History

In the 1930s, few officers were qualified, either by training or experience, to engage in joint operations. The demands of World War II brought out the urgent need for joint action by ground, sea, and air forces. To alleviate the friction and misunderstanding resulting from lack of joint experience, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. ANSCOL conducted a four-month course that was successful in training officers for joint command and staff duties.

After the war, educational requirements for the armed forces were fully examined. Although thorough contingency planning was recognized as essential for waging war on a joint and combined scale, ANSCOL, which had been established to meet the immediate needs of war, was discontinued. A joint committee was appointed to prepare a directive for a new school. This directive, which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 June 1946, established the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

Responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its facilities was charged to the Chief of Naval Operations. Following a temporary residence in Washington, D.C., AFSC was established in Norfolk, Virginia, on 13 August 1946. The site, formerly a U.S. Naval Receiving Station, was selected by the Secretaries of War and Navy because of its immediate availability and its proximity to varied high-level military activities.

There were 150 students from all Services in the first class. They assembled in converted administration buildings on 3 February 1947 to be greeted by the first commandant, Air Force Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons. The faculty officers came from joint assignments in all theaters of World War II.

With the construction of Normandy Hall in 1962, AFSC completed its transition from a temporary to a permanent institution. AFSC was assigned to the National Defense University on 12 August 1981. In the summer of 1990, AFSC changed from an intermediate joint professional military education school to an institution where Phase II of the Chairman’s Program for Joint Education is taught.

In 2000, the AFSC was renamed the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The Joint and Combined Warfighting School proudly traces its origin back to the Army Navy Staff College. Today’s JCWS educates over one thousand senior military officers from the United States and International countries as well as civilians from the interagency. We are proud of our heritage and anticipate a bright future for this great institution.
JCWS Mission

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) produces graduates capable of creatively and effectively planning operational level warfighting for joint and combined military forces while integrating the effects of the United States Government, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations to ensure the success of Combatant and Joint Task Force Commanders operating within an uncertain operating environment.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of Defense.
Welcome to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School’s quarterly journal, Campaigning. This quarter’s Campaigning features an article on “Military Objectives and the Levels of War” written by our dear friend and staunch supporter Dr. Milan Vego. Dr. Vego has provided a very thoughtful article focusing on an important aspect of campaign planning. Robert Kemp’s contribution to this edition is an extremely interesting and timely piece which discusses a variety of issues associated with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan. Robert uses a very worthwhile case study method which emphasizes key aspects of planning that make the implementation of a coherent policy on reconstruction so complex and challenging. Dr. Alex Crowther addresses the interworkings of an embassy at war. He provides superb insight into the difficulties associated with implementing our nation’s policies at the cutting edge of the Global War on Terror. Each of these submissions should substantially contribute to the ongoing dialogue and debate surrounding our profession. I hope you find each of these articles interesting.

In addition to our main featured articles, this issue of Campaigning contains an update on the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System, (JDEIS) provided by Dave Spangler from the Joint Forces Command, as well as updates on the activities of your Joint Combined and Warfighting School (JCWS). Based on the outstanding reputation of our faculty and alumni, JCWS has been asked to participate in the development and execution of a number of education endeavors throughout the world. We have included an update of just two of our undertakings in Brazil and Saudi Arabia.

We are always searching for contributors to keep the quality of our journal as high as it has been to date – please consider sending us your article for review and publishing.

Finally, I would like to thank Seaman Jania Battles and Ms Monica Clancy. Both of these ladies spend a great deal of time into making Campaigning a truly worthwhile endeavor.

Craig L. Bollenberg
Colonel, USA
Dean, Joint and Combined Warfighting School
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Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination—a maxim which should take first place among all causes of victory.

Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War 1812

The objective to be accomplished comprises the very heart of both the theory and the practice of war. Without a clearly stated and attainable objective, the entire military effort becomes essentially pointless.¹ This is particularly true at the operational and strategic levels of war because the stakes are so much higher than at the tactical level. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related, either directly or indirectly, to the objective to be accomplished. Among other things, the objective determines the method of one’s combat force employment, the size of the physical space for accomplishing it, the level of war, and also the level of command, type of planning, and major phases and elements of one’s combat force employment.

Aims/Goals vs. Objectives

All too often, the terms aims, goals, and objectives are used interchangeably, as if they mean the same thing; they do not. Aim refers to a general statement of intent or direction for an action. A goal is a statement of one’s intent. However, it is more specific than an aim. Aims and goals are, by their very nature, ambiguous, vague, open-ended, and difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. They are usually expressed in very broad terms. Military planning and execution cannot be based on aims or goals because they lack sufficient specificity. They also do not contain elements that can be used to measure progress toward their ultimate accomplishment. This is the reason that aims/goals were replaced with something much more specific: objectives (or objects).

In generic terms, the objective can also be understood as the “purpose” of the actions one carries out within a specific space and time. Military objectives are those that, by their nature, location, purpose, or potential use, would make an effective contribution to military action, or whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would offer a definitive military advantage. Some theoreticians contend that the term objective has physical and geographical

meaning and thus tends to be confusing. The famous British theoretician B. H. Liddell Hart observed that better terms would be “object” when dealing with the purpose of policy, and “military aim” when dealing with the way forces are directed in the service of policy.²

Scale

Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated according to their scale. It is the scale of the objective that determines the method of one’s combat force employment and the size of the physical space (and hence, levels of command to be established) in which one’s forces are to be employed—not vice versa. The accomplishment of any military objective requires a drastic or radical change to the military situation (see Figure 1). Therefore, the solution to any military problem concerns an evaluation of the factors that would create a new and favorable military situation.³ The accomplishment of a military objective is intended to cause a drastic or radical change in the situation. It also creates some desired or undesired effects on the mind of the enemy commander or leadership.

Fig. 1

In general, the political objective should dominate the strategic objective, and the strategic objective should drive the determination of the operational and tactical objectives.⁴ In

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generic terms, a *strategic objective* can be described as the one whose destruction, annihilation, neutralization, or control will have a drastic (or radical) effect on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Correspondingly, the accomplishment of a strategic objective should have a drastic or radical effect on the situation in a part of or the entire theater (of war). In general, strategic objectives range from neutralizing or reducing military and nonmilitary strategic threats to one’s national or alliance/coalition interests in time of peace, to partially or completely eliminating these threats in time of war.

A distinction is made between the *national* (or alliance/coalition) *strategic objective* and the *military strategic objective*. In the case of a country potentially waging war in two or more theaters, there will also be a need to accomplish the theater-strategic objective in each theater. In war, the accomplishment of a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective should end the enemy’s organized resistance and the hostilities in a given theater of war.\(^5\)

Normally, a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective cannot be accomplished with a single step but requires the achievement of two or more intermediate steps or military strategic or theater-strategic objectives. The accomplishment of each of these subordinate strategic objectives should lead to a drastic change in the military situation in a given theater of war and would also represent a distinctive phase in a war as a whole.

The intermediate strategic objectives can be accomplished sequentially and/or simultaneously. The number of theater-strategic objectives principally depends on whether a war is global or regional in scale. In a global war, in each theater of war, there might be several theater-strategic objectives, some offensive and some defensive, to be accomplished in sequence or simultaneously; this was the case in the Pacific in 1941–1945. The larger the theater, the more likely each theater-strategic objective would be separated by long distances from each other. For example, in the spring of 1942, there were four theater-strategic objectives in the Pacific: defense of Alaska and the Aleutians; defense of the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and Midway; defense of island positions and shipping routes from the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand via the southern Pacific; and defense of Australia/New Zealand. In the offensive phase of the war in the Pacific after August 1942, the Allies had four offensive theater-strategic objectives to accomplish: seizing control of the Solomons archipelago, the central Pacific, New

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5 In the nineteenth century, the term operations-object was used in referring to the objective of an operation. The most important operations-object was the enemy army. Strategic points could serve as the operations-object only if they were to create favorable conditions for the next operations or if their seizure, because of their political significance, would result in peace; the seizure or occupation of the enemy capital was considered the main operation-object to which all operations were directed; J. Neumann, *Grundzüge der Strategie. Ein Leitfaden für das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte* (Vienna, 1870), p. 11.
Guinea, and the Philippines. Defense of Alaska and the Aleutians remained a defensive theater-strategic objective until the end of the war. The final offensive theater-strategic objective was the planned invasion of the home islands and the capture or neutralization of the key island positions guarding the southern approaches to Japan (i.e., Formosa, Iwo Jima, and Ryukyus).

In a regional war—such as were the Korean War, 1950–1953; the Iraqi-Iranian War, 1980–1988; the Gulf War of 1990–1991; Afghanistan 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom); and Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom)—there is a single military or theater-strategic objective to be accomplished.

Because of its scale and complexity, a military strategic or theater-strategic objective cannot be accomplished by a single act; several intermediate steps—operational objectives—have to be accomplished to achieve the entire military or theater-strategic objective. Depending on the respective strength of the friendly and enemy forces, the characteristics of the physical environment, and other aspects of the situation, the intermediate objectives can be accomplished in succession and/or simultaneously. The accomplishment of each operational objective should lead to drastic or radical change in the situation in a given declared (or undeclared) theater of operations.

In land warfare, an operational objective might be a large city or industrial basin, an oil-producing area, an oil refinery complex, the country’s capital, a major part of the enemy forces, or a certain phase line (PL) to be reached. For example, in the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow were operational objectives in the purely military sense, as was the Donbas Basin, the Crimea Peninsula, and the Caucasian oil fields.

In war at sea, the operational objective is usually accomplished by obtaining control of a certain sea or ocean area, destroying or neutralizing a major part of the enemy fleet, or cutting off or defending the flow of maritime trade. In a maritime theater, obtaining sea control in a major part of the theater or seizing or defending a large island or archipelago or strait/narrows can be an operational objective. Sometimes even a large naval or air base, such as Singapore in 1942, can be an operational objective to be defended or captured. Also, the destruction or successful defense of a large convoy or a convoy carrying sorely needed reinforcements and supplies can be an operational objective. In the Allied Solomons Campaign of 1942–1943, the ultimate theater-strategic objective was accomplished through the successive accomplishment of three operational objectives—the islands of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and New Georgia—and the neutralization of the Japanese naval and air complex at Rabaul, New Britain.

In air warfare, an operational objective would be to obtain or maintain superiority or supremacy in the air in a given area or joint area of operations; to destroy a major part of the enemy air force; or to prevent enemy strikes from the air or through airspace in a given area of operations. For example, in the Allied bombing offensive against Germany in World War II, the
destruction of the industrial Ruhr area—especially of the Schweinfurt ball-bearing plants—and of the Ploesti oil-producing area in Romania were operational objectives.

An operational objective also has to be divided into several intermediate—or tactical—objectives. These, in turn, can be major or minor in scale. The accomplishment of a major tactical objective should represent a major step toward accomplishing the respective operational objective and should also lead to a drastic change in the situation in a given area of operations. Examples of major tactical objectives would be the destruction of a carrier group, amphibious task force, or large convoy, and seizing or holding a large naval base, port, or airfield complex. In war on land, a major tactical objective might be destroying or neutralizing a major element of the enemy division or seizing or successfully defending a large city, a critical major road junction or mountain pass, or some controlling heights. In an amphibious operation, major tactical objectives could include capturing a beachhead or some important island facing the main landing beach, or seizing control of an important inland airfield.

The accomplishment of a minor tactical objective should directly contribute to achieving the respective major tactical objective and also result in a drastic change in the situation in a given combat zone or sector. Examples of minor tactical objectives are the seizure or defense of some key natural or human-made feature, such as a hill, valley, river crossing, port/anchorage, village/town, or road junction. The destruction or neutralization of force elements, such as an army company or battalion, and one or a group of ships or aircraft, also constitutes a minor tactical objective. In practice, it is often difficult to precisely differentiate between major and minor tactical objectives. It is often a matter for the commander’s judgment and experience.

**Tasks vs. Objectives**

A military objective is normally divided into a number of constituent parts—called tasks—that, when carried out, will collectively lead to the objective’s accomplishment. Tasks are those measurable entities that allow the commander to properly determine the rate of progress toward the accomplishment of a given military objective. A task answers the question of what needs to be done, while the objective or the purpose answers the question of why it needs to be done. The linkage between the objective and its constituent tasks cannot be arbitrarily broken up without serious consequences for one’s ability to accomplish that objective.

The larger the objective, the more tasks it encompasses; thus, the larger and more diverse the forces and the more time required to accomplish the given objective. A large military objective is usually divided into several related, arbitrarily named, main (or principal) tasks; each of these is, in turn, composed of a number of component (or partial) tasks (see Figure 2).
The process of deriving tasks is an art rather than a science. Determining too few tasks is bound to lead to partial or even complete failure to accomplish the stated objective. Adding new tasks without changing or modifying the objective or having larger resources leads to so-called mission creep. This, in turn, would lead to a disconnect between one’s ends and means; hence, in most cases it has fatal consequences.

Types

In general, a military objective can be offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two. An *offensive objective* is aimed to seize, capture, or destroy a territory, position, or some source of military or nonmilitary power. A *defensive objective*, in contrast, is aimed to defend, hold, or control these. A side that possesses overwhelming military strength usually determines a series of offensive, military objectives to be accomplished. A side inferior to its opponent in the key elements of strength is usually forced to take a defensive posture until the correlation of forces shifts in its favor.

