a desired end state, assuring objective accomplishment. Not only does this conform to the traditional tactical “effects” of weapons systems (applying military instruments such as artillery to cause an effect in a military condition, e.g. enemy air defense neutralized), it is broad enough to describe the “Effects” of the instruments of national power applied against the entire range of military and non-military conditions at the strategic and operational levels of war.\(^{vi}\) While probably limited in utility at the tactical level of war, what is important about this framework is that it links effects directly to a discussion of the desired end state.

This “nesting” of objectives, end states, and effects is best exemplified in transitions between the levels of war. A strategic end state required to assure strategic objectives may be opposed directly by an enemy, challenged in somewhat less direct ways by an adversary, or undermined by the pervasive conditional impediments of the operational environment itself (e.g. poverty or famine). If the operational level of war, usually through a campaign, or series of campaigns, links ways and means to accomplish strategic ends, then operational objectives, and end states, should, in a Clausewitzian sense, aim to render these enemies, adversaries, or impediments powerless. While this can continue to derive its military connotation from phrases such as


\(^{iv}\) Ibid., 185.

\(^{v}\) While Clausewitz actually uses the terminology “object of war” rather than “purpose of war,” his use of the term “aim” is more consistent with our current definition for “objective.”

\(^{vi}\) Drawing a distinction between little “e” effects (tactical) and big “E” effects (strategic/operational) was the product of senior leader discussions at the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, in the hopes of avoiding confusion between existing doctrine and future concepts.
“levels of war,” for which we have no present alternative, it can apply to military and non-military forms of power and conditions just as readily.

End State Development and the Vietnam War

“Grand Strategy” has often been a term to describe not a specific set of ends, ways and means, but an overarching purpose around which all strategic activity is centered. One of the best articulations of U.S. grand strategy for the Cold War may be found in the Truman Administration’s NSC-68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” dated April 14, 1950. Drawing on the U.S. Constitution, it asserts that the “fundamental purpose” of the U.S. is “to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.” In addition, it goes on to conclude that “our free society” is “mortally challenged” by the “Soviet design,” because the grand vision for a world of free states was fundamentally at odds with communism. The Soviets were clearly the global adversary.

Much like the proposed framework above, the U.S. had global strategic objectives, nested within its grand strategy, with the aim of diminishing Soviet power, so the USSR could no longer oppose creation of a free community of world states. They were “to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations; and, to bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.”

The aggregate global strategic end state which supported the global strategic objectives may be considered by theater. Obviously in Europe, communism had to remain within the Iron Curtain. In Asia, it had to be restricted to mainland China, North Korea (after the Korean War) and north of the 17th parallel in Vietnam (after the 1954 Geneva Accords). This preserved open lines of communication (LOCs) between the Western Pacific and the Middle East and ensured access to markets and resources. China was an adversary opposing these desired conditions. Theater strategic objectives therefore concentrated on China, and the loss of Indochina was considered the most serious threat to these objectives. If Indochina fell to the Soviet and mainland Chinese supported communists, free world efforts to oppose communism in Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma and all of Southeast and South Asia would be seriously jeopardized. Losing these areas meant losing the resources (e.g. rubber and tin) they produced, endangering access to Middle East oil, and ultimately threatening the economic, and therefore security, interests of Europe and Japan.

Thus, the U.S. embarked upon a campaign in Indochina/South Vietnam which linked ways and means towards accomplishment of the desired strategic ends. Achieving operational objectives

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against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese would contribute to both the theater and global strategic objectives, oriented on Chinese and Soviet power, respectively. It would diminish Chinese influence on Asia. It would undermine the power of people’s revolution, or Khrushchev’s “wars of liberation,” thus contributing to the stated global strategic objectives of reducing Soviet power. With Soviet power on the wane, U.S. grand strategy could be assured. This describes the nesting of operational objectives in Vietnam within U.S. grand strategy.

End State Assessment and the Vietnam War
In the fall of 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor visited South Vietnam to conduct an assessment. In November, President Diem was assassinated in a coup only weeks before John F. Kennedy, placing an exclamation point next to the decade-long frustrations of developing good governance in South Vietnam. By early 1964, General William Westmoreland considered the growing threat of a North Vietnamese invasion should the U.S. escalate the conflict. This was a vastly different operational environment than when President Eisenhower made his 1954 pledge to provide advisors to South Vietnam.

Yet, despite these deteriorating conditions, and another visit in early March 1964, Robert McNamara submitted a report to President Johnson, which articulated U.S. goals in Vietnam: “We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military to root out and control insurgent elements.” This report, approved by the President in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, “Implementation of South Vietnam Programs,” and accelerated by the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, would introduce the notion of “graduated pressure” against North Vietnam and more than quintuple U.S. troop commitments in the following year (1965) a drastic increase over the still fewer than 25,000 troops there at the end of the 1964.

