



MARINE CORPS Gazette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

OCTOBER 2017 Vol. 101 No. 10

www.mca-marines.org/gazette

Lead Article: 21st Century Logistics 12

LtGen Michael G. Dana

MajGen O.P. Smith 11

*Staffs, Lejeune Leadership Institute
& Marine Corps History Division*

A Vision for Future "Smart Logistics" 23

LtCol Howard Marotto, et. al

Amazon on the Battlefield 29

*Maj Micheal R. Graham &
1stLt James R.R. Van Eerden*

The MARSOC Lens 40

Col Paul Bertholf

The Marine Corps Design Methodology 73

Staff, MSTP




A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation



40 Cover Article
Marines experiment with C-ULS at Camp Pendleton. (Photo by Sgt Salvador R. Moreno.)

DEPARTMENTS

- 3** Editorial
- 4** Special Notices
- 6** Letters
- 10** Chase Winners
- 11** MajGen O.P. Smith
- 83** Books
- 86** TDG
- 88** Index to Advertisers
- 88** Writers' Guidelines



83 Book Review

The *Marine Corps Gazette* (ISSN 0025-3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will advance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offices. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. "Marine Corps" and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual \$35.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1-866-622-1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES to James G. Elliott Co. Inc., Phone New York: 212-588-9200 Chicago: 312-236-4900 Los Angeles: 213-624-0900. E-mail s.dinkel@mca-marines.org. • COPYRIGHT 2017 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Phone 703-640-6161. DSN 278-2854. Toll Free 800-336-0291. Fax 703-630-9147. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: gazette@mca-marines.org. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Marine Corps Gazette*, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: mca@mca-marines.org. • For credit card orders, call 800-336-0291, ext. 331. PUBLISHER'S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsements by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F's name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion.

IDEAS AND ISSUES

Logistics

- 12** 21st Century Logistics LtGen Michael G. Dana
- 16** Embracing Change in Our Logistics Enterprise LtCol Randy Hodge, et. al
- 20** Establishing a Career MAGTF Logistics Operations Course Maj Leo Spaeder
- 23** A Vision for Future "Smart Logistics" LtCol Howard Marotto, et. al
- 26** Continuous Process Improvement LtCol Erik Smith & Capt James Knight
- 29** Amazon on the Battlefield Maj Micheal R. Graham & 1stLt James R.R. Van Eerden
- 33** Medical Simulation in the Marine Corps LT Shannon Smithson
- 38** Intelligence Requirements for LCEs Maj Benjamin D. Ortiz
- 40** The MARSOC Lens Col Paul Bertholf
- 44** Logistics Staff Trends Capt Matthew Morse & CWO3 Chadwick Pearson
- 50** Medical Operations LCDR David Klimaski
- 54** Buying out Bureaucracy Maj Benjamin D. Lawless

Irregular Warfare

- 56** A Three Front War John W. Kiser
- 61** The Godfather Doctrine LtCol Douglas G. Luccio
- 68** Irregular Warfare Maj Matthew Peterson