Sometimes the term “positive” objective is used for an offensive objective, and the term “negative” for a defensive objective.6 For example, in the American Civil War (1861–1865), the northern states had a positive strategic objective—to defeat the southern states and thereby force them to remain in the union. This objective could be accomplished only by going on a strategic offensive. For the southern states, the strategic objective was negative—forcing the North to

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recognize their independence. However, for the confederate states, the accomplishment of that strategic objective required going on the offensive.⁷

A military objective can be exclusively or predominantly physical or tangible. This is usually the case with tactical and operational objectives in a high-intensity conflict. A military objective can be exclusively unquantifiable or intangible. This is often the case with the For example, undermining the enemy’s morale and will to fight is an essentially intangible military objectives. However, in most cases a military objective is composed of both tangible and intangible elements. In a low-intensity conflict, tangible elements of a military objective are present at all levels of war.

It is at the strategic level that political and military objectives start to diverge in terms of their ultimate purpose. At the strategic level, objectives can range from the threat of the use of force to a change in the enemy’s behavior or policy on a certain issue. If the political objectives are unlimited, then so are the military objectives; the opposite is not necessarily always true. An unlimited political objective is usually directed at eliminating the enemy’s leadership from power or even radically changing the enemy’s social order. A regime can be removed but afterward given back to the people, or a new constitution can be imposed, as the Western Allies did in the aftermath of World War II in Japan and their zone of occupation in Germany. In contrast, in the aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviets imposed the Stalinist communist government and social system on Eastern Europe where their troops were deployed. Unlimited objectives can also include the conquest of the entire country or groups of countries, or even the extermination of the entire population of the hostile state.⁸

For example, the real U.S. strategic objective in the war in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom) was the end of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the defeat of the Taliban’s armed forces, and the establishment of a new central democratic government. Another major part of that objective was eliminating Afghanistan as a base for al-Qa‘ida’s leadership and and its base of operations.

In a war fought for limited strategic objectives, the intent is not regime change and occupation of the enemy’s entire territory. One normally does not risk all for limited political objectives, nor does one commit all his sources of power in such a war.⁹ For example, the Gulf

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⁷ Guenther Korten, Erfahrungen ueber Wehrmachtsfuhrung aus dem amerikanischen Sezessionkrieg, lecture at the Kriegsakademie, March 1936, RW 13/v. 34, Bundesarchiv-Militäerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i. Br., p. 13.


War of 1990–1991 was a limited war, because the U.S.-led coalition never intended to defeat the Iraqi armed forces as a whole and seize the entire Iraqi territory. The coalition objectives were immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and the safety and protection of American citizens abroad. The United States aimed to remove Saddam Hussein by his domestic opposition, but without endangering Iraqi territorial integrity. The coalition did not aim to defeat Iraq so completely that the ensuing vacuum would be exploited by Iran and spark further turmoil in Iraq. However, the United States was unwilling to pursue its objective directly and did not intend to be involved in the nation-building and humanitarian relief that would surely accompany the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. A serious disconnect existed between the more ambitious ends and modest means to be used by the United States and its coalition partners. Hence, it was not surprising that the termination of the Gulf War not only was confused and ambiguous but had unintended and adverse consequences for U.S. national interests.

Optimally, the commander should determine a single main objective and one or more alternate objectives. The situation that exists during one’s planning and preparation might significantly change during the actual execution of a major operation (or even a campaign). By having an alternative objective, the commander on the scene can act quickly instead of waiting on orders from the higher commander. For example, one of the major flaws of the naval component of the Japanese Sho-I Plan for the defense of the Philippines was that Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s First Diversionary Attack Force was assigned a single main objective—to break into the Leyte Gulf and destroy the U.S. forces defending the area and their transports. He never received an alternative objective in the event that for some reason the main objective could not be accomplished. As it turned out, by the morning of 25 October 1944, when Kurita’s force exited the San Bernardino Strait and sailed southward, most U.S. transports had left the Tacloban anchorage. By then only one attack cargo vessel; 23 landing ships, tank (LSTs); two landing craft, medium (LCMs); and 28 Liberty ships remained there. However, even these ships were

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12 Stanley T. Kresge, Gulf War Termination Revisited (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Air University, April 1999), pp. 22–23.

worth attacking. In addition, the landing beaches were piled high with food, ammunition, and other supplies, and much equipment was stored at the Tacloban airfield.14

There is probably no greater mistake than to formulate and simultaneously try to accomplish multiple operational, or even worse, strategic, objectives. Such a course of action could only be taken if one’s forces possess overwhelming strength against any conceivable combination of the enemy’s forces. For example, Hitler’s Germany in World War II pursued several strategic objectives, some of them simultaneously, although it did not possess sufficient military or economic strength to achieve them against the overwhelming combined strength of its enemies. Hitler also had the bad habit of trying to almost simultaneously accomplish several operational objectives by conducting eccentric operations. In the initial phase of the invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, the Germans tried to achieve several initial operational objectives at the same time by defeating the Soviet forces in the areas close to the borders in the northern, central, and southern parts of the front. Afterward, the Germans tried to accomplish three operational objectives, also almost simultaneously: the capture of Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. They succeeded in seizing only Kiev (on 19 September 1941).

Perhaps the most fatal error was Hitler’s decision, during the German summer offensive of 1942 (Operation Blau), to seize almost simultaneously both Stalingrad and the oil fields in the Caucasus in two separate and eccentric major operations.15 This decision was aimed at bringing the war in the east to at least a temporary halt before the onset of winter. General Franz Halder, chief of the army’s general staff, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Hitler to change this decision. Halder’s thinking was based solely on the operational realities, while Hitler was entirely focused on so-called “strategic necessities.” Halder was well aware of the fatal consequences of any reduction of the German forces advancing toward Stalingrad, especially as that city had by then been turned into a fortress.16 The lack of focus on a single main objective and failure to employ the German forces within mutually supporting distance was one, though not the only, reason for

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Germany’s first major military defeat of the war—the encirclement and destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in November 1942–January 1943.\(^{17}\)

The establishment of the initial lodgment in a maritime campaign often requires the accomplishment of the principal operational objective and several supporting operational objectives by a single or several services of the armed forces. Supporting objectives—for example, obtaining and maintaining sea control or air superiority—are prerequisites for the accomplishment of the main or principal objective on land or ashore. They differ from other types of military objectives, because they are usually the first necessary step for the respective combat forces to carry out other tasks. For example, a certain degree of air superiority must be achieved before an air force can successfully carry out close air support, interdiction, and other tasks.

Several supporting objectives must usually be accomplished in the case of an offensive campaign. For example, in the Allied Normandy invasion (Operation Neptune), the principal operational objective was the establishment of the lodgment on the continent from which to carry out successive operations. Obtaining and maintaining air superiority and sea control in the amphibious objective area were each supporting operational objectives. In the Philippines Campaign, October 1944–August 1945, the capture of Leyte in October 1944, by which the Allies hoped to secure the initial lodgment in the Philippine archipelago, was both the initial and the principal operational objective of the Leyte operation. To accomplish that objective, it was necessary to plan and execute a major amphibious landing operation. To consolidate initial operational success, a successive major land operation was planned and executed as well. However, the main amphibious landing could not have been successful without accomplishing two supporting and related operational objectives: obtaining and maintaining sea control and control of the air, respectively, in the Leyte area and its approaches. These, in turn, required planning and executing a major naval and air operation, respectively.

**Determination of the Objective**

The selection of an objective is the first and most critical step in undertaking any military enterprise. Once the objective is determined, the entire problem becomes greatly simplified (but not necessarily easy to resolve). However, it is usually the determination of the objective that is the most difficult part of any military planning.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) This figure included 147,200 killed and wounded and 91,000 captured; in Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East*, p. 79.

\(^{18}\) The objective, as a principle of war, should not be confused with the term “physical objective,” as it often is. The physical objective is the point upon which the aim or goal is directed; Richard L. Connolly, “The Principles of War,” *Proceedings* 1 (January 1953), p. 3; the objective can also be defined as that “concrete thing in possession of the enemy against which our effort is to be directed”; “Principles of War and Their Application to Naval Warfare,”
The process of determining one’s military objective requires a careful analysis of the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force. In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the larger the factors of space, time, and force to be considered. Among other things, one should focus primarily on the size and physical characteristics of the land, air, and sea in the objective area and its approaches; the distances from the objective to one’s staging and deployment area and other key positions from which one’s combat forces can be effectively employed; the time required for the enemy’s forces to be deployed, concentrated, and reinforced; the time required to commit reserves; and the time required for regenerating combat power or reconstituting friendly forces.

The next step in the process is the evaluation of the enemy’s factor of force. Optimally, this analysis should include all the tangible and intangible elements of the enemy’s source of power available or deployed in the objective area. This step also encompasses the examination of the part of the theater where enemy forces can prevent friendly forces from accomplishing the selected operational or strategic objective.

In determining strategic and operational objectives, operational planners should also fully consider political, diplomatic, economic, financial, information, legal, environmental, ethnic, religious, and other nonmilitary aspects of the situation. Normally, these considerations, with the exception of legal aspects, do not play a major role in determining operational objectives in war at sea and in the air.

Very often foreign policy or domestic political considerations might dictate whether a certain objective should be selected or not for a military action. This is especially the case in the first phase of an invasion. Similarly, the economic or financial aspect of the situation might force the commander to capture a certain area first before trying to destroy or neutralize the enemy forces. For example, prior to the outbreak of World War I, the German chief of the general staff, Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., was concerned with the prospect of violating Belgian neutrality; he wanted to keep England out of the war. In one memorandum in 1913, he wrote that the violation of Belgian neutrality would make England Germany’s enemy. In his view, it was vitally important for England to prevent Germany from having a foothold on the opposite shore. He considered it inconvenient to start a war with a violation of the territory of a neighboring state. In short, the German general staff was fully aware of the negative implications of a violation of Belgian neutrality. However, for Moltke, Jr., the main conclusion was not that England might enter the war on the side of Germany’s enemies, but that the Germans must fight not only the Belgian army but also English troops in Belgium. His solution for that problem was purely military: the German flank in Belgium must be made as strong as possible. In drafting his plans for the possible war with France and Russia, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (chief of the Great General Staff, 1891–1905) believed that in the coming war Germany must unconditionally

July 1925, Record Group 4, Box 23, Folder 1018A, Naval War College Archives, Newport RI; U.S. Naval War College, p. 5.
go on the offensive and, therefore, must invade France. The possibility of going on the offensive against Russia in case of some Balkan conflict and remaining on the defensive against France and not violating Belgian neutrality—thereby possibly keeping Britain out of the war—was not considered at all. Just the opposite: Moltke, Jr., directed in 1913 that all planning for a great offensive against Russia be stopped, because he was concerned that, in case of war, the existence of such a deployment plan could lead to confusion for subordinate commands. The German government was also fully informed that the general staff had stopped all planning against Russia.\textsuperscript{19}

A strategic objective normally comprises a mix of both military and nonmilitary elements. In a major combat phase of a campaign, it is the military aspect of the strategic objective that needs to be accomplished first. For example, Hitler’s strategic decision of 31 July 1940 to invade Soviet Russia was based on a combination of political, military, economic, ideological, and racial factors. Perhaps the single most important factor in making the decision to invade Soviet Russia was Hitler’s determination to create “living space” (\textit{Lebensraum}) for the Germans in the east. It was also Hitler’s aim that through the annihilation of what he called “Jewish bolshevism” any opposition to German hegemony in the east would be eliminated and the development of the “pure” German race would thus be allowed to proceed.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Philippine campaign of 1944–1945, the military aspect of the strategic objective for the Allies was to obtain control of the Philippine archipelago and its approaches through the destruction of enemy ground, sea, and air forces defending the archipelago, and to cut off lines of supplies between the vital Southern Resources Area and the home islands. The political strategic objective was to liberate the Filipino population from Japanese rule, restore U.S. political control of the Philippines, and enhance American influence and prestige among the peoples of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Normally, in determining operational objectives in a conventional war, military, not nonmilitary, considerations should predominate (this is not necessarily the case in a low-intensity conflict); otherwise there is a great danger that such objectives will not contribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective of a campaign. In practice, one’s efforts should be directed against those sources of the enemy’s critical strengths that can endanger the


accomplishment of one’s objectives. For instance, in 1941, Hitler’s decision to advance to Rostov (southern Russia) and Leningrad was based primarily on economic and political considerations. Actually, the advance to Moscow was the proper first operational objective for the Germans in the first phase of the Barbarossa campaign, because it would have led to the destruction of the major part of the Soviet forces defending the capital.21

Sometimes geography or location may play the main or sole role in determining the operational objective. For example, the primary reason for selecting Leyte as the initial main operational objective in the Philippines Campaign was the belief that the island, with its large and fertile Leyte Valley, offered a favorable place for the construction of airfields from which large-scale attacks could be launched against Luzon and the rest of the Philippines and China. Subsequent events proved that Leyte was unsuitable for the construction of large numbers of airfields and air facilities. The Allied planners correctly believed, however, that Leyte would provide an excellent anchorage, as well as sites for supply bases.22 By selecting Leyte as the next major landing objective, the Allies accepted certain penalties. The most serious problem was that Leyte was beyond the effective range of Allied land-based fighters. The distance to the nearest Allied airfields exceeded 500 miles.23 Leyte was also located in the center of an extensive network of enemy airfields. The enemy aircraft based on Luzon and Mindanao and on the other Visayan Islands could easily support enemy forces on Leyte. Because of the short distances and the presence of numerous islands and islets, the Japanese could covertly bring troop reinforcements to Leyte from the Visayas, Luzon, and Mindanao by using barges and smaller vessels, under cover of darkness and in bad weather. In the initial phase of the landing, the Allies had to rely primarily on carrier aircraft for close air support and to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his troops on Leyte. In MacArthur’s view, the success of the entire operation hinged on the ability of Allied naval forces to keep the enemy from building up his strength on Leyte and adjoining Samar, and to prevent enemy naval forces from attacking friendly shipping in the beachhead area.24


Forces’ Requirements

Clearly, any military objective should be determined with due consideration of what forces (one’s own and friendly) are available or becoming available. The larger the objective, the more “massed” combat potential (not necessarily a numerically larger force) should be available or become available to accomplish it. Force requirements also depend on the scale of the military objective—whether the objective is offensive or defensive, and limited or unlimited.

