

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

Featured Essays

Globally Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Core

U.S. Needs to “Get Smart” vs Russia



Countering Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort Model

Transregional Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow's Fight



“That All May Labor As One”

Fall 2017

Campaigning

Fall 2017

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Editor's Corner

Welcome to the Fall 2017 edition of *Campaigning*. One of the desired outcomes of the Joint Professional Military Education system is to develop Joint officers who can think creatively and adapt to change. This edition of *Campaigning* presents seven essays from students and faculty who think critically and strategically while applying joint warfighting principles at all levels of war.

The Features section begins with an essay by Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P) Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro. Their essay, "Globally Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Core," posits that a globally integrated Joint force is necessary to meet today's global security challenges, but the DoD enterprise is not operationally optimized to do so. The authors suggest changes to doctrine, organization, training and leadership to create greater synergy for future globally integrated operations.

The second featured essay, "Countering Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort Model," by Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata, LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer proposes that understanding networked adversaries and countering threat networks is becoming an increasingly challenging problem for Joint force commanders. The authors identify generally accepted means to understand these threats along with the lines of effort necessary to combat these challenges successfully.

CDR David Wolynski, LTC John Cuva, Maj Ryan Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony Newman provide our third featured essay, the "U.S. needs to 'Get Smart' vs Russia." In this essay, the authors argue that Russia is re-emerging as a global actor and that their use of 'smart power' differs from the traditional approach used by the U.S. and its Western partners. The authors suggest that an adaptable and responsive integration of all of the U.S. instruments of national power is needed to successfully counter Russia's strategic progress.

Our final featured essay is "Transregional Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow's Fight," by LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West. Building upon General Joseph Dunford's priority of improving the Joint force's ability to integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional fight, the authors propose institutionalizing a Transregional Capstone Exercise Program to do so. The authors support this thesis by identifying basic exercise requirements, propose training objectives, and address three potential challenges to exercise implementation.

This edition's Commentary section presents two essays for your consideration. The first essay, "Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding Critical Aspects of the Environment," by Tom Snukis, is the third in a series of four essays. This essay focuses on the challenges of

failed and failing states and the affect they have on the U.S.'s ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction after armed intervention. Professor Snukis provides the reader with a keen understanding of the problem of failed and failing states and an understanding of the forces within the environment that must be understood and managed.

Our final Commentary essay is by Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and Dr. Sadi Sadyev who apply the concept of polarity management to the current international relations environment. Using historical and current examples of natural counter-poles, the authors identify the inherent dangers in a uni-polar environment. Given the lack of a natural counter-pole to the U.S. in the current strategic environment, the authors argue that the U.S. must act as if there is a counter-pole to minimize the natural oppositional reaction to an unopposed hegemon.

Finally, in this edition's Foresight Factor essay, MAJ Kent Justice applies foresight tools in an assessment of Russia's National Security Strategy. In this essay, "Strategic Foresight Tools and the Russia National Security Strategy: U.S. Policy Implication," he argues that using foresight tools can provide policy makers with a different perspective with which to develop a national policy to counter Russian security interests that run contrary to U.S. interests. After a detailed analysis, MAJ Kent provides the reader with a policy recommendation.

We hope you enjoy this edition of *Campaigning*. You can let me know what you think by emailing me at mccauleyd@ndu.edu.

Daniel H. McCauley
Editor

Globally Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Core

by

Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P)
Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro

“I personally don’t believe the current planning and organizational construct or command and control are optimized for the current fight,...What really is required is global integration.” Gen Joseph Dunford, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹

As Chairman Dunford asserts, the United States needs a Joint Force organized, trained, equipped, and ready to execute globally integrated operations (GIO) to meet the complex challenges of today and the future. The ability of the globally postured Joint Force to purposefully combine quickly with mission partners to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations currently is not operationally optimized. Rapidly emerging, destabilizing phenomena such as the effective rise of transregional violent extremists (for example, the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL)), regional pandemics, and aggression by near peer actors are the “new normal.” Events like these will require the Joint Force to effectively aggregate swiftly, reconfigure amid operations, and disaggregate ready to execute again. The world that the nation will face is fraught with transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain threats. These threats will increasingly cut across the

regional commands, operate as asymmetrical actors, and compete in multiple domains threatening to overwhelm US military war fighting plans and resourcing. Chairman Dunford’s approach to managing such cross-cutting threats better “is improving the ability of the Defense Secretary to work with the wide swath of functional and regional commanders, from Strategic and Cyber Commands to Central and Northern and Pacific Commands.”²

