Campaigning
The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

Featured Essays

From the Commandant: An Interview with RDML Brad Williamson
Building the Joint “Bench”: Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to Enhance Talent Management

The Straw that Stirs the Drink: The Implications of Resurgent Religion for Strategists and Policy Makers

Where Are the Cops? Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad

That All May Labor As One

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Cover image: Students of JCWS Seminar 13, Class 16-01 apply design concepts during a seminar exercise at NSA Norfolk, VA on Mar 2, 2016. Photo by Daniel H. McCauley.
In this issue of Campaigning:

Editor’s Corner
Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

Features
From the Commandant: An Interview With RDML Brad Williamson
Dr. Daniel H. McCauley, JFSC Faculty

The Straw That Stirs the Drink: The Implications for Resurgent Religion for Strategists and Policymakers
CDR Steven L. Dundas, JFSC Faculty

Building the Joint Bench: Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to Enhance Talent Management
LTC Eric J. Weis, Col Paula Hamilton, and Col Laura Lenderman, JCWS

Where Are the Cops? Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad
Lt Col M. Honoré Spencer, Col Gene Hughes, and LtCol Cesar Rodriguez, JCWS

Commentary
The American Way of Strategy
Maj Paul Franz, CDR Robert W. Lightfoot, MAJ Vincent Luther, and LTC Matt Rinke, JCWS

Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The Need to Create a Language Requirement or General Officers
MAJ Steven Lacey, LTC Tyler Oxley, Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC Aldo Vergara, JCWS

The Foresight Factor
Improving the International Community’s Response to Mass Conflict Refugee Migration
MAJ Alison Hamilton and Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin, JCWS

It’s Time for the U.S. to Turn Down the Aid and Turn Up the Pressure on the Government of South Sudan for Peace and Security
Lt Col Chad Diaz and MAJ Joshua Fishman, JCWS

Author Submission Guidelines

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
As the world’s preeminent military and economic power, the United States faces an international security order rife with complex challenges. The faculty and students of JFSC not only recognized those challenges, but are determined to meet them head-on. The Spring edition of Campaigning presents eight essays all of which promote various methods to perform the Joint force’s missions more effectively while making the world a little more secure.

This edition’s main features begins with “From the Commandant: An Interview With RDML Brad Williamson,” which was an opportunity for the Commandant to share his views on the Joint Forces Staff College, Joint professional military education, and his vision for the future. The second featured essay was written by CDR Steven Dundas titled, “The Straw That Stirs the Drink: The Implications for Resurgent Religion for Strategists and Policymakers.” In this essay, CDR Dundas discusses the role that religious ideology plays in influencing societies and international relations. He posits that there is a growing religious influence outside of the Middle East that is threatening to subvert Western secular models of the state.

The third featured essay, “Building the Joint Bench: Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to Enhance Talent Management,” was written by LTC Eric Weis, Col Paula Hamilton, and Col Laura Lenderman. In this essay, the authors argue that as operational environment becomes more complex, building a “bench” of future joint leaders who have the requisite skills necessary to tackle this complexity is a critical concern. The authors propose transitioning from what has been a “train and develop” approach to leader development to one that maximizes the best practices from industry through an “assess and select” approach.

The last featured essay, “Where Are the Cops? Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad,” by Lt Col Honoré Spencer, Col Gene Hughes, and LtCol Cesar Rodriguez contend that a main feature of the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism is through the development of stronger law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. Unfortunately, U.S. Government efforts to develop effective law enforcement abroad is fragmented and suffering from parochial agendas. The authors propose enhancements for the development of foreign police capabilities.

This edition’s commentary features “The American Way of Strategy,” by Maj Paul Frantz, CDR Robert Lightfoot, MAJ Vincent Luther and LTC Matt Rinke suggest that the U.S. Government’s process for creating grand strategy has become increasingly ineffective because of overly
prescriptive legislation. The authors argue that the U.S. Government should seek to create balance across the DIME in its strategy production process rather than applying rigid focus on the Department of Defense alone.

The second commentary feature is “Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The Need to Create a Language Requirement for General Officers,” written by MAJ Steven Lacy, LTC Tyler Oxley, Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC Aldo Vergara, discusses that despite the rhetoric, foreign language and cultural expertise in today’s military is lacking. The author’s suggest that the Goldwater-Nichols Act must be amended to create a foreign language requirement for General Officers.

This edition’s Foresight Factor features are “Improving the International Community’s Response to Mass Conflict Refugee Migration” by MAJ Alison Hamilton and Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin and “It’s Time for the U.S. to Turn Down the Aid and Turn Up the Pressure on the Government of South Sudan for Peace and Security” by Lt Col Chad Diaz and MAJ Joshua Fishman. MAJ Hamilton and Lt Col Goodwin use foresight tools to analyze and assess the U.S. policy toward the Syrian refugee migration, which is undermining regional stability. Security, perceived risk to civilian life, and stability are the biggest drivers in the mass refugee migration system, causing populations to displace both internally and externally. As such, there must be a committed effort to establish security before the refugee crisis will begin to abate.

Lt Col Diaz and Maj Fishman also apply foresight tools in the analysis and assessment of the U.S. policy toward the newly established nation of South Sudan. Efforts to stabilize the new nation consist of providing relatively large sums of money and aid to South Sudan; however, these efforts are not achieving the desired effects. Based upon their assessment, the authors propose an alternative strategy that dismantles the failing system currently in place.

We hope you enjoy this edition of Campaigning. You can let me know what you think by emailing me at mccaulayd@ndu.edu.

Daniel H. McCauley
Editor
From the Commandant
An Interview
with RDML Brad Williamson

By
Dr. Daniel H. McCauley
Photos by Mr. David McManaway

On November 20th, 2015 Campaigning had the opportunity to interview RDML Brad Williamson, the Commandant of Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The following is a transcript of that interview.

Campaigning: After six months at the helm, what are your impressions of JFSC?

RDML Williamson: It’s really an outstanding organization. I did not have the opportunity to go through any of the schoolhouses here earlier in my career, but I’ve certainly been stationed in and around the Joint Forces Staff College several times. The thing I found, after immediately reporting here, was the dedication and quality of the staff and faculty here and how engaged they are in the mission. I’ve had the opportunity to spend six months now engaging the students, engaging the staff, and engaging the faculty. I can tell you that the mission performed here at JFSC is absolutely critical in supporting the combatant commanders and joint staffs, ensuring they get the people they need to operationalize the strategies of our senior leaders. That’s true whether I’m talking about one of the C4I courses, the JCWS class, the JAWS class, or the AJPME class. All of our students leave here and the go directly to operational staffs and make a difference as soon as they arrive.

We are probably the only PME institution that is focused like that.

Campaigning: What do you think are JFSC’s strengths?

RDML Williamson: I think two things. One is the faculty and the way that we are set up here. What I have seen is them doing a tremendous job of taking what we are teaching, and then looking at it in an honest and objective fashion each cycle, and then adapting the curriculum to stay focused and relevant. Every year our military missions change and so if we end up with a static curriculum, in some period of time it will become outdated. So what I have seen is faculty who are talking about what is going on right now and adapting the instruction to ensure that it is relevant to what’s going on. So that’s the first thing. Then the second thing is just the overall climate here. A lot of our students come here for 10 weeks and they are very focused because of the structure of the course. The JAWS students, who are PCS’d here, they are brought together in a joint environment where they are forced to interact with each other. We could have the best instruction in the world, but if it wasn’t done in an in-residence joint environment it wouldn’t carry the same weight. That applies even to AJPME folks even though they do a 40 week course, and most of it is done on-line or in synch sessions on-line, we still bring them here and put them in the same room with each other and that enculturation into a joint setting is critical. From my time at the National War College, although the instruction was fabulous and the educational experience was wonderful, the fact that I was
in a committee and other classes with people who were from other Services and organizations, that was the true value of the education. I think that remains true today.

**Campaigning:** How have your experiences in the Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer shaped your perspective of Joint education?

**RDML Williamson:** I tell people, and a lot of the classes coming in, that I was so “heads down” and operationally-focused for the first part of my career as a junior officer that I was absolutely convinced that the surface warfare community had all of the answers to the world’s problems. It wasn’t until I went to the National War College after my executive officer ride that I was exposed to other perspectives. This could not have come at a better time for me personally because my next tours were on the OSD staff and then in command. Because of the Joint education at National one is able to think more broadly, and what you are able to provide your bosses, whether it’s a naval officer or someone from another Service, is a better perspective on how we might approach a problem or challenge. One of the things I say to the students when I have the opportunity to engage with them, when they go to a joint staff or a combatant commander staff, it’s not about providing the commander with a solution, we can all do that and what will happen is that we will tend to be very parochial based upon our own experiences. What we need are officers who can work on that staff and provide the best solution, and that means the best solution while taking into account all of the things that the combatant commander has going on. And that may be a Naval officer saying the Air Force has a capability here we should be utilizing; when we have done that, then we have done our jobs well—and by that, I mean officers are thinking about solutions to problems without thinking of their own Service. The students that are coming in right now they understand joint as they have lived it in Iraq or Afghanistan or in other places. As a naval officer, I always say that the Navy and Marine Corps team is kind of joint in its own right. We bring aviation forces, surface forces, and amphibious forces and utilize them together. I just came from an exercise, the last thing before I got here, BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea, and we had naval forces from multiple nations, allies, and partners; we had Marine and Army forces on the ground; and we had B-52s participating. This is how we have to fight and I can think of no situation in the future where it won’t be a multi-Service operation, and that means also Interagency, and it will almost certainly be a coalition of some sort. I see no instance in where a Service will go it alone. The days of the Navy saying “hey, we’ve got this,” or the Army
saying “we’ve got this,” that’s not going to happen again. That’s really a testament to all of the joint education that has occurred over the past 25 years or so where we have really focused on making our officers think that way.

VADM William “Dean” Lee, USCG, Commander, Atlantic Area and RDML Brad Williamson

Figure 2

Campaigning: In the past, General Dempsey spoke about the need to develop agile and adaptive leaders who are comfortable with ambiguity. Do you see this need affecting the way JFSC currently teaches?

RDML Williamson: I don’t know, I think we do a pretty good job of that, teaching people how to think and interact and not so much what to think. When we talk about adaptive and agile leaders it’s about leaders who are always seeking to understand what’s happening. When you look at the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, I don’t think there is anyone who would look at those and say we knew everything we needed to know on the day we went in. I do think we did a pretty good job of learning and of how we might adapt what we were doing. I think because of that, people understand better, especially at the more junior levels that this is part of the process. That you have to go in understanding that no matter how good your plan is it’s not going to account for everything that you need to account for. You have to be ready to adapt your plan. The other thing I would tell you is that when you look at Iraq and Afghanistan, that where there were successes, that most of those successes occurred in environments where the missions were as joint as they could possibly be (Meaning Interagency, coalition, etc.). We should recognize that, and applaud that, and make sure we are ready to work that way.

RDML Williamson and CS2 Wordell Bradley

Figure 3

Campaigning: Are there any external surprises or wild cards that have the potential to significantly impact the Joint education community?

RDML Williamson: I think so. I don’t want to say that surprise is the new normal, but I think that the potential for surprise is much greater nowadays. Now, having said
that, I also think we are more ready to deal with it. I think, to be honest, 9-11 was a big surprise for us. Because of that, we have learned that the potential for events like that at different places in the world is possible. What we saw in France, unfortunately, over the last week is that we were still caught off guard, but I don’t think we were surprised. I think we have to be thinking about how we can best utilize all of our national instruments to address the security challenges we are going to face over the next 20 or 30 years. I think they will be broad. So thinking that we can just build a solution today and that it will stand the test of time over the years is probably a fool’s errand. I also think this is what we are teaching our students to do in all of our courses here. To think about how we look at problems and not so much what to think. The facts will continue to change, and if you get caught up in thinking just about the facts, and not how the facts apply to (current) potential solutions, then you will get trapped in kind of a time warp where what may have been true five years ago is

Campaigning: What do you think are the most urgent challenges facing the JPME community today?

RDML Williamson: Well, obviously, I’m not involved in the current budget negotiations, but the budget environment over the past couple of years has caused us to take some significant cuts here at the Joint Forces Staff College. I think right now though that we are where we should be and I think what you see is some other folks coming on line and saying, quite rightly, that if we are going to have an environment for the next 10 or 15 years where certain parts of the military don’t receive the resources that perhaps they have in the past, then joint professional military education ought to be a priority because we provide the bridge to the future. I know there are a lot of people right now looking at how we educate our officers and our enlisted personnel across all of our Services not just in professional military education, but across the board. Again, if you look at the last 10 plus years in Afghanistan and Iraq, we can’t lose sight of the fact that joint is the only way we are going to fight and we are going to have to continue to educate our officers in that way, and so I think when I look at professional military education, specifically at the National Defense University schools, I think it is the best possible investment of our scarce resources. As I said, I think there are others who also recognize that and are becoming more vocal that this is the wrong place to take further cuts because, again, the officers that we are training right now, some of whom were in the graduation ceremony today, are our future and we should invest in our future.
Campaigning: If you had five minutes with the Chairman, what question(s) would you ask that would make him re-think Joint education?

RDM Williamon: I have a simple answer to this—what do we value?” What do we value in our officers? What makes us the military that we are and what will make us the military we want to be in the future? If it’s not the education of our officers, I would ask what is it then? I think when I look at our military, whether it’s the Navy or any of the other Services, it’s the men and women who serve that set us apart from other institutions around the world. An investment in those people, one that recognizes that they are the reason that we maintain the capabilities and the standing that we rightfully deserve right now, and investing in their talents is a wise investment. So, again, I would ask him what is it that we value? Twenty years from now, if we have a lot of kit, but not great people, we won’t be a great military. But if we have great people and we decide that we need more kit, we can buy the kit, but I don’t know if we can mass produce the people. So, in an austere environment, investing in the education of our people is a wise choice. That doesn’t mean you don’t need kit for right now or to help you to operate right now, but when you look at the overall budget, investing in the education of our people, which is both a retention tool and a training tool for those people, is a very wise investment.

The second part is, as I remind people, we got to joint because we were pushed and shoved here a little bit, we the Services, but we are here now and I think we all recognize that we are a better military because of that. I think there should be a recognition that joint education, and joint staffs and joint training are imperative for us to be more efficient in the future. I think the efficiencies we have been able to gain by operating in a joint environment are overlooked sometimes. Those are the dividends of the joint education of officers. Our ability to do things when the Navy doesn’t have all of the assets but can utilize the Army or the Air Force. That’s a benefit that is being realized right now because of the joint mindset of our officers.

Campaigning: JPME Phase II at JFSC is written into law—other than that legal requirement, what is your vision for the College that will promote and sustain JFSC’s relevancy for the next 15-20 years?

RDM Williamson: Well, the reality is that what makes it relevant is what we discussed earlier, which is that there are things we can leverage to make JPME II more accessible, to continue to make it relevant, not just to the stakeholders that utilize the product, but to make it easier for the students. So, the vision for 15 to 20 years from now ought to be that at some point we can get to where the students walk in with their device and we are able to operate with them on their device that they take with them with their notes on it, at least all of the unclassified information. Maybe we can offer some training to people via distance education, synch sessions, and other things, but I would never lose sight that what makes joint education work is putting people from the different services and agencies in the same room. So, no matter
where you go in the future you have to have that as part of the curriculum. If you don’t, then we are educating but we are not inculcating. We have to have people who are inoculated to think there is a different view on this subject. Back to my own experience, if I had taken the curriculum from National War College on my own, on-line, I would have probably, from an educational standpoint, understood the material just as well, but I wouldn’t have had a joint view imposed on it. I got that because I sat there with people from other Services who provided me with their perspective on the issue or problem. This forced me, for really the first time in my life, to think about different ways to do things. That only happens when you are in the room with each other.

RDML Williamson and JFSC Faculty Members

Figure 5

Campaigning: What are the five or six values that underpin that vision?

RDML Williamson: As I said, jointness is at the top of that list…you have to be joint. Two, we have to be thinking, and to use earlier terms, I think adaptive. So, we can have a curriculum in place, but we have to be able to adapt not only what we teach, but perhaps how we teach it. I think we ought to be innovative and that is slightly different than adaptive. I always use adaptive as you responding to impetus put on you from the outside. Innovation is you forcing your will on the rest of the world, and so, I think we can be innovative. I think what we are doing right now for the satellite program for JCWS is fairly innovative. So now we are trying to adjust other things to make that work. Finally, different than thinking, we should be thoughtful. By that, I mean we have to be honest with ourselves about where we are not meeting the mark and we have to continually evaluate the product we are providing, interacting with our stakeholders, and trying to determine if the product that we are providing to the combatant commanders, joint task forces, and others is meeting the mark and what can we do with the resources we have available to make it better. I think if we can do those things, we’ll be not only just as relevant in the future but perhaps even more relevant.

Campaigning: What can JFSC do that no other educational institution can replicate?

RDML Williamson: There is nothing we can do that others can’t replicate, but right now what we do that is unique is two things. One, and this doesn’t apply to some of the other NDU institutions, but a lot of the other PME institutions are joint, but they are still heavily dominated by their Service…that’s just the nature of their institutions that are providing that education. Here at the Joint Forces Staff College, across the board in all
of our curriculum, we are joint. We are as evenly split among the services, interagency, and international students as we can possibly be. We are the same way on our faculty side. Because of this, the perspectives that the students get in the classroom are really a little bit different than what they might get elsewhere.