This part of the planning process is more of an art than a science. It is critical that there be no disconnect or mismatch between the ends and the means; otherwise, the ultimate or intermediate objectives of a campaign or major operation might not be attained. For example, the Israeli top political and military leadership committed such a blunder in going to war against the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah in July 2006 (Operation Change of Direction). The Israelis did not realize that the means they wanted to use—massive use of airpower alone, without ground attack—against Hezbollah, and Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure, was in mismatch with their declared ultimate objective, total disarmament of Hezbollah. Reportedly, there was no serious discussion among the highest leaders on the relationship between the ends and ways to achieve these ends. The Israeli prime minister’s stated objectives of the operation were over-ambitious and unfeasible.

One’s assumptions on anticipated enemy resistance are one of the major factors in determining the requirements for employing one’s sources of power to accomplish strategic objectives. Other factors include the available combat potential of the enemy forces, characteristics of the physical environment, and weather/climate.

Force requirements differ considerably in the post-hostilities phase from those in the major combat phase of a campaign. Also, a different size and composition of one’s forces are required when engaged in a counterinsurgency than when fighting a conventional high-intensity war. Force requirements are also dependent on one’s forces’ degree of combat readiness and such intangible factors as quality of leadership, quality and reliability of weapons and equipment, soundness of doctrine, quality of training, morale and discipline, and unit cohesion.

25 Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft und Zeit in der Militärischen Kriegsführung (Frauenfeld: Verlag von Huber, 1944), p. 2.


For example, the Allied objective for the landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 was selected without due regard for the factors of space and, particularly, force. The objective of the amphibious landing required the Allied force to be large enough to cause the Germans to react operationally, and also to be able to sustain itself until the expected linkup with the U.S. Fifth Army troops, advancing northward after the German withdrawal from the Gustav Line. The Allied VI Corps initial force comprised three ranger battalions, two commando battalions, a parachute regiment, and an additional parachute battalion, plus some supporting units. The size and composition of the landing force were determined, not by the objective to be accomplished, but by the availability of troops and landing craft. Afterward, one armored division (minus an infantry regimental combat team) was added.28 British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and his advisers mistakenly believed that a two-division landing force plus some paratroops would, by cutting off the German X Army’s lines of communications, force the Germans to withdraw their troops from the front or to immediately retreat.29 However, the landing force of only two divisions was clearly inadequate to achieve that effect, regardless of how aggressive the local commander was.

**Articulating the Objective**

In the process of determining a military objective, it is not sufficient to specify only the objective; one must also clearly spell out what type of action one must carry out to accomplish the specific objective. Otherwise, the planners will be unable to properly plan the pending operation. Clearly, actions intended to accomplish an offensive objective differ significantly from those aimed at achieving a defensive objective. An offensive objective is accomplished by its destruction, annihilation, or neutralization. The enemy is destroyed when he suffers such losses that he cannot continue the fight.30 *Destruction* means making the core of the enemy forces incapable of operating.31 It also means that a target is so damaged that it can neither

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function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition. The enemy is *annihilated* when he is left with no sources of power to offer any serious resistance. *Neutralization* means that the enemy is rendered ineffective and cannot prevent one’s forces from accomplishing their assigned objective. In defense, one has to hold, control, or retain a certain territory or position or delay withdrawal.

A properly articulated objective should be expressed clearly, concisely, and unambiguously. A lack of clarity could lead to waste of one’s time and sorely needed resources. It will also unnecessarily dilute one’s focus of effort, prevent the development of a coherent strategy, and make success difficult to obtain. Without clear political objectives, operational commanders cannot determine strategic and operational objectives or define what constitutes success. Failing to define clear objectives or changing objectives during a war or campaign causes confusion, lack of focus, and, often, lack of success. For example, the objective given to General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, prior to the landing at Normandy was clearly and concisely stated: “You will enter the Continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” Compare this with the highly ambiguous and open-ended objective in the Kosovo conflict of 1999: In March 1999, the United States publicly stated that the objectives of NATO’s action against Serbia were to demonstrate the “seriousness” of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s policies in the Balkans; to deter Slobodan Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on civilians and to create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and, by diminishing or degrading Serbia’s ability to wage military operations, to damage the country’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or to spread the war to neighbors. Likewise, the Israeli leadership provided ambiguous and unclear objectives to the military for the operation against Lebanon in July 2006.

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33 Department of Operations, *Sound Military Decision (including the Estimate of the Situation and the Formulation of Directives)*, p. 158.


37 “Summary of the Winograd Committee Interim Report,” p. 3.
In articulating the objectives for a campaign, the focus should be clearly on the ultimate strategic objective. The highest politico-military leadership should not group strategic and operational objectives together, thereby confusing the distinction between these two. The list of the objectives at the strategic level should not include purely routine military activities. For example, the basic rules of clearly and succinctly stating the proper objectives for a campaign were grossly violated by former U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld in his public statements both at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in March 2003.38

**Objectives and Effects**

The operational commander and the planners must also give a great deal of thought to anticipating the possible effects (also called consequences or results) of the accomplishment of the military objective. This is not a science, as many information warfare proponents seem to believe, but rather an art. Much depends on the commander’s knowledge and understanding of the enemy and all aspects of both the military and nonmilitary situation. There are also many pitfalls in the process, which, in turn, make any prediction on the possible effects tenuous at best.

In contrast to the so-called effects-based approach to planning, the effects of one’s actions cannot be determined prior to the accomplishment of a given military objective.

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38 Rumsfeld publicly stated on 7 October 2001 that the U.S. objectives were “to make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price; to acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban regime that harbors the terrorists; to develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support; to make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operation; and to alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive system that hampers the progress of the various opposition forces; and to provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime;” cited in Philipp Eder and Bruno Guenter Hofbauer, “Operation Enduring Freedom,” Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1 (January–February 2002), p. 58; the U.S. objectives for the war in Iraq as stated by Rumsfeld on 21 March 2003 were as follows: “Our goal is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people. Coalition military operations are focused on achieving several specific objectives: to end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished. Next, to identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks. Third, to search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq. Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity. Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens. Seventh, to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime. And last, to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.” Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives,” Defenselink, 21 March 2003, www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003.n212003_200303219.html.
However, it is incumbent on the operational commander and his staff to try to realistically anticipate the possible effects of the accomplishment of a given objective. They should also contemplate the possible effects of partially accomplishing the objective, as well as the effects of failing to accomplish the objective of a campaign or major operation (see Figure 3).

In general, the effects of accomplishing a military objective can be positive (desired or intended) or negative (undesired or unintended). Effects are not limited to the enemy and friendly sides but are also felt by neutrals. They can be military or nonmilitary in their nature. They can be tangible or intangible (or both). One should bear in mind that in most cases the type of effects and their strength and duration cannot be accurately predicted, much less expressed in quantifiable terms.

Effects can be felt at a specific level of war or across several levels of war. In terms of the factor of space, effects can be limited to a given part of the theater where the military action took place, or they can be felt far beyond the confines of that theater. The duration of effects can vary greatly. The effect of accomplishing or failing to achieve the objective might not be immediately recognized by the enemy and friendly or neutral sides; it might be some time before the effect of one’s action is fully understood. The effects of success or failure in accomplishing the objective can reinforce or neutralize each other.
In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the more likely the effects will be felt in a much larger area and over a longer time. These effects often lead to changes in the political, diplomatic, economic, informational, psychological, and other aspects of the situation in a theater, or even beyond the theater where the military action took place.

The accomplishment of an operational objective can sometimes have highly negative effects at the strategic level, as the Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 illustrates. In the planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese operational objective was to neutralize the U.S. Pacific fleet long enough for the Japanese forces to complete their planned conquest of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). At the strategic level, the Japanese hoped that by the time they had consolidated their position in Southeast Asia, the United States would accept the Japanese conquests as a fait accompli. However, the strategic effect of their action was just the opposite. The attack brought together divisive elements of the U.S. government and galvanized political and public support for declaring war on Japan. In other words, the action had strategic effects that were unintended and undesirable for Japanese interests.39

A decisive victory over a numerically much larger force can have profound effects at both operational and strategic levels, as the U.S. Navy’s victory in the battle of Midway on 4–6 June 1942 illustrates. The U.S. Navy’s force, composed of two carrier groups (three carriers, eight cruisers, and 14 destroyers), sank four fast Japanese carriers. The Japanese suffered their first defeat at sea since the sixteenth century; four carriers, with 253 aircraft, and one cruiser were sunk, and 3,500 men were killed, including 100 pilots. 40 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943), CINC of the Combined Fleet, still had huge superiority in surface forces, but immediately (and properly) realized that without carriers any attempt to sustain Japanese forces on Midway would eventually end in disaster, and made a sound decision to withdraw from the scene of action.

The U.S. Navy’s victory at Midway was due to almost perfect intelligence, which allowed its small force to concentrate at the right place and time; Admiral Raymond Spruance’s skillful handling of the carrier task force; aggressiveness of U.S. naval pilots; and, not least, a good deal of luck. The Japanese underestimated their opponent. They also tried to accomplish several objectives almost simultaneously and in the process did not achieve their main objective

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at Midway. The Japanese prepared plans based on wishful thinking, envisaging that the enemy would react exactly as the planners wanted him to.41

In retrospect, the Battle of Midway was clearly the turning point of the entire war in the Pacific. Its effects were also felt in the European theater, by both the Allies and Germany and Italy. The Japanese were unable to quickly replace their losses of four fast carriers. In the aftermath of the battle, the quality of the training of Japanese naval pilots declined drastically. The effect of this failure was not recognized by Japanese naval and military leaders and planners for several months. For example, the Japanese army took the lead in preparing a number of offensive plans. The Japanese army general staff made a decision to seize Port Moresby, New Guinea (Papua) but overland. The news of Field Marshal Rommel’s advance in North Africa emboldened the Japanese to revive their plans to capture Ceylon (Sri Lanka today) and carry the offensive further into the Indian Ocean. On 29 June 1942, the army general staff issued orders to carry out that operation. It was the Japanese navy that was unwilling to support the action. Instead, Yamamoto planned a new raid in the Bay of Bengal for August 1942. However, that operation was canceled because of the Allied landing at Guadalcanal, Lower Solomons, on 7 August 1942. Afterward, the Japanese faced progressively larger requirements for defense of their outposts in the Pacific but had steadily weakened forces.42

Perhaps no operational failure had so many diverse and enduring effects as the German defeat in the battle of Stalingrad, November 1942–January 1943. The Soviets encircled the German Sixth Army (including some forces of German allies) at Stalingrad in November 1942. By the end of the battle, in late January 1943, the Axis losses were 225,000 killed, including 170,000 Germans. About 25,000 German soldiers were flown out to safety. About 110,000 Germans and 3,000 Romanians went into Soviet captivity; most of them never returned home. The Luftwaffe lost 500 transport aircraft in its resupply efforts.43 The Soviets claimed that the German losses were 147,000 killed and 91,000 captured (including 24 generals and 2,500 other officers). The Soviets never released information on their losses, but they are believed to have been substantial.44 In fact, they most likely exceeded those of the Germans and their allies.

41 Ibid., pp. 224–25.
42 Ibid., pp. 226-27.
The loss of the Sixth Army, with 21 divisions, plus the destruction of the four armies of their allies was a huge defeat for the Germans.\(^{45}\) For the Soviets the battle of Stalingrad was an operational victory that had significant effects at both operational and strategic levels. After Stalingrad, the strategic initiative began to shift to the Soviets, and in that sense Stalingrad represented a point of no return for the Germans. It marked the culmination of the process of shrinking German options for achieving victory in the east.\(^{46}\) Yet the defeat at Stalingrad was not as decisive as some claimed, because the combat strength of the German army was not yet broken, as the German counteroffensive in southern Russia and in February–March 1943 and at Kursk in July 1943 showed. It was only after the battle of Kursk that the strategic initiative finally went over to the Soviets.

Stalingrad was much more than a military defeat. It had a huge political and psychological effect on both the victors and the losers. Soviet morale rose tremendously. At the same time, the defeat at Stalingrad had enormous consequences for the Germans. It caused feelings of despair among the German population. There was also a widespread impression that the defeat represented a turning point in the war. Even Hitler became the target of discontent among the Germans.\(^{47}\) Despite Nazi minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ call for total war, the German people lost confidence in Hitler’s “genius.” Some young staff officers posted on the eastern front began to organize resistance to Hitler, which eventually led to the failed assassination attempt in July 1944. Hitler’s basic mistake in planning the summer offensive in Russia was that he confused policy, strategy, and propaganda. The consequences were bad not only for Hitler’s standing among the Germans but for the German people as well.\(^{48}\)

The foreign policy effects of the German defeat at Stalingrad were extraordinarily large.\(^{49}\) Stalingrad had a major effect on the attitudes and policies of Germany’s closest allies and of neutrals as well. Finland, Hungary, and Romania almost immediately sensed that the war against Soviet Russia had been lost and started to look for ways to ensure their own salvation. Mussolini also became concerned about the war’s outcome and proposed making a separate peace with the


\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 121.