MSTP

- 73** The Marine Corps Design Methodology Staff, MAGTF Trng Program

Commentary on Marines United

- 79** Socializing the Network Capt Justin Gray, et. al

WEB EDITION

Available at www.mca-marines.org/gazette

Increasing Seabasing

Maj Robert Barber & MAJ Christopher Wolfe

The Future of Marine Corps Logistics

LTC Barbara Haines & LtCol James A. Jones

Reinforcing the Castle

Capt Cameron M. Allen, et. al

Physical Network Analysis

Maj William P. Sumption

In God We Trust, All Others Use Data

CWO4 Robert J. Toole

A Cold Weather LCE

Maj Mark Wlaschin

Bringing the War to Their Neighborhood

Capt Timothy M. Bagnell

Putting the First Team on the Field

Gil Barndollar & R. Sam Long

Ancient Wars of the 21st Century

LtCol Michael D. Reilly

The Godfather Doctrine

**SFA (security force assistance) training—
an offer the Marine Corps can't refuse**

by LtCol Douglas G. Luccio

Fourteen years into the “Long War,” and the Marine Corps risks forgetting lessons learned and relearned in blood. The Marine Corps needs to archive or institutionalize military advisor training before the knowledge base disappears. Upon looking to the past for answers, a repetitive cycle appeared—initial advisors into a conflict relied on impromptu training to ready themselves, and those who deployed in a mature campaign were more thoroughly prepared. To gauge advisor training efficiency, military advisors from Vietnam to Afghanistan were interviewed. Interviews focused on training: What was effective? What was not? Advisor insights from 1965 reflect similar concerns to those deploying in 2016. In 40 to 50 years, will Marine Corps military advisor programs reflect lessons learned and codified in doctrine, or will we again start from scratch? Currently, there isn't an advisor training doctrine. There are, however, SOPs, MARADMINs (Marine Corps administrative reports), Marine Corps orders, course curriculums, journals, books, and articles that can provide definitions and explanations for SFA. Doctrine, to the magnitude of the *Small Wars Manual* for COIN, does not exist for SFA. *The Godfather Doctrine for Military Advisors*, formalization of advisor training and advisor selection, is proposed as a starting point to build SFA doctrine. History, similarities, cost, cultural change, and recommendations articulate where the Marine Corps has been and where it ought to focus in the future should be captured, recorded, and documented.

>LtCol Luccio is an Artillery Officer with the Foreign Security Force Advisor free-MOS. He is currently assigned as a Military Instructor, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk, VA.



Effective training methods must be employed by U.S. advisors. (Photo by Sgt Ian Leones.)

Both effective and ineffective training methods are fresh in the minds of Iraq and Afghan advisor veterans.¹ Vietnam veterans recall, quite vividly, what prepared them to be effective advisors and what training could have improved. The Marine Corps needs to reach out to the Korean and Vietnam advisors before their experience is lost to time. Some things are constant and should be archived and codified as insights through military advisor doctrine.

After the initial 2003 success of U.S. forces in Iraq, policy makers realized that SOF (special operations forces), specifically U.S. Army SF (Special Forces), were in higher demand than were available. There was a need to train Iraqi Army, police, border guards, and port authorities. The solution was to train conventional forces to serve as advisors, freeing up SF to maintain its capacity in UW (unconventional warfare). In 2006, the Marine Corps established MARSOC (Marine Forces Special

Operations Command).² As SOF capabilities expanded, both the Army and the Marine Corps trained ISF (Iraqis Security Forces). While both Services faced similar challenges, the depth of this discussion specifically reflects Marine Corps equities.

After completing advisor training with three separate teams, I shared and compared observations with other advisors, trainers, and both division and MEF staffs. I learned my observations are not unique—many advisors, trainers, and G-3/G-7 staffs had similar insight. When I MEF hosted the first annual Tri-MEF cross-leveling conference, 13 to 14 April 2015, advisor training trends were presented to LtGen David H. Berger (I MEF), LtGen John E. Wissler (III MEF), and MajGen William D. Beydler (II MEF). Their EOTG (Expeditionary Operations Training Group) directors, who ensure advisor training, concurred that stabilizing advisor training throughout was a Marine Corps-wide issue. I discussed ideas that this article highlights with them. There is an enthusiasm and realization that SFA training needs a permanent home. The Marine Corps is a learning organization, one that improves every year it provides advisor training. In 2007, Richard Cavnol pointed out that 50 years ago, the Marine Corps had a “lack of coherent and integrated strategy for training, deploying, and supporting” military advisors.³ I interviewed 15 Vietnamese advisors and inquired about advisor training concerns. Specifically, I asked, “What training was effective?” and, “What training do you wish you had received?”⁴ My conclusion: nascent conflicts start with rudimentary advisor training. Organizationally, the Marine Corps responds and re-learns how to train advisors after each major conflict. The next conflict should train advisors quicker, with the wisdom of the past based on doctrine, not forgotten ideas. Iraq and Afghanistan advisor training, similar to Vietnam, started slow, re-discovered history of previous advisors, and eventually produced veterans and developed effective training. Why re-learn if you could start at a proven level of performance?