The second thing is that we are operationally focused. By that I mean, at the other institutions someone might go through one of the courses and he/she might come out and go to a command that recognizes that he just attended War College X, but nobody is going to say to him apply what you just learned to your new job. Almost to a man and a woman, everyone who goes through one of our courses, when they leave here the place they go immediately following their educational experience is going to expect them to apply what they just learned here. Again, it doesn’t matter if it’s one of our courses upstairs in the SCIF, it’s a JCWS class, or one of our JAWS students. People are going to expect them to perform at a higher level based on what they learned here. We make that clear to our students when they come in and I think it is very clear to them when they go back by how much better prepared they are. I recently had the opportunity to fly down to Tampa and speak at the graduation ceremony for our satellite program down there. Almost every single person said to me how valuable they thought the course was. We had people in the course that were at various stages within their joint tour down there. The ones closer to the end [of their tour], said how much they had wished they had gone through the course earlier in their tour, and the ones at the beginning of their tour said how fortunate they felt that they got this so early in their tenure. So, I think that speaks volumes to how valuable it is immediately to the people who graduate.

Campaigning: How does JFSC ensure its stakeholders understand and appreciate the value of its educational experience?

RDML Williamson: Obviously we conduct surveys to try and get feedback from all of the stakeholders about the value they see in the students that have graduated from here and go to their staffs. We do outreach at the senior leader/director level to reach out to ensure we are meeting the mark. That being said, this goes back to the thoughtful piece, I think there are ways perhaps that we can do that part of our mission even better. To really find out. You know I asked a question when I first arrived here, and again, being the new guy it’s easy to ask questions, and I said how do we know how many of our students do the various combatant commands really want? Because we should be working off of a size and comp that is looking out into the future, but I don’t know that anyone has gone to a
combatant commander yet and said would you rather have five more JAWS graduates or five graduates from another War College? So, I think at the highest levels as part of this look at the overall continuum of education that this has to be part of the conversation. We ought to be asking our customers, the combatant commands and joint staffs, which of these curriculums do you value on your staffs? Which of these people make a difference for you? And then we ought to weigh that pretty seriously as part of how we build the construct of education. Saying that we want everyone to have this degree is interesting, but if the feedback we get from the stakeholders is that they wish they had five more guys who have been through the C4I course or wish they had more JAWS graduates or more JCWS graduates, and, listening to them, being thoughtful, we should take this into consideration. What people should really start to look at is what is really valued and why is it valued? And then, should we be doing more of it if it is valuable? I think that, again, especially if the resources become even more constrained, that’s something that’s got to happen. We have to realize what is making a difference and then we have to ensure that’s where the resources are being applied.

Campaigning: The Services have a fantastic network of alumni and associations that support their PME institutions. Can JFSC strengthen its alumni connections? If so, how?
RDML Williamson: Yes, and we are working on that right now. Currently, COL Yeager has done a great job looking at JAWS graduates. I think we are starting to see, just because of the timing of when people started attending that course, that we are having our first flag and general officers who are JAWS graduates. So, getting those people to come back and engage the classes is important. The other thing that is coming up is our 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces Staff College, which was our predecessor here. We are going to use that event as a means to kind of recognize some of our previous graduates and the impact that those graduates have made on our Services and on our nation in some cases. So, we are in the middle right now of going through our JCWS graduates and trying to identify some people that we would like to include in that. At first blush, what we have found is how many of the people that are walking around the Services now as flag and general officers have been through one of the courses here. Just today, we had Maj Gen Jamieson here to be our graduation speaker and she spoke about how 21 years ago she was a JCWS student. That has a powerful impact on the JCWS students who are sitting there listening to her and really having to recognize that someday one of them is going to be that graduation speaker. So, I think that’s good for us.

Campaigning: How do you see the relationship between the College and the City of Norfolk and surrounding cities?
RDML Williamson: Well, it’s interesting, I actually had the opportunity to have dinner with Mayor Fraim and some of the other people from the Norfolk government. Of course the Dean and I are involved in the Tidewater Consortium for Higher education and so I think we have an excellent
relationship with the schools in the area and with the City of Norfolk. In fact, I invited some of those leaders to come by and to see the PME institution that resides here in Norfolk so they can have a better idea of what we do here and who is here doing that. You can never underestimate the value of having good working relationships, not just with the government officials or the school officials, but with the community in general. You know our students come in here, a lot of them here for short periods of time as geobachelors, so a lot of them are out in the town and we want the area here to be proud of being the home of the Joint Forces Staff College. We want our students and our staff and faculty to feel like they are part of the community. I think, my view, is that everyone feels that way. Obviously, we can always do more things to help that, but overall I like what I have seen about our engagement.

**Campaigning:** Campaigning traditionally asks new faculty members what was the last book they read. What’s on your nightstand?

**RDML Williamson:** I’ve got three right now. Admiral Stavridis’ book, *The Accidental Admiral*, is on my nightstand back home. My roommate at the Naval Academy, his father wrote a book called *Ambrose*, and it’s about his great grandfather who was in the Civil War and survived four years of fighting. Because of the personal connection with that book, I kind of moved that to the top. Then the third book, which isn’t really a book that one might think has any applicability, is called, *Think Like a Freak*. It’s a third in the series of the “Freakonomic” books. I am, kind of by trade, an analyst and have looked at things a lot of times in an objective rather than subjective manner. The two key things I like in the “Freakonomic” books that I think are applicable when we look at strategy, and these were really brought home in the first book, are: Correlation does not always mean causation and are we prepared for the second, third, and fourth-order effects of what we do? When we look at a lot of the situations in the world right now it’s very easy for people to say that “this caused this” and it’s of course not always the case. There are usually lots of factors that caused something to happen. I think if we can take a broader view and step back and say why did this really happen we would be better served. A lot of times we like to analyze things in the simplest of terms, and by that I mean the things that are easy for us to count, and if you can count something or measure something you tend to measure it without really stepping back and saying “is this the thing you should measure. In some situations we look at things and we think somehow we’ve figured out the answer because we went in with a question we wanted to ask because we knew in advance we could come up with the answer. So, if you think you can count or measure something a lot of times you pose the question knowing that you can get an answer, but it doesn’t mean it’s the right question.

The second thing is: Are we prepared for the second, third, and fourth-order effects of what we do? And again, from a strategic sense, I think that’s really where we don’t do a great job. We understand when we do “this” what the immediate reaction will
be; I think if you look at the last 15 years, it’s those second-, third-, and fourth-order effects that we have had a very difficult time understanding before we took the initial action. This is why we had to adapt in what we were doing in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We didn’t really understand what the second-, third-, and fourth-order effects of our actions were going to be. Because we didn’t understand those, we didn’t anticipate them, and then we were reacting and trying to adapt what we were doing because things were happening that we didn’t foresee happening. Again, from an economics standpoint, that thought process of “if this happens, what will really happen next?” A great economic example of that right now is what is playing out is the world oil prices. When the prices started coming down, there were lots of people writing a lot of things about what the impact would be but I don’t think any of them properly captured what the end result and I think we will see more impact coming. As an analyst, I look at the strategic environment through an analytical lens and I think sometimes we measure things simply because we can measure them, but without thinking about whether they are the right things to measure. I find that fascinating and interesting for me. Some people might not find that aspect of it as fascinating, but I do. The other two books were more for my professional pleasure.
The Straw that the Stirs the Drink
The Implications of Resurgent Religion
for Strategists and Policy Makers

By
CDR Steven L. Dundas, CHC, USN

One can never separate war and the means by which it is fought from its political ends. There are, however, many societies whose language and religious ideology shape the leader’s political ends. To borrow the immortal words of legendary baseball slugger Reggie Jackson, religion is often “the straw that stirs the drink.” The fact that religious ideologies influence societies and international relations is not new, but after almost three centuries of decline the twenty-first century promises to begin a new age of religious influence. Samuel Huntington notes, “Western secular models of the state are being challenged and replaced”¹ in many nations as religious influence grows. The indicators of this shift, religious, cultural, and racial, are glaringly obvious in the Middle East but clearly present in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Balkans, India, Latin America, and the United States, and threaten to subvert Western secular models of the state.

According to Clausewitz, war is an extension or continuation of politics. Clausewitz, a product of classic German Liberalism, understood the term politics in light of the German concept Weltanschauung, which translates as “World View.” The term is not limited to a particular doctrine or the ideology of party politics, but it encompasses the worldview of a people or culture and includes religion. Religious leaders, as well as media outlets and politicians, use a world view to influence their population. In fact, the world view is often crucial in the decision by a people to go to war, their rationale for going to war, whom they war against, the means for conducting war, and the end state they envision from warring.

Because Weltanschauung includes all elements of culture, to include race, religion, and economy, as well as sociological and historical factors; religious leaders, as well as media outlets and politicians, use it to manipulate their people. Radical proponents of religious fundamentalism around the world, who reject the pluralities of modernism and science, skillfully “use each new method of communication”² to spread their message of fear in a dualistic manner to influence those most vulnerable to the threat of change.

Modern Americans and Western European policy makers tend to look at the world, and issues of politics and policy in isolation from each other, and especially in isolation from religion. Such an atomistic method ensures that many policy makers cannot see the forest for the trees. This is particularly true when religion is a motivating factor and an ideological component of conflict. Religiously based ideology is a powerful and “often intractable force that can be quite unresponsive to all the instrumentalities of state power, let alone the instrumentalities of foreign policy,”³ and has been so from the advent of civilization to the present day. Samuel Huntington observed, “To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions; and people who share ethnicity and

Campaigning Spring 2016 11
language but differ in religion may slaughter each other….”

Even among religions that claim to worship the same god beliefs may differ, and that fact underscores Colin Gray’s all important, “contexts of war.” Gray makes the case for seven essential contexts policy makers and military leaders must understand regarding war that “can have strong negative consequences,” if ignored or misunderstood.

Each of the contexts is associated with the manner of social development, and define the essential characteristics of a particular armed conflict. In many areas of the world religion functions as the “central political pillar maintaining the power of [the] ruler - a major pole in determining people’s loyalty - and as a key ingredient in determining a nation’s stability or instability.” Religion and religious values remain instrumental to the ethics and the social norms of a society and dictate how it deals with other nations and peoples, as well as how it conducts war.

Over the course of the last three centuries the emphasis on rational and empirical thought predisposed western strategists and policy makers to exclude religion as a component of analysis. Furthermore, the scientific methodology used by many analysts dictates that they asses individual components of issues in isolation from each other, and often without connection to their opponent’s world view. Experts dissect economic factors, military capabilities, existing political systems, diplomatic considerations, and the ways societies gather information and exhaustively examine and evaluate each individual component. But the problem comes when policymakers fail to understand how worldview, ideological factors, history, and religious belief impact how a given opponent will conduct war.

In part, policy makers tend to interpret information through their own worldview. As Gray notes, “Policy and strategy will be influenced by the cultural preferences bequeathed by a community’s unique interpretation of its history as well as by its geopolitical- geostrategic context.” As such, both military and civilian policy makers fail to address the criticality of religion to developing effective strategy. Barbara Tuchman wrote, “When information is relayed to policy-makers, they respond in terms of what is already inside their heads and consequently make policy less to fit the facts than to fit the notions and intentions formed out of the mental baggage that has accumulated in their minds since childhood.”

A world view imposes cultural prejudices and blinders on western policy makers and strategists, that predispose them to look for shortcuts, or the most convenient explanations selected from the information they can see. Edward Luttwak wrote:

Enlightenment prejudice has remained amply manifest in the contemporary professional analysis of foreign affairs. Policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who are ready to overinterpret economic causality, who are apt to dissect social differentiations most finely, and who will minutely categorize political affiliations are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict, and even in reporting their concrete modalities. Equally the role of religious leaders, religious institutions, and religiously motivated lay figures in conflict resolution has also been disregarded – or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting.
Unbeknownst to policy makers, their prejudices, the world view blinders they wear, inhibit them from seeing how interconnected the most primal elements of the human experience are to others’ worldviews, even their own. As such, both military and civilian policy makers fail to address the criticality of religion to developing effective strategy.

Many people believed that modern ideas, “such as science, technology, secularism, and humanism would overcome the religious concept of the universe that dominated premodern society.” Contemporar y Western strategists and policy makers came to adulthood in a culture that supplanted the importance of religious ideas and need. A global, four-decade resurgence of religious ideals makes adaptation for strategists and planners difficult because of the dramatic shift in essential, unquestioned views. Others’ worldviews, including religious beliefs, often influence the application of economic, political, diplomatic, military power, and the use and dissemination of information. That fact remains true despite the religion or sect involved, and especially in a decidedly secular, or at least outwardly non-religious, nation. Perhaps, by ignorance or a refusal to admit the importance of religious motivations in conflict, strategists and planners fail to realize the western culture arose from primal religious beliefs that informed politics, philosophy, ethics, law, economics, art, racial constructs, and science for nearly 1500 years. Perhaps, that refusal fueled a justified appall or embarrassment of the religious justifications their forbearers used to incite war that subjugated or exterminated peoples.

The United States Military made a belated attempt to address ideology, culture, and religion in terms of counter-insurgency doctrine when it published the *U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Manual*. The discussion of these issues is limited to two pages that specifically deal with various extreme Moslem groups that use religion as a pillar of their ideology, strategy, and operations. But the analysis in the counterinsurgency manual is limited because its focus is very general and at a tactical level. While the manual encourages leaders to attempt to understand the cultural differences it contains little to help leaders understand the importance of religion and ideology at the strategic and operational levels.

Commendably, the manual discusses how terrorist and insurgent groups use ideology, which is frequently based on religion to create a narrative. The narrative often involves a significant amount of myth presented as history, such as how Al Qaida and ISIL use the Caliphate as a religious and political ideal that for many Moslems, “produces a positive image of the golden age of Islamic civilization.”

A purely intellectual understanding of how Al Qaida and ISIL use symbolism and imagery limits how strategists and planners can develop methods to counter it. Rather, strategists and planners would benefit from a historical introspection that leads to a personal reflection, aimed at understanding how the theological tools of the Christian religion subjugated peoples and the ramifications today. Protestant Christianity, particularly the Puritan concept of “a city set on a hill” undergirded the American belief in the nation’s Manifest Destiny, which in large
part led to the extermination of the Native Americans, the War with Mexico, the romanticism of the ante-bellum American South, the belief that African Americans were sub-human, and that God ordained slavery. The concept persisted after the Civil War in the myth of the Lost Cause, and was exported abroad as the United States belatedly entered the race for overseas colonies.

The concept of Manifest Destiny is still an essential element of the idea of American Exceptionalism, which often justifies much of American foreign policy. Former President George W. Bush alluded to this idea in his 2003 State of the Union Address where he said, “that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity.”

Throughout the Bush presidency, the President’s idea that God undergirded the policy of the United States led to a mismatch of policy ends and the means to accomplish them. Former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and historian Michael Oren wrote:

Not inadvertently did Bush describe the struggle against Islamic terror as a ‘crusade to rid the world of evildoers.’ Along with this religious zeal, however, the president espoused the secular fervor of the neoconservatives…who preached the Middle East’s redemption through democracy. The merging of the sacred and the civic missions in Bush’s mind placed him firmly in the Wilsonian tradition. But the same faith that deflected Wilson from entering hostilities in the Middle East spurred Bush in favor of war.

Only when policy makers and strategists understand that the use of religious ideology to conquer, subjugate, and terrorize in the name of God is universal, does it become easier to defeat those who employ it.

American Presidents often invoke the name of God to justify the compulsion to conquer, such as McKinley did when he decided to annex the Philippines in 1899 following the defeat of the Spanish. The war against the Filipinos used some of the most bloodthirsty tactics employed to fight the Filipino insurgents, who only wanted independence, and stained our own national honor. Mark Twain wrote: “There must be two Americas: one that sets the captive free, and one that takes a once-captive’s new freedom away from him, and picks a quarrel with him with nothing to found it on; then kills him to get his land. . . .”

A doubtlessly sincere McKinley sought counsel from God about whether he should annex the Philippines or not. Barbara Tuchman wrote: “He went down on his knees, according to his own account, and ‘prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance’. He was accordingly guided to conclude “that there was nothing left to do for us but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos. And uplift and civilize and Christianize them, by God’s grace to do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ died.”

The counterinsurgency manual does mention how “Ideology provides a prism, including a vocabulary and analytical categories, through which followers perceive their situation.” But again, it does this at a micro-level and the lessons are not applied at the higher levels of strategic thinking and
policy. This is often due to the fact that American and other western strategists and policy makers view religion “as a set of theological issues rather than as a profoundly political influence in public life.” Even after nearly a decade and a half of unremitting war against enemies for whom religion is at the center of their politics, policy makers still misread or neglect the importance of religion and religiously based ideology in the political motivations of their opponents. In many cases, the religion of a people is a stronger part of their identity than that of the state. Nations created during the post-colonial era “continue to see religion, clan, ethnicity, and other such factors as the markers of community identity” Despite the advances in communications and technology and the globalization of so many western concepts, the political and religious leaders of Islamic nations view modern western political and social concepts as unwanted intrusions on their ancient cultures, and more importantly, insults to their religion.

But, lest American policy makers and strategists see this rise as something completely foreign, a similar phenomenon is occurring in the United States. Despite the fact that a growing number of Americans espouse no-religious preference and, according to multiple studies conducted over a period of two decades, are leaving organized Christianity, adherents of two highly motivated and militant branches of Christianity have grown in strength and political power over the last forty years. The group known as Christian Dominionism advocates Christian domination of all parts of society and culture, and Pre-Millennial Dispensationalists believe in the imminent return of Christ to earth, including the belief that most of the earth’s population will be killed during the Apocalypse. A Pew Research Center survey found that by the year 2050, that 41% of Americans believe that Jesus Christ will return to earth. Leaders, politicians (including major conservative presidential hopefuls), pundits, and preachers often weigh in on public policy, to include military strategy, and claim that God’s law supersedes that of the state. They simultaneously reject secularism while legislating against those they deem enemies, and advocate for a “holy war” against Islam without distinction to Islam’s own divisions and denominational detectives.