Chairman Dunford has identified planning, organizational construct, and command and control as three areas in which the Joint Force is currently not optimized to perform GIO.³ While application of GIO is a Department of Defense undertaking that affects departments, services, and combatant commands, the scope of the discussion will focus on the joint task force (JTF). Focusing on the JTF is key because this is the organizational structure upon which the Joint Force will aggregate to employ the range of military operations across and within geographic combatant commands (GCCs).

Dr. Daniel McCauley has pointed out that the current organizational structures of the Joint Force are basically anachronisms of the Cold War.⁴ The Joint Force is built to deliberately mass forces and effects in order to dominate the enemy. This construct carries service expertise and inclinations. While the expertise strengthens the joint approach, inclinations can provide detriments to fully realizing GIO. In order to optimize, Joint Force providers and organizational constructs require joint enhancements to equip the JTF with the resources and

capabilities to operationalize GIO to meet the complex problems of an uncertain world.

This essay provides a brief case study of the challenges in organizational formation of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) JTF highlighting areas where the Joint Force can focus GIO optimization efforts. From there, a framework is presented that consists of critical components that future GIO optimized JTFs can adopt. Next, the requisite training and organization is examined to integrate and synchronize the GIO optimized Joint Force with other national instruments of power required to enhance unity of effort. Finally, insight is provided into preparing and sustaining a GIO optimized Joint Force. These revelations will provide an initial pathway for the Joint Force to enhance the GIO concept to present the national command authority an optimized military as an instrument of national power to engage the transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain challenges of the 21st century.

JTF Considerations: OIR Challenges

In June 2014, emboldened by growing sectarian discord, ISIL emerged from the eastern deserts of Syria and began an expansion into Iraq. ISIL swiftly and effectively captured Mosul, pressing southward virtually unimpeded into the remaining Sunni territories coming within a stone's throw of Baghdad. In order to prevent the fall of the Iraqi capital, the national command authority (NCA) authorized United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to deploy an assessment team, and to conduct air strikes, to defend

Baghdad. USCENTCOM designated United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) as a joint force land component command (JFLCC) to engage in operations. As the operations proved to require a more thorough joint approach, USCENTCOM chose ARCENT to form the core of a combined joint task force (CJTF), designated as CJTF-OIR.⁵ The threat of destabilization posed by ISIL provides a pertinent and contemporary example of a situation requiring GIO. OIR, and the challenges experienced in standing up a CJTF in this dynamic and evolving operational environment, provide valuable insight into where to focus efforts to optimize JTF's for GIO.

Prior to the rotation of the initial CJTF-OIR command structure, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) conducted an initial impressions report. The hard lessons observed during the creation of CJTF-OIR serve as considerations for creating JTF cores that can effectively aggregate and execute GIO from the outset. Chief among the lessons from CALL are JTF manning, interagency interoperability, and multinational partnership considerations.

Manning presented a clear challenge to CJTF-OIR as it attempted to stand-up amid the roiling crisis. CALL noted that it was three months after CJTF-OIR's October 2014 establishment before it received intelligence, targeting, fires, information operations, civil affairs planning, and cyber operations subject matter experts.⁶ This occurred because ARCENT did not understand the training support and qualifications required to take on the full authorities and responsibilities of a CJTF. Manning analysis is a seemingly

simple undertaking in benign conditions, but a daunting undertaking when conducting operations while under force management level constraints. CALL also observed that ARCENT allowed Service habits to influence CJTF manning.⁷ Taking an approach informed by only one way of doing business further exacerbated the delay in CJTF-OIR obtaining the personnel necessary to maximize its mission. Dynamic situations requiring GIO are not going to allow for pre-ordained JTF manning packages nor will the resource constrained environment allow for standing JTFs. Service headquarters elements that provide the core of a JTF must begin the manning capability analysis well prior to receipt of mission. It is important to place emphasis on capabilities required and the approach to using them.