According to my observations, initial advisors focused on hard skills (weapons, radios, and first aid). Soft skills (negotiation, language, and culture) didn’t receive as much attention. Language consisted of parroting a few key memorized phrases. Advisor team leaders were allotted “white space” to fill in what they thought was important. Since this effort was a new venture, instructors and advisors didn’t know what was important. Without a doctrine or realization that proven concepts existed, the neophyte ATCs (advisor training centers) provided their best effort. Feedback from deployed advisors shaped the focus of following teams. Eventually, advisor instruction had expanded to include Afghanistan bound teams. Their instruction included lane training for counter-IED, convoy operations, advanced first aid, small arms, crew-served and foreign weapons training, and greater language and culture experiences. A formalized process developed at home station ATC (primarily staffed by 1stMarDiv and 2dMarDiv) led to a TECOM (Training and Education Command) validated Block IV capstone exercise at ATG (advisor training group) in Twentynine Palms, CA. The formal nature and articulated standards evolved quickly and improved every year.

After 10 years of learning and improving SFA advisor preparation, the Marine Corps closed ATG. Experienced advisors returned to their parent unit, and institutional expertise was lost. In August 2014, a requirement to send advisors to Iraq emerged. Although the training architecture had been dismantled, I MEF and II MEF did their best to provide advisor training. I was a recently-deployed advisor, now working in I MEF G-3, and provided a voice to emerging challenges. My counterparts in II MEF reported similar frustrations and challenges. The 2014 Iraq advisor teams (I MEF and II MEF) leaned heavily on residual advisor training experience resident in MEF G-7’s EOTG. Teams following them would have a skeleton crew of experienced advisors. Once the limited experience transfers, advisors will again “start from scratch,” just as the beginning of the Iraq and Vietnam efforts did. This cycle can

stop. Policy makers must consider a permanent advisor structure, established on pre-existing expertise and training facilities. Advisor know how will be costly to recreate later.

The cost of advisor teams training includes time to develop training expertise. Adding advisor training does not happen overnight. The investment starts with selecting the right people to teach as well as serve as advisors. Selection includes Marines who have demonstrated the capacity to train, mentor, and advise others from different cultures under stressful conditions. While selecting the right person may be a challenging metric to achieve, a useful analogy illustrates the perils of improper military advisor selection. *The Godfather Doctrine* is proposed as a solution to codify Marine Corps advisor training.

Military advising crosses cultural, language, and training barriers. Advising is conducted independently in austere, dangerous environments. Advisors are often surrounded by treachery and conflicting values. An individual who is too quick or too slow to make a decision will fail as an advisor. The Marine Corps must identify and assign the culturally astute and patient to the advisor mission.

Older Than Amphibious doctrine

The Marine Corps was a small wars force long before it became a proponent of amphibious doctrine (1930s) and a successful large-scale land force (1950s). The Marine Corps is justifiably proud of its amphibious contributions to WWII and the Korean War. While landing on opposed beaches was innovative and effective, the Marine Corps first made a reputation as trainers, advisors, and as a force to quell resistance to U.S. interests. COIN (counterinsurgency) and military advising gave Marine Corps legend to names like Chesty Puller, Dan Daly, and John Ripley.

Understanding what enabled the Marine Corps to ensure military effectiveness of nascent or re-emerging governments is applicable to future conflicts. The Marine Corps effectively advised in the Philippines, Caribbean, and Central America (Banana Wars), laying the groundwork for special op-

erations during WWII. *The Small Wars Manual* articulated the lessons learned in what many consider the precursor to counterinsurgency doctrine. U.S. involvement in Vietnam started as a military advisor effort, yet unlike COIN and the *Small Wars Manual*, advising doesn't have a Marine Corps doctrine.

First published in 1940, the *Small Wars Manual* found resurgence 60 years later when Marines began training for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ The *Small Wars Manual* provides TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) in the following areas: logistics, initial operations, infantry patrols, mounted detachments (to include tactical load for a mule), convoys, river crossings, disarmament of population, armed native organizations, military government, and elections.⁶ The *Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)* was published in 2006.⁷ Its authors relied upon the *Small Wars Manual*, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), Mao Zedong's *On Guerilla Warfare* (1965), and other counterinsurgency texts written in the last century.⁸ While the Marine Corps developed small wars and COIN doctrine, training, and employing military advisors have several interpretations. The Marine Corps needs to determine the role of the military advisor. History shows what training, priorities, and doctrine should be. Now is the time to ensure we establish the training necessary to groom the next generation of advisors.