Such beliefs may appear irrational to American strategists and policy makers, but it is completely rational to those who subscribe to it. The study of history, particularly how the deep roots of religion and faith shape cultural worldviews, as well as the actions of various peoples and nations, helps the policy maker and strategist adapt policy, strategy, and ultimately operational and tactical methods to the context of the conflict at hand. To do this effectively it is important that American strategists not be afraid to examine our own past to see how our ancestors used religion for good as well as for evil. However, the often dark mirror of history can be disconcerting to peer into. People tend to be uncomfortable when the face that they see in the mirror is all too similar to their current enemies, to the point that one might turn away in fear of what they see. The inability to look into the dark mirror of our own history is especially perilous when enemies are perfectly willing to wage war without end unto the destruction of the
world in the name of their God, because when you belatedly look back in the mirror, failure will be staring you right in the face.

Author Biography

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Building the Joint “Bench”
Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to Enhance Talent Management

By
LTC Eric J. Weis, USA, Col Paula Hamilton, USAF, and Col Laura Lenderman, USAF

“It became clear to me that at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in military manuals… the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.” - attributed to George C. Marshall

Between 1936 and 1939, George Marshall went from commanding an Infantry Brigade (approximately 5000 soldiers) to being a four-star Army General and Chief of Staff. While this tremendous acceleration occurred during a unique period of a World War build-up, it is not surprising that Marshall felt slightly unprepared for the demands required in his new position. The quote above addresses a common concern across organizations throughout the world. As leaders continue to move up the corporate ladder into levels of increasing authority and responsibility, has their varied exposure to experience, stretch assignments, tough on-the-job training, and formal/informal education prepared them for these highest levels of leadership? Traditional commercial organizations and the military industrial complex typically address this problem set by trusting that their system of evaluative performance success in a progressive set of demanding positions effectively winnows the field from regular performers to the potentials – a train and develop approach. It is these potentials that are then further groomed for increasing levels of leadership in accordance with the organization’s succession plan. Be it the production of C-suite executives or General/Flag officers, this system has enjoyed past success. However, unlike the military, the corporate world also has a back-up plan in case this grooming process fails to produce the necessary crop of heir-apparants. They can out-source by utilizing a careful assessment and selection approach that actively seeks and matches the potential candidates with the specific cognitive, psychological, and emotional attributes required for the targeted position.

While outsourcing for mid- to senior-level talent is not feasible in the military, one might ask if the military necessarily constrains itself with a dominant “train and develop” approach, without maximizing the advantages of the “assess and select” method used with great success in the corporate world. As today’s operational environment becomes more complex, building the “bench” of future leaders to address future challenges is a critical strategic and operational concern. While not ineffective, our current model for building these future leaders remains anachronistic and relies too much on traditional models of development. This paper explores a complementary talent management approach, to focus the assessment, selection, training, and development of key attributes required at the strategic leadership level. A summary of the extant literature on leadership competencies across varying levels of responsibility will be followed by a closer examination of both the traditional military leader development approaches as compared to a singular best practice of Assessment Centers being utilized in the corporate sector. This foundation then
provides an opportunity to recommend key, cross-profession aspects that could be incorporated to address this complex problem set. Although the maxim, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” tends to be the default position when exploring the challenge of building the bench of future joint leaders for our military services, as professionals we should be asking ourselves if we are truly doing enough.

Stratified Leadership Literature

The study of leadership has enjoyed a place of prominence in the social science literature for the last century. Numerous perspectives have significantly contributed to the leadership field (i.e., traits/competencies, leader-follower exchanges, transformational/transactional), many of which were either sponsored by the U.S. Armed Forces or quickly incorporated into military doctrine. However, one in particular is highly relevant to the purpose of this discussion: that leadership processes and the competencies required vary across leadership levels. Both research and experience indicate that the performance demands required of leaders as they progress through increasing levels of authority and responsibility (e.g., organizational levels) change significantly. While this may represent a blinding flash of the obvious, the ancillary truth to this reflects that these performance demands will in turn require associated critical competencies – competencies that must be enhanced if already present or must be developed if they are not. Effectiveness at any level is dependent on the successful execution of role behaviors within this increasingly complex environment. Acquisition of these skills is based strongly on increases of cognitive conceptual ability and associated critical competencies as leaders’ progress from low, to middle-, to higher-levels or executive-levels of management. Decisions and thinking skills increase in complexity as one progresses from low- to high. Competencies developed and honed at each leadership level progressively builds and adds value to subsequent levels. A comprehensive literature review of all leadership competencies is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, to lay the foundation for the subsequent argument, a description of one of the more influential theories on stratified leadership competencies is provided. Additional competencies or knowledge/skills/abilities/other characteristics (KSAOs) are highlighted in the Table 1 in the final section.

In 1987, Jacobs & Jaques described this differentiated pattern of leader behavior and competencies across organizational levels in their Stratified Systems Theory. They argued that organizational levels could be sub-divided into three primary levels (direct ~ tactical; organizational/operational; indirect ~ strategic/systems), with further differentiation into a total of seven sub-strata. In essence, leadership requirements become more complex with respect to possessing a greater sphere of control/influence and longer temporal outlook for the organization. Personal leadership progresses from direct control to indirect control, requiring greater capacities for organizational and environmental sense-making within settings consisting of greater complexity and ambiguity.
Lower levels of an organization rely primarily on direct leadership. These front line supervisors have direct access (typically face-to-face) and control of subordinates (understanding and articulating work demands), and work tends to be more structured and less ambiguous. Based on this closeness of direct reports, cognitive and interpersonal skills play primary roles. Technical and administrative skills also play prominent roles to accomplish hands-on, basic production processes.

As leaders progress to mid-level positions, the nature of their internal and external job requirements expand. This conceptualization is key because at this mid-level, a leader now controls subordinates who in turn fulfill leader roles for sub-elements or teams – requiring greater conceptual and social complexity. Technical skill is replaced by cognitive and non-cognitive skills associated with management with the ability to deal with more diverse elements. There is also a greater focus on internal and external resource allocation, interpretation with a two-way vertical orientation, and more indirect facilitation of task accomplishment.

Leadership at the organizational summit can also moderate the influence of leader attributes. As illustrated earlier, high-level organizational leaders have the greatest sphere of control, are generally externally focused, and are expected to develop an integrated vision for long-term performance. Their indirect influence on concrete actions (e.g., sales, tactical/operational decisions) is complemented by a stronger, direct impact on vision, policies, and strategic decision-making (e.g., profit margins, operational/strategic impacts).

Leaders at this highest level create and integrate complex systems, oversee direct operation of subordinate divisions, organize the acquisition and allocation of major resources, and create/apply policy. They require additional competence in strategic thinking, business acumen, interpersonal behavior, and cognitive capacity for not only dealing with ambiguous situations, but more importantly predicting the next major event to proactively place the organization in the best position. Finally, they also must possess a more global and societal perspective, allowing them to deal with increasing uncertainty, address a broader range of decisions with longer time spans, anticipate and assume greater risks, and incorporate higher level interests, goals, and priorities at the national level. Whether in a corporate board room or Corps/Fleet/Numbered Air Force leaders in the highest organizational positions must have substantially increased capacities for knowledge (tactical and technical business savvy), conceptualization (capacity to deal with complexity), social competence (being able to interpret complexity of social systems), tempered personality (tolerance to ambiguity and openness to experience), and discretion (leads to traits playing larger role). Although the strata or levels of leadership build upon one another, certain nuances, as described by Jacobs and Jaques, specifically within areas of cognitive, interpersonal, business, and strategic complexity tend to have differential, moderating impacts on overall organizational performance when the leader competencies are aligned with the level in which they lead.
Traditional Leader Development Approaches

Today’s model for building senior military leaders is informed by traditional strategic leadership development theory dating back to early nineteenth century Prussia. Following devastating defeats by Napoleon and France, the Prussian government recognized the importance of developing a cadre of professional military leaders and subsequently established new criteria for officer development. Rather than rely exclusively on aristocratic lineage as the primary qualification for senior leadership positions, the Prussian government established a system of merit-based military schools for the development and intellectual training of young officers. The young officers who attended these schools and rigorous follow-on training were exposed early on to strategic planning concepts and graduated with “common methods and outlook, and an almost monastic dedication to their profession.” The top graduates of these schools were then appointed to the General Staff where junior officers would undergo further training, often outside traditional military studies, and alternate between line and staff duties. This served to expose select junior officers to the highest levels of strategic decision making as well as stretch them intellectually and experientially, ultimately providing Prussia with a deep bench for succession planning for future leadership positions.

Prussia’s revolutionary approach to professional officer development and its subsequent military successes influenced officer development practices throughout many armies around the world in the early twentieth century. The Prussian model of leadership development was particularly influential in shaping the thinking of Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904. Secretary Root is credited with reforming the War Department in the aftermath of the Spanish American War by establishing the General Staff as well as changing procedures for promotions, organizing the military education system, and instituting the principle of rotating officers from staff to line. Within Secretary Root’s system of rotating between staff and line positions and periodic professional education and training experiences, the assumption was that “officers with the desired characteristics and attributes could be ‘grown’ by putting them through a series of varied developmental experiences.” However, unlike the Prussian model of strategic officer development, this system focused on developing a cadre of operational generalists rather than officers with depth of skills, knowledge, and behaviors.

Although warfare has changed dramatically throughout the past century, the U.S. military has steadfastly applied Secretary Root’s Industrial Age philosophy toward strategic officer development. While the officer management system has been tweaked along the margins over the years, officers across all of the military services today continue to follow the same general path to the Pentagon’s E-ring as they did during General Marshall’s time. This developmental path includes short-term operational and staff assignments interspersed with periodic educational opportunities and episodic self-development initiatives. The figure (Figure 1) below
highlights a “typical” Air Force officer career path today and is illustrative of the military’s general “train and develop” approach towards strategic officer development.\(^\text{22}\)

Moreover, even though the illustration shows that today’s system offers limited opportunities for select officers to pursue broadening assignments outside the traditional military realm of studies, the current model generally recognizes (and rewards) sustained operational excellence as the “linchpin component of leader development.”\(^\text{23}\) Herein lays a widely recognized but rarely communicated military management truth: that despite the acknowledgment that our current/future operational and strategic leaders should possess a strong balance of Spartan martial prowess and broadening Athenian erudition, the journey to pursue this equilibrium can result in a terminal conclusion. A system that disproportionately rewards the former and either disregards or unofficially penalizes the latter, will undoubtedly serve as a blueprint for future career path decisions. This position reflects a similar opinion expressed in the mid-19th century British Army officer General Charles George Gordon who opined, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”\(^\text{24}\)

Furthermore, under the current system, the primary means of identifying, tracking, assessing, and ultimately promoting officers to strategic leadership positions is based on a mass board process that expeditiously reviews an array of annual performance evaluation reports. These reports, in general, are assessed by senior raters who retroactively evaluate officers’ performance across broad categories, such as military bearing, mission accomplishment,
and leadership abilities. Based on performance across these general categories, officers are then stratified against peers. Those who demonstrate the “highest” level performance are promoted after a fixed number of years-in-grade to positions of greater strategic responsibility. As an evaluation system that serves as the primary means to select future strategic leaders, its primary focus on performance provides an incomplete picture of the candidate pool, specifically by omitting key information related to key competencies and critical attributes required at the next level of assignment. While this one-size fits all approach to officer performance evaluation, coupled with the century-old “train and develop” approach to officer assignments, has resulted in military success over the years, it may no longer be the most effective and efficient means to capture and leverage the strategic skill sets needed in the future.

Traditional Corporate Leader Assessment and Selection Approaches

In a talent management benchmark study designed to review how top companies assess their high-potentials and senior executives, executive assessment and development psychologists Church and Rotolo concluded that formal candidate assessments have become a widespread event in the corporate environment, both internal and external to individual organizations. As cited in Church and Rotolo, “assessments have become quite popular in practice, particularly in the talent management area. It is increasingly common, for example, for recruiting firms to use pre-employment assessments to aid in decision making for their clients.”

Competition for talent has raised awareness and concern in many organizations about company’s ability to fill future gaps. The extant research and literature, specifically in the business environment, supports high correlations between job performance and natural ability/experience. Similar to the military, leaders at the senior middle management and senior executives must possess the skills and attributes required to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) corporate landscape. While many of these organizations support promotion from within and spend time and energy on long-range succession plans, the military may be able to learn from its more capitalist-focused brethren when it comes to assessment and selection. As addressed in the introduction, the business world is not constrained by a finite internal population pool to draw from. As corporations seek to fill key positions, they have facilitated the creation of numerous tools, processes, and systems designed to ascertain levels of alignment between available, critical positions and myriad of internal and external applicants.

One of the most widely used and accepted tools in the corporate world that could be leveraged in the joint military environment is the use of Assessment Centers. Ironically, this improved talent identification and development technique can trace its roots back to the military environment. Derived initially from methods that the Office of Strategic Services used to attract and recruit undercover agents in World War II, Assessment Centers use trained assessors to evaluate candidates’ behavior in a series of job-related
simulations, cognitive/emotional/personality/behavioral measurement tests, interviews and other socio-metric devices.\textsuperscript{27} This combination of assessment activities has been shown to accurately predict key positional performance and has reliable validity in the fairness of the selection methods.\textsuperscript{28} Although expensive to run, the Assessment Center method represents “one of the most advanced technologies of personnel psychology and form part of the ‘best practice’ prescription both for efficient personnel management and as a means of protecting equal opportunities.”\textsuperscript{29}

Although there are a variety of types of Assessment Center, the traditional construct follows a fairly accepted pattern. Prior to assessing a pool of potential candidates, it begins with a thorough job analysis to derive specific assessment dimensions, capabilities, qualities and behaviors required for success in particular position. Once an acceptable word picture describing the KSAOs required for the position has been created and approved, a pool of potential internal and external candidates is invited to participate. The level and complexity of the targeted position, as well as the number of applicants, typically shape the length of the Assessment Center process, but in general, they last several days due to the intensity of the exercise evaluations.

Although there is no official order of the events, the candidates typically begin by completing a battery of self-report tests to gauge intelligence, determine dominant personality traits, assess behavior decisions in simulated situations, and measure interpersonal communication styles (usually in the form of emotional intelligence questionnaires).\textsuperscript{30} Subsequent exercises assess candidates in a series of individual or group situational tests (e.g., personal interviews with a trained assessor; “in basket” tests designed to determine how candidates plan and prioritize information based on explicit or implied guidance; individual presentations to assess confidence and communication skills; leaderless group discussions to gauge leadership potential and interpersonal acumen; and stress-induced role playing to measure empathy, risk-taking, and adaptability) to provide a holistic picture of each candidate across multiple scenarios and environments.\textsuperscript{31} The overall assessment score of the candidate is usually derived by consensus of the panel of assessors. Resulting Assessment Center scores can serve multiple purposes. From an assessment and selection perspective, the scores can be aggregated to winnow the candidate pool to the top performers designated for follow-on personal interviews with key leadership. From a training and development perspective, the scores can serve as a counseling opportunity that captures each candidate’s profile of current or emerging strengths and challenges for future organizational- and/or self-development (i.e., the nature and sequence of future developmental activities). An additional strength of the Assessment Center method, is its ability to assess leadership potential from three key perspectives: 1) an assessment of the individual’s repertoire of leadership traits; 2) its ability to measure interpersonal aptitude under stressful conditions; and 3) an evaluation of critical
thinking skills and behavioral reactions under a myriad of simulated situations.32

Recommendations

While Assessment Centers tend to rise to the top of assessment, selection, training, and development methods, it should be evident that there exists a wide assortment of tools and measures specifically designed to address concerns regarding finding the best person for the job, or in this case, how to fill the joint bench with the proper staff. For the purposes of this discussion, it remains just as important to recommend “when” these assessments are executed in addition to focusing on “what” types of measurements are used. When approached from this perspective, two primary options emerge – both with their own challenges and opportunities. The first option is to embed the assessment into the normal promotion schedule. There is an obvious danger to this association in which service members would equate competency assessment with promotion potential. On one hand, the services would not want to propagate a strategic message that in terms of perception, either penalizes or rewards officers’ assessment scores based on depth or breadth of current/future competency sets. On the other hand, as these leaders approach promotions designed to align them with the highest levels of command and leadership, one could argue that it makes extremely poor strategic sense to select personnel who lack particular strengths in key areas as they embark on their future roles.

The second, and perhaps more palatable option, is to embed the assessments in the normal officer education system (e.g., pre-commissioning, basic branch, advanced courses, Command and General Staff College or equivalent, War College). This system is already in place and could create curriculum white space for the required assessments. The assessments would become
more determinant as the officers progress further into their educational experience with the early assessments (O-1 through O-4) being more informational and developmental based, and the latter assessments (O-5 through O-7) used as additional indicators for specific competency-positional requirement matching. An additional benefit to this approach allows for longitudinal mapping of competency strengths (or weaknesses requiring focus) over time – a critical developmental tool for leaders at all levels. Table 1 summarizes the leadership literature, current military doctrine, and timeline considerations that can potentially assist in updating our assessment and selection process.

Conclusion

In a recent 2015 letter, Acting Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Brad Carson, outlined several upcoming challenges and opportunities by describing the “Force of the Future: A Revolution in DOD’s Talent Management.” Secretary Carson highlighted that globalization and environmental complexity require a workforce with an incredibly diverse set of talent, skills, abilities and backgrounds. This challenge, in terms of both an evolving work context and the need for highly specialized and adaptive leaders, has made the realm of personnel and talent management “increasingly difficult to identify, attract, access and retain.” Concerned that the problem is likely to become even more acute in the coming years, he advocated a fundamental reform of an antiquated personnel system for military and civilians that has not experienced a significant change in 40 years. The traditional narrow slice of information upon which officer management and development decisions depends almost entirely on a “one size fits all” method, and although conducive to creating a population pool of similar looking, highly effective generalists, it does little to address the importance of selecting for targeted KSAOs required at the senior levels of leadership.