Although McNamara referred to them as “U.S. objectives,” the desired conditions contained in the excerpt from his report above also reveal the desired end state for the campaign in South Vietnam, almost identical to the end state desired in 1954 by NSC 5405. More importantly, within the same report, McNamara’s asserts the same danger of losing South Vietnam to communism as was articulated in NSC 5405 (summarized above). Within the context of the relevant operational environment, the required increase of U.S. effort to meet the decade-old end state is readily understandable. What is less apparent is whether the desired end state in 1964 was as relevant as it was in 1954 to U.S. strategic objectives. At least two observations indicate that it was not.

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First, the victory of communism in Vietnam, and its near domination of Southeast Asia, did not impact U.S. strategic interests in Asia. While this observation is made with the benefit of hindsight, some indicators were available by 1964. The Republic of China, with U.S. support and enough votes in the United Nations had resisted claims and threats by the People’s Republic of China for 15 years. Japan had entered into the “Golden Sixties” of economic growth. Furthermore, the communist insurgency was defeated in Malaya. U.S. policy makers also misjudged the extent to which China desired a powerful Vietnam. Had they studied Asian history more closely, they might have recognized that there were limits to how powerful China would desire Vietnam, their historic enemy (and again in 1979), to become.

Second, the level of effort embarked upon in 1965 became a self-fulfilling prophecy for its strategic importance. The more the U.S. fixated on Vietnam for a decisive conflict with communism, the more its prestige as a defender of freedom was at stake. This narrowed focus can be seen in Kennedy and Johnson Administration documents, which starkly contrast with the more regional approach taken by Nixon in 1969. In other words, while the strategic assumption under Johnson seemed to be that the desired end state of Vietnam was critical to the region, Nixon appears to have concentrated quite a bit more effort on creating a desired end state in the theater as a whole, particularly in China, for the same U.S. global strategic objective of containing communism.

The lesson which can be drawn from the Vietnam War is that strategic objectives may be accomplished in many ways. A very important first step is the articulation of a clear end state, defining conditions that assure objective accomplishment. However, equally important is debate and consideration of alternative end states (at multiple levels of strategy), which fully take into account changes in the contemporary security environment. Only through this continual process can strategic objectives remain relevant to overarching national security interests.

**Operational Analysis of the Vietnam War**

If the Vietnam War failed to accomplish U.S. objectives, at least two potential causes are within the scope of this paper. One is articulated above – as the situation in Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and Asia evolved, the end state was not re-assessed for continued relevance. Another could have been a failure, based on the campaign objectives, to wage an effects-based interagency campaign, rather than an attrition-based campaign against the communists.

First, if attrition means reduction in capability, and an effect is a change in condition, then the application of military force against military capability is both an attrition-based and effects-based approach. Likewise, attrition warfare is intended to erode the enemy’s will to fight over time – again, a strategy to generate an intended effect (although “time” may have meant different durations to the communists and the U.S. architects of graduated pressure). However, in emerging doctrine, an effects-based approach has really come to symbolize the employment of...
all instruments of national power (military and non-military) in pursuit of desired effects. How may the conduct of operations in Vietnam be judged from this perspective?

While the necessity of understand the complexity of the War was discussed in the introduction to this paper, it is equally important to understand the War within the context of the communist strategy. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong waged a classic Maoist revolutionary war against South Vietnam. In Phase I, the revolutionaries organize, consolidate and preserve base areas (enlist popular support). In Phase II, they procure materiel through acts of sabotage and raids. Finally, in Phase III, they seek decision or destruction of the enemy in conventional battle.

Arguably, by the time the U.S. became directly involved in the Vietnam War, Phase I was well under way by the communists. The first period of American involvement, 1955-1965, was characterized by a struggle between the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and Viet Cong for control of the non-urban population areas. During this time, aside from the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), later Military Assistance Command (MAC), Vietnam, which did not grow significantly until the end of the Kennedy Administration, U.S. involvement was decidedly non-military by comparison to later years. In fact, most American energies and resources were political, social and economic, for example, government reform, information campaigns, land and economic reform, and improvement of civil defense. Although there was some criticism that the GVN response was often inappropriately heavy-handed for counterinsurgency, the U.S. continued to increase pressure for a broader GVN approach to counterinsurgency as well.