Lessons learned in the Banana Wars and WWII were relearned in Vietnam. Marine Corps doctrine was well suited for conventional warfare while slow to adapt to counterinsurgency and advising.⁹ The *Covan* Association (Vietnamese word for "friend") offered many resources and experts to discuss training and challenges associated with military advising. This Association includes retired Marines: Gen Walt Boomer, LtGen Paul K. VanRiper, BGen Tom Draude, Col Marsh Carter, Col Bill Warren, and a dozen other advisors who have recommended sources and confirmed research. Their input validated the assumption that military

advising is cyclical. Initial advisors of a new conflict improvise training and those in a mature environment arrive at training priorities that have been effective in previous conflicts. From their input, I captured trends on advisor selection and training to include: proven combat leadership experience; first-aid, language, culture, and enemy weapons familiarization;¹⁰ expertise plus team role; CAP (combat advising platoon); combat tour length of advisors: 1 year; and MATA (military assistance training advisor).

Military advising crosses cultural, language, and training barriers.

Proven combat leadership experience. Proven combat leadership is preeminent—a lieutenant with no concept of combat should not make his debut as a combat advisor. He should deploy first and, if successful under fire, become an advisor. Credibility is everything. Vietnam advisors understood the importance of leveraging credibility while frequently advising senior Vietnamese officers. War experience was the credential that mattered most.

First-aid, language, culture, and enemy weapons. The core skills that made Vietnam military advisors successful were priorities during training. Unfortunately, language and cultural training were not standardized, and some advisors deployed without first learning to speak Vietnamese. They were at a disadvantage immediately. Those who received language training were far more confident and competent. Reviewing the experience of Korean War advisors shows the importance of language in culture. KMAG (Korea Military Advisory Group) recognized the challenge as

communication between a highly skilled and competent group of technicians on one hand and an eager and willing, yet often uneducated and untrained people on the other.¹¹

The Marine Corps utilized an 11-week Vietnamese language training program at DLI (Defense Language Institute) in Monterey, CA;¹² however, not all advisors attended formalized language training. Many only received rudimentary training in language survival skills before deployment. It was not uncommon for last minute assignments to force an advisor to bypass language training and head straight to Vietnam.

Expertise plus team role. Everyone on the team must be an expert at something. Everyone was also cross-trained. In the event the expert was unavailable, an alternate must accomplish the mission. Along with individual and team experts, a command relationship (modeled after KMAG from Korea) was developed for Vietnam. The MAU (Marine advisor unit) reported to the MAC-V (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam).¹³ This command relationship was built around the advisors. Conventional units had a separate chain of command. The advisors brought order out of confusion by articulating the context of South Vietnamese military leadership.¹⁴

CAP (combat advising platoon). A platoon imbedded within a single village protects the people while ensuring their development and friendliness toward U.S. efforts. The villages that had CAPs were effectively influenced to support South Vietnam. Viet Cong were gradually pushed back from these areas. This technique was additionally successful as VSO (village stability operations) in Afghanistan from 2009 to the present day.¹⁵

Combat tour length of advisors: 1 year. By the time an advisor builds credibility and rapport, his tour ends and a new advisor replaces him. This lack of time together leads to a degradation in continuity of progress. One year may be a difficult assignment, but it leads to more effective advising effort.¹⁶

MATA. Marine advisors trained at Fort Bragg, NC, learned from Army Special Forces. The MATA (Military Assistance Training Advisor) course of instruction was tailored for Vietnam. The sentiment among Marine advisors was that this course contained some of the best training they had prior to deployment. A review of the course cur-

riculum showed a methodical examination of culture, geography, government, weapons, tactics, and navigation.¹⁷ The most important attribute of their training was that the instructors had previous combat advising experience in Korea or Indochina.¹⁸