The military process of ensuring our highest quality personnel are selected for the right positions - be it joint staff, large formation commanders, or top level leadership – is certainly not broken. The United States military continues to be at the forefront of world powers, of which our leadership at the highest levels is undoubtedly a key component. However, after reviewing the literature and taking an honest self-assessment on whether or not our services are using the best available means to make these determinations becomes questionable. With an organization of this size, individualism is commonly trumped by collective identity. Whether this is due to time, cost, or scope, our system is not designed to capture critical cognitive, interpersonal, behavioral, or strategic attributes of individual leaders. Indeed, the current evaluation system across the services focuses almost entirely on “Spartan” performance indicators, and rarely addresses the “Athenian” prowess that seems to align itself with the highest levels of leadership in both the military and corporate world. Perhaps the question we should be asking ourselves is, “Can we do better.”

While the training and development approach is necessary for providing education and experience to leaders who
have yet to be exposed to a wide variety of complex situations requiring adaptive thinking and execution, the proverbial honeymoon is over when leaders begin to reach the senior mid- and executive level of leadership. This is not to say that learning does not continue to occur, especially in this increasingly VUCA environment; however, the increased levels of leadership are qualitatively more complex and necessarily require an enhanced repertoire of KSAOs. At these levels, the services need leaders that hit the ground running and can have an immediate impact on achieving desired strategic or national results. To use a sports metaphor, there is no more time for batting practice. The leaders in this line up are expected to step in (with the requisite tool kit of higher functioning leader competencies) and knock the next pitch out of the park.

One of the greatest challenges facing the military’s Talent Management system is that we have fallen into a comfortable bureaucracy with regard to conventional paths of upward progression. As a traditional hierarchical organization, we have used a system of increasingly complex duty positions that expand in scope, authority, and responsibility as one progresses through the ranks. This makes obvious sense based on levels of maturity and experience typically possessed by leaders that can be applied to their duty position, and is supported by mountains of leadership literature. But while this perspective and accompanying research highlights the required attributes that are most useful at specific stages of leader position (i.e., span of control, time span of future visioning, cognitive/conceptual mapping, sense-making, interpersonal communication), it makes a fundamental assumption that these skills and competencies are natural by-products of the wisdom gained through age and experience. The current process does not fully explore early potential or the possibility that there may be junior members of the team/organization that already possess a multitude of these desired skills sets. Nor does it suggest that matching competencies with positions early in one’s career cycle could leverage, maximize, and even encourage further focused development in these select areas to achieve desired organizational efficiency and effectiveness. In its purest essence, this current/potential matching is exactly what “talent management” is supposed to do.

The proposals offered are far from capturing the numerous best practices available to align the right leader (defined by possessing the requisite skills, attributes, and competencies) with a specific, targeted position. This essay represents an active approach to identifying and leveraging talent for both job performance success and building a bench of high potentials for succession planning. The military’s current method relies more on performing well in a series of progressively complex assignments, which in theory is both logical and effective, but is more attuned to the collective talent management as opposed to a more focused individualized approach. Instituting an Assessment Center approach to the military career progression is not a panacea for addressing leadership concerns; however, like both Secretary Carson and General Marshall, the system we use to assess, select, train, and develop must at least evolve at a
rate similar to the increasingly VUCA environment in which we expect these critical leaders to operate.

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2. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


**Table 1 References (not included in Endnotes)**

Where Are the Cops?
Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S.
Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad

By
Lt Col M. Honoré Spencer, USAF, Col Gene Hughes, ANG, and LtCol Cesar Rodriguez, USMC

Why We Need to Develop Foreign Police

Despite nearly 14 years of concerted effort, the United States continues to battle Al Qaeda affiliates in countries throughout the Middle East, as well as Pakistan and Somalia. None of these groups have been eliminated or even degraded to the point that would allow U.S. counterterrorism (CT) operations to substantially decrease.1 Al Qaeda elements continue to be the primary CT focus of the United States because of their stated intentions to continue to attack Western interests.2 President Obama specifically took aim at the Al Qaeda spin-off group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), when he publicly commented that the United States will “ultimately destroy” the group, an accomplishment the United States has yet to achieve against any of the Islamic extremist terror organizations it has pursued since 9-11.3 In contrast, from 2010-2014 the number of radical Islamic groups has increased 58 percent, and extremist fighters have more than doubled. Furthermore, the number of attacks by al-Qaeda affiliate groups increased nine-fold from 2007-2013.4 Terrorist group motivations have not subsided. According to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, groups such as ISIL continue to espouse ambitious external goals, including “the expansion of the caliphate into the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa and attacks against Western, regional, and Shia interests.”5

In recent decades, U.S. CT efforts have focused heavily on military solutions to combating terrorist networks, with significantly less attention paid to improving policing capabilities worldwide. However, numerous CT and counterinsurgency experts argue that policing and intelligence have the greatest impact on defeating terrorist networks.6 Historical evidence has proven policing to be the most effective approach to destroying terrorist groups. According to a 40-year RAND study, since 1968, 40% of terrorist groups that have ended were defeated as a result of policing, while only 7% were defeated as a result of military force.7 Additionally, significant decreases in rule of law, in particular due to weak local policing and enforcement, have been directly correlated with a marked increase in Salafist-jihadist groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa.8

Because modern terrorist networks are organized in loose, decentralized hierarchies, “direct-action” approaches to decapitating terrorist leadership have limited long-term impact on their own. However, terrorist networks are quite vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by indigenous police working in the communities where the groups operate. Furthermore, effective community policing provides the means to gain critical intelligence from the local populace on terrorist group activity and membership. Good police work and community involvement are at the heart of defeating terrorist organizations. Despite evidence emphasizing the impact effective policing has on combating terrorist groups, U.S. and international efforts to integrate
indigenous policing into a comprehensive CT plan have been haphazard and ad hoc.

Some U.S. national guidance notes the importance of building foreign law enforcement capabilities. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism specifically stressed “building the capacity of foreign partners in all areas of counterterrorism activities, including strengthening their ability to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and military counterterrorism operations,” while the current 2011 National Strategy emphasizes “the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience.”

The National Security Council further emphasized the U.S. commitment to help build our partner’s organic security capacity: “For nations that have the will to fulfill their international law enforcement commitments but lack the necessary means, the United States is committed to partnering with them to develop stronger law enforcement and criminal justice institutions necessary for ensuring the rule of law.”

Unfortunately, national strategy and guidance have not been translated into coordinated action by United States Government (USG) agencies. USG efforts to develop foreign law enforcement capabilities in at-risk nations have been wholly fragmented and uncoordinated. If defeating transnational terrorist groups is truly a top national security priority, and developing effective law enforcement abroad is a supported and proven approach to counter these groups, the United States must significantly improve its focus and coordination with regard to police development.

What’s Impeding Effective Police Development Abroad?

Lack of an Integrating Coordination Mechanism and Strategy

Depending on the environment, personnel ranging from municipal police officers to special operations forces may be the most appropriate personnel to assist indigenous police forces in improving CT capabilities. Personnel and resources would likely come from various organizations, partly based on political or legal restraints associated with the given environment. Remarkably, there are approximately 20 different USG organizations and associated programs across six agencies involved in assisting foreign law enforcement. These organizations and programs are found in, but not limited to, the Departments of State (DoS), Defense (DoD), Justice (DoJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Treasury (TREAS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Police development programs range from DoS’s Civilian Police (CIVPOL) program, providing contracted police advisers to assist foreign governments, to DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) offering specialized training to international law enforcement officers. Unfortunately, the efforts of the numerous U.S. organizations are not coordinated and lack an integrated strategy.

A 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report showed extensive deficiencies in the ability of U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to assist foreign countries in disrupting and prosecuting terrorist groups. The GAO report illustrated that LEA efforts were
significantly hindered by a lack of clear roles and responsibilities, funding priorities guidance, performance measurement systems, and assessments of countries’ CT needs. A later 2012 GAO report further highlighted that while some higher-level coordination of police assistance policies has taken place, the U.S. government still has not defined agencies’ roles and responsibilities to assist foreign police and agencies do not consistently share information to assess capabilities.

The Department of State has lead roles in coordinating CT strategy and police assistance abroad. The DoS Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is responsible for coordinating the development of USG strategies to counter terrorism abroad, while the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affair normally has the lead role for providing police assistance abroad. Unfortunately, DoS alone lacks the resources and commensurate authority to effectively coordinate assistance and prioritize the efforts of other departments. DoS also has a considerable array of responsibilities that dilute its ability to coordinate actions across a large number of disparate USG organizations. While many would still argue that DoS is the most appropriate agency to act in a lead role for USG unity of effort, a consistent, interagency coordination mechanism is needed to bring the many organizations together and coordinate their actions utilizing a synchronized approach.

Overall, the lack of an effective coordinating mechanism to synchronize USG efforts and the lack of key national strategy elements have contributed to significant deficiencies in police assistance programs.

Unfortunately, this has created an interagency system obstructed by Departments’ parochial agendas and strongly reliant on informal relationships developed between agencies.

**Legislative Prohibition on Training Foreign Police Forces**

Section 660, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, prohibits the use of U.S. assistance funds to advise, train, or offer financial support to foreign police force. This amendment was passed in 1973 and was designed to prevent the USG from supporting and training the foreign police forces of repressive regimes, particularly those that commit human rights abuses. Prior to this legislation, there existed an overall lack of effective policy guidance with respect to the training of foreign police forces. This led to significant training of foreign government police forces, but little accountability for its long-term impacts.

Despite Section 660’s blanket prohibitions, over time, numerous exceptions to the amendment were implemented for select USG organizations to conduct training in various post-conflict environments and for other specified purposes. These exceptions have been granted on a case-by-case basis and provide for specific limits to the training provided to foreign police forces. Although these exceptions have been helpful in creating pathways for training foreign police forces, the issuance of piecemeal exceptions to Section 660 has created a fragmented governmental approach to providing effective CT training and assistance to foreign police forces. We must do better.
How to Enhance Foreign Police Assistance

To effectively develop foreign police to combat terrorist groups, the U.S. government must address key legislative hurdles and interagency deficiencies. To be successful, multiple USG departments must coordinate and prioritize the multiple forms of support that they can provide. Police development must also be a central part of a long-term strategy in which USG support continues for an extended time while target nations’ capabilities incrementally improve. The following proposals seek to address these key aspects of developing foreign police capabilities.

Rescind Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act

Section 660 has created a fractured system for training and assisting foreign police forces to combat transnational terrorist groups. Before Section 660 was implemented, the Office of Public Safety (OPS) coordinated the training of thousands of police officers worldwide in the 1960s, at that time to contain the spread of communism. After human rights abuses were committed by personnel trained by OPS, Congress summarily disbanded OPS, creating a disjointed “diaspora” of agencies and funding streams to conduct foreign police training activities. While assistance can be provided by agencies to assist foreign police in narrowly defined areas based on various exemptions, the patchwork of restrictions has made training inconsistent and ill-managed.

Authority for agencies to provide assistance to police is somewhat restrictive. While limited, DoS and DoD have been the top providers of assistance for training foreign police. Authority for DoD to provide police assistance is generally restricted to police combating narcotics trafficking, and for areas authorized by Presidential directive, such as building police in Afghanistan. These types of legislative restrictions prevent or dissuade many USG agencies from providing police assistance strategically or in a holistic manner, even though history proves terrorist organizations are best defeated through effective policing. While the main impetus for Section 660 restrictions was to prevent human rights abuses, other safeguards exist, such as the Leahy Amendment which prohibits security assistance to countries that commit human rights abuses. Additionally, the DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor coordinates with U.S. missions abroad to ensure that nations with officials committing human rights abuses or corrupt practices are not provided assistance. Hence, oversight and guidelines are already in place to prevent assistance from being given to nations committing human rights abuses, which, ironically, negates the overall purpose of Section 660.

Congress should rescind the legislative prohibition on training foreign police forces to remove the patchwork of restrictions and exemptions hampering effective police assistance and coordination. This change would make many more USG resources available to develop foreign police forces to combat terrorist groups. Various DoD forces, such as military police and Special Operations Forces, could be employed and coordinated to provide training in appropriate areas such as patrol/checkpoint.
operations, weapons and equipment use, small unit tactics, and other skills critical for an effective CT force. More importantly, the resources of numerous USG agencies with specialized expertise in law enforcement could be better planned and organized without the legislative and administrative hurdles which dissuade their use and coordination. The multiple instruments of power from various agencies could be employed more synergistically, taking advantage of key capabilities within each agency, such as DoJ’s capability to enhance critical community policing and criminal investigative procedures and DoD’s ability to deploy and train forces in poor security environments. Recinding Section 660 would pave the way for improving interagency focus and coordination on developing foreign police, while still maintaining established processes to prevent human rights abuses.

Establish a Foreign Police Assistance and Coordination (FPAC) Sub-Interagency Policy Committee (IPC)

The coordination, oversight, and assessment of CT assistance programs for police are critical to developing effective police capabilities abroad. Interagency coordination must take place at the strategic level to ensure appropriate departmental resources are matched to specific countries’ needs and to ensure capabilities are developed consistent with a long-term strategy. A specifically chartered interagency coordination mechanism should be established to address this issue.

The National Security Council (NSC) and its subordinate committees are the “principle means for coordinating, developing, and implementing national security policy.” The subordinate committees to the NSC include the Principal’s Committees (PC), Deputies Committees (DC), Interagency Policy Committees (IPC), and Sub-IPCs. These committees serve to analyze and prepare key issues at varying levels for potential high-level deliberation and decision. Historically, IPCs and sub-IPCs have served as the main forums for interagency coordination through policy development, analysis, and resource determination.

One key IPC, the Security Sector Assistance IPC, was established in 2009 to provide a forum to review security assistance policy, roles, and authorities. This IPC would serve as an ideal interagency coordination mechanism that has already been formed to ensure appropriate development of foreign security sector capabilities. Unfortunately, the IPC has historically been underutilized and has not met on a regular basis due to reported workload and turnover issues faced by the National Security Staff (NSS). Given the importance of building effective foreign security forces to combat terrorist groups abroad, the NSS should establish regular, consistent meetings of the Security Sector Assistance IPC by interagency players. The establishment of clear roles and responsibilities for all agencies should be at the top of the agenda for the IPC. Additionally, the IPC should serve as an interagency forum to coordinate development and sector reform in security.
elements to include foreign military, police, and judiciary capabilities.

Subordinate to the IPC, a Foreign Police Assistance and Coordination (FPAC) Sub-IPC should be established to specifically address the crucial role of coordinating foreign police assistance to combat terrorism and other key security issues abroad. The proposed FPAC Sub-IPC would act as the strategic-level coordination mechanism to ensure that police assistance programs and activities are effectively synchronized to meet national strategy objectives, address partner nation needs, and optimize the use of U.S. and international resources. The FPAC Sub-IPC would be responsible for setting partner nation assistance priorities, designating departmental roles and responsibilities, monitoring funding, and assessing the effectiveness of assistance.

Properly fulfilling these responsibilities would lead to coordinated actions by the departments to fulfill national strategy/guidance and address the main factors that impede effective interagency coordination.

Representation in the FPAC Sub-IPC should include all departments/agencies that provide foreign police assistance, to include DoS, DoD, DoJ, DHS, TREA, and USAID. Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should have representation to assist in monitoring agency fund use. DoS would be best suited to serve as the chair of the Sub-IPC, primarily since the lead role in providing police assistance abroad has normally been delegated to DoS through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. However, based on limited capabilities within DoS to manage interagency coordination, assistance may be needed from other key departments such as DoD and DoJ. Within the DoD, the most appropriate lead coordinator would be the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, which provides guidance...
for developing U.S. military capabilities to conduct security sector reform activities.

To enhance police assistance coordination internationally, the proposed FPAC Sub-IPC would also communicate and coordinate with international police assistance organizations to include the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United Nations Police (UNPOL), International Police Training Institute (IPTI), and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Improved U.S. coordination with these international organizations and with partner nations possessing well-established police assistance programs would greatly enhance international capability to leverage resources to improve police development in at-risk countries. The Sub-IPC could then serve as a centralized focal point for strategic collaboration and role delineation with international organizations and partners abroad. The following figure provides an organizational chart of the proposed FPAC Sub-IPC within the structure of the NSC.

**Implement Re-Focused and Coordinated USG Strategy for Security Development**

Given today’s fiscally and resourced constrained environment, it is foolish to believe “the United States alone [can] eliminate every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens our safety, security, or interests.”27 It is imperative that we leverage key partners to share our common security burdens. Although history is replete with examples of counter-insurgency strategies, one that may be particularly applicable to combating transnational terrorist groups is the oil spot strategy. Traditionally, an oil spot strategy entails a method of countering insurgency and terrorism through the provision of effective security and stability in selected key areas. Once security and stability is established in these key locations, it would be methodically and continually expanded outwards to neighboring areas; much as an oil spot expands outward in porous material.28 An excellent historical example of the use of the oil spot strategy was during the British Malayan Emergency (1948-1957) in which communist terrorists waged a violent revolt against the Malayan government. In response, British forces trained indigenous security forces and created “oil spots of security” through the newly established, and well-policed, New Villages. This tactic proved especially effective at isolating communist terrorists from the populace; their source of power. Over time, the terrorists/insurgents were weakened and eventually defeated. A stable, democratic government in Malaya soon followed.29

Our Malayan Emergency example illustrates the effective use of the oil spot strategy in context of a single country; however, if properly applied, this strategy can be equally useful to combat transnational terrorist networks regionally and globally. Terrorist groups thrive in areas where the absence of state control creates safe havens and permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting.30 Thus, a comprehensive global oil spot strategy focused on CT assistance within strategically selected countries, can be the impetus for overall regional and global security development. As physical security and policing improves in a selected country, information sharing increases fostering CT intelligence...
improvements. This ultimately leads to an increased capability to disrupt terrorist activities in adjacent areas, thereby allowing security to spread as a drop of oil does on cloth.