\(^{49}\) Ibid.
Soviet Union. Romanian dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu also proposed a separate peace, but with the Western Allies. In early 1943, the Finns, Romanians, and Hungarians all started to have some contact with the Western Allies in order to mitigate the consequences of a Soviet victory in the war.\textsuperscript{50}

Sometimes a tactical action such as a raid may have not only psychological but also operational and even strategic effects. For example, the so-called “Doolittle Raid” (named after General James H. Doolittle) conducted on 18 April 1942 was planned as an action to boost U.S. and Allied morale after a string of defeats in December 1941–April 1942. The raid was carried out by Task Force 16 (the carriers \textit{Hornet} and \textit{Enterprise}, three heavy and one light cruiser, and eight destroyers, supported by two submarines and two tankers). On board the U.S. carriers were embarked 16 B-25 land-based bombers. The plan was that both carriers, accompanied by four cruisers, would make a dash west and launch 16 B-25 bombers from a position some 500 miles from Tokyo, so that the bombers could reach the Chinese airfield at Chuchow (Zhuzhou) (some 1,100 miles away from Tokyo). The success of the raid depended on TF-16’s concealed approach to the assigned launching position. As it turned out, the B-25s were launched some 670 miles away from Tokyo.\textsuperscript{51} The bombers successfully reached Tokyo and dropped their bombs but caused only slight damage. Not a single B-25 was lost over Japan.\textsuperscript{52}

The military and psychological effects of the Doolittle Raid were far greater than U.S. decision makers and planners had envisaged. The raid gave American morale a huge lift, which was then badly needed. The Japanese military leaders lost face because they had promised that the home islands would never be bombed. One of the first operational effects of the raid was that the Japanese directed four army fighter groups to be deployed to defend Tokyo.\textsuperscript{53} As it happened, the raid came at a propitious time, when the Japanese navy and army were involved in an often-bitter debate over what course of action to take in the Pacific in the future. The naval officials argued for cutting off the United States from Australia and New Zealand by occupying the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, and Samoa. The precondition for that action was the neutralization of the U.S. carrier forces. This, in turn, in the view of Admiral Yamamoto,

\textsuperscript{50} Cited in Ziemke and Bauer, \textit{Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East}, p. 505.


\textsuperscript{52} One bomber had to fly to Vladivostok, where it was interned; and 15 bombers made for Chuchow; Morison, \textit{History of United States Naval Operations}, Vol. 3, \textit{The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942}, p. 396.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 398.
required the capture of the bases in the Aleutians and the western tip of the Hawaiian Islands chain. The Japanese army was opposed to any further offensive in the Pacific. The raid ended the discussion and provided a powerful argument for accepting the Japanese navy’s view. Yamamoto was directed to execute a major operation that also included luring U.S. carriers into the waters around Midway Island.\(^\text{54}\) The subsequent defeat of the Combined Fleet in the battle of Midway on 3-6 June 1942 was the turning point of the war in the Pacific.

For example, in the Battle for Britain in the summer of 1940, the German Luftwaffe was engaged in the increasingly bitter struggle for control of the air over the southern part of England. The Germans prepared plans based on a certain sequence of tasks to be carried out. This sound timetable was derailed by a rather inconsequential Royal Air Force (RAF) raid on Berlin on 25–26 August 1940 that caused only slight damage to the residential area. However, the RAF’s raid enraged Hitler, who directed Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, CINC of the Luftwaffe, to shift air attacks from the British Fighter Command to London and other cities. As a result, the Luftwaffe diverted scarce forces and resources to strengthening the defense of Berlin and escorting bombers attacking London—a new and irrelevant operational objective.\(^\text{55}\) This decision ended all German hopes, if there were any, of obtaining air superiority over the English Channel as a prelude to the planned invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion).

A tactical action should be decisive in its ultimate results; otherwise, it might lead to an operational failure. Very often, losses in men and materiel are not the only or even the most important factor in determining which side won or lost in some tactical action or a major operation. For example, in the battle of Jutland in June 1916, the numerically much smaller German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) inflicted heavier losses on the British Grand Fleet than they received.\(^\text{56}\) The Germans could plausibly claim that they had won a great tactical victory

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despite their large inferiority in numbers and materiel. However, in operational terms, the British Grand Fleet was the clear victor, because the operational situation in the North Sea remained as it was prior to the battle. The High Seas Fleet remained unable to operate beyond the narrow confines of the North Sea. Another effect of the Battle of Jutland was that the German admiralty and the army’s high command persuaded Emperor Wilhelm II and his chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg that the only way for Germany to break out of the enemy blockade was to launch unrestricted U-boat warfare. This decision, in turn, had extremely bad consequences for Germany, because it eventually led to America’s entry into the war on the side of Germany’s enemies and ultimately to Germany’s defeat.

In other cases, a tactical defeat might actually result in an operational victory for the defeated side if the enemy cannot complete the main part of his mission. For example, the Battle of the Coral Sea in 28 April–8 May 1942 was a tactical victory for the Japanese but an operational victory for the Allies. The Japanese planned to invade Port Moresby, New Guinea, by landing troops there. The Japanese fast carrier force would provide distant cover and support to the amphibious force. In the carrier engagement fought in the Coral Sea, the Japanese lost one light carrier (Shoho), and one fast carrier (Shokaku) suffered heavy damages so that it was unable to launch or receive any aircraft. The Japanese were left with only 39 aircraft. The U.S. losses were one fast carrier (Lexington), one fleet oiler (Neosho), and one destroyer (Sims). Coincidentally, the U.S. carriers were also left with only 39 aircraft. The biggest consequences for the Japanese were that both carriers were put temporarily out of service. One carrier was so heavily damaged that it was not ready for action by the time of the Midway operation; the other carrier (Zuikaku), although undamaged, was left with only nine planes. The reserve aircraft at that time were insufficient to cover these losses. This left the Japanese with only four front-line carriers available for the Midway operation. One might speculate that if these two carriers had been present in the subsequent battle of Midway, they might have provided the necessary margin for the Japanese victory. Another effect of the operational failure in the battle of the Coral Sea was that the Japanese decided to seize Port Moresby by advancing across the Owen Stanley mountain range, rising in height up to 13,000 feet. This attempt ultimately failed in late 1942, but only after the Allies suffered relatively high losses.

A major operation aimed at defending or resupplying a certain position or place might be only partially successful and end in larger losses in personnel and materiel, but might ultimately

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57 Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective, p. 251.


represent an operational success. For example, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean in the spring and early summer of 1942 was very difficult for the Allies. In the summer of 1942, the British Eighth Army in North Africa was on the defensive. The Axis’s Afrika Corps threatened the Nile Valley. The island of Malta was under almost constant air attack by the Axis aircraft based on Sicily and North Africa. By April 1942 the chances of Malta’s survival were low. The island’s reserves of wheat and flour, fodder, benzene, and kerosene fuel would not last beyond mid- or late June, while stocks of white oil and aviation fuel were sufficient only until mid-August. Specifically, there were only 920 tons of diesel oil and about 2,000 tons of furnace oil, needed for refueling Allied warships in the docks. The Welsh coal would last until the end of May and other grades until mid-June 1942. Stocks of AA ammunition were sufficient for only about six weeks of fighting. The Allied dual-convoy operation (Harpoon/Vigorous) to resupply Malta in June 1942 was a major defeat for the Allies. Out of six merchant ships in the convoy from Gibraltar (Operation Harpoon), only two ships, with about 15,000 tons of supplies, reached Malta. This convoy also lost two destroyers, while three more destroyers and a cruiser were seriously damaged. The convoy from Haifa and Port Said to Malta (Operation Vigorous) had 11 merchant ships, but none of them reached their destination. Two merchant ships were sunk, along with one cruiser and destroyer, before the rest of the convoy was ordered to turn back and sail for Alexandria. The supplies that reached Malta were to last only until early September 1942.\(^{60}\)

The failure of the convoy operations in June 1942 dramatically worsened Malta’s situation. Hence, on 10–15 August 1942 the Allies mounted another major effort to resupply the island (Operation Pedestal). A convoy of 14 merchant ships, plus a very large force of distant and direct support, sailed out from Gibraltar toward Malta. The convoy was subjected to almost continuous attacks by the Luftwaffe, U-boats, and motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and in the process suffered very heavy losses. Eventually, only five merchant ships reached Malta; two of them were so damaged that they almost sank. The naval losses were also heavy: one Allied aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and one destroyer were sunk, while another carrier and two cruisers were damaged.\(^{61}\) Yet despite all these losses the operation proved to be an operational success. About 47,000 tons of cargo reached Malta (including 15,000 tons of black and white oil and 32,000 tons of general supplies), sufficient to keep Malta alive until December 1942.\(^{62}\) By then the second battle of El Alamein in November 1942 had completely changed the situation in North Africa and the central Mediterranean in the Allies’ favor.

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In some cases, a series of large tactical or even operational defeats can still be transformed to positive strategic effects, as the Vietcong Tet offensive in Vietnam in January 1968 showed. Some 70,000 Vietcong guerrillas launched the offensive. It failed to inflict large losses on the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. About 40,000 Vietcong fighters and the core of its leadership were killed.63 Yet the psychological effects of the offensive were enormous. It convinced the majority of the U.S. public that the war in Vietnam was essentially unwinnable. From then on, public support for the war went down dramatically in the United States. This, in turn, led to the election of Richard Nixon as president, who initiated the policy of “Vietnamization”—of progressively turning over the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese government in Saigon—and eventually to the fall of South Vietnam under communist control in 1975.

**Level of War**

The scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the level of war to be conducted. The larger the military objective, the higher the level of war. Thus, three basic levels of war exist: strategic, operational, and tactical (see Figure 4). The Soviets were stricter in their interpretation of what constitutes a level of war. Because of their focus on quantitative aspects of warfare, the levels of war were essentially tied to specific force size. Hence, the Soviets differentiated among tactical, operational-tactical, operational, operational-strategic, and strategic forces and formations. In contrast, the principal differences among the levels of war for the Germans were the objective to be accomplished and the purpose of command and other elements of any given force.64

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The strategic level of war can be divided into two sublevels: national-strategic and theater-strategic. The national-strategic level of war is conducted in all three mediums for a country, or for groups of countries of both sides in a war. In World War II, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, his closest advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were chiefly responsible for determining strategy, providing strategic direction and sufficient personnel and materiel, and coordinating strategic actions in multiple theaters of war. Their counterparts in Great Britain were Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the War Council, and the British Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) operated at the coalition’s strategic level. Adolf Hitler and his Supreme Command of Wehrmacht (OKW) and Josef Stalin and the High Command (Stavka) operated at the national-strategic level. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the U.S. president, his national security advisers, and the JCS operated at the national-strategic level.

The theater-strategic level of war is conducted in a specific theater (of war). In the case of a global conflict such as World War II, several campaigns can be conducted sequentially and/or simultaneously in a given theater of war. Normally, the highest politico-military leadership would assign to each theater-strategic commander a single national or alliance/coalition strategic objective. The theater-strategic commander would then translate that objective into several theater-strategic objectives and take appropriate actions and measures to accomplish them. In World War II, the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, the Pacific Ocean
Area (POA), and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) represented theater-strategic levels of war, in today’s understanding of the term.

The operational level of war takes place in a formally (or informally) declared theater of operations. Then a single campaign is normally conducted to accomplish a single theater or military strategic objective. Normally, the accomplishment of a theater-strategic objective would require the sequenced and synchronized employment of military (land, sea, and air/space) and nonmilitary sources of national power in a given theater of operations. The operational level of war was conducted in the northern, central, and southern Pacific Ocean Areas in World War II. Similarly, the operational level of war took place in New Guinea (Papua) and adjacent areas in 1942–1944 and in the Philippines in 1944–1945. The operational level of war was conducted by both sides in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982; in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) in the Gulf War of 1990–1991; in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom); and in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom). An example of the operational level of war, in which a limited strategic objective was accomplished through the planning and execution of a major joint/combined air offensive operation, was the Kosovo conflict of 1999 (Operation Allied Force). This operation was conducted largely in NATO’s Allied Force South (AFSOUTH) area of responsibility.

The tactical level of war is conducted in a small part of the theater, ranging from a combat zone or sector to an area of operations. This is the level of war at which one’s and enemy forces are engaged to accomplish their respective major or minor tactical objectives through the conduct of battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions. These actions take place in all three physical mediums.