Unfortunately, at this time, it was assumed that the Viet Cong were training and infiltrating back into South Vietnam, possibly at a rate of 1,000 per month, without any significant attempts at interdiction until at least 1964. By 1965, the stage was set for both sides to confront each other conventionally, as the North Vietnamese accelerated their approach to Phase III, and the U.S. committed hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces. By this time, as described by General William Westmoreland, he was caught in a dilemma of resources. How much should he commit against the conventional forces of North Vietnam versus how much to commit against the Viet Cong insurgents, particularly as he assessed the insurgents living off the support of conventional forces, as opposed to the more typical Maoist condition of the reverse. By the third period of the War, after the Tet Offensive and near decimation of the Viet Cong, a clear transition from insurgency to largely conventional conflict can be seen.

While an effects-based approach can be seen in the first period of the War, and bombing for the strategic effect of compelling negotiation at least in the third, it is often the middle period which

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xii For an example see A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam (26 April 1961) [database on-line] (Washington, D.C.: Digital National Security Archives, accessed 27 October 2006); transmitted to President via Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum on 6 May 1961; approved as policy by the President in NSAM 52.


xiv Westmoreland, 174-196.
is judged to be attrition-based, based on near obsession with body counts. However, this does not necessarily stand up to scrutiny of the campaign plans, particularly the “Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, Combined Campaign Plan 1967.”

The 1967 campaign plan cites two objectives: “to defeat VC/NVA forces” and “to extend GVN control in the Republic of Vietnam.” As assessed by the U.S. Army Staff within an overall review, U.S. policy linked hundreds of tasks across what were categorized as political, military, economic, and sociological areas. In fact, the analysis links tasks, such as “increase rice productivity,” to objectives in much the same way a current doctrinal publication would describe effects to objective linkages. However, what is conspicuously missing from the 1967 campaign plan among the mission, objectives and tasks is a clearly defined campaign end state.

What the American campaign in Vietnam illustrates is not a simplified attrition-based approach, but rather a sophisticated effects-based approach, which at times relied on attrition for effect, unfortunately congruent with our emerging doctrine. Much like the strategic planning at the time, the operational planning embarked upon changing conditions (whether military or other) in pursuit of objectives without a clear articulation of what those conditions should look like at campaign end to ensure campaign objectives were achieved.

Conclusion
What the Vietnam War represents, at both a strategic and operational level, is a campaign waged over 20 years without a clear articulation of expected outcomes, and no significant assessment and modification of expectations as the conditions in the operational environment evolved. The critical process at both levels of war is developing, assessing, and understanding the nested linkages between objectives, the end states which assure accomplishment of those objectives, the effects which cumulatively create those end states, and the tasks which generate those effects. While we can look back at Vietnam with hubris, saying we now know how to conduct effects-based operations and understand counterinsurgency, the sobering fact is that we know no more now about either. We knew plenty then. The real question is whether we will use our knowledge in the future for the thoughtful application of strategy and campaign planning to assure our national interests.

Major David W. Gardner is an infantry officer currently enrolled as a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Subsequent to his tactical assignments in the 3rd Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne Division, and after completion of a fellowship at Harvard University, he served in the Strategy, Doctrine and Concepts Division of the Army Staff G-35.

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xv Available via the Declassified Documents Reference System.

Congratulations to the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Operational Art and Campaigning faculty team for bringing together another superb Campaigning journal. Once again, we are fortunate to have an exceptional quality and relevance in the articles from our contributors. The entire joint planning community benefits from the writings of those who continue to support this unique journal. A heartfelt thank you goes out to our contributors and to our many readers – we appreciate your feedback and suggestions.

The current JAWS class is reaching the mid-point of the academic year and the school rapidly matures in curriculum delivery methods and reputation. Once again, the future campaign planners in JAWS recently visited the National Capital Region to benefit from briefings and dialogue with the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and others to include the Information Resources Management College at the National Defense University. The students and faculty enjoyed exceptional support from all organizations and agencies visited; the engagement and discussions throughout the week centered on interagency processes and strategy development. Additionally, current students took advantage of opportunities to meet and discuss with graduates of the first two JAWS classes.

The JAWS class also made a trip south to visit U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force – South. This proved to be yet another excellent investment as senior leaders and planners took the time to talk with students about the actual rigors and challenges of campaign planning in our contemporary strategic-operational environment. Everyone gained new insights and appreciation from a first-class field research experience in some of our nation’s busiest joint commands. Additionally, this allowed another opportunity for current students and faculty to talk with those recent JAWS graduates that are living on the cutting edge of campaign planning.