Central to the success of this strategy would be a measured increase in USG focus on police assistance, improved coordination of police assistance provided by the multiple agencies, and synchronization of police assistance with other forms of security force assistance, both within the USG and with other supporting nations. Additionally, with numerous resource constraints, the United States cannot plan to build security capabilities everywhere at the same time. Prioritization and continued commitment to strategic areas/locations will be critical to the long-term success of a global oil spot strategy. The Security Sector Assistance IPC and FPAC Sub-IPC would serve as excellent forums for optimizing the allocation of limited USG resources and focusing security assistance against key qualified countries, utilizing a long-term strategic approach. Additionally, these strategic-level coordination mechanisms could synchronize assistance with international organizations and regional partners to avoid duplication of effort and best match resources to associated assistance goals.

Valuable to this strategy at the country-level would be the placement of “Coordinators for Combating Terrorism” in embassy country teams. These coordinators would aid in improving interagency coordination and facilitate developing internal security forces in key partner nations. Additionally, these coordinators would enhance in-country agency coordination and assist in CT and security force capabilities assessment. Coordinators would work closely with embassy security assistance officers to optimize CT assistance programs being employed in-country and assess the effectiveness of these programs. They would prove invaluable when working in conjunction with legal and defense attachés to develop close ties with law enforcement and military intelligence officials, while also fostering and developing relationships for information sharing. CT coordinators could also work directly with international organizations, such as the INTERPOL, to enhance information sharing. Essentially, CT coordinators would serve to 1) ensure security is improving in the key selected countries and their surrounding neighbors (i.e., the oil spots are established and expanding); and 2) ensure information is being shared to better combat local and regional terrorist groups.

Through the systematic development of effective security organizations in selected key countries, key partner agencies coordinated through the FPAC Sub-IPC and international organizations would help to develop “oil spots” of effective local security across the region and globe. With continued effective assistance these security spots would stabilize and expand improving security to larger areas. The improved security environment would thus set the conditions for the selected redirection of additional U.S. and international resources to improve other areas such as economic development and social well-being. To be clear, the most effective long-run strategy must include a comprehensive approach using all the instruments of national power. Security force development efforts should be combined with parallel efforts by U.S. and
international agencies to improve civil institutions and economic opportunity in at-risk nations to address the root drivers of terrorism derived from social, political, and economic inequalities. As part of a long-term, multi-faceted approach, an oil spot strategy for development could be central to neutralizing many transnational terrorist groups at the state, regional, and eventually global level over time.

Conclusion

From a global perspective, U.S. CT efforts abroad have been unsuccessful at defeating the most dangerous terrorist groups that threaten our national interests. Unfortunately, military-centric approaches to CT operations and partner nation development have not been effective over the long-term in destroying these resilient groups. Years of historical evidence have shown that effective policing has the greatest impact on rooting out terrorist groups. Unfortunately, antiquated U.S. legislation and ineffective interagency coordination have shackled the U.S. government’s ability to develop foreign nations’ police capabilities.

If the United States is to be successful at vitiating the global threat posed by extremist groups, it must change the development paradigm and reprioritize its effort on building localized and connected policing capabilities abroad. Rescinding legislation prohibiting the training of foreign police forces, establishing a strategic-level Foreign Police Assistance and Coordination Sub-IPC to coordinate interagency and international police assistance, and applying a global oil spot strategy for comprehensive and enduring security force development will greatly enhance partner nations’ capabilities to combat transnational terrorist groups in their own countries. Only with a long-term, refocused approach to development, synchronized between our own agencies and with our international partners, can the United States hope to find success at eventually vanquishing an extremely resilient global threat.

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Over time, the U.S. Government’s process for creating grand strategy has become increasingly ineffective due to overly prescriptive legislation and to fundamental misunderstandings of what grand strategy is, where it is located, and when it should be created. In the future, U.S. leadership should ensure the formulation of grand strategy is driven by changes in the security environment, fiscal environment, or national policy goals rather than focusing on rigid statutory periodicity.

Curiously, the term grand strategy continues to escape formal definition in US government code and doctrine. This lack of clarity opens the door for misunderstandings between the senior leaders of the Executive Branch, departments within the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branch. “When politicians, officials and soldiers, and of course media commentators, speak imprecisely of policy, grand strategy, military strategy and operations, they fatally inhibit their own ability to grasp properly the issues of the day.”

The lack of specificity is especially alarming considering the breadth and depth of statutory requirements oriented towards strategy formulation. Numerous think tanks, philosophers, and academic professionals have produced definitions for grand strategy, but many of these definitions are vague and generalized, while others provide lengthy descriptions paired with detailed caveats. Usually, these definitions articulate grand strategy in relation to national instruments of power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME). Strategy, to the Department of Defense, as opposed to grand strategy, is typically defined as a risk informed balance between ends, ways, and means.

Having defined what grand strategy is, we must also articulate where grand strategy exists. Locating grand strategy presents significant opportunities for misunderstanding, but the key to preventing this confusion is to articulate grand strategy’s location in relation to policy and implementation. In particular, identifying the territorial boundary between policy and strategy presents a challenge. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government offers no specific definition for policy. The Oxford Dictionary describes policy as “a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party, business, or individual.” However, The Oxford Dictionary also names the terms strategy and stratagem as primary synonyms to the term policy. Seeing the terms policy and strategy described as synonymous is clearly unhelpful and has undoubtedly led to confrontation and confusion between policy makers and strategy makers. For the purposes of this paper, we propose that strategy is located between policy and execution. Policy comes first and identifies broad intent.
Strategy organizes the intent in terms of a risk informed balance of ends, ways, and means. The implementation of the strategy is execution.

Ideally, national level policy requires a grand strategy that achieves balance and mutually supporting relationships between the elements of DIME, which in turn leads to integrated methods of execution. The idea being that the sum of the whole of government effort exceeds the sum of the parts. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the relationship between what grand strategy is, and where it is located. Grand strategy is comprised of all elements of DIME and is located between policy and execution. When at its best, grand strategy is able to optimize the integration of the national instruments of power in order to achieve a whole of government effort where the sum of the whole is more effective than the sum of the parts.

The US Strategy Process and Failures

The US strategy-making process is formalized in law. Specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 formalized the requirement for the President of the United States to submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy (NSS) to Congress. The NSS seeks to gather subordinate strategies from the various parts of the executive branch and merge them into a single, cohesive document that expresses how the United States views and desires to address the multi-faceted world it operates in. The NSS however, is just the tip of the strategy iceberg, both figuratively and legally speaking.

In addition to the National Security Strategy, U.S. law also requires that, “Not later than February 15 of each even-numbered year, the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the

Figure 1 – Grand Strategy: What and Where
House of Representatives a report containing the results of a comprehensive examination of the national military strategy” and, a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The first element of the QDR is “to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a).” The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is a critical component of the QDR, but is yet another militarily specific strategy document that does not appear to differ significantly from the NMS, as both are Department of Defense products.

The military element of national power, with its robust statutory attention, is the only element represented by multiple statutorily required strategy documents. The State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) addresses the diplomatic instrument of national power but is not required by law. Interestingly, the information and economic elements of national power have no departmental level strategy and could be considered rudderless. Though it must be acknowledged that aspects of the information and economic instruments of power are addressed tacitly through the NSS itself and the other strategy publications.

Figure 2 depicts US strategy publications within a national instruments of power framework. One might conclude that the number of strategy publications is directly proportional to the budgetary size of the department. However, it is also important to consider the composition of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC’s statutory Secretary level members all currently publish quadrennial strategy documents as do each of the statutory advisors.

Like the QDR and the QDDR, The Department of Energy’s Strategic Plan is nested within the NSC and includes a risk informed description of ends, ways, and means. With respect to DIME, the Department of Energy’s area of responsibility is split between the economic and military spectrums. The Department of Energy strategy addresses nuclear and energy security related items that are not and cannot be dealt with in the various Department of Defense documents. The Energy Strategic Plan only touches on the economic instrument of power in very limited ways.

In regards to the Information instrument of national power, the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding is a domestically oriented strategy document and does not discuss the application of information as a form of national power in respect to nation states, terrorists, or other potential existential threats. The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, a five-year strategy document championed by the Director of...
National Intelligence, does focus on external threats and concerns, but does not cover the full spectrum of the information element of national power. The mission of the intelligence community is to “Provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence to inform decisions on national security issues and events.” The intelligence community focuses on gathering rather than shaping.

The members of the NSC have clearly taken steps to focus on strategy production. However, the NSC’s statutory composition does not directly reflect the DIME construct. The NSC is not task organized and this predictably results in an imbalance in grand strategy.

By mandating strategies from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the law is inserting Congress into the strategy making process 3-4 levels deeper than it reasonably might be expected to. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is also “Strategist-in-Chief” and subordinate strategies do not necessarily add to, enhance, or bring clarity to U.S. strategy. In reality, the legal requirements result in more work for headquarters staffs without producing better strategy. Strategic guidance may be the rare, “less is more” exception.

The framework formed by these strategic documents fails the United States in many ways. Most critically, the process is tied explicitly to internally imposed timelines and budget submissions, rather than changes in the security environment, fiscal environment, or national policy goals. The world does not, however, change in lockstep with the U.S. strategy making process. Because a new strategy is due every year, developing it has become a significant bureaucratic chore; a duty to fulfill rather than an exercise rooted in intellectual rigor.

By linking the annual NSS submission to the submission of the budget, the United States has rooted strategy to expenditures. Reasoning exists in that the strategy’s ways and ends should be driven by the means provided through the budget. However, following this model inappropriately links the two. The NSS is not the programmatic basis for the President’s Budget. The strategy must be considered, but not as the foundational document for acquisition. When the defense budget follows the five-year Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), changes in the means portion of strategy are fairly predictable and rarely surprising.

The law, insomuch as strategy documents are concerned, does not appear to be followed that closely anyways. Figure 3 depicts how often strategies do not meet their required periodicity. The annual NSS appears to be the most challenging; published barely over half of the time (16 of 29 years). The NMS is even more absent, occurring only 6 of the 13 years required by law. The QDR fares the best, appearing every year it was required, save for the extra year between the 2001 and 2006 editions.
This rigid timeline driven process is flawed and does not serve the United States well. By requiring new strategies and comments on strategies so often, Congress has opened the door for repetition, work for the sake of fulfilling the law rather than serving a genuine need, and worst of all, contradiction. If the documents’ purpose is to provide underpinning for the work of the government it should carry weight for longer than a few years. If those needing the guidance hesitate to implement it for fear of a contradictory mandate forthcoming in a draft document, then the strategy fails them as well. Lastly, if most presidents cannot produce a new strategy annually, and the need for one is not apparent, then the periodicity requirement must be revisited and a more effective regimen should be developed.

Counter Argument

The current method by which U.S. grand strategy is prepared does yield some important positives. Leaders and their staffs, who are concerned with strategy’s design, thought, and activity may believe that the current process of strategy creation (or re-creation) is a great benefit. Followers of this line of thinking will sometimes quote Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything”\textsuperscript{13} Arguably, regular strategy production cycles prohibit senior leaders, and their supporting staffs, from becoming lax. The idea being that the rapid cyclic strategy process may prevent the nation from failing to detect and address emergent threats before they become overwhelming. Additionally, the activity of strategy planning can serve as a forcing function to ensure the ends directed by the strategy are appropriately resourced and supported in a synchronized fashion. On the other hand, it is important to consider that Eisenhower’s comments where intend specifically in regards to unexpected emergencies in a near term operational sense.\textsuperscript{14} The concept being that emergencies happen in unexpected ways and cannot be ever fully predicted by pre-made plans. By contrast, strategy is fundamentally proactive in nature, long term in its duration, and
typically requires persistence and consistence. Eisenhower was not talking about strategy.

Alternatives

There exist some instances where U.S. strategy development has been notably successful even without statutory requirements. In 1950, responding to the possibility of the USSR developing a nuclear bomb and the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist People’s Republic of China over Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China, the US issued National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68). Signed by President Truman in 1951, NSC-68 became, in the eyes of many historians, the most important strategic document throughout the Cold War, and set the tone for US relations with the USSR and other communist nations.

NSC-68 introduced strategic context through a discussion of upheaval caused by the previous two world wars. The document defined what the purpose of the United States is in historical terms and articulated foundational national interests. In the same way, the Soviet Union’s own designs are described with an eye towards understanding the underpinning sources of tension between the two nations. Crucially, the document described ends, way, and means within a DIME like framework. NSC-68 emphasized alleviating, “the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war.” NSC-68 presented four courses of action for the US and concluded with recommendations that harness all aspects of the DIME to “frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust.”

NSC-68’s strength lay, not only in its cogent structure, but in providing guiding purpose and principle to the whole of the U.S. government. Indeed, the whole nation marshalled for the struggle against communism. The authors of the document possessed the capacity to define the problem, establish the goals for the U.S. in leading the free world, and describe how and with what the nation and her citizens could achieve those goals. NSC-68 provided unambiguous guidance in a world with clearly defined sides.

Of late, the challenge for strategists has been to clearly articulate a strategy in an uncertain world; one with, “unknown, unknowable, and constantly changing elements.” Breaking from convention and the normal documents required by law, in January of 2012, the Department of Defense issued the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The DSG, not a legally mandated review of the nation’s defense strategy, developed a response to changing geopolitical and domestic realities. This new strategic document addressed the draw downs in Afghanistan and Iraq and spoke to the need to protect the Nation’s economic vitality and protect U.S. “interests in a world of accelerating change.” The Department’s assessment developed a “defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’s efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending.” Accordingly, the DSG defined the projected
security environment driving the need for change and the military missions for which the Department of Defense must prepare.

The DSG, in defining the global security environment first declared that the United States’ security and economic well-being are inexorably tied to the Western Pacific, East Asia, Indian Ocean, and South Asia. This reality mandates a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. The document then set the geopolitical cause for a new strategy. In relating the M of the DIME to the ends, the DSG stated, “The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence.”22 Recognizing that the Department needs to maintain global presence and vigilance, it then discussed the primary security priorities for each geographic region and the DoD’s responsibilities and activities for addressing those priorities such as the Middle East and Europe. Throughout the DSG, an emphasis was placed on working by, with, and through the United States’ partners and allies, both regionally globally. Emphasis also was placed on the Department’s responsibility to support the other instruments of national power, particularly economic, and diplomatic.

After defining the environment and the problem, as well as the military’s role in the Nation’s strategy, the DSG directed the primary missions for the armed forces. Risks, both external and domestic, were discussed as well as methods for reducing that risk or accepting it. The DSG concludes that “The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate.”23

Conclusions and Recommendations

Leaders, within the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, should amend the ineffective and unbalanced strategy making system created by multiple generations of their predecessors. The U.S. Government should seek to establish statutory and regulatory instructions that ensure efficient and effective mechanisms for the creation of grand strategy; ineffective and counterproductive mechanisms should be avoided. More specifically, the U.S. Government should seek to create balance across the DIME in its strategy production process rather than applying rigid focus on the Department of Defense alone.

Congress has an important duty of oversight, carries the power of the purse, and can require that a grand strategy exist if it so desires. However, Congress should avoid specifying rates of publication that dive two, three, or even four levels deep into the Executive Branch. With one hand, Congress demands a reduction in DoD staff size, while with the other hand requiring specific and continually increasing rates of strategy publication.24 The situation, in the name of oversight, has become abusive and disproportionately focused on the military. The Executive Branch should require the national instruments of power be addressed through subordinate strategies, and nested in the current NSS. As with the NSS, these subordinate strategies, one for each facet of DIME, need not be tied to a rigid publication cycle and should instead focus on creating grand strategy formulated, as needed, in
response to changes in the security environment, fiscal environment, or national policy goals. Implementing such changes allows the nation to gain synergy between its national instruments of power and will help to ensure balance to grand strategy.

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1 Note: JP-1 provides the following comment in lieu of a definition for grand strategy: “None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)” A definition for grand strategy is not presently available in top level US legislation, regulation, or doctrine.
6 Figure 1 is original to this paper
7 10 U.S.C. § 153
8 10 U.S.C. § 118
9 Figure 2 is original to this paper
10 Note: The NSC statutory members include the President, Vice President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Intelligence Director, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy are advisors to the Council.
11 James R. Clapper; The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America; (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2014); p. 2
12 Figure 3 is original to this paper and derived from multiple sources.
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower; Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference; 14 NOV
1957; para 3; available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951
14 Eisenhower; para 3
16 US Department of State website; NSC 68 webpage; accessed 1 November 2015; https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68
17 Note: NSC-68 was written before the DIME concept was codified. Instruments of national power are articulated in a DIME congruent fashion.
21 Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance; 1.
22 Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance; 2.
Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The Need To Create A Language Requirement for General Officers

By MAJ Steven Lacy, USA, LTC Tyler Oxley, USA, Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC Aldo Vergara, Chilean Army.

“Throughout my seven years as Combatant Commander, both at Southern and European Command, and with NATO operating in Afghanistan, I’ve learned that shipmates who truly have the language, culture and regional skills are often ‘silver bullets’ that can transform a difficult challenge into a success.”