Although related, levels of war and levels of command are not identical. The first nominally exist only in time of war and deal exclusively with the employment of one’s sources of military and nonmilitary power to accomplish specific military objectives. Normally, levels of command exist in time of peace and in war. They are only prerequisites for conducting war at a given level in the course of accomplishing assigned military objectives. Yet if the respective theater commander does not apply the tenets of operational art in the employment of his sources of power and instead focuses on tactics or, even worse, pure targeteering, he does not conduct war at the operational or theater-strategic level. Normally, levels of command are clearly differentiated from each other, while levels of war are not. The reason is that the outcome of combat actions often has effects beyond the boundaries of a particular level of war. A major tactical defeat can result in the failure of a major operation and thereby adversely affect the situation at the operational level, and in some cases even at the strategic level. The boundaries between individual levels of war are often not constant, but they may overlap, sometimes considerably.
The relationship between the levels of war may differ depending upon the unique circumstances of a particular war. Levels of war are not clearly delineated from each other. Distinctions among the levels are greatest in a high-intensity conflict. It is there that the stratification of levels tends to be most complete and the levels’ individual characteristics most evident. The more the nonmilitary aspects of the strategic objective predominate, as in the case of an insurgency or counterinsurgency or so-called counterterrorism, the less need there is for the use of one’s sources of military power; the opposite is equally true. Hence, the scope of the operational level of war in a low-intensity conflict is comparatively much smaller than the scope of the strategic and tactical levels. In low-intensity conflict each level exists, but it is more difficult to isolate key events and decisions associated with each level.\textsuperscript{65}

In a physical sense, there are, of course, no “levels,” but only different sizes of physical space and mediums (land, sea, air/space) in which friendly and enemy forces operate. The levels of war refer to the actual employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish assigned military objectives in a specific part of a theater or in the theater as a whole. They provide a framework for command and control; they are very useful tools for analysis of politico-military activity before, during, and in the aftermath of combat. They provide a means of achieving a coherent picture of force in different ways, at different levels, in pursuit of strategic objectives. Force can be applied offensively at one level and defensively at another level.\textsuperscript{66} A full understanding and knowledge of the levels of war and their mutual relationships are the key prerequisites for operational commanders and their staffs in sequencing and synchronizing the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power in accomplishing strategic or operational objectives.

A thorough knowledge and sound understanding of the levels of war are a critical for selecting the proper methods of combat employment of one’s forces. The levels of war determine the nature of the decisions to be made, the type of planning process (i.e., progressive vs. regressive), and the plans’ execution. Without the understanding and knowledge of what constitutes a given level of war, it is hard to understand the true differences in the concepts of critical factors and centers of gravity, culmination point, and maneuver, to name just a few elements of operational warfare. The higher the level of war, the more important the role each of these elements plays in the planning and execution of a given military action. The higher the level of war, the more complex the situation that the military commanders and their staffs must understand, evaluate, and synthesize. Both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation are critical for success at the operational and strategic levels across the spectrum of conflict. This is

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., pp. 6–8.

not necessarily the case at the tactical level, except in the post-hostilities phase of a campaign or operations other than war. Errors made at the operational and strategic levels of war can be overcome only with great difficulty, if at all.

Levels of war are not, as is often erroneously believed, identical to the respective components of military art. Each component of military art encompasses the fields of study and practice—art, while the levels of war encompass only the field of practice. To complicate the matter, strategy and operational art spans several levels of war. For example, operational art is mainly applied from the operational-tactical to the theater-strategic levels of war. Likewise, strategy is applied at the operational, theater, and national-strategic levels.

All the levels of war are interrelated; actions and activities at each level affect the other levels. In a low-intensity conflict, the levels of war are often hard to distinguish from each other because of the inherent complexity of the objectives to be accomplished. Then, decisions made at the tactical level have a considerable and sometimes significant impact on events at the operational and even strategic levels of war. Sometimes tactical events cause a significant ripple effect at the operational and strategic levels of war. In low-intensity conflict, it is more difficult to isolate the key events and decisions associated with each perspective.\(^67\) For instance, in a peace operation, a tactical action should not lead to undermining the ultimate strategic purpose. A single tactical action that results in a large loss of civilian life or other collateral damage can have significant adverse political and psychological effects. Several such actions can even have profound negative long-term strategic consequences.

**Conclusion**

The military objective is the single most important part of operational warfare. Almost all its aspects are related in one way or another to, or dependent on, the military objective to be accomplished. Among other things, the objective determines the levels of war to be conducted, methods of employment of one’s combat forces, and establishment of the corresponding levels of command. The objective also greatly affects the content of and mutual relationships among individual elements of operational warfare, such as concentration, critical factors and centers of gravity, maneuver, fires, point of culmination, deception, sequencing, synchronization, branches and sequels, and reserves, to mention the most important.

Properly determining the objective is the first and perhaps the most important step in planning and executing military action at any level. This is not an easy task for commanders and their staffs. Afterward, the problem is to properly match ends with means and then select proper ways. The importance of the military objective in planning and executing a military action cannot be overstated. The larger the scale of the objective, the more critical that all steps in

\(^{67}\) Petrole, *Understanding the Operational Effect*, p. 8.
harmonizing one’s ends, means, and ways are done properly; otherwise, it is hard to see how the military action can be successful. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are in one way or another linked to the objective.

Once the objective is determined, one of the key issues is to divide it into a number of main and partial (component) tasks that will collectively ensure its accomplishment. The linkage between the objective and its constituent tasks cannot be arbitrarily severed without seriously endangering the accomplishment of the objectives as a whole. The accomplishment of any objective will invariably have positive or negative effects on one’s own situation and future operations. Operational commanders and planners should always try to think ahead and to anticipate what effects the accomplishment of a given objective will have on not only military but also nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a theater. Many of these effects are hard or impossible to quantify. Hence, the operational commander should avoid the temptation to embark on the time-consuming and labor-intensive but ultimately futile effort of trying to accurately predict what these effects might be.

Comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the activities and actions at each command echelon and level of war are prerequisite to understanding the full complexity of relationships among strategy, tactics, and operational art. No mastery of operational art is possible without understanding each level of war and the mutual relationships among the levels. Because of the difference in the scope of the military objectives to be accomplished, each level of command and level of war require commanders and their staff to have a different perspective. The higher the level of command, the broader that perspective. The narrowest perspective, in terms of both physical space and the elements of the situation, is at the tactical level. This determines that, normally, only military sources of power are used to accomplish a tactical objective. At each level above the tactical level, the perspective becomes progressively larger and more complex. At the national- and theater-strategic levels, the accomplishment of military strategic objectives requires the employment of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power over time.

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By

Robert Kemp

Introduction: Regional Command – East 2004 - 2005

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in eastern Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005 were predominantly focused on provinces bordering Pakistan, where the majority of combat operations took place. The provinces with the most active insurgencies were Khost, Paktika and Konar Provinces, with security generally improving away from the border and in non-Pashtun areas, such as Bamian and Panshir Provinces.

The main counterinsurgency tools were the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and maneuver battalions, integrated into a brigade command. US Special Forces were also present, and, by 2005, significant numbers of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units were deployed.

The PRTs were composed of soldiers working in civil-military units, augmented by officers from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The PRTs were not assigned combat roles (except to react when attacked), but instead carried out small-scale reconstruction and development projects, supported elections, and bolstered the provincial and district-level government. In contrast, the maneuver battalions were tasked with combat operations, as well as normal patrolling and joint operations with the ANA. The Regional Command - East (RC-East) brigade command in 2004 was under the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 25th Infantry Division, followed in 2005 by the 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne. The coordination of the PRTs, maneuver units and air assets was done at the brigade level; coordination with Special Forces was done both at the brigade level, and on the ground between field-grade officers.

The situation in many provinces, particularly those near the border with Pakistan, was often unstable and rapidly changing. Provincial governance was weak, with limited reach into the districts, and tribal leaders and local strongmen often filled power vacuums. Cross-border attacks were common in some areas, particularly Khost and Paktika, and by the summer of 2005 the insurgents had increased their numbers, command and control, and armaments. Suicide bombings, previously a rare occurrence, happened more frequently beginning in the spring of 2005. The ANA, though lacking anywhere near the required number of kandaks (battalions), gradually increased its presence in several provinces. The ANP continued to struggle, hampered by insufficient equipment, poor pay, high levels of corruption, and in many cases poor leadership.
This paper looks at how the USG carried out counterinsurgency efforts in Regional Command East, using three case studies to examine how the level of security determined what combination of Afghan Government, PRTs, maneuver units, international organizations and Special Forces were used in different areas for different goals.

Case Study 1: Bermal Valley: Maneuver Battalion leads

The Bermal valley, in the far eastern reaches of Paktika province, is a rocky desert, with low mountain ranges to the east and west. Across the border is Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area’s (FATA) South Waziristan agency, a hotbed of insurgent activity, apparently based in the town of Wana. Several mountain valleys have streams that support limited agriculture, but otherwise the economy is based on trade, particularly cross-border commerce.

The predominant tribe is the Waziris, who extend into Pakistan. The Durand line has split this tribe, and in some sense Bermal district is an extension of Waziristan. Historically, the government of Afghanistan has never had strong control of this district. Twice during the period 2002 – 2004 the Afghan National Police had been driven off by insurgents, in one case with several officers killed. Complicating the picture, only a poor road connected Bermal with the rest of Afghanistan, stretches of which were the sites of ambushes by insurgents. In 2004, a PRT convoy was ambushed on this road, taking several casualties in a firefight that lasted more than an hour.

In 2003, the U.S. 2-27 maneuver battalion maintained a company in the area, a period during which there was minimal combat activity, later handing the area of operations (AO) to a Special Forces unit. The porous border with Pakistan, frequent cross-border insurgent attacks, and rocket barrages made the Bermal district difficult to secure. Added to the mix were inter-tribal rivalries between the Kharoti and Waziri tribes, and the tendency of people on the border to be “fence sitters”, reluctant to trust their future to either the Coalition or the Afghan government, for fear of an insurgent return.

In early 2005 Paktika Governor Mangal decided to reestablish a district government in Bermal, and requested assistance from the US military. A decision was made at the brigade level to support this request, and the 1-508 battalion (which had taken over Paktika from the 2-27) was tasked with the operation, in coordination with Special Forces. The provincial government, the commander of the 1-508, and tribal elders first hammered out a political agreement, guaranteeing the support of the tribes, providing a parcel of land for a government center, and agreeing that each tribe provide men for a security force.

By late spring, elements of a company arrived in Bermal Bazaar, roughly 15 km. north of the town of Shkin, and began setting up a perimeter in a patch of desert outside of town. Over the next weeks, a district sub-government was established (headed by a bold ex-police officer from...
Paktia province), and provincial ANP and ABP units arrived. This was followed by the construction of barracks, a government center, a medical post, and a mosque.

This operation was important for several reasons. It directly extended the reach of the provincial government into an area where its writ had not only been contested, but effectively removed by insurgents. It also took the fight directly to the South Waziristan based insurgents, putting Afghan and Coalition forces close to their sanctuaries, and providing a buffer for the remainder of Paktika province.

**Analysis**

Bermal was a case where a very tenuous security situation required that the maneuver battalion, supported by Special Forces take the lead instead of the PRT. Although the goal of “extending the reach of the Government of Afghanistan” fell within the PRT’s responsibilities, the PRT lacked the firepower and resources to take on the job. The State Department’s role was limited, with the officer assigned to the brigade command involved in the initial planning, and making several trips to Bermal to assess the situation. At this time, there was no State political officer assigned to either the PRT in Sharan, or the maneuver battalion in Orgun – E. Either or both would have put an extra “tool in the toolbox”, particularly during the negotiations with tribal leaders prior to the operation, and in helping establish the district government. The AID officer in Sharan contributed by working to arrange funding for the district government center.

By late 2007 the Bermal firebase had grown to include a U.S. battalion HQ, as well as the district government center, a mosque, and an ANA base. This was a successful operation that provided security and governance to a tough district, while also interdicting the cross – border flow of insurgents.

**Case Study: United Nations Leads**

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) maintained two regional offices in the RC – East, in Gardez and Jalalabad. These offices kept good contacts with the governors and tribes, as well as the USG. The Gardez office worked closely with U.S. military and civilian officers to plan and execute the so-called “Zadran Arc Initiative”, targeted at the districts where the Zadran tribe has influence, where Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces come together. The UNAMA officer responsible for the project saw the need to reduce tension between the various tribes, while expanding the influence of the governors and engaging U.S. development funds. To that end, he worked closely with tribal leaders and the three provincial governors to broker a peace deal between the tribes (in part by delineating boundaries of tribal lands), with the governors and tribal leaders signing a formal agreement. The U.S. military provided additional support, hosting several regional governors’ conferences, and providing funding for projects in the area under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The Zadran Arc Initiative helped secure the pass between Khost and Gardez, keeping an important
logistical route open and improving security along the route of a planned 100 million dollar USAID road-building project.

The UNHCR led in Khost in the spring and summer of 2005, when several Afghan Refugee camps located across the border in Pakistan were closed on short notice. UNHCR took the lead on coordinating efforts with the Afghan Government and U.S. forces, including the Khost PRT, while also providing some logistical support for the returnees. Interestingly, tribal and village ties played a major role in absorbing the returnees back into society.

Elections: Afghan Government Leads, with Considerable International Support

The Presidential elections, held in October 2004, and the Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections, held in September 2005, were complex operations, requiring considerable planning and logistical efforts over periods of several months. At the same time the very nature of the event required complete Afghan participation, and the lead of the Afghan government. In support of the elections were a wide range of participants – UNAMA, including the establishment of a welcome center the Joint Electoral Management Board, the PRTs, maneuver battalions and Task Force commands, Afghan security forces, and international contractors, along with considerable community involvement.

Analysis

UNAMA political officers brought considerable background and skill to their work; however, their offices often lacked adequate staff to fully carry out the responsibilities assigned to them by their Kabul office, and in a larger sense, by the Bonn Agreement. In the end the resources brought to bear by the brigade commands both overshadowed the UNAMA efforts, and also drew the UNAMA officers to try and co-opt the U.S. military into funding projects they deemed necessary. UNAMA did carry influence as a perceived neutral player in the complicated political playing field of the border provinces.

The successful elections of 2004 and 2005 probably have not received as much recognition as they deserve. Carrying out elections in Afghanistan in the best of times would be difficult, but doing in the midst of an ongoing insurgency, in a country battered by more than 25 years of war, was exceptional. Much of the credit goes to the ability of the various organizations involved to coordinate and integrate their efforts.