At the outset of operations, CJTF-OIR did not adequately address interagency and multi-national interoperability. The conditions that allowed for the rise of ISIL primarily point to areas of governance as shortfalls. A fact proven by the nine lines of effort (LOE), seven of which fall under the capabilities resident in the Department of State.⁸ CALL discerned that CJTF-OIR command structure lacked unity of effort.⁹ This resulted in duplication and friction amongst the various organizations tasked with conducting missions under OIR auspices. Another hindrance on unity of effort was the ability to share information within CJTF-OIR and across its partners. CALL observed that OIR participants had trouble sharing information due to differing Service information enterprises and multi-national partner classification levels.¹⁰ JTFs

optimized for GIO will need to account for institutional and information enterprise interoperability requirements.

These examples are a few lessons that future JTFs can consider in optimizing for GIO. The Joint Force and future JTF commanders are wise to prepare for friction points. As the DoD continues to evolve the Joint Force to better build JTF cores, it must also develop an approach to meet the challenges upon which GIO is designed. There is a current functioning example of an interagency and coalition integrated JTF with global operational responsibilities that can offer a potential roadmap: the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Benchmarking for GIO Success

USSOCOM, through its theater special operations commands, provides a model for the implementation of GIO optimized to engage the transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain threats. The previous USSOCOM commander, General Joseph Votel, highlighted the ongoing global responsibilities of USSOCOM in his posture statement to Congress in March 2016. “Our actions in support of the GCCs include such mission sets as: enhancing partner capabilities, coordinating counter-terrorism (CT) planning and operations, supporting the capabilities of our interagency partners, and developing critical relationships with key influencers”¹¹

The description of USSOCOM’s global responsibilities is remarkably similar to the vision of GIO as described by Chairman Dunford, “We need to make sure

in the context of transregional, multi-domain, multifunctional conflicts that we have the right command-and-control construct in place to integrate joint capabilities and support rapid decision-making by national command authorities.”¹² USSOCOM maintains persistent capabilities and personnel in more than 80 countries. These capabilities remain in the environment on a constant basis to generate understanding, faster relationships, and reduce reaction time. These elements support the regional or geographic combatant commander, but are simultaneously integrated into USSOCOM’s global network of US and International Special Operations Forces (SOF). This connection permits collaboration across geographic, functional, and bureaucratic boundaries that do not routinely occur in the regionally focused combatant commands.

There are a number of unique aspects of SOF that cannot be replicated in the general purpose force – in fact, two of the ‘SOF Truths’ are that “SOF cannot be mass produced” and that “Quality is more important than Quantity.” The quantity and types of capabilities required to address the transregional threats exceed both the mass production and quality maxims of SOF. However, there are key fundamentals in USSOCOM’s global approach that do transcend the SOF core mission sets and are scalable to all Joint Forces.

USSOCOM uses three critical components to execute GIO: the relationship network, the information technology network, and persistent forward presence. These underlying principles are prominent in the USSOCOM mission, and reinforced by

GEN Votel, “Our mission, as I pointed out last year, is to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to support persistent, networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operations to protect and advance our nation’s interests.”¹³

The ‘relationship network’ is not a specific USSOCOM description, but refers to the effort and focus on nurturing and investing in key allied and partner nation individuals and institutions. USSOCOM has consistently increased the number of foreign liaisons to its headquarters facility in Tampa, increasing the total number of contributing partner nations to 17 over the last two years. Each USSOCOM element in the more than 80 countries where SOF deploys is in part a liaison node and views the maintenance and investment in host nation partners essential. GEN Votel describes this during his posture statement, “...we are continuing to build relationships with international and domestic partners through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures, and liaison activities.”¹⁴ USSOCOM has strengthened the relationships and connections that provide the foundation for this network to enable more regular communication and collaboration. The number of participating nations is just a measure of performance. The proven ability during many crisis operations for SOF elements to lead general purpose force elements into unfamiliar environments leveraging their relationships and networks, as in Mali in 2013 and returning to Iraq in 2014, is the key measure of effectiveness. Despite the importance of the relationships,

the ability to effectively communicate information to the right decision maker is even more important, especially if that decision maker is on the other side of the globe.