Many Things Are Different, But Many Are The Same

Many lessons learned by Vietnam advisors have been re-learned in recent conflicts.¹⁹ While these best practices were not widely known, the skills quickly became apparent and were incorporated into training and readiness. History shows us a similar conclusion was reached during previous advising efforts. The relearned or rediscovered best practices include experience, hard and soft skills, selection of advisors, and a balance of combat mindset and diplomatic ability. Combat advising is not the same as conventional fighting. Regional experience is also critical. Military advisors need both hard skills and soft skills. Recent advisors have added a few tools. Picking the right talent for tours as advisors remains a consistent area for improvement. While it is necessary to select experienced combat veterans, it's equally important to ensure the selectee has patience, creativity, and an understanding of the views of the people he is training. Combat mindset while serving as a military diplomat is another way of articulating a balance of negotiation skills with a sense of force protection. "Blue on green" (where the military trainees assaulted their trainers or supporting military) attacks from 2010 to 2013 highlighted the balance of cultural awareness and making oneself hard to kill.²⁰

Division and MEF staffs need to provide articulate advisor training requirements and ensure integration into operational objectives. Picking the right Marine for the job is important, as is building a team. SFA ATs (SFA advisor teams) are especially effective when built around a core of individuals who already know each other.²¹ Before assembling a team from the same battalion or regiment, SFA AT requests are initiated by MARFOR commanders. Requests are vetted, scrutinized, and



Currently, advisor training is conducted by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group prior to the advisor team's deployment. (Photo by Cpl Melanie A. Kilcline.)

reviewed by MARFORCOM (Marine Forces Command). Manning documents identifying rank and MOS, presented by line number, grouped by team, with report date for training are assigned to operational units to execute their Title 10 Responsibilities (train, man, and equip).

Insight from WWII Marine 2d Raider Battalion holds true in that initiative, resourcefulness, control of small groups ... specific orders few, but strictly enforced ... and advisors should be encouraged to think for themselves.²²

Afghanistan's COM ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide proposed the following characteristics enhance an advisor's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture: rank, age, and technical expertise; empathy, flexibility, and perceptiveness; open-mindedness, tolerance for ambiguity; self-reliance; tolerance for difference, ability to accept and learn from failure, and a sense of humor; ability to work in transactional environment; and patience to include knowing when it is right to step away.²³ This offers insight to what makes an individual successful as an advisor. Traditionally, MEFs task subordinate billets to their major subordinate commands to fill. The vetting process requires a lieutenant colonel-

level battalion or squadron commander to validate an individual's fitness for service as an advisor. My experience training military advisors suggests that the commander's exposure to military advising has a direct effect on who is nominated to advise. Commanders who had been advisors or worked with advisors had a better appreciation of the skills needed. One criticism is that the best candidates aren't always selected, rather those who the command can do without. It's a non-standard assignment that takes individuals away from their primary responsibilities. Fortunately, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has included language in promotion and command board precepts to reward those who have been advisors.

In order to put the right person to the right job, there needs to be a panel, consisting of commanders and former military advisors to ensure only the "right Marine" becomes an advisor. The right Marine should be: a creative thinker, a hustler, well read, and an intellectually-curious risk taker who looks at organizational success over personal interests.²⁴ Advisors thrive in the gray area. Iraq advisor Seth Folsom, who authored *In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War*, argued the difficulty of being an advisor is meeting American objectives while addressing the culture of "what's

in it for me?” of those he advised.²⁵ One such advisor who thrived in this gray area was LtCol Bob “Ogre” McCarthy who was assigned as a PTT (Police Transition Team) in Habbiniyah, Iraq. He was stern, demanding, and culturally astute. His Arabic skills allowed direct engagement with the Iraqi police, and his understanding of Arabic culture facilitated leveraging decision makers. When an Iraqi police officer arrived at Camp Coolie holding his bleeding and unconscious daughter, Ogre knew exactly what to do. McCarthy took the girl to the field hospital and explained her kinship (granddaughter) to a powerful sheik. The field hospital made an exception to treating the Iraqi civilian and her recovery boosted Ogre’s influence with the Iraqis.²⁶

An advisor board ensures a balance of the commander’s observations of their troops and discerning eye of former advisors who know what the job entails. Commanders understand the strengths and weaknesses of their organizations and can appreciate developmental needs of Marines in their charge. The balance between commanders and former advisors selecting future advisors is worthy of additional consideration.