Case Study 3: Position of PRTs on the Civil-Military Spectrum, 2004 - 2005

Each PRT in RC – East, despite similarities in overall organization and strategic goals, was unique in its specific objectives and methods. Each had to adjust to the local conditions – security, economic, geographic, cultural, and political – and adopt its own model, while staying
within guidance from higher commands, including the Division command, Brigade command and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (and, in the case of the New Zealand –led PRT in Bamian, from Wellington).

The security situation in each province was the determining factor for each PRT. Where on the “civil” to “military” spectrum each province was – if kinetic operations predominated, or if reconstruction was the main effort of Coalition forces in the province - determined how the PRT functioned (keeping in mind that no PRT had a combat role to play, other than self-defense). Some provinces, such as Konar, had high threat levels in many areas. This resulted in more emphasis on combat operations, carried out by maneuver units and Special Forces, with the development projects often done in support of these operations. On the other end of the spectrum, PRTs in Bamian and Parwan, operated in a much more permissive security environment, and were able to emphasize economic and political development, and reduce (or eliminate) combat operations and patrols.

In very general terms, the security situation improved away from the border with Pakistan; in areas where Hazaras or Tajiks were the predominant ethnic group, or where abundant coalition firepower was available, as in Khost or near Bagram Air Base. Of course, economic and security considerations were closely related, so that in areas with economic growth, including the towns of Jalalabad and Ghazni, the security situation improved as a result.

Following is a description of the resulting PRT “continuum” as it stood in the fall of 2005, from the most challenging security situation (Asadabad, Konar Province and Sharan, Paktika Province) to the most favorable (Bamian, Parwan and Panshir).

**Asadabad**

The PRT at Asadabad, in Konar Province across from the FATA’s Bajaur Agency, was a case where significant security threats resulted in an emphasis on military operations over development efforts during 2004 - 2005. Threats were due to cross-border attacks, indigenous insurgent forces as well as those infiltrated from Nuristan Province and Pakistan, as well as criminal groups involved in smuggling opium, lumber and jewels. The geographic layout of the province, with the roads often following linear valleys, or with only one route in or out (for example the Pesh valley road, leading to Camp Blessing north of Asadabad) resulted in predictable and unavoidable travel routes, and significant casualties due to IEDs.

Beginning in 2005 the Marines were the main maneuver force, operating out of Camp Blessing, backed by Special Forces at other bases. By early 2005 smaller ANA units were actively patrolling. The Korangal valley, a very rugged area west of Asadabad, was the site of many contacts, as the insurgents were using it as a staging and supply area (in 2006 a major operation, dubbed “Mountain Lion”, was mounted to stabilize the area). By late 2005 the
provincial government, with financial support from Kabul, was standing up militias at the district levels with the aim of fielding a 2,000 man force to counter instability in the province. Because of repeated attacks, some ANP stations were de-facto fire bases, protected with sandbagged towers and heavy machine guns.

The security situation slowed development projects; construction of the Jalalabad to Asadabad road was repeatedly postponed due to threats, and in at least one case, the death of construction engineers at the hands of insurgents. Movements of the AID representative posted to the PRT were restricted, and most projects were limited to Asadabad and its surroundings, and to support of counter-insurgency operations the Pesh valley. PRT Asadabad was also responsible for the eastern half of Nuristan (with PRT Methar Lam responsible for western Nuristan). The focus of efforts there was building rudimentary roads, to open access for future development as well as open military lines of communications.

The role of the political officer in Asadabad was particularly important during 2004 – 2005, due to a weak and corrupt provincial government. This led to an eventual housecleaning in early 2005, with the replacement of the governor, NDS chief and police chief.

Sharan

As described in the previous section on Bermal, the security situation in Paktika province made the maneuver battalion predominant relative to the PRT. This was in part due to sheer numbers – the maneuver battalion counted on roughly 700 soldiers, versus 100 soldiers manning the PRT. CERP funding levels were roughly equivalent between the maneuver unit and the PRT. AID had signed several million dollars worth of contracts with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) as an implementing partner, but due to security concerns, these projects were on hold, making the CERP funds particularly important.

The first maneuver battalion in Paktika, the 2-27, was on the ground prior to the establishment of the PRT, and built up strong relations with Governor Mangal and other provincial officials and tribes. These strong ties were carried on by the 1-508 maneuver battalion. Both battalions pushed units out to the districts, often for extended periods, which the PRT was rarely able to do due to security and manpower restraints. The 1-508 established several patrol bases, as well as a permanent base in the south of the province at Waza Khwa. This established a reach the PRT was never able to match. In addition, helicopters were at times made available for operations by the 1-508, an enabler the Sharan PRT – or most other PRTs – did not have access to, a critical difference given the poor road network.

Other factors reduced the effectiveness of the PRT relative to the maneuver battalion. The State Department was not able to place an officer at Sharan until late 2005 – prior to this, the province was covered by the political officer based in Khost. AID was also slow in placing an officer in Sharan. When an AID officer did arrive, an IED attack on a convoy – resulting in the deaths of several Afghan police officers – led to the officer being relocated to Khost. Making matters worse for the PRT, Orgun –E was the previous capital of Paktika, and much political and
economic weight remained there. The Special Forces ODB responsible for Paktika was also located in Orgun-E, reducing the chances for synergy with the PRT.

In order to improve coordination with the PRT, the maneuver battalion had assigned a captain as liaison officer. This was an easy arrangement to make, as a small force was assigned to Sharan to help guard the governor’s compound. This improved relations, and was also a link for State and AID officers to the commander of the maneuver battalion.

**Jalalabad**

Given the relatively large population and economic output of Nangarhar Province, its proximity to Pakistan and Peshawar, as well as the considerable poppy cultivation and opium production, Jalalabad was the most important PRT in RC – East. Operations in this province were the most complex, involving the PRT, a substantial USAID effort, SF, Marines, military trainers, and State.

Two AID officers were assigned to the PRT, in part to handle the heavy workload generated by alternative livelihood programs, and the need to manage sub-contractors such as Development Associates International. A USDA officer was assigned to the PRT, advising on agriculture and micro credit (although USDA was hobbled by not having its own funding for projects).

The PRT’s presence benefited from a Marine battalion headquartered at the Jalalabad airfield, Special Forces, as well as an increasingly strong ANA presence. This helped open access to some of the more difficult districts, particularly in the Spin Ghar range south of Jalalabad, bordering Pakistan, and the heavily tribal districts near the Khyber Pass.

The PRT commander, an efficient regular Army lieutenant colonel, was heavily involved in the complex politics of the province. Several families had traditionally run the province, but there were other poles of power, including the provincial chief of police and the chief of the Afghan Border Police. The PRT was a moderating influence between the power brokers, extending the influence of the Embassy and, more than other PRTs, acting as a de-facto consulate. This influence took several forms – pressing the provincial government to crack down on drug production and corruption; settling disputes between the ANA and the ANP; and reacting to riots magazine that erupted in the spring of 2005, precipitated by an article in Newsweek magazine. While this incident damaged security for the short term, overall security was sufficient for development to take precedence over combat operations by the summer of 2005.

**Ghazni**

During 2004 Ghazni province was relatively peaceful, allowing for freedom of movement by the PRT in most of the province. By the summer of 2005, however, the Taliban was
resurgent, making operations more difficult, particularly in the districts bordering Paktika (particularly Andar district) and Zabol provinces. The Ghazni PRT also covered Wardak province, a difficult assignment given the distances and poor roads in that province.

The PRT benefited from sharing its base with an army maneuver battalion, easing its access to less secure parts of the province. Interestingly, the Afghan Highway Police was a significant factor in provincial security, by not only keeping the Kabul to Kandahar ring road open, but by also serving as the governor’s private militia.

The political and AID officers shared strong working relations with Gov. Assadullah Khalid, a young and vigorous official with strong ties to both the Northern Alliance and President Karzai. This relationship was in some ways the textbook of what a PRT political officer can do – improving the efficiency of the provincial government, shaming the governor into doing the right thing, acting as an honest broker (with a mixed Tajik, Hazara and Pashtun population, politicians from these various groups at times caused problems for their own ends); and explaining USG programs and policies.

An additional U.S. maneuver battalion was assigned to Ghazni and Wardak provinces for the September 2005 provincial elections. This brought a significant increase in security to areas that had previously had only occasional Coalition presence. An opportunity was missed, however, by not assigning a State officer to this temporary deployment.

**Methar Lam**

Laghman Province had been fairly quiet for the years after the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban, with insurgent activity mostly in two northern districts. The Methar Lam PRT also covered western Nuristan province. The PRT initially shared a base with a Marine company, which aggressively patrolled in the province. In part due to the Marine’s presence, the PRT was able to make rapid progress in several areas. In coordination with the provincial government, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program was effective, defanging several militia groups and bringing in Taliban members. The 2005 parliamentary elections were used as leverage against several warlords, who were forced to at least partially disarm before being eligible as candidates.

In general, the combined PRT/Marine presence seemed to give confidence to the local government, headed by the reasonably competent Governor Safi, and several development projects – including roads in the Alishang valley – were begun. The civilian presence at Methar Lam was limited at first, with Jalalabad-based State and AID officers providing coverage when possible. The AID presence was primarily a counter-narcotics effort to promote alternative livelihoods, and construct the road linking Methar Lam with Route 1. By late 2005, a State officer had been permanently assigned.
Bamian

Within RC-East, the Bamian PRT was unique for several reasons. Although it was an OEF PRT, it was commanded and staffed by New Zealand soldiers. They brought their own doctrine to the field, including a “softer” approach emphasizing reconstruction and community relations over combat operations. The population in Bamian Province is predominantly of the Hazara ethnic group, who are mostly Shiite Muslims. As a result, the Taliban and other insurgents groups had difficulties operating in Bamian, and the security situation was permissive. This allowed the PRT to operate without the support of a maneuver battalion, relying instead on their limited combat capabilities (rarely, if ever used) and the presence of Afghan security forces.

The Hazara have historically been an underclass in Afghanistan, and have received limited development assistance over the years. The PRT’s development projects therefore made a disproportionately large impact. The PRT worked closely with Gov. Sarobi, Afghanistan’s only woman governor, supporting her in struggles against corrupt government and police officials. This PRT had an unusually large proportion of medics, and made good use of “medcaps” throughout the province. Officers from USAID, State and USDA were posted to the PRT, making their agencies resources available in support of the NZ effort.

In contrast to the situation in Bermal, Bamian was a case where the PRT was able to lead, without any maneuver battalion support to speak of. The security situation was good enough that the focus was almost entirely on reconstruction work and development of the provincial government.

Panshir

The Panshir PRT was also unique among OEF PRTs, with a State Department officer designated at the commander instead of a military officer. Only a minimal number of soldiers were assigned to the PRT, and its focus was on political and economic development. This arrangement was made possible by the special conditions in the Panshir valley – a receptive Tajik population, a provincial government willing to assure the PRT’s security, and the difficulty the Taliban or other insurgent groups have operating in the Panshir. The Panshir model had significant benefits – a smaller footprint, cheaper costs, and reliance on local capabilities. However, this model may be difficult to replicate in areas where the security situation is more fluid.

Analysis

In 2004 – 2005 Regional Command East dealt with a wide variety of conditions in terms of security, economic development, Afghan government capacity, ethnic groups, insurgent capabilities, border conditions, and terrain. As a result, each PRT was considerably different than other PRTs, and was specifically adapted to the conditions and development needs of its province. The most important variable, as illustrated by the examples above, was the level of
security. This determined not only how much access the PRTs had to their districts (some were no-go areas), but also what type and how many development projects were undertaken.

One measure of the long-term success of the PRT concept in Afghanistan will be the rate at which PRTs are able to shift from a focus on security efforts – as was the case in Asadabad, and in the Bermal valley – to a reconstruction and political focus, as in Bamian and the Panshir. This depends on a multitude of factors – how strong and effective the Afghan security forces eventually become, whether the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to continue their activities, overall economic development, the maturation of the district, provincial and national government, the future level of NGO and international organization involvement, the rejection of the insurgents by the populace, and events in the FATA. Ultimately, the PRTs should completely hand the “humanitarian space” off to the NGOs, IOs, and the efforts of the GoA. At that point, the PRTs will have worked themselves out of a job.

Conclusions and Recommendations

By 2008 the situation in RC – East had significantly changed from the fall of 2005. Afghan institutions were making their presence felt, particularly the ANA, which had more troops, an increasing ability to carry out operations, and the support of the Afghan population. After considerable investment by the U.S. in training and equipping the ANP, the police were gradually improving. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), established in August 2007, was working to improve policy, infrastructure, capacity, and the overall functioning of government at the provincial, district and municipal levels. The IDLG had also brought in several new governors, both improving the administration of the provinces, but also improving the outlook of citizens towards their government. At the same time, economic growth in several provinces – notably Nangarhar – was cause for optimism. The trend of increasing Afghan government capacity has changed the dynamics of cooperation outlined in this paper – increasingly, U.S. military and civilian officers follow the Afghan lead.

In 2007 the U.S. military added a second brigade combat team to the border areas, with a second task force headquarters established in Jalalabad. This considerably increased the ability to carry out combat operations in areas that were previously “economy of force” operations, as well as increase partnering with ANA, ABP and ANP units. This had the added advantage of increasing the level of security enough that the PRTs could operate in districts where their movements had previously been restricted. At the same time, the levels of CERP funding were significantly increased. For example, Task Force Bayonet, the brigade command based in Jalalabad, funded roughly 100 million dollars of projects with CERP in 2007, most of which went through the four PRTs in its AO (Jalalabad, Asadabad, Methar Lam and Nuristan).