Admiral James G. Stavridis

The need for cultural and language expertise in today’s military is almost cliché. Planners, military theorists and senior leaders throughout the U.S. armed forces accept a need for increased understanding of operational environments, a need highlighted during the last decade’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leaders periodically decry the lack of cultural knowledge or foreign language skills of military officers--the management class of the force--but have provided little incentive for officers to develop these capabilities. Initiatives to address these shortfalls have failed because they lack an adequate incentive for the military’s leadership to make cultural and language capability a core capability of the officer corps. The best mechanism to affect this change is amending the Goldwater-Nichols Act to create a foreign language requirement for General Officers.

The Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes the need for better language and cultural understanding. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: “Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change.”

As early as 2005, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap stated a “new approach to warfighting in the 21st Century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in the force.” DoD even developed a Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities for 2011-2016 to “enhance and institutionalize these critical enablers” yet little has changed. And while DoD has fallen short of implementing necessary change in this area, so too has our legislative branch failed to enact meaningful reforms. As one congressional subcommittee noted, “congressional oversight suffers from lack of follow-through on issues examined in hearings and briefings. Opportunities to make lasting changes are lost when problems are identified put proposed solutions are not implemented.”

According to the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), if the US is to maintain its leadership role within the international system it must mandate an improved cultural approach that will allow a better understanding of world societies. We must develop an improved cultural understanding and empathy that largely can
be achieved through knowledge of local languages. US armed forces senior officers with a level of linguistic and cultural awareness would be able to operate more effectively and avoid possible misunderstandings that could affect their mission accomplishment, not only in military matters but also involving other instruments of US national power such as the diplomatic, informational and economic. Language capability also has the potential to reduce the breach of cultural asymmetry between the US and host nations in an operational environment.

“Because we live in an increasingly small world, we are going to be engaged more frequently with other nations to solve problems together. The best way to do that is to be open, to engage with one another, to understand one another’s cultures and perspectives. If we can speak one another’s languages, and apply the cultural context to our interactions, our communication will improve dramatically.”

General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF (RET)

This paper focuses on language skills as the critical enabler for regional expertise and cultural understanding. While mastery of a foreign language does not automatically imbue cultural expertise, there is a strong correlation between acquiring a foreign language and developing cultural competence. We consider language skills to be a quantifiable skill the DoD can use to measure its progress in meeting cultural, language and regional expertise goals. The vast majority of our officer corps is not bilingual. Less than 10% of all military personnel speak a foreign language; although statistics are difficult to come by, the percentage is likely even lower among officers. The limited number of officers who do speak a foreign language fluently usually acquired that language in a home where English was a second language. Anecdotally, this also means that the most common foreign language spoken by officers is Spanish. Other important world languages, such as Chinese, Russian, Farsi and French are not widely spoken by our officer corps. This presents a critical vulnerability during U.S. military operations abroad.

The issue is not that DoD or Congress fails to recognize the problem. Conversely, the challenge is to force a cultural shift among senior leaders in the military that will require key decision makers in the uniformed services to implement solutions. If senior leaders were required to develop a foreign language capability in order to reach the General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) ranks, the services would be forced to adopt a training and testing pipeline that ensured its most capable officers had the opportunity to attain some level of language proficiency. We believe that the best mechanism for achieving this change is for Congress to amend the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to require any officer promoted to GO/FO rank to have a standard, minimum level of proficiency in a foreign language. Many of our allies have already made foreign language proficiency a requirement for their officer corps. In 2014 the U.K. made proficiency in a second language (preferably Arabic or French) a requirement for promotion to Captain. Canada has long had a requirement for its officers to be able to operate in both English and French.
The logic behind this proposal is simple. GO/FO candidates may be among the least likely military officers to speak a foreign language, unless they happened to be one of a handful of Olmsted scholars. This is not due to a lack of capability; one could argue that our GO/FOs are among our brightest and most capable officers. Rather, the career track that creates our senior leaders in each of the military services is unlikely to result in a bilingual officer. These officers typically spend their careers in highly operational assignments, leading combat units, ships or air units. There is little incentive for fast-track officers to move out of these operational assignments due to fierce competition for leadership opportunities. Yet, knowledge of a foreign language could prove a benefit to these officers during multinational operations.

Because learning a foreign language usually takes considerable time, and because promotion boards traditionally have not valued foreign language capability above other skills or accomplishments, there is little incentive for senior leaders to learn a foreign language. While our senior leaders may appreciate the challenge of learning a foreign language and the capability language proficiency brings to the fight, very few are practitioners of this foreign language skill. Requiring GO/FOs to have a foreign language proficiency would create a powerful incentive for the military services to provide fast-track officers better opportunities to develop a foreign language capability. Once a critical mass of senior leaders has developed this capability, they will champion initiatives to increase this capability among the officer corps.

If language capability was institutionalized, opportunities would be plentiful. Most officers spend tremendous amounts of time in Professional Military Education (PME) courses during their career. These courses range from a few months, to almost a year of full-time instruction. It would be feasible to add short language course requirements to the services’ staff colleges, as well as to each of the War Colleges, which are themselves a prerequisite for promotion. Imagine if the average Army officer, for example, was convinced that speaking a foreign language would increase his promotion potential, and significantly enhanced his potential effectiveness in an operational environment. He could start learning a foreign language in college, for instance through the ROTC Cultural Understanding and Language Program (CULP), and continue to develop that capability through resident and distance learning courses throughout his career. By the time the U.S. was involved in its next significant campaign, it would be more likely to have a number of highly qualified officers with more than a basic language and cultural understanding of the operational environment. Of course, this only works if the officer is incentivized and believes it benefits of his career to devote his time to foreign language study. This incentive would need to apply equally to all services in order to force a cultural shift among all senior leaders across the military.

True language proficiency takes time—the amount of time is a matter of some debate. Purveyors of the current batch of quick learning programs (i.e., the discontinued DoD Rosetta Stone program)
make spectacular claims about rapidly acquiring fluency with little effort. More conservative authorities (who are not selling a product) claim that up to 10,000 hours of intense training is required to master an additional language. Quick fix solutions to language deficiencies—whether software programs or the hiring of battlefield interpreters—are an easy trap for leaders who lack a true understanding of what it takes to develop language capability. The point is, language training cannot wait until an officer is approaching possible selection as a GO/FO. If Goldwater-Nichols required a Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 2/2 for all GO/FO candidates, services would ensure they were creating a pool of suitable senior field grade officers that met this requirement. Similarly, ambitious junior officers would want to make sure they “checked the box” in hope that stars were in their future. The logical progression would be to require a modest foreign language proficiency either as a prerequisite for commissioning, or early in every officer’s career. A Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 1/1, for example, sets the bar fairly low at, “Limited exposure to the country, region, or area of specialization. Less than 1 year of experience.” This certainly is not an impossible task. Foreign language proficiency at this level is already a common requirement either for admission to or graduation from many undergraduate programs.

Currently, without any emphasis on maintaining these language skills, what little capabilities our officers have developed prior to entering the military has atrophied, and is gone by the time they become mid-grade officers. Some initiatives to tackle this problem have merit. Service academies require that all cadets/midshipmen receive foreign language instruction. French was once a requirement for all US Military Academy cadets. Scholarship ROTC cadets in non-technical fields of study (Air Force/Navy) are required to take language courses. Ironically, the Army is the only service that does not require language education for commissioning, and yet it is arguably the service most likely to benefit from increased language proficiency in a military campaign.

“The military services have each implemented a strategy for cultural and foreign language training, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to highlight the importance of culture in workforce development. Time will tell whether these efforts are sufficient to ensure that culture does not recede, once again, into specialist communities and out of the awareness of general purpose forces.”

Military Review, July/August 2012

The initiatives mentioned above fall short of providing a coordinated solution to a problem that should be a priority of our senior military leaders. All cadets should be required to take the DoD language proficiency exam prior to commissioning, and language instruction should be a requirement for all commissioning programs regardless of service and field of study. Language training can even be maintained through refresher courses concurrent with PME. However, these initiatives will have little effect if not part of a broader, coordinated life-cycle of instruction for officers.
Language proficiency added as a requirement to attend (or graduate from) Intermediate-Level Professional Education (Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Army Intermediate Level Education, etc.) simply should be a continuation of university or service academy requirements. This could potentially reduce pressure on PME schools to require extensive language training in house. Officers with current language proficiency scores of 2/2 or better could be exempted. If officers have a notion that their careers will not progress beyond O-6 without language capability, services and officers will have a mutual goal of continuing language education. Current university level continuing education and country exposure would be desired by the officer and supported by the service. Continuing education could be added to existing PME curriculums with the proper institutional incentive, and by leveraging existing distance learning tools offered by the Defense Language Institute (DLI).

Flag level officers, in addition to their traditional tasks, form military and political relationships within NATO and other coalitions around the world. In some cases, these relationships may be as valuable to the DoD as the officers’ primary military functions. In this context, the knowledge of a foreign language and culture would greatly enhance a senior leader’s ability in his assignment and improve military planning in support of national strategic and military objectives. Globalization has greatly impacted military operations. The US military is regionally aligned through combatant commands and faces the challenge of operating in more world regions than the Victorian-era British Empire. A proficient use of “smart power” requires a high degree of cultural understanding and language proficiency by key leaders. By increasing language aptitude in our senior leadership, we will make great strides in gaining respect among key nations on the world stage. Yet we cannot wait until an officer is selected as a GO/FO to being the long process of training him or her in a necessary foreign language.

Some might argue that resources are the main obstacle to implementing these ideas. This argument ignores the plethora of excellent language-learning resources DoD currently provides (free of cost), that few officers take advantage of. While the DoD may require additional means to fully implement a language requirement in the officer corps, plenty of distance learning options currently exist for officers to improve language capabilities. However, without career incentives for officers to devote substantial time to these endeavors, little progress will be made.

The authors of this paper each possesses some level foreign language proficiency. We can tell you from experience that it takes dedication to continue to improve and maintain language capability. A few officers study and learn foreign languages on their own because they have a personal interest, but this number will always be small. Most officers require an incentive, because the opportunity cost of learning a language is high due to the amount of time involved.

Goldwater-Nichols has been hugely successful in encouraging the services to send officers to Joint Commands and Joint PME. Without its legislative mandate, the services almost certainly would not fill many
of their joint billets, or require Joint education. While some have argued for a complete overhaul of Goldwater-Nichols, we advocate no such thing. We merely recommend a small change in law that creates a language requirement for officers prior to becoming a GO/FO. This small change will have major, ripple effects in the DoD, institutionalizing language initiatives that are often pushed aside for other priorities.

An alternate approach to a change in federal law would be to incorporate language training into all Joint PME, although the financial costs could be substantial due to extended TDY periods and/or increased faculty numbers. GO/FOs under Goldwater Nichols are required to be Joint qualified, which includes necessary PME. Language courses and a testing requirement should be required during this instruction. Waiting for a revision of Goldwater Nichols may delay unnecessarily the implementation of a language requirement. DoD also needs to examine alternate means of institutionalizing language capabilities. The Secretary of Defense can direct a policy change that introduces language training into the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) or other Joint/National Defense University course curriculums as an elective requirement. For those unable to attend classroom instruction, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) can be leveraged for distance learning and high demand, low availability language instruction. While this alternative will do little to encourage language training of junior officers in the short term, it would represent a significant cultural shift in how the officer corps views foreign language capability.

It must be understood that the initiatives we propose will at best, result in an officer corps with rudimentary language skills. While these skills will be imperfect, and unlikely to reflect all known foreign languages, the result will be a significant increase in capability for operations and a better likelihood of effectively working in a multi-national environment. Amending Goldwater-Nichols is an important step, but necessary to force a change in military culture. Our current military leadership will not unilaterally implement necessary changes in military language capabilities due to a lack of experience and appreciation of this capability.

With recent discussions in Congress of updating Goldwater-Nichols, the time is right to incorporate this requirement into legislation. Congressional leaders, including Sen. John McCain, have recently called for a review of Goldwater-Nichols, 30 years after this historic legislation. This is an opportunity to codify a language requirement when Congress is already poised to review existing Joint requirements. Again, the need for cultural and language expertise in today’s military is clear. Despite a known lack of foreign language skills among military leaders, DoD has provided little incentive for officers to develop these skills. Initiatives to address these shortfalls have been inadequate as they lack an incentive to make cultural and language capability a core capability of the officer corps. The best mechanism to affect this change is amending the Goldwater-Nichols Act to create a foreign language requirement for General and Flag Officers.
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Improving the International Community’s Response Framework for Mass Conflict Refugee Migration

By
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“We know from recent history that massive refugee movements can unbalance peace and stability in the world as much as any arms race or political or military confrontation.” Senator Edward Kennedy made this statement in 1979 as part of a world refugee crisis report for the U.S. Congress. While the statement was made over 35 years ago as Senator Kennedy was talking about mass refugee migration in Indochina, it is as relevant today when thinking about the refugee crisis from Syria’s five-year civil war. Since March 2011, the Syrian civil war has caused the mass migration of over four million refugees into neighboring countries and Europe. In addition, another 7.5 million Syrians are internally displaced and could become refugees in the future. Many consider the Syrian refugees Europe’s worst human migration crisis since World War II.2

Mass Syrian refugee migration is increasingly threatening regional security and political, economic, and social stability in Europe. Although the U.S. is the largest unilateral provider of humanitarian assistance in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, humanitarian assistance is no longer enough to ensure U.S. strategic security priorities. To develop effective national policy and inform international response frameworks, mass refugee migration requires systemic and holistic analysis to understand strategic factors, elements, interconnections, and drivers that effect complex human migration networks.

Human migration systems are much larger and more nebulous than the specific case of Syrian conflict refugee migration for any number of reasons. Generically, human migration is the movement of people from one place in the world to another. People can either choose to move, voluntary migration, or be impelled or forced to move, involuntary migration.3 Voluntary migration is usually due to perceived economic, educational, or quality of life improvement or benefit from migrating. The voluntary migration population is mostly economic migrants trying to escape poverty and seek better economic opportunities. In theory, voluntary migrants would receive the protection of their government if they were to return to their home nation. Impelled migrants, like those fleeing the Syrian civil war, are refugees forced to leave their home country because of unfavorable situations such as warfare, political instability, or religious persecution. There are many factors and forces influencing mass human migration, and those factors and forces may not be the same for all categories of voluntary migrants and refugees. Understanding the phenomenon of mass human migration is multifaceted and multilayered and deserves further analytical study; however, this abstract will focus solely on developing a systemic understanding of mass conflict refugee migration and will not analyze all migration categories.

System Element Identification

A mass conflict refugee migration system has three main populations – a
population within a nation still living in their homes/communities, an internally displaced persons (IDP) population, and a population of refugees who have migrated outside of the nation. Specific Syrian conflict refugee migration system elements and elements’ behaviors were subjectively interpolated from academic articles and news reports on Syria since its civil war began in March 2011. Elements and trends within the system taken from are:

a. Level of governance in country of origin – decreasing
b. Level of stability in country of origin – decreasing
c. Level of security in country of origin – decreasing
d. Level of access to basic needs in country of origin (SWET-EH) – decreasing
e. The size of the IDP population – increasing
f. The level of international community’s (IC)/nongovernmental organizations (NGO) access to provide services to IDP populations – decreasing
g. Intensity of indiscriminate violence from armed conflict affecting civilians – increasing
h. Size of receiving country economy – steady or increasing
i. The level of political stability of receiving countries
j. The level of institutional capacity of receiving countries
k. The level of Transnational Criminal Network activities (smuggling) – increasing
l. The level of International Community (IC) engagement and capacity – increasing.

Understanding the conflict refugee migration system elements’ behaviors over time provides insight to element relationships, interconnections, and potential correlation or causation. Key internal, or push, and external, or pull, elements are superimposed and mapped below on two Behavior over Time (BOT) graphs (Figure 1). The internal elements BOT graph indicates an apparent inverse relationship between the governance and stability in Syria and the number of IDPs. Additionally, the internal elements BOT graph potentially shows how refugee numbers increase gradually during the first phases of conflict, perhaps when civilians are not as affected by warring faction

![Conflicts Refugee Internal (Push) Strategic Elements Over Time](image_url)
violence, then reaches a breaking point of sorts, increasing exponentially in a short period of time. The closing months of 2013 saw increased Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) attacks against Syrian military forces, which affected security within Syria in a new way, and may have affected individual decision making whether to flee Syria.

External, or pull, elements (Figure 2), such as the IC’s ability to provide support and humanitarian relief to IDPs and the IC’s willingness to accept refugees for resettlement, do not appear to have a significant effect on refugee numbers. One hypothesis is that the number of refugees a country is willing to resettle does not impact the decision of potential refugees to flee their home country because conflict refugees are making internal security calculations, not external benefit calculations. Many countries have publically stated their willingness to provide protection to conflict refugees, i.e. Germany estimates it will accept up to 800,000 refugees in 2015. But 800,000 is meaningless when over four million refugees have already fled Syria and 7.5 million more IDPs could flee any day. External factors, perhaps because of the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, appear to have little impact on the conflict refugee migration system. However, current IC response policies focus almost entirely on building humanitarian assistance capacity, willingness to receive refugees, and other external, or pull, factor mechanisms. Deeper analysis of the complex and dynamic conflict refugee system is needed to better understand the relationships between strategic factors and their effects on the conflict refugee migration system, but the BOT graphs indicate internal security factors have potentially the greatest effect on refugee migration decisions.