The Cost of War Versus The Cost of Preventing Wars

Iraq’s current security challenges reflect the resolve of military advisors from Iran. Iran advisors had different objectives for Iraqi government than those espoused by the U.S. led coalition. There is a historical comparison: The NVA (North Vietnamese Army) was trained by the CMAG (Chinese Military Assistance Group),²⁷ mirroring efforts of the American MAAG (Military Advisory Assistance Group).²⁸ More recently, Iran has sent over 1,000 military advisors to train Shiite and Kurdish fighters against ISIS.²⁹ Iran’s advisor effort allows them to shape their narrative. China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have all used military advisors to train foreign military forces. Significant opportunity to invest in advising is available.

Military advisors require training that is unique from conventional military training. I MEF and II MEF have

benefitted from a DOD grant for critical language acquisition. Specifically, SDSU (San Diego State University) and CCCC (Coastal Carolina Community College) provide professional instruction in Arabic, Dari, and Pashto for deploying military advisors. The focus of these programs is conversation, validated by performance on the OPI (oral proficiency interview). OPI success determines conversational competence. Professional linguists and cryptologists are evaluated through the DLAB (Defense Language Aptitude Battery), which determines reading and comprehension competence. The testing difference is an important distinction. Advisors need to converse and training should focus on conversation, not reading comprehension.³⁰ As long as the program is endorsed, entire advisor teams or designated advisors on each team are immersed in 5 to 7 weeks of language training.³¹

The JIED-DO (Joint Improved Explosives Device-Defeat Organization) sponsors intensive “lane-training” for conventional forces, including military advisors. The training is regionally tailored, teaching individuals and teams how to identify, avoid, and mitigate IEDs. Since military advisors are often outside the wire, their understanding of these TTP is critical to their suc-

cess. Similar to the language grant, this is a DOD funded program and greatly improves the survivability of advisors.

ATC funding varies by MEF to include focus on advanced medical training (live tissue), pre-deployment site survey, foreign weapons training, negotiation, and tailored individual/team training. The cost per team ranges from \$500 to \$900,000.³² ATG expenses are close to \$2 million per team and 60 percent of that budget is the international role players.³³ In order to provide a realistic training validation, native speaking role players are assigned “acting roles” as local chief of police, mayor, mullah, or military leadership. The advisor teams interact and apply their learning in an environment that reflects the local culture, language, custom, and TTP experienced in projected deployment environment. After factoring DOD sponsored funding, the Marine Corps is responsible for the cost of approximately \$3 million per team.

Changing a Culture: Ensuring Relevance for Military Advisors

Combat military advising is frequently treated as a temporary solution to a larger problem. In order to prevent the cyclical process of learning, forgetting, and relearning the effective ways



We need to find a way to keep advisor training permanent without constantly “restarting” the lesson. (Photo by Cpl Melanie A. Kilcline.)

to prepare military advisors, there must be a greater sense of permanence. The improvements include the creation of a supplemental MOS, Commandant of the Marine Corps directed language in command and promotion board precepts giving credit for advisor experience, the creation of MCSCG (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group), and re-investment of experienced advisors.

First, the Marine Corps established a foreign security force advisor “free” MOS on 23 September 2014,³⁴ which allows the tracking of military advisors. A free MOS is a critical skill additional duty. Proven advisors can be assigned to training or policy billets where advisor advocacy is desired. Additionally, they serve as advisors as additional requirements arise.

Second, promotion boards are governed by law and select “the best and most fully qualified”³⁵ candidates. The Secretary of Navy provides guidance through precepts, which highlight critical shortfalls for consideration for promotion boards. Command selection boards are informed by precepts articulated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In both cases, there is an acknowledgement of skills demonstrated by military advisors. Assignment of advisors is balanced against critical billets such as battalion or squadron operations or executive officer. The commander’s dilemma is who to deploy with the unit and who to deploy externally (as an advisor). Board precepts ensure proven combat performance is considered analogous to critical billets within an individual’s MOS.

Finally, upon successful deployment, advisors blend back into the landscape. There are opportunities to re-invest advisors. My assessment is that ATCs were ad-hoc organizations requiring temporary assignment from operating forces. Their utility and efficiency grew rapidly from 2004–2014. Lessons learned and relearned from previous conflicts climbed an initial sharp learning curve. To ensure momentum, some of our best advisors need to be assigned to ATC or ATG. Some should serve in MEF, Division, Wing, and Group level G-3 or G-7 staffs. PCS opportunities could also include MCSCG or HQMC.