The establishment since 2005 of three new PRTs in RC – East – in Wardak, under Turkish leadership, in Logar under the Czechs, and in Nuristan, under U.S. leadership has allowed for a more “tailored” approach to each of these provinces. Previously, each of these provinces was covered by U.S. PRTs located in adjacent provinces, and was often a secondary
The Nuristan PRT in particular has improved the ability to provide development assistance to one of the least developed and most remote Provinces in Afghanistan.

Maneuver battalions still play a major role in RC – East. Some areas in Konar province, particularly the Watapor and Korangal valleys, still have troops in contact on a regular basis, while sectors of Khost and Paktika provinces, particularly the border districts, have significant insurgent influence. Some provinces that had only low levels of insurgency in 2004 – including parts of Ghazni, Logar, Wardak and Kapisa – now see increased insurgent activity. The maneuver units are needed not only to directly counter the insurgents, but also to support the ANA and ANP, and to allow the Afghan government and the PRTs to operate freely in contested districts. The duties of maneuver units and the PRTs sometimes overlap, particularly in less secure areas, with officers from both involved in CERP projects and support of the government.

Some provinces appear to be shifting towards the positive end of the security spectrum, so that PRTs (and Afghan government ministries) play an increasing role relative to security forces. An example is Nangarhar province, where in 2004 there were only minimal U.S. and Afghan security forces, and a considerable insurgent presence. By 2008, the ANP and to a lesser extent the ANA had the lead on security, and insurgent activity was mostly limited to a few border districts. This allowed the PRT to concentrate on development, spending almost 25 million dollars of CERP funds for projects in 2007, and to focus on working with the governor, the Provincial Council, and tribal leaders. The improved security situation helped a U.S. “special troops battalion”, composed of soldiers whose specialties were not combat arms, to succeed as a hybrid combat and development unit.

The need for increased civilian staff at the PRTs and at brigade commands, apparent in 2004 – 2005, remains a problem in 2008. The military has shifted officers to fill these gaps, assigning officers to work on political, development, agricultural, and rule-of-law issues, but the counterinsurgency effort would benefit from more civilian officers with training and experience in these areas. At the same time, UNAMA suffers from being both understaffed and underfunded at both the provincial and regional levels.

On the negative side, various insurgent groups have survived to 2008, including the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, Hezb-i- Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), and foreign jihadist groups. In some cases, their capabilities have increased (particularly in “asymmetric” warfare such as IEDs and suicide bombings). The resulting low-intensity conflict has had a disproportionate negative impact on development efforts, by keeping NGOs out of many areas, diverting money that might be spent on development projects into security, and keeping the U.S. PRTs with a preponderance of military, rather than civilian officers.

Robert Kemp is a State Department Foreign Service officer currently assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. He has previously been political advisor to brigade commanders of the 25th ID, the 82nd Airborne and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team during their deployments to Afghanistan. This paper reflects the personal views of the author, and does not represent official State Department or U.S. Government policy or views.
The Embassy at War
By
Alexander Crowther

Introduction
As a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States has adopted a more forward security stance. Because of this, US embassies throughout the world are required to spearhead interagency, intergovernmental and sometimes multinational security efforts in support of the US National Security Strategy and the strategies of our international partners. This requires a US country team that is able to focus the efforts of all US government organizations to achieve the synergies needed to defeat our enemies. As such, we need to ensure that the US Embassy is organized appropriately and capable of running operations along a spectrum of conflict from ‘normal’ or peaceful circumstances to all-out conflict like Iraq. The embassy must be able to organize for war.

Modern Challenges
The modern global milieu is fraught with challenges. In the post-Cold War era, opponents of globalization and the perceived hegemony of the developed countries have attacked not only developed countries but also our partners throughout the world.

Our opponents seek to use asymmetric means to attack us. Asymmetric approaches are the only way that our opponents can attack us and survive due to the overwhelming conventional capability present in the modern developed state. They seek to undermine our credibility and our political will. Rather than overthrowing governments and replacing them, modern opposition groups use terrorist techniques to gain their political goals, which usually center on gaining the space to do what they will, whether making money like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) in Colombia or seeking room to organize and build weapons like al-Qaeda.

Modern Approaches
Modern challenges require modern approaches. It is no longer sufficient to unleash the might of the US armed forces on the opposition. In modern warfare, use of military force is often counterproductive.1 Even when the military is used, it is used as a part of a Joint/Interagency/Intergovernmental/Multinational (JIIM) team. The US part of the JIIM team is known as the interagency.

The interagency is a colloquial term for the collection of US government agencies. With the burgeoning challenges of the 21st century, an approach that only uses one or two agencies

1 See Rupert Smith “The Utility of Force” for a more detailed analysis.
will be overwhelmed by the opposition. Therefore, the USG seeks synergies by mobilizing the resources of the entire government. This team can be very flexible and bring a wide variety of resources and capabilities to the table. On the other hand, it can be hidebound, hierarchical and shot through with rivalries. The first team described is the one that everyone wants to work with. The second is the team that we usually end up in.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense is organized with a series of headquarters in the Pentagon and forces in the field. In the Pentagon is the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff which serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four service staffs – the Army Staff, the Marine Staff, the Navy Staff and the Air Staff, who serve the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the four service Chiefs in their missions to train and equip the forces. Ten Combatant Commanders are responsible for regional and functional areas around the world. The “Geographic Combatant Commanders” are responsible for forces deployed into their “Areas of Responsibility.” These are Northern Command (North America), Southern Command (Latin America and the Caribbean), European Command (Europe, Russia and Israel), Africa Command, Central Command (the Near East and Central Asia) and Pacific Command (as far west as Pakistan and the Indian Ocean). These commands are not aligned along the same lines as the Regional Bureaus within the State Department. Each of these commands has their own Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air and Special Operations component commands. The functional Combatant Commanders who have global responsibilities are Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, Transportation Command and Special Operations Command.2

Combatant Commanders have recently added an interagency capability within the command. Each of them has formed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which provides an interagency coordination capability. Although this does not give the interagency an operational-level capability, it is an admission that the interagency needs to have capabilities that parallel those of the Department of Defense.

Department of State

The Department of State is organized with a headquarters at “Main State” in Washington DC with embassies and consulates throughout the world. Main State is organized along both regional and functional lines. There are six Under Secretaries of State who are in charge of Political Affairs, Economic Business and Agricultural Affairs, Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Management, and Democracy and Global Affairs.

2 http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs has eight Assistant Secretaries: six have “Regional Bureaus” that manage affairs in the different parts of the world. The other two include International Organizations and International narcotics and Law Enforcement.3

The United States has 260 diplomatic and consular posts in 163 countries.4 The mission of the Department of State is to “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”5 In order to perform this mission, the State Department will “strengthen the capability of the U.S. Government and of international partners to prevent or mitigate conflate, stabilize countries in crisis, promote regional stability, protect civilians, and promote just application of government and law.”6

The State Department does not have an operational-level capability that would match the capability of the Combatant Commanders. Each regional bureau executes these functions. The regional bureaus have to perform the functions that are performed by the regional offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the regional Deputy Directorates within the Joint Staff J5, and the Combatant Commanders. This imbalance of capabilities puts the State Department at a significant disadvantage at the policy, strategic and operational levels where DOD has quite robust capabilities.

The head of each embassy is called the Chief of Mission (COM). Usually the COM is the Ambassador, in the absence of the Ambassador the Chief of Mission is a designated Chargé d’Affaires. Although there are several other titles, this person is the senior US government official in the country and is the personal representative of the President of the United States. The various agencies within an embassy are called the “Country Team.” The head of the country team is the Chief of Mission.

Strategic Guidance

Given the importance of this issue, there is a surprising lack of guidance on this subject. An examination of strategic level policy documents shows that many people do not conceptualize the importance of our overseas operations.

3 Department of State Home Page: http://www.state.gov/r/rls/dos/99494.htm
5 Ibid p 9
6 Ibid p 12
The National Security Strategy 2006 has an entire chapter on the interagency. In it, it addresses the need to continue “to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy” but does not talk about country teams. It does address the need for “improving our capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed-state situations.”

The National Defense Strategy 2005 talks about partnerships, both international and domestic. Again, it does not address the country team, but does state that “The (State) Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default…to that end, the (Defense) Department will work with interagency and international partners to improve our ability to transition from military- to civilian-led stability operations.”

The National Military Strategy 2004 addresses the formation of the JIACGs mentioned above, but does not address the Department of State.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 provides some guidance on what the President has three goals that call for effort by the US Embassy. They are “Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists”, “Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit” and “Defend US citizens and interests at home and abroad.” The description of these goals does not identify what US agencies have responsibility for them, however upon close reading it is obvious that the State Department has the lead for many of the objectives.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 dedicates an entire chapter to “Achieving Unity of Effort” which emphasizes both domestic and international operations. It does recommend “the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities.” It also discusses the country

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8 Ibid
11 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. p 17
12 Ibid, p 22
13 Ibid, p 24
14 QDR pp 83-92
15 Ibid, p 85
team, saying that “for most other (i.e. non-DOD) agencies, the U.S. Chief of Mission in a specific country, leading an interagency Country Team, has an important field leadership role.

Creating opportunities to help enable Combatant Commanders to work more collaboratively with Chiefs of Mission is one objective.”\(^\text{16}\) It also says that the Department of Defense will “Support broader Presidential authorities to direct resources and task the best-situated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may be best suited to provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new authority would enable the U.S. Government to capitalize on inherent competencies of individual agencies to tailor a more effective immediate response.”\(^\text{17}\) These two statements contain a paradox that bedevils interagency planning and operations. Although the second statement seems to state that the State Department and other agencies might be better suited to lead certain types of operations, the first statement clearly indicates that the Department of Defense considers that DOD assets are not subordinate to the Chief of Mission. This bifurcated attitude has caused significant problems with a lack of unity of effort in both Vietnam and Iraq.

As one could expect, the Department of State Strategic Plan 2007-2012\(^\text{18}\) addresses many aspects that refer to the country team. It addresses the need for Transformational Diplomacy and addresses cooperation with other agencies. It identifies the Departments of Homeland Security and the Defense as “key U.S. Government partners with whom we will coordinate.”\(^\text{19}\) Unlike Defense products that obliquely refer to the other Departments, this plan overtly articulates the need for cooperation with other departments by name, stating that “(The Department of) Defense coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs, and provides the military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that strengthen military and alliance relationships, play an important role in the management of arms transfers and the Excess Defense Articles program, and support the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster sites. Defense sponsors significant cooperative threat reduction programs and supports the Proliferation Security Initiative. Defense leads in providing security support, when needed, for stabilization and reconstruction activities and participates in government-wide stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations with other agencies.”\(^\text{20}\)

State also acknowledges that the country team needs to be reorganized. Indeed one of their seven Strategic Goals is “Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities.”\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{16}\) Ibid

\(^{17}\) Ibid, p 86


\(^{19}\) Ibid, 16

\(^{20}\) Ibid

\(^{21}\) Ibid, p 38
Unfortunately, their strategic plan addresses consular and management functions and does not speak to the need to strengthen the country team, as exemplified by their strategic priorities in this chapter: Visa services, Passport/American citizen services, Human Resources, Information Technology, Security, Facilities, Planning and accountability, Administrative services, Rightsizing/regionalization, and the Office of Inspector General.\(^\text{22}\)

We can see, therefore, that the policy-level documentation talks about the interagency, but actually provides very little guidance. This makes it very difficult for people seeking to improve the situation in what is one of the most important manifestations of US forward presence.

**Strategic & Operational Challenges**

In the 21\(^\text{st}\) Century, there are a series of specific challenges that an embassy faces. During large-scale operations, these are particularly important. These challenges include the size of operations of different departments, an imbalance in the elements of national power, cultural and size issues between departments, personalities, the need for additional capabilities during contingency operations, the span of control, unity of effort, a lack of doctrine, lack of guidance, and the ability to assess operations.

The sheer size of operations in the modern world can be difficult to handle. Although some military operations in countries in Latin America and Africa can consist of only a few military people working with the host nation, in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq the size of deployments can overwhelm embassies. There are currently 160,000 US troops on the ground in Iraq. The US Embassy in Iraq has over 1,000 people in it. These types of operations require a robust capability that many agencies, including the State Department, have trouble handling.

This is reflected in the imbalance in the elements of national power. Regardless of whichever conceptual construct for elements of national power one uses, it is obvious that the military is only one of many aspects in any given operation. Other agencies must be able to address the other requirements of current operations. Currently operations tend to be quite imbalanced towards the military. It must become balanced out by strengthening the other elements before we can return to normal operations there.

Cultural and size issues are very important as well. The entire State Department is smaller than a US Army mechanized division. There is no State Department planning community. They do not have a think tank to perform their policy-level deep thought. There is very little reach-back capability. What does exist is in the regional bureaus. But the State Department is not the only agency with cultural foibles. The Defense Department is a huge, unwieldy organization that lacks flexibility. Because Defense has so many assets, it tends to

\(^{22}\text{Ibid, pp 38-42}\)
throw more at problems rather than seeking different routes or non-traditional approaches. Although some would say that State lacks doctrine, they would also say that Defense is hobbled by excessive dependence on doctrine. Seeking to impose a conventional solution on Iraq in the early 2000s is a very good example of this. Another example of cultural problems is the attitude that Defense personnel tend to have towards others, mainly due to a lack of understanding cultural differences. In the US Embassy in Baghdad, many field grade officers treat interagency and coalition partners with contempt bordering on disdain.