To better understand the dynamic relationships within the conflict refugee migration system, a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD), or systems map, helps depicts the structure and elements of the system, and their interconnections and functions. The CLD below (Figure 3) represents the conflict refugee migration system on the left and the subsystem of refugee movement on the right. Both are needed to fully illustrate conflict refugee migration.
The center stocks of the system, highlighted in yellow, are the system’s foundation and represent the population, IDPs, and conflict refugees. These three stocks are put into motion by actions or effects of other system elements. The most influential elements in the system are the stability and security within the population’s home country. Stability encompasses governance (political, economic and institutional effectiveness), and access to basic services (sewer, water, electricity, trash, education, healthcare (SWET-EH)). Security encompasses rule of law and protection of life. Erosion of stability causes the population to migrate internally, becoming IDPs, to locations of greater perceived stability. This internal migration can be reversed with increases in stability. If the population perceives there is low risk to civilians, and perceives risk and cost of leaving are high, the population is likely to remain in place. External diplomatic engagement, and Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organization (IGO and NGO) involvement positively affect stability. Monitoring IGO/NGO access could be an indicator of stability – if access is high, stability is likely to improve, and if access is low, stability is likely to deteriorate.

Erosion of security causes the population (including IPDs) to flee the
country as refugees. Once the population perceives their lives, not just their livelihoods, are at risk, they will flee to seek protection in another country. Military action, either by internal military forces or external military forces, will either increase or decrease security, depending on the population’s perception of that action. If the population perceives civilians are at high risk, they will weigh the risk and cost of leaving against staying, but the risk and cost of staying are exponentially higher when they feel they are subject to indiscriminate violence. Also, over time, risk and cost of leaving decrease because a transnational refugee migration network is established.

The transnational refugee network provides information, direction and advice to those still at home and provides a connection to a potential host country. Refugee migration takes significantly more time to reverse than internal migration. Refugees seek enduring security, not cease fires or temporary improvements in security.

The population-IDP-conflict refugee–stability-security loop is the dominate system loop. There is a time delay in the system when security disintegrates to the point of high perceived risk to the civilian population and mass refugee migration. The transnational refugee network will take time to establish itself. With only a nascent

![Diagram of refugee movement system](image)

Figure 4.
refugee network, the population’s perceived risk and cost of movement may still outweigh the perceived risk of staying. Once the refugee network is established, mass migration can occur.

The refugee movement subsystem on the right-hand side of the systems map is the most important subsystem, and requires analysis to fully appreciate the complexities of refugee migration and develop effective policy responses (Figure 4). A refugee seeks immediate protection and assistance in a host nation, which are often the nations with which their home country shares a border. Refugees are likely placed in camps, provided humanitarian assistance, and, finally, processed to obtain some type of legal status as a refugee. This resettlement experience is influenced by the host nation’s political, economic, social/cultural, and institutional capacity to receive refugees, and by the transnational refugee network made up of relatives/friends, communications technologies (cell phones, social media), and transnational criminal networks profiting off of smuggling refugees and other migrants to a second or third country. Whether a refugee stays in the first country they arrive at or if they travel on to a second or third country is directly related to their level of perceived long-term security.

**Identifying Trends and Drivers**

Another way to understand the mass refugee migration system is to understand the various trends and drivers of change within the system. Determining which factors have the most influence on refugee migration will help the international community leverage the right policy mechanisms to prevent further mass migration. The force field diagram below (Figure 5) depicts external and internal factors and their relative strength or influence on refugee migration decisions. All factors in the force field diagram were assessed as having an influential effect on an individual’s decision to flee their country of origin. Individual factors were assessed on a subjective scale of 1-10 of relative strength of influence. As indicated, internal factors outweigh external factors by almost two-fold when considering influencers of refugee migration.
The factor that most affects conflict refugees is the level of security in their home country, directly followed by risk to civilians and stability. Again, internal factors appear to have greater influence on refugee migration decisions than external factors. However, the simple factor of having a relative or friend in another state is the greatest influencer of external influencers. Understanding the interrelationship of these four factors merits further analysis.

The force field analysis also indicates efforts aimed at eliminating transnational criminal smuggling networks are potentially an ineffective use of time and resources. European Union Naval Forces Atlanta (EU-NAVFOR) are specially missioned to target, disable, and prevent refugee and migrant smuggling by transnational criminal networks. The counter-smuggling effort would be more valuable if the effort was solely aimed at preventing refugee exploitation and significant loss of life at sea. The conflict refugee systems analysis, supported by the force field analysis, seems to indicate targeting TCN smuggling will have very little impact on the number of refugees seeking to enter Europe, as the refugees will find other legal and illicit ways to enter a host nation.

Figure 6.
A critical element within the conflict refugee migration system is security within the country of origin. As security in the system erodes, refugee migration increases. To understand potential consequences of eroding security on future outcomes, a futures wheel (Figure 6) was developed to identify expected secondary and tertiary consequences of this trend.

The primary trend within the system is a worsening security situation. The primary, or first order, effects of this trend are represented in yellow, while the secondary and tertiary effects are represented in orange and green respectively. The most likely implication is that 7.5M IDPs begin to migrate out of Syria. This is obviously highly undesirable as it triggers broader regional instability, increases the humanitarian crisis, and potentially causes militarization of border security and border closings. Both the collapse of opposition forces and the Syrian central government (tertiary consequence of US military/coalition action) could result in the positive outcome of a negotiated transitional government to secure and stabilize Syria.

Current Syrian Refugee Crisis Response Efforts and Policy Framework Shortfalls

The international community, specifically the EU and the U.S., is focusing response efforts on humanitarian crisis response and external factor mitigation, such as targeting smugglers, closing borders, and limiting refugee resettlement quotas. To date, the U.S. has given $4.5 billion in humanitarian assistance, the most of any nation, with much of the donation going to International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) working with the refugees. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have received the largest share, with much of the money going to medical care, vaccinations, safe drinking water, food, and shelter. The U.S. objective in sending money, in part, is to resolve the refugee problem abroad without additional commitment.\(^{10}\)

Recently, the majority of EU ministers voted to take new steps to respond to the refugee crisis. They voted to resettle 120,000 additional refugees, committed more money to the humanitarian effort to improve conditions in refugee camps in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and other locations, and to tighten border security within the EU. Although ministers recognized the need to stabilize Syria,\(^{11}\) no policy pathway or tangible commitments were made to formalize the Syria stabilization effort beyond more than just wishful thinking. A recent editorial provided an insightful summary of current response inadequacies:

“The mass of refugees searching for asylum in Europe has made it obvious that solving the refugee crisis on European soil is not feasible. Making border fences higher and immigration controls more stringent is the wrong approach, as it tackles the symptoms rather than the causes of the waves of refugees coming to Europe. Granting asylum helps many vulnerable people in emergency situations, but it does not stop dictators, despots and warlords from arbitrarily and coercively persecuting and torturing minorities, opponents and dissidents. The key to solving the refugee crisis lies in the countries of origin – and, more precisely, in the hands of their political leaders.”\(^{12}\)

As the conflict refugee migration system analysis indicated, response efforts and policy frameworks focused on external
factors appear ineffective at best, and negligent in preventing suffering and indiscriminate violence at worse.

**Recommendations**

The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) stated, “…a strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples.”

Additionally, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, Secretary Richard, has recognized that the Syrian crisis has gone from a nation in crisis, to a region in crisis, to a global crisis. This rhetoric alone, without the insights garnered from the systemic analysis of the mass conflict refugee migration system, indicates the U.S. and the IC must do more than simply throw money at the problem. Security, perceived risk to civilian life, and stability are the biggest drivers in the mass refugee migration system, causing populations to displace both internally and externally. Though humanitarian aid to limit and prevent human suffering is critically important, it alone will not stop refugees from migrating if they perceive they are subject to indiscriminate violence. Targeting the root cause of instability and insecurity through diplomatic, economic, informational, and military efforts must be the foundation of any refugee response policy framework. The IC has recently taken steps in the right direction as foreign ministers from across the IC met to discuss beginning negotiations between the Assad regime and opposition forces. A January 1, 2016 deadline was established for beginning the negotiations and agreement on a UN-administered cease-fire mechanism was reach. But without significant, committed effort to establish security within Syria, political transition and a cease-fire declaration will not change the refugee decision cycle until the risk of leaving outweighs the risk of staying.

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7 See EU Responses and Challenges in Archick, Kristen; Margesson, Rhoda. Europe’s Migration and Refugee Crisis. September 4, 2015. CRS IF 10259


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It’s Time for the United States to Turn Down the Aid and Turn Up the Pressure on the Government of South Sudan for Peace and Prosperity

By
Lt Col Chad Diaz, USAF and MAJ Joshua Fishman, USA

Seceding from Sudan on July 9, 2011, South Sudan, the world’s newest African State and 193rd member of the United Nations, remains trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and corruption. The United States bears some responsibility for its current conditions as the principle actor drafting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Not only did the U.S. invest manpower to draft the CPA, but leading up to its creation donated close to $10 billion in development aid in the region over the years to both the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to bring about peace and stability in central, northern, and the Horn of Africa. Although the citizens of South Sudan are independent and free as of July 2011, the fledgling country is drowning in a sea of problems. The U.S. needs to step up and reassess the types of rescue efforts needed to get the country afloat. Diplomatic efforts combined with throwing large sums of money and aid at the problems in South Sudan are not achieving the desired effects. To understand and address the issues facing South Sudan and to develop a strategy to bring about positive change, it is important to layout a process. First, there needs to be an understanding of the history and the current threats existing in this conflicted region of the world. Second, a general understand of the United States’ strategic direction and national interests in the region. Third, development of systems and modeling to understand the environment through patterns, relationships, and interrelationships with associated first-, second-, and third-order effects. Fourth, the identification and description of social change theories related to key stakeholders. Finally, a proposed alternative strategy or strategies that, if applied, dismantles the failing system currently in place.

Pre-South Sudan Independence

Prior to the breakup of South Sudan and Sudan, Sudan underwent two periods of civil war stemming back to its independence in 1956. The major periods of conflict were 1956-1972 and 1983-2005 in which an estimated three million lives were lost due to conflict, disease, drought, and starvation. Violence emerged primarily between populations living in the north, predominately Arab Africans who were Muslim, and the South, predominately Non-Arab Africans whose religions were Christianity and Animism, over language, religion, government representation, and resource access. A respite from the fighting came in 1972 with the “Addis Ababa Agreement” that achieved a short-term peace for 10 years with the southern portion, consisting of the current South Sudan territory, gaining temporary autonomy. Another flare up of violence occurred from 1983 until 2005, culminating with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a period of stability for six years until a final vote in January 2011 granting South Sudan permanent independence in July 2011.
Post-South Sudan Independence

When Sudan lost the South Sudanese territory, it also lost 75% of its natural oil reserves. This loss brought about immediate problems as can be imagined. South Sudan refused to pay transit fees to the Sudanese and cut oil production. Additionally, South Sudan accused the Sudanese administration (Khartoum) of stealing over 600 million dollars of oil. To add to that, South Sudan refused to pay compensation fees to Sudan since its secession despite the appeals of the African Union (AU) as a means to broker a peace deal and stabilize both nations’ economies. Subsequent international diplomacy among nations and international governmental organizations were able to resolve the oil argument with South Sudan agreeing to pay reparation fees to Sudan for a period of several years. However, oil in general, where it is drawn, where it flows, how it is refined, and where the profits go, remains vehemently contested between the two states.

Although the South Sudanese are predominately described as non-Arab with Christianity and animism as the more popular religions, over 200 ethnic tribal affiliations exist. Tribal make-up primarily consists of the Dinkas (11%), Nuer (5%), Azande, Bari, Shilluk and Anwak (3%). The inter-ethnic struggles inside the country prevent the notion of solidarity. Further adding to the problem is a perceived misrepresentation of minority tribes in the government. Many of the cabinet ministries in South Sudan are held by Dinkas, who are of the same tribal background as South Sudan’s first and current president, Salva KIIR. It is readily apparent that South Sudanese government seats are awarded due to tribal affiliation versus regional populations.

Roughly five identified border region issues need to be addressed by both the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments. Some of these border areas directly resulted in violent clashes due to proximity to oil fields, such as the Heglig Oilfield, whereas others, such as a buffer zone straddling between Sudan and South Sudan, referred to as Abyei, contains oil reserves and tribal residents argue over access rights. These flashpoints could escalate to full-scale war and threaten peace and prosperity in this region.

In addition to the energy and border issues, infrastructure is poor at best. South Sudan contains virtually no transportation networks. It is believed that out of a roadway network of approximately 12,600 km, only 4,000 is drivable. Materials to improve roads are costly as the materials need to be imported. The country also lags in agriculture with no modern irrigation system, to include an absent public water supply system throughout the country. Despite strong international ties with the United States and Israel as well as regional partners within the eastern African countries of Eretria, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan continues to fail in providing peace and security, good economic governance, a strong, and fully representative government, and opportunities and development for its citizens.

U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa

In July 2015, President Barak Obama conducted a series of speaking engagements
in Kenya, including an address to the Kenyan people at Kasarani, the 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES), and a bilateral state address with the Kenyan President in Nairobi. In each of his speeches, President Obama spoke of the desired conditions resident in his 2012 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Leading off, the President highlighted that Kenya has taken the lead in the region as a model where ethnic affiliations are being overcome with a sense of solidarity. It is this notion of solidarity that leads to stability and prosperity. Furthermore, Kenya is a nation which enjoys true freedom of the press which holds leaders accountable.

Despite progress, however, many challenges still face Kenya and the African continent as a whole, especially when it comes to nations such as South Sudan. The President indicated that economic growth is not shared among all African state citizens resulting in socio-economic disparity. There are also widespread regions within African nations where growth and development efforts are marginal or non-existent—what can be referred to as spatial unevenness. As Africa’s newest nation, South Sudan lags well behind in the global modernization process. Large-scale corruption is one of the central activities undermining preventing relatively new African nations from developing prosperity through access to local and global markets. As President Obama put it, “Pervasive corruption with bribery as the mechanism correlates to stagnation of job creation and unbalanced distribution of resources throughout a nation, such as clean water and electricity.”

The President reemphasized the pillars of his U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa by focusing on strong, inclusive, and more transparent and democratic governance. Good governance leads to economic and social development by providing opportunity and prosperity for all and not just for select groups. It also helps to bring about a feeling of national identity. Good governance ensures rights equal to more citizens and plants the idea that differences amongst tribes and ethnicities is a strength and not a weakness. Corruption practices must be eradicated not only at lower levels, but at the highest levels, too. By enforcing anti-corruption laws at all levels, nations can slowly change social attitudes of the acceptance of illegal practices.

The President wrapped up his speech by reaffirming that the U.S. will continue to partner not only with Kenya, but all nations in Africa who strive to and can provide food security, utilities throughout all intra-state areas, urban and rural; improve health and preventative medicine; reduce emissions to slow climate change; and publicly denounce and physically combat violent extremists and violent extremist organizations.

Relationship of U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan African and South Sudan

To analyze U.S. government perspectives and interests toward the current South Sudan situation, the 2012 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa is used as the baseline system for analysis. This strategy is based on four main pillars: strengthen democratic institutions, spur economic growth, trade & investment, advance peace & security, and promote opportunity &
These pillars and associated sub-pillars provide the various elements forming the framework of this strategy and allows the analysis of it as a system. These elements and their associated trends are:

- The degree of strong democratic institutions – increasing slowly
- The level of peace and security – decreasing slowly
- The amount of oil production – increasing slowly
- The amount of infrastructure – increasing slowly
- The degree of tribal/ethnic relationships – decreasing moderately
- The degree of climate change programs – increasing slowly
- The degree of opportunity and development – increasing slowly
- The level of stability – decreasing slowly
- The level of education – steady
- The amount of economic prosperity – increasing moderately
- The level of health care programs – decreasing slowly

These nine elements are shown in the Behavior-Over-Time (BOT) graphs below (Figure 1) as an example. The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa did not associate specific time periods with any of the factors or variables, therefore, the time axis is non-specific.

Individual behavior over time graphs often do not provide any additional information for analysis; however, when combined with other trends correlation can become more evident. In Figure 2 below, the nine individual BOTs were superimposed on one another to provide several potential linkages. The graphic depicts possible relationships between the degree of strong democratic institutions, the degree of
opportunity and development, and the amount of infrastructure; all increasing slowly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, the graph shows potential relationships between the declining factors of stability, tribal relations, and peace and security.

**Causal Loop Diagrams**

The next several causal loop diagrams generate a visual depiction of the issues facing South Sudan and the relationship with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 3 is our initial understanding of the U.S. Strategy as published in June 2012. The strategy entails leveraging a peace and security element, an opportunity and development element, and an economic growth, trade, and investment element on the left side of the diagram and a stability element on the right side. Both sides are tied together in the center by an element of strong, inclusive democratic institutions along with an initial reinforcing linkage between economic growth, trade, and investment and local and global prosperity. In other words, economic growth, trade, and investment leads to local and global prosperity and local and global prosperity reinforces economic growth, trade, and investment. The rest of the offshoots stemming from the major elements are one-way relationships and expressed in a positive manner.

As most models are necessarily general, it is important to understand more complex relationships starting with economic growth, trade, and investment. In Figure 4, economic growth, trade, and investment (EGTI) goes beyond facilitating strong, inclusive democratic institutions. EGTI additionally facilitates peace and security along with opportunity and development, both reinforcing relationships as depicted by the “R;” there is a strong relationship between EGTI and internal and external security.
security as well as EGTI and stability (Figure 4). Additional reinforcing loops are identified between peace and security and strong, inclusive democratic institutions and between opportunity and development and strong, inclusive, democratic institutions.

Figure 5 highlights the effect strong, inclusive democratic institutions have on other major and secondary CLD elements. Not only is there a positively definitive
linkage between strong, inclusive democratic institutions and stability, but a few more positive and implicit relationships. Strong, inclusive democratic institutions begets tribal and ethnic diversified strength and acceptance, the notion of national solidarity, and improved and mutually beneficial international relationship.