The information technology (IT) network is perhaps the most underestimated and overlooked element leading to the successful integration of global operations. SOF operates and manages its own IT networks. This permits a level of access, control, and ability to adapt that does not exist on larger DoD systems. The most critical difference in the way SOF approaches the IT network is that they do not differentiate between the tactical and strategic networks. In SOF, there is one network that is used by both elements in CONUS performing garrison and training functions, and elements in forward persistent presence locations. Deploying conventional forces bring their own tactical network that is unique to that unit, and it does not integrate well with the global strategic network. Merely shifting the principle approach of the Joint Force to a single, interoperable network, would pay tremendous dividends to effecting GIO. GEN Votel describes the importance of the principle of side-by-side systems in his posture statement, “Our facility provides our international partners access to their own national classified communication systems while placing them in a single collaborative space, side-by-side with their US counterparts.”¹⁵ While the principle of side-by-side systems seems intuitive, it is not the norm. The rapid movement of information transregionally is so important that GEN Votel invested resources to ensure that

USSOCOM maintains a competitive advantage. “Another critical effort is our SOF Information Environment, which supports our need for better situational awareness, collaboration, decision-making, and synchronization under complex conditions. While these technologies are important, we believe humans are more important than hardware.”¹⁶ The right relationships and the right communication tools are enabled by the final focus. In order to truly understand the environment, you must be in the environment.

GEN Votel comments, “In all of these examples, which cover just a segment of our activities, SOF plays a key role by working with a range of partners on complex and demanding problem sets. Even in those situations where SOF are in the lead for small-footprint, high-risk missions, we are fully integrated with, and fully dependent upon, our conventional force.”¹⁷ USSOCOM executes this using a mix of rotational forces and permanent assignments, and is comfortable operating with very small footprints in remote locations. This concept of employment allows for greatly increased understanding of the environment and for increased ability for indications and warning, which reduces risk to time and distance considerations when key military advice or capabilities are required.

Securing additional basing agreements could be exceptionally difficult, but there may be an opportunity to look at expanding the use of commercial Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) platforms and increasing, within the Army specifically, a set of forward rotational exercises and

deployments to give the Joint Force a more forward presence (Figure 1). The commercial company Maersk has already looked at the concept of converting a commercial ship to an AFSB, with projected costs of 60-75% less than newly built ships and Navy platforms.¹⁸



Figure 1. Rendering of converted commercial vessel AFSB¹⁹

These three key focus areas: persistent presence, the relationship network and the information technology network, are key scalable elements that are proven in the USSOCOM model for GIO. However, while USSOCOM provides the Department of Defense an example of a functional command with global operational responsibilities, other agencies and departments must be integrated with the joint force to truly achieve globally integrated operations.

Realizing Effective GIO Partnerships

One of the critical shortfalls in the current organization of the JTF for executing GIO is the lack of an element dedicated to maximizing the synergy with the other three components of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. While current doctrine governing JTF operations highlights the necessity of coordinating in the JIIM environment in order to facilitate unity of effort, achieve common objectives, and provide common understanding, organizationally, JTFs only account for the Joint, leaving the Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational elements to be worked out later.²⁰ Without these elements present, a JTF commander will be hindered in meeting the requirement identified by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, that forces be globally postured and able to move quickly across traditional boundaries.²¹ As Dr. Dan McCauley correctly points out, GIO requires leaders who are experts in operating in the JIIM environment.²² However, these leaders cannot be created overnight, nor can they create effective JIIM teams without preparation and training. This integration of JIIM efforts into the JTF must begin even before planning for the JTF commences in order to ensure trust and effectiveness within the JIIM team. However, current doctrine falls woefully short in proposing how to do this.