The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) continues to expand in program offerings and provided more professional education opportunities to joint, multinational and interagency students this past year than ever before. The Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education program (SEJPME) was recently launched and the Reserve Component JPME (RCJPME) program continues to provide distributed education to satisfy Reserve Component needs for quality joint education in a blended educational format. Week-long courses centered on Homeland Security Planning (HLSPC) and Joint, Interagency and Multinational Planning (JIMPC) have waiting lists established for those desiring to attend. The new Commandant, Major General Byron Bagby (USA), is overseeing a complete update of the JFSC’s strategy and renewed emphasis is being placed on attracting interagency and multinational students to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) JPME II course. The JFSC will again offer four 10 week JPME II courses in 2007 (additional information is available on the JFSC website at www.jfsc.ndu.edu –
while you’re there, check out the new JAWS OP6500 Joint Operation Planning Process Primer recently completed by the OP6500 faculty).

Finally, best of luck to our CAMPAIGNING editor, Colonel Craig Bollenberg, as he departs JFSC for a year-long “sabbatical.” Craig will spend his “sabbatical” in Baghdad on the planning staff of the Multi-National Force Iraq making contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Bollenberg has assured everyone that he will remain engaged with the production of CAMPAIGNING and perhaps have an occasion to solicit new articles “from the front.” Godspeed Craig, we’ll stay in close contact and we look forward to your insights.

Happy Holidays to all and keep up the campaign planning debates in the coming year!
The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Campaign Planning and Operational Art Division have recently published a Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Primer. This Primer is published to assist JAWS students at the Joint Forces Staff College during their Operational Art and Campaigning block. It is intended to supplement, not replace, Joint Doctrine publications. The Primer contains both Joint Doctrine and information from several source documents with its purpose being to assist the student logically through the planning process functions. In those instances where Joint Doctrine is absent, the Primer utilizes “best practices” devised by planners to get the job done correctly.

The JAWS Primer presents the JOPP as described by Joint Doctrine in its logical flow and will enable planners to sequentially follow the process. The JOPP focuses on the concepts of operational planning and key joint doctrine with the main references being Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0 and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I. JP 3-0 is now signed (17 Sept 2006) but 5-0 remains in the signature draft form as of this printing. The JAWS Primer concentrates its efforts on how CCDR/JFC’s and their staffs work through the JOPP.

Discussed within this Primer are the myriad of considerations, functions and steps the operational commander must consider while creating an effective campaign plan. The Primer also assumes a working knowledge of Operational Art and Design and has left the informed vision, creativity and practical extension of that process with JP 3-0, which does an excellent job describing this framework.

You will also find that this document includes the necessary processes and procedures to implement the Adaptive Planning (AP) process. The Secretary of Defense signed the AP Roadmap on 13 December 2005 directing that as AP matures it will succeed the Department’s current planning and execution system. At full maturity, AP will form the backbone of a future Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System, supporting the development and execution of plans.

The JAWS JOPP Primer will be reviewed continually and updated annually by the faculty at JAWS. Your comments are solicited.

The hyper-linked Primer can be viewed at the JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning web site at: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/publications.asp

POC for comment is Col Mike Santacroce/USMC JAWS faculty at santacrocem@jfsc.ndu.edu, 757-443-6307.
Upcoming Events

- 11 January: Operational Art and Campaigning (OP6500) Begins
- 19-23 March: Information Operations Course
- 2-5 April: Joint Special Operations University Course
- 30 April-3 May: Western Combatant Command Tour
- 7 May: Homeland Security Planners Course
- 22-23 May: Joint, Interagency and Multinational Planners Course
JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications

The following campaign planning publications are available from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Schools, Department of Operational Art and Campaigning.

**CAMPAIGNING Journal**

- Fall 2006 [pdf]
- Summer 2006 [pdf]
- Spring 2006 [pdf]
- Winter 2006 [pdf]

**Joint Operation Planning Primer** [pdf]

**Case Studies**

- Horatio Nelson and the 1798 Mediterranean Campaign [pdf]
- The Mexican American War [pdf]

**War Plans**

The following collection of war plans are from the Joint Forces Staff College Library. These are original World War II campaign plans have been scanned electronically to enable easy accessibility. Each campaign plan consists of a back ground introduction followed by the original plan in electronic format.

**Introduction Reno IV Outline Plan** [doc]

- RENO IV Outline Plan 6 March 1944 [pdf]

**Introduction Mindoro Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO** [doc]

- Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 13 October 1944 [pdf]

**Introduction to Tarakan Island Operations Instruction NO. 99** [doc]

- Operations Instruction NO. 99 Tarakan Island 21 March 1945 [pdf]

**Introduction to Operation “ECLIPSE”** [doc]

- Operation “ECLIPSE” Appreciation and Outline Plan 24 November 1944 [pdf]

**Introduction Operation Blacklist** [doc]

- Operation Blacklist Basic Online Plan [pdf]
Intent

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with a cadre of officers expert in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations. Graduates will be capable of synergistically combining existing and emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish a range of operational or strategic objectives.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of Defense