Figure 6 illustrates the effect opportunity and development have on other primary and secondary CLD elements. Not only are there positive and reinforcing relationships between this element and strong, inclusive democratic institutions and economic growth, trade, and investment, but additional implied relationships as well. Opportunity and development facilitates peace and security, educated citizens, optimism and idealism, tribal and ethnic diversified strength and acceptance, and local and global security.

Figure 7 portrays the effect the element of peace and security opportunity have on other major and secondary CLD elements. Easily identifiable and positive, reinforcing linkages exist between this element and strong, inclusive democratic institutions and economic growth, trade, and investment. Additional implicit relationships extend from peace and security out to tribal/ethnic diversity strength and acceptance, local and global prosperity, internal and external security. Although not depicted, peace and security will also lead to a sense of national solidarity.
The CLD in Figure 8 highlights the numerous positive reinforcing relationships. Additionally, positive, reinforcing interrelationships exist between the sub-elements themselves, specifically interrelationships between local and global prosperity and national solidarity, and between local and global prosperity and internal and external security.
The CLD in Figure 9 portrays the interrelationships between the element of national solidarity and other CLD elements. In addition to the reciprocal relationship with local and global prosperity, national solidarity leads to tribal/ethnic diversified strength and acceptance, internal and external security, and improved and mutually beneficial international relationships.

Figure 9.

Figure 10.
The iridescent CLD in Figure 10 integrates the identified specific and implied elements and associated connectivity. When assimilated, the elemental relationships and interrelationships makes one understand the high level of complexity associated not only with the President’s overarching National Security Strategy, but a targeted strategy directed at Sub-Saharan Africa.

From a systems thinking perspective, one can identify both the leverage elements (green) and the outcome elements (blue) as seen in Figure 11. Interestingly, the element of opportunity and development appears to affect more elements than the element of economic growth, trade, and investment. Unfortunately, opportunity and development takes time. Opportunity and development are delayed in a country like South Sudan and it will potentially take ten years or more for South Sudan’s system to align with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan African system. While the leverage element of economic growth, trade, and investment will generally affect a system sooner, the magnitude of the effects could be less than the effects driven by the engines of opportunity and development and peace and security. As was postulated in the introduction to this argument, despite the billions of dollars in aid invested by U.S. and other multinational partners, the current system in South Sudan is not improving, it is failing.

![US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa](image)

The outcome variables shown in Figure 11 are strong, inclusive democratic institutions and stability. Stability emerges as the element affected by the greatest number of merging linear and reciprocated connections. Combining the leverage element of opportunity and development with the outcome element of strong, inclusive
democratic institutions, emphasis should be placed on both in the development of a strategic approach. Perhaps the 2012 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa should have focused less on economic growth, trade, and investment and focused more on stability ameliorated by opportunity and development.

trafficking in persons, social unevenness, and spatial unevenness. Corruption and cronyism also beget a kleptocracy and tribal/ethnic divisiveness. The divisiveness is connected to armed militias, which are further tied to recruitment of child soldiers.

In Figure 12, identified threats against a stable, secure, and prosperous South Sudan and a stable, secure, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole are shown. One can ascertain from the diagram that the stronger of the threats undermining the strategy to stabilize South Sudan are the armed militias operating inside the country, corruption and cronyism, and tribal/ethnic and gender discrimination and oppression. Not depicted, but worthy of mentioning, are the interrelationships among the threats. For example, corruption and cronyism beget criminal networks which also beget trafficking in persons, social unevenness, and spatial unevenness. Corruption and cronyism also beget a kleptocracy and tribal/ethnic divisiveness. The divisiveness is connected to armed militias, which are further tied to recruitment of child soldiers.

Global Trends

Global trends are a useful tool that can be applied to further describe and analyze conditions in South Sudan supporting a strategy to lead to desired change. The top global trends affecting The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa are derived from the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Global Trends 2030 document and Richard Watson’s Table of Trends & Technologies for the World in 2020. The following trends selected are:

- Income inequality
- Increased ideological landscape
- Multiculturalism
- Diffusion of power
- Economic growth of U.S.
- Food, water, energy nexus
- Increased interstate conflict
- Increased great power convergence
- Decrease in intrastate conflict
- Hedonism

In addition to global trends, the following endogenous variables were selected:

- Need for effective, united, sustained military
- Need for governmental balance of power
- Need for an educated and trained civilian workforce
- Need to have a national identity
- Desire to have an economic bilateral agreement with Sudan

A force field analysis based upon the identified global trends is shown in Figure 13. The purpose of the South Sudanese system is situated in the middle of the diagram, South Sudan’s attempt to establish a secure national order post-independence. Running down the left- and right-hand sides of the diagram are the variables and associated intensities of each trend. In addition, assessments of each variable as either acting in a positive or negative way against the system’s purpose in indicated. Rated 1 through 10, with 1 being the lowest intensity, and 10 the highest intensity, each side is added up to get an aggregate of the positive and negative trends on the system. In this case, although there are fewer negative trends on the right side than positive trends on the left, the negative trends’ combined weight (32) was more than the positive (22). Therefore, our identified global trends tend to have an overall stronger negative effect on
South Sudan than a positive effect. The stronger negative trends can be attributed to historical and recent conflicts, poor economic governance, and weak democratic institutions. To strengthen the intensity of the positive trends and weaken the intensity of the negative trends, stronger international involvement is essential to reinforce trends supporting positive change.

Building on global trends, income inequality was selected to further develop an implications tree out to the tertiary order of effects. From our developed implications trees, many potential implications are derived. In Figure 14 below, most of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd order effects indicate negative implications, which is what is being observed in South Sudan today.

In Figure 15, another implications tree was developed based on the current South Sudanese system with the desirability and likelihood of each implication happening. From this tree we can surmise several conclusions: most of the implications are undesirable with a high probability of occurrence; in addition, the desirable implications are the result of some form of external intervention. From this, we can assess that South Sudan will not prosper on its own. It will require the involvement of regional or international influences; similar to the level of U.S. involvement required to finalize the comprehensive peace agreement which resulted in South Sudan’s independence.
Alternative Futures

Pertaining to the futures diagram in Figure 16 below, two variables with a high level of uncertainty were selected: the establishment of a stable South Sudanese government and cultural acceptance. The upper right-hand quadrant represents a future in which a stable government is established and multiculturalism (tribal/ethnic diversity) is accepted. The lower right-hand quadrant assumes a future with a failed government, but multicultural acceptance. The lower left-hand quadrant represents a future with a failed government and continued conflict among differing tribal/ethnic groups. The upper left-hand quadrant assumes a future with an established government, but continued ethnic/tribal divisiveness and conflict. The quadrants are labeled as descriptors of these alternative futures.

Some of the triggers or indicators for the upper right-hand quadrant (Bright Horizon) are:

- U.S., regional and/or international organizations lead diplomatic
solutions to resolve South Sudanese / Sudanese border and region disputes
- International agencies establish programs to reduce corruption and reinforce rule of law
- Social programs established to incorporate differing cultural factions to strengthen trust and understanding
- Oil production issues resolved between South Sudan / Sudan as well as established policies/practices in place to distribute wealth among the South Sudanese tribal/ethnic groups
- Lasting resolutions achieved, such as a revised comprehensive peace agreement, among rival South Sudanese political factions and peaceful elections established to enhance government legitimacy

Some of the triggers or indicators for the lower right-hand quadrant (Unknown Tomorrow) are:
- Tensions remain along South Sudanese / Sudanese border
- Rival South Sudanese political factions unable to resolve differences and government institutions breakdown and are ineffective
- Differing tribal/ethnic groups collaborate to overcome inept government support structure
- Corruption remains rampant among government/military institutions
- Regional/international efforts to stabilize government are ineffective

Some of the triggers or indicators for the lower left-hand quadrant (Gloom & Doom) are:
- South Sudanese / Sudanese border disputes escalates into military conflict
- Rival South Sudanese political factions unable to resolve differences and escalation into civil war
- International / regional powers remain on the sidelines and do not become involved in South Sudanese internal and external conflicts
- Oil production stops, increasing regional poverty levels and exacerbating the Sudan / South Sudan wars, further causing disruption in global oil markets
- Violence erupts among the varying tribal/ethnic groups, as distrust and blame is at an all-time-high, leading to IDPs inside South Sudan and South Sudanese refugees in the bordering countries

Some of the triggers or indicators for the upper left-hand quadrant (Unstable Balance) are:
- Global power broker tenuous agreement among South Sudanese political factions
- Emphasis placed on strengthening current government institutions, but do not effectively address corruption practices
- Oil production remains stable, but wealth distribution remains a challenge
- Resolution achieved over Sudanese border disputes, however, both sides remain apprehensive
- Tensions among the South Sudanese cultural regions, such as the state of
Jonglei and the Abyei Area, remains high as the government has failed to take the appropriate steps to improve stability and arrive at a diplomatic solution to curb the violence.

Social Change

One cannot expect to manage change to a system without somewhat of a firm understanding on the concept of social change and the leading theories describing social change. When discussing social change, one must keep in mind that it is a product of the academic discipline of sociology, the study of humans in group settings. Sociology can be subdivided into social structure and social change. There is no single explanation describing social change, but a string of explanations that perhaps fit the model or system that one is trying to bring about change to a more preferable future. Social change is uniquely challenging in that it relies on human consciousness which is not fully understood. For each of widely agreed upon social change theories, critical assumptions exist for each to mitigate misunderstandings. Military planners and strategists identify assumptions to identify gaps of information when promulgating plans. Concerted efforts are made to fill in those gaps to continue or refine plans with an ultimate goal of turning assumptions into facts.

The following key stakeholders associated with improving conditions in South Sudan, to include a description of the applicable social change theories, are as follows:

- U.S. – Technology Theory, Progress Theory, Market Theory
- Israel – Culture Theory, Progress Theory, Technology Theory
- China – Progress Theory, Power Theory, Conflict Theory
- South Sudan – Cycle Theory, Culture Theory, Conflict Theory
- Kenya – Progress Theory, Market Theory, Culture Theory
- Sudan – Cycle Theory, Culture Theory, Conflict Theory

The U.S. was selected because without its support, South Sudan does not secede from Sudan and become an independent nation. The Obama...
administration indicated, and continues to do so, that it will provide support for the budding nation.\textsuperscript{30} China was identified as a key stakeholder as South Sudan is increasing its relationship with the Chinese despite China’s historical ties to Sudan. South Sudan is open to building a stronger rapport with China over oil and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{31} As for Israel, South Sudan considers Israel as a close ally and relates to Israel’s challenges and ability to find solutions and become a prosperous nation. Israel can provide security cooperation through foreign military sales as well as provide education system models in which South Sudan sorely needs.\textsuperscript{32} Sudan was selected due to its historical relationship with South Sudan and the fact that many disputes, conflicts, and hostilities remain between these two countries. Not unexpectedly, change theories for Sudan are almost identical for South Sudan. Lastly, the African nation of Kenya is included as it is viewed by the Obama administration as the model for stability and prosperity in the region. In addition, if South Sudan can sustain peace, it can potentially generate billions of dollars in revenue through oil exports to Kenya and other eastern African states, such as Eretria and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{33}

Social change in the U.S. can be described most adequately by Progress Theory. Progress Theory, general improvement over long periods of time, is the dominant explanation of social change in Western culture.\textsuperscript{34} Progress Theory postulates that while most Western societies generally respect the societies and cultures of other countries, it is the modern, Western society that serves as the bellwether for human development and innovation.\textsuperscript{35} Two critical assumptions for the Progress Theory are that one, today’s society is better than societies of the past, and two, future societies will be better than the present.\textsuperscript{36} Opposition pundits of Progress Theory express that the theory is too overly optimistic.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, in support of Progress Theory, “the U.S. believes that there is a universal standard for judging the value of societies, in other words, those that do not conform are wrong.”\textsuperscript{38} With Progress Theory, we see a direct parallel with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. will continue to partner with South Sudan and other African nations as long as they strive for and accept strong, democratic institutions, spur economic growth, trade, and investment, advance peace and security, and promote opportunity and development – all Western ideals.

On the opposite side of social change theory spectrum, we have Conflict Theory. We see Conflict Theory as the current dominating theory driving social change in South Sudan. Conflict Theory presupposes that change occurs as a result of the conflict among different groups and individuals in a society or organization.\textsuperscript{39} The assumptions for this theory are the following: “one, that society is not a unitary entity, but a collection of different groups in conflict with each other, working to achieve their own goals and execute their own agendas, two, that social change effects different groups and people at both different ways and different times, three, that conflict binds more people closely together, as long as radical conflict does not threaten the very existence of the society, and four, that conflict among groups motivates people to work harder for their goals and
increases the amount and the rate of social change."^{40}

We believe that Conflict Theory is what is driving social change in South Sudan. Most of the conflict is the product of tribal/ethnic competition against one another inside South Sudan. Additionally, there is tremendous spatial unevenness throughout the states of South Sudan. Some states and regions have access to clean water, electricity, cellular phones, whereas other regions remain in the dark. The Southern Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM), the current ruling party in South Sudan, is in conflict with any and all opposing parties and, furthermore, is more focused on achieving its own goals and has its own agenda with little regard for all of South Sudan’s citizens.

**Recommended Actions**

Current policies aimed at improving the conditions in South Sudan are ineffective. The spending of vast sums of U.S. taxpayer money, tens of millions of dollars, is not achieving the desired effects in this country. The diplomatic instrument of power is too blunt and engagements with the government of South Sudan are ineffective. President Obama himself publicly stated that South Sudan must develop another comprehensive peace agreement to end the violence.

The reality is that a country like South Sudan is not a failing state, rather, the current system is working in the way it is intended, for a few to acquire wealth and power at the cost of killing and suffering of many.\(^41\) To change this system, a multifaceted approach is recommended. The approach entails leveraging both economic incentives and disincentives as well as diplomatic disincentives. A more hardline approach is what is needed to influence regime change in South Sudan. A hardline approach is also what is needed if one argues that mechanism driving change in South Sudan can be explained by Conflict Theory.

With this new hardline approach the following actions are recommended: that monetary donations from the U.S. be scaled back and pressure applied to intergovernmental organizations; the United Nations and the African Union provide even greater protection to innocent South Sudanese citizens regardless of tribal and ethnic affiliation; and the money the U.S. continues to invest in South Sudan for opportunity and development purposes and peace and security purposes must be audited. Audits must come in the form of investigative reports and assessments on the ground through intergovernmental, interagency, and NGO coordination. Measures of effectiveness that are appropriate and quantifiable on whether financial aid is achieving the desirable effects in South Sudan must be drafted and used in testing whether or not the conditions in South Sudan are improving. Should assessments indicate that U.S. dollars are continually not producing desired effects, then less and less amounts will be invested.

A proposed economic disincentive is to keep the implementation of harsh economic sanctions available. Referring once again to Mr. Prendergast’s idea that in order to break up the status quo in South Sudan and given the current profitability of conflict, U.S. policy efforts must center on how to make war more costly than peace.\(^42\)
Sanctions on individuals and entities, such as illicit financial networks and networks responsible for the flow of arms and resources to warring factions, need to be implemented. In other words, we must follow the money. The financial networks that are funding violence must be frozen. This is no easy task, but with coordination among the US departments, IGOs, and foreign governments, this indirect approach could eventually lead to better behavior on South Sudan’s part.

The next recommendation to bring justice to those state and non-state actors who continue corruptive practices and rob the general South Sudanese population of money which could be invested into opportunity and development to improve quality of life. Again, this is very challenging as corruption has become the norm in South Sudan as well as throughout most of Africa since the end of colonialism. Working with the Department of Justice, IGOs, and foreign allies, there needs to be arrests, legal prosecutions, and sentencing for not only low-level corruptors, but the elites as well. If the South Sudanese see that those guilty of corruption are being held accountable, arrested, tried, and sentenced, the idea that crime does not pay could begin to percolate. Another message tied to justice is that no one is safe, not even the president of South Sudan, should the president be found to be a direct source of corruption.

A diplomatic disincentive to improve the conditions in South Sudan is to publicly denounce those actors who continue to undermine relief and development efforts. Public condemnation of irresponsible individuals and entities on the regional and global stage could lead to marginalization or removal of these nefarious groups and individuals from governmental or military positions. Incentives need to be developed to have the Southern Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) remain unbiased and not side with certain tribal and ethnic groups and wage violence.

Educational reforms need to be pushed hard. According to CIA World Factbook, the literacy rate of South Sudan is 27%. If South Sudan stands any chance of breaking out of a perpetual cycle of violence and corruption, its citizens need to be literate. This can be accomplished if models of education from country’s like the U.S. and Israel are adopted. Furthermore, literacy must be extended to women and girls. As President Obama stated, governments that discriminate against individuals, be it due to tribal/ethnic make-up or gender make-up, are doomed to fail in keeping up with global markets.

Lastly, a completely new draft of a comprehensive peace agreement and constitution of South Sudan. Diplomacy did work and was effective in the first comprehensive peace agreement in which peace was achieved and South Sudan became an independent country. In fact, South Sudanese came together as a nation and voted, 98%, to secede from Sudan. This indicates that the majority of South Sudan can unite and most want to see improved conditions for themselves and their children. Without a hard stand against corruption, holding high level officials accountable, and allowing financial networks to continue to supply weapons and resources to support intra-state and interstate violence, the current South Sudanese system remains intact.
Author Biographies

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1 Lyman, Princeton N., 2013, "The United States and South Sudan: A Relationship Under Pressure." The Ambassadors REVIEW, Fall: 13-17 The CPA ultimately gave rise to South Sudan’s independence by authorizing a referendum in which South Sudan voted an overwhelming 98% to break away from Sudan and become its own sovereign nation
2 Ibid.
3 (Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: South Sudan 2015)
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
8 Sarwar, 2012.
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