Recommendations

Does the Marine Corps and its military advisor venture get the respect it deserves? The Marine Corps needs to build an advisor network that ties together the network of relationships and know-how of those who have done it. A few recommendations explain a path to break the cycle of re-learning.

Appoint leaders with proven advisor experience. The Marine Corps needs to ensure the right teachers/mentors run the advisor training schools and organizations. There needs to be advisor growth opportunities through colonel and representation as general. Blunt, candid, seasoned advisors who have thrived in the darkest and most dangerous places need a home in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps needs to ensure advisor training is properly maintained. Successful advisors should be reinvested into roles that keep their experiences relevant. Many have been advisors but few really understand it. Though not a primary skillset, the few who have done it well should be called upon to do it again. OAGs (operational advisory groups) ensure the interests of discrete fields or warfighting functions have a venue. There are air, ground, logistics, artillery, and ANGLICO OAGs, why not establish an SFA OAG led by a seasoned military advisor?

Get the right operations officer. The caretakers of MCSCG, ATG, ATC, and EOTG need to understand the mission of the advisor and provide counsel to the SFA OAG. G-3 and G-7 staffs also need to look holistically at grooming advisors and keeping the plan on track.

Honor your past. Knowing history and language of those you will advise follows the same logic. Lessons learned are the flash backs of a Marine Corps doctrine for military advisors. The *Small Wars Manual* introduced doctrine for the advising and counterinsurgency lessons of the Philippines and the Banana Wars. It’s time to do the same with Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan combat military advisor efforts and publish a doctrine for advisors.

Learn to speak the language. Emphasis on conversational speaking and a basic knowledge of alphabet, grammar, and sentence construction are optimal.

DOD grants for academic institutions, such as SDSU and CCCC give the Marines the tools they need. An arrangement where the schools could teach on Marine bases and installations would reduce the TAD costs. Make foreign languages a priority in the Marine Corps. Cultivate relationships with universities that can tailor language to emerging mission sets. Create advisor opportunities at MARSOC and SOCOM. Keep resident knowledge keen while putting successful advisors where they can influence the next generation of advisors.

Move the family to where it can do the most good. The MCSCG (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group) and ATG (Advisor Training Group) were established as dedicated security cooperation organizations. Advisor training is coordinated through MCSCG and validated through Block IV training at ATG. MCSCG’s mission is

execute and enable Security Cooperation (SC) programs, training, planning, and activities in order to ensure unity of effort in support of USMC and Regional Marine Component Command (MARFOR) objectives and in coordination with the operating forces and MAGTF(s).

In this capacity, MCSCG serves as the Marine Corp’s school house and training center for advising efforts. MCSCG should remain as the intellectual center for military advising.³⁶ MCSCG is staffed with former advisors and ensures throughput for security cooperation advising efforts. Re-locate to Twentynine Palms to ensure a constant role for ATG, which stood down in 2014. Fort Story, VA, (current home of MCSCG) doesn’t have the training ranges and practical integration of hard and soft skills available at Twentynine Palms. Moving MCSCG and increasing its scope to the ATG mission offers the merger of culture and hard skills in one location.

Conclusion

SFA advising has proven its utility in Marine Corps counterinsurgency operations for over 120 years. SFA is addressed as a new idea each time we

fight a war. Training the next generation of advisors will take time to regenerate corporate knowledge. It's time to institutionally accept and codify SFA doctrine. The Marine Corps needs to establish SFA advisor doctrine to ensure the success of those that follow.