Personalities have a huge impact on operations forward. There is a spectrum from bad relations between Lieutenant General Sanchez and Ambassador Bremer to a better relationship between General Casey and Ambassador Khalifizhad to the other end of the spectrum with the current relationship between General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

During a contingency operation, there is a need for additional capability within an embassy. The non-military aspects of these US efforts must be handled by someone. In Vietnam the US Government created the Civil Operations and Rural (or Revolutionary) Development Support (CORDS), in Afghanistan, both the US and international efforts have created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which assist the Afghan government in development efforts. In Iraq, the US Government developed the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to provide oversight on the $20 billion provided by Congress in support of Iraq reconstruction. As this money was expended, IRMO changed to the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) which concentrates on capacity-building at the national level in Iraq. Another organization created in Iraq is the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) which supervises the efforts of PRTs as well as capacity building in at the provincial and municipal levels in Iraq.

Unity of effort is another aspect that must be addressed during these operations. As previously mentioned the Chief of Mission is the senior US Government official in a country and is the personal representative of the President of the United States. There can be three types of relations in a country. The COM can be in charge, the military can be in charge, or they can each be in charge of their own areas. The first example is the most ubiquitous. It is the international norm. It is also how we have executed operations in countries like El Salvador in the 1980s and Colombia today. The second example is quite rare. It applies in places where the military obviously needs to be in charge, such as Germany and Japan at the end of WWII. The third example is fairly rare but has been used twice recently: Vietnam and Iraq. Each provides a lesson in what happens when we have a lack of unity of effort.

This is a short list of the challenges that the US Government has faced over the years in trying to plan and execute interagency operations overseas. Although it is impossible to develop a comprehensive list of difficulties as each agency, each country and each situation present their own challenges; this list can illustrate the difficulties faced by US officials on the ground.


**Recommendations**

In order to address these issues, the government must address a wide variety of issues: embassy structure; education; selection of leaders; cultural issues; reach-back of strategic planning capability; and the need to achieve legitimacy for both US presence and local government.

Changes to address these issues will require two major shifts in the way that the State Department does things. First, State needs to establish a personnel account that allows for a ‘float’ capability, similar to the US Army “Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) account. That would allow the State Department to function at full potential while simultaneously training and educating their personnel.

The second major shift will have to be the relationship between State and Congress. These changes will require significant resources, all of which will have to come from Congress. State should revamp their ability to communicate their agenda to Congress. The premier government organization that generally has the greatest success in communicating with Congress is the United States Marine Corps. State should examine how the Marine Corps plans and executes this plan and adopt the best practices that can apply.

**Conclusion**

The United States are challenged at the beginning of the 21st century. Our opponents are ruthless, flexible groups who seek to use asymmetric means to delegitimize US efforts around the world. Only by creating synergies through the focused use of the interagency can the United States hope to prevail. This will require providing policy-level guidance, resources to improving interagency capabilities, and a flexible, rational approach to designing country teams.

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Colonel Glenn Alexander Crowther recently served as the Principal Advisor for Hostage Affairs for U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker. COL Crowther is currently assigned as a Research Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA.
“One Stop Electronic Shopping for Joint Doctrine and More…”
By David Spangler

If you have a need to research joint doctrine, get information on Joint Staff directives, instructions or access joint training or education information, all this information is at your finger tips. All you need is access to the internet and a CAC card and reader. This wealth of joint information is contained on the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS). The JDEIS Web Portal is managed for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) by Joint Staff J-7 (Operational Plans & Joint Force Development). JDEIS replaces the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) as the primary authoritative source of joint doctrine, education, training and related information supporting Department of Defense and interagency planning and operations, and is not accessible by the general public. The JEL remains operational as a publicly-accessible source of information.

JDEIS provides portal capabilities for the Joint Staff J-7 and gives the Joint Community a responsive user-friendly tool for rapid access to current U.S. joint doctrine, training and education information, related materials and research tools. JDEIS makes it possible to rapidly find key joint doctrine, UJTL tasks, educational and training materials, joint publications and other references, and provides links to other websites and data collection venues. JDEIS has fast and easy search tools that bring up a vast amount of information including definitions, related topics, related Universal Joint Tasks, and related joint publications.

In addition to all that JDEIS offers, U. S Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group has added three training portals currently available on JDEIS under the Joint Exercise and Training Section. The Combatant Command Headquarters Training Guide (CCHQTG) is a searchable database that describes the tasks that are performed by Combatant Command staffs, boards, centers, and cells. The Joint Task Force Headquarters Training Guide (JTFHQTG) is a searchable tool that lists the steps, practices, and procedures that aid Joint Task Force staff members. The Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure (CJTFHQSOP) is a base-line SOP for establishing and operating a Joint Task Force headquarters and staff. All three of these products are based on current policies, joint doctrine, and UJTL tasks.

This great “One Stop” electronic tool is available to all that have .mil access, CAC reader access and have a strong desire to gain more joint knowledge. The Joint Warfighting Center’s Point of Contact is LTC Andy Creel at (757) 203-6132 or andrew.creel@jfcom.mil.
Update: Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference
By
Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Evancho

Three Faculty Members from JCWS participated in a Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference June 2-6, 2008.

Four Brazilian officers graduated the JCWS during the last five years and brought the lessons and concepts back home. The Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MOD) organized a Joint Force Operations Conference to expose a wide array of their officers to their emerging Joint Concepts and their view for the way ahead. To facilitate this, the MOD arranged for US participation to foster both learning and enduring partnership between Brazil and the USA.

The Joint Force Operations Conference, designed by the Brazilian MOD included participants from the Brazilian MOD, instructors from their Naval War College, Army Command and Staff College, Air Force Command and Staff College, and representatives from their service staffs and operational commands as well as the invited US participants from the US Military Liaison Group (Mil Group), US Defense Attaché Office and the three instructors from the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) from the US Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC).

The Brazilian MOD requested, through the US Mil Group, three JCWS instructors to present four lectures on Joint Operations presented iteratively next to Brazilian lectures on the same topics to compare and contrast methods and terminology. After each pair of lectures, a substantive debate via tandem question and answer session followed. The four topics were “Joint Operations Planning, Military Direction of Civil-Military Operations, Logistics in Joint Operations and Joint Planning during Execution.

The event was held at Brazil’s National War College, the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) in Rio de Janeiro. Several Brazilian Flag Officers attended the conference and made presentations to express to the participants the importance of Joint Force Planning and Execution to the participants. Each, to a man, expressed personally to the US participants, their appreciation for US involvement and specifically the growing partnership and sharing of useful lessons learned and participation with the Brazilian officers in the conference.

After three days of lecture and debate on the topics, the participants broke into working groups to further explore questions of deficiencies and possibilities of doctrinal improvements in Brazilian Joint Operations planning and execution methods based on the US model and lessons learned. The group was then convened again to present the specific findings of the working groups.
The Brazilians held the lessons and the available references from the US in high regard. They appreciated the US willingness to assist and foster increasing partnership in their perceived need to move their military planning into an era of greater Joint focus. The success of this first US-Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference bodes well for requests for increased future participation by the US in Brazilian plans to develop their Joint Force Operations planning and execution.

The US participants from JCWS were LTC M. Ivan Evancho, USA, LtCol Ted Rubsamen, USMC, and LtCol Marc Cwiklik, USAF. LTC Evancho is an Asst Professor assigned to JCWS since 2005, a Portuguese speaker and Foreign Area Officer. LtCol Rubsamen is a JCWS instructor since 2007, an Artillery Officer and experienced in International Relations through his many deployments and work in the NATO Counter-IED field. LtCol Cwiklik is a JCWS instructor since 2006 and SME in Logistics, with International experience through his many deployments and assignments in the UK.
JCWS Support to the Saudi Arabian Staff College

By

Lieutenant Colonel Jon McDonough

The Joint Forces Staff College continues to strive to be at the leading edge of Security Cooperation with our international partners and allies. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has been an integral part of the Joint Forces Staff College educational experience for decades. This Security Cooperation program has clearly provided a benefit to all the US and international officers at the college, but additionally it has also provided some great opportunities to enhance the Joint Forces Staff College’s role in our Defense Secretary’s security cooperation vision. Several of the senior leaders from our friends and allies Ministries of Defense have expressed interest in developing a similar joint staff education program in their own nations.

In late 2006 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in establishing a JCWS-style program at the Saudi Staff College. Responding to this interest, the JFSC conducted a Mobile Training Team (MTT) visit to Saudi Arabia which was coordinated by the US Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia. In January of 2007, at the invitation of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), JFSC sent two senior military instructors to Saudi Arabia to conduct an advisory visit to the Saudi Arabian Staff College. In consultation with the leadership of the Saudi Staff College and members of the Saudi MODA, the Joint Forces Staff College advisors proposed the introduction of the JCWS curriculum with US instructors as the lead, and subsequently spiraling into a Saudi lead program within a year of initial implementation.

In order to implement the JCWS curriculum and assist in the transition of the JCWS curriculum into Saudi national strategies and capabilities, four senior field grade Saudi officers, from all of the Saudi military services attended the 10 week JCWS program. After the IMET sponsored course, the Saudi officers participated in the JFSC instructor development program which included classes on teaching techniques, curriculum development and practice teaching in the JCWS seminars. These four Saudi officers are the seeds of the program in Riyadh and have been working along side experienced US instructors hired by the Saudi Government through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract in the fall of 2007.

As of June 2008, within the parameters of the Foreign Military Sales USMTM established contract, two former JFCS instructors have co-taught four 12-week sessions with their Saudi counterparts at the Saudi Staff College. In addition to the USMTM established
contract the Joint Forces Staff College continues to provide updates on emerging US planning doctrine and policies. The Joint Forces Staff College has also sent five of its active duty military instructors on three week staff assistance visits over a six month time period to advise our Saudi counterparts on curriculum development, seminar teaching philosophies and other areas of military professional education that the Saudi Staff College professionals would like to explore.

Lieutenant Colonel McDonough is a Military Intelligence Officer and a Eurasian Foreign Area Officer in the US Army. He has served as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Vilnius, Lithuania and is currently serving as a member of the military faculty at the Joint Forces Staff College.
JCWS Award Winning Papers

JCWS recognized five papers for awards during the Graduation Ceremony for Class 08-03. General Cartwright, VCJCS assisted in the presentation of the awards. The awards are:

**MacArthur Foundation Award** – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the best paper addressing joint leadership, joint warfighting or other topics demonstrating the ideals of General Douglas MacArthur. The winning paper was titled: *Synchronizing DOD’s Global Strike Mission* and was written by LTC Phillip J. Deppert, USA, Lt Col Jeffery N. Aldridge, USAF and Maj Jeffery W. Garza, USMC. These students are from Seminar 2 and their faculty advisor was Lt Col Kristopher J. Alden, USAF

**National Defense University Foundation Award** – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the paper that best displays excellence in research, analysis and writing. The winning paper was titled: *Linking Combatant Command Plans to Service Resources* and was written by CDR Mark S. VanYe, USN, Maj Jerry L. Norwood, USAF and MAJ James A. Fosbrink, USA. These students are from Seminar 10 and their faculty advisor was CDR Elizabeth A. Yeomans, USN

**JFSC Commandant’s Award** – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the best paper that clearly demonstrates on of our primary goals – development of joint attitudes and perspectives concerning critical issues of the day. The winning paper was titled: *A Proposal for the Realignment of the Department of State and Department of Defense Areas of Responsibility* and was written by CDR Thomas A. Zwolfer, USN, LTC James Januszka, USA, Maj Dennis S. Rand, USAF and Mr. James S. Engler, DAF. These students are from Seminar 9 and their faculty advisor was LTC Mark J. Hovatter, USA

**JFSC Transformation Award** – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the best paper on the subject of Transformation. The award winning paper was titled: *Interagency Leadership: Improving Joint Tactical Level Predeployment Training: Utilizing the Joint National Training Capability and the Joint Live Virtual Constructive Federation* and was written by CDR Robert W. Patrick, USN, Maj Olgun Deyeci, Turkish Air Force and Major Richard T. Whitlock, USAF. These students are from Seminar 8 and their faculty advisor was LtCol Lance K. Landeche, USMC

**Association of the United States (AUSA) Award** – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the best paper on land warfare in a joint environment. The award winning paper was titled: *Keeping the Fire Lit: Democracy and the Long War* and was written by LCDR Lance J. Luksik, USN, Maj Eric B. Moses, USAF and MAJ John R. Woodward, USA. These students are from Seminar 5 and their faculty advisor was CDR Christopher T. Kirkbride, USN
The Joint and Combined Warfighting School Crest

The Mermaid holds multiple symbolic references to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. The mermaid symbolizes eloquence in speech, applicable to the graduates of the school, but in more familiar terms, the Mermaid signifies the school’s strong bond and heartfelt association with Norfolk, Virginia.

The Mermaid is colored purple to represent the combination of all colors of the Military Forces of the United States. Green for the Army, Navy Blue for the Navy, Ultra-Marine Blue for the Air Force and Cardinal and Gold for the Marine Corps.

The Torch she carries symbolizes liberty, truth and intelligence, the keystones of genuine Education.

Her flowing hair, the hallmark of the Mermaid’s vanity, reflects the Service colors of the Joint and Combined military services that attend the school.

Her scales represent the armor protection provided by the synergistic combination of the joint forces working together.

The shaft of the Spear she brandishes represents the supreme force of National Power. The mantle that connects the shaft to the four tines represents the inter-agency coordination that bolsters the strength of those four tines. Each of the tines represents the four Branches of the Military Arm of national Power.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of Defense.