Notes

1. LTC Remi Hajjar, USA, "What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 9/11?," *Military Review*, (Online: November–December 2014), available at www.armyupress.army.mil/military-review.
2. MajGen Paul E. Lefebvre, *MARSOC Pub 1, MARSOB*, (Camp Lejeune: Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Camp Lejeune, May 2011), available at <https://www.marsofoundation.org>.
3. Richard Cavagnol, "Lessons from Vietnam: Essential Training of Marine Advisors and Combined Action Platoon Personnel," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Online: March 2007), available at <https://www.mca-marines.org>.
4. The following *covans* provided insight that validated Vietnam era experiences or my observations from more recent conflicts: Gen Walt Boomer, USMC(Ret); LtGen Paul Van Riper, USMC(Ret); MajGen Tom Draude, USMC(Ret); Col Marsh Carter, USMC(Ret); Col Bob Fischer, USMC(Ret); Col C. Sean Del Grosso, USMC(Ret); Col Carl Fischer, USMC(Ret); Col Bill Warren, USMC(Ret); Col Regan Wright, USMC(Ret); Col Bill Symolon, USMC(Ret); Col Klink, USMC; LtCol Dave Henderson, USMC(Ret); LtCol Ed Tipusus, USMC(Ret); Don Bosper; Zach Martin; William Whorton; and Carlos Flores.
5. Headquarters Marine Corps, *FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual*, (Washington, DC: 1990).
6. Ibid.
7. Headquarters Marine Corps, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, DC: 2006).
8. GEN David H. Petraeus and Gen James F. Amos, *The U.S. Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
9. John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
10. Arthur J. Hoen, "The Design of Cross-Cultural Training for Military Advisors," (presentation, Division of Military Psychology, 74th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New York City, September 1966).
11. Robert K. Sawyer, "Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War," *Army Historical Series*, (Washington, DC: 1962, reprinted 1970).
12. Don Bosper, *Vietnam Memoirs Part 2: My Experiences as an Advisor with the Vietnamese Marine Corps*, (New York: AroSage Publishing, 2015).
13. Gerald Turley, *The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors in Viet Nam, 1972*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985).
14. Ibid.
15. Bing West, *The Village*, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003).
16. Personal interview between author and Col Jeff Kenney, II MEF EOTG (Expeditionary Operations Training Group) Director 2014–2015, in November 2015.
17. U.S. Army Special Warfare School, *ST31-179 MATA Handbook for Vietnam*, (Fort Bragg, NC: 1966).
18. Personal interview between author and MajGen Tom Draude, USMC(Ret), on 14 September 2015.
19. CPT Wesley Moerbe, USA, "Early Mistakes with Security Forces Advisory Teams in Afghanistan," *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May–June 2013).
20. Nick McDonnell, "Green on Blue: A Betrayal of American Troops in Afghanistan," *Time*, (Online: June 2013), available at <https://world.time.com>.
21. Personal interview between author and Col Sean Del Grosso, USMC(Ret), on 13 September 2016.
22. Leo J. Dougherty, *Counterinsurgency and the Marine Corps: Volume 1, the First Counterinsurgency Era, 1899–1945*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2015).
23. Gen Joseph F. Dunford, *ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide 2.0*, (Kabul, Afghanistan: NATO ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), 2014).
24. Trends from interviews of Vietnam, Iraq, and Military advisors. Eighteen Advisors from the *Covan* Association were interviewed from September 2015 to February 2016. When asked, "What makes a good advisor?" multiple responses from separate advisors could be summarized as "creative thinker, hustler, well-read and intellectually curious risk-taker who looks at organizational success over personal interests." These traits were repeated independently by over half or the respondents.
25. Seth Folsom, *In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).
26. Owen West, *The Snake Eaters: Counterinsurgency Advisors in Combat*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2012).
27. Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–54," in *The China Quarterly*, (United Kingdom: March 1993).
28. Lien-Hang Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).
29. David McCabe, "Iran Has Sent Over 1,000 Military Advisors to Fight ISIS in Iraq," *The Hill*, (Online: December 2014), available at <http://thehill.com>.
30. Personal interview between author and Bill Whorton, Silver Star Recipient (Vietnam), on 15 September 2015.
31. Personal interview between author and LtCol Steve Coast, I MEF ATC Operations Officer 2013–2015, on 23 November 2015.
32. Ibid.
33. Kenney interview.
34. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 472/14, Approval of the Foreign Security Force (FSF) Advisor Free MOS and Processor Experience Track Designation*, (Washington, DC: 23 September 2014).
35. Department of the Navy, *SecNav Precept Convening Fiscal Year 17 U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Promotion Selection Board*, (Washington, DC: 24 August 2015).
36. John A. Nagl, "A New U.S. Military Would Be an Army of Advisors," *The New York Times*, (Online: July 2014), available at <http://www.nytimes.com>.