While virtually every element of GIO would benefit from the inclusion of JIIM experts into the JTF construct, there are three GIO elements in which such inclusion is

absolutely essential – global agility, partnering, and being increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences. To obtain *Global Agility*, the U.S. must be able to posture when and where in the world it needs to. Getting the permissions for access, basing, and overflight (ABO) requires experts who have developed relationships with the State Department and the host nation. Another element of GIO, *Partnering*, clearly depends on having a JTF with experts who know how to build these partnerships. Having personnel on the JTF staff with extensive knowledge of JIIM partners will also help the commander better understand both the friendly and operational environments and avoid making missteps which have *unintended consequences*. Synchronizing the military element of power with the other aspects of national power – diplomacy, economics, and information is an implied element of GIO and in this regard, having a built-in JIIM expert is critical.

Perhaps because the military was such a dominant player during the nearly nine years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military leaders were slow to develop a structure in Iraq in 2014 to optimize integration with the other elements of national power, resulting in a lack of understanding of the environment and a lack of unity of effort, according to CALL.²³ This was most visible in the unsynchronized efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) after they had been routed in Anbar and Nineveh Provinces.²⁴ The CALL report went so far as to call the State Department – DoD relationship “divisive.”²⁵

In comparison, JIIM coordination was handled better outside of Iraq. The CENTCOM leadership, utilizing the expertise of its foreign area officers (FAOs) in the J5 and in the Embassies throughout the AOR, developed a relatively effective key leader engagement strategy with the regional partners and the interagency in Washington, which facilitated the rapid building of the anti-ISIL coalition and permissions for ABO in the AOR.²⁶

Recommendations

Current Doctrine, Organization, Training and Leadership (the DOTL of DOTMLPF) do not adequately address the need to include JIIM when considering and creating a JTF to execute GIO. Changes in this area could ensure much greater synergy between DoD and its JIIM partners in future GIO. The doctrine for JIIM coordination found in Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, states that a whole of government approach is required to achieve unity of effort in any joint operation.²⁷ While the doctrine ties operational success to the integration and harmonization of military and civilian efforts, it is more suggestive than directive. As currently written, it is likely to lead to ad hoc organizations in which no relations or trust have developed prior to the crisis. To mitigate this, doctrine should be changed to require DoD to reach out to interagency partners and try to create JIIM teams focused on a particular issue (such as Iraq, Korea, pandemics, WMD proliferation, etc.) who correspond regularly and meet periodically

so that relations and trust are already in place if a crisis develops. However, without direction from the NSC, or Congress rewriting laws, these organizations will continue to be ad hoc. For there to be a lasting solution, Congress would have to direct a Goldwater-Nichols-like law that forced members of the interagency, whose leaders were members of the NSC, to send representatives from their respective agencies to the JTF and reward them appropriately for taking these assignments.

Creating JIIM organizations would require buy-in from the National Security Council and the other JIIM members. While DoD cannot force these partners to agree to create these contingency JIIM organizations, it can take steps to address the shortfall in its own doctrine regarding JTF organizations. Currently, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) have Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) that facilitate interagency coordination at the GCC level, but there is no such requirement at the JTF level. Doctrine should require DoD to reach out to its interagency partners and try to create a JIACG as soon as there is an indication that a JTF will be stood up. While more difficult, the GCC Commander should also help the JTF commander get representation from key multinational partners to join the JTF. The GCC should designate a senior FAO to lead the JTF's JIACG, who can facilitate organizing and ensure the effectiveness of JIIM activities. Through multiple tours, a senior FAO has the experience working with JIIM partners, knows how a country team works, can help the Commander better understand the

environment, and can work with the host nation to maximize the effectiveness of JIIM efforts and the coordination of the national instruments of power. Because JIIM coordination is such a critical part of the JTF effort in GIO, this JIACG leader must be part of the Commander's primary staff with regular and direct access to the commander to be both an advisor and a "translator" between the different cultures that exist within the JIIM team.

The JTF's JIIM team will be much more effective if they train together before there is a crisis. Planning and war gaming possible scenarios for their region or issue of interest would help to build mutual understanding and trust. These efforts should culminate with annual exercises. The State Department's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) regularly runs crisis management exercises for Embassies. For GIO to be effective, the GCC J7 and FSI should develop exercises to build JIIM synchronization.

Maximizing the effectiveness of JIIM in GIO will also require a greater investment in the assessment and training of FAOs. Because most FAOs do not reach full effectiveness until they have multiple JIIM tours under their belt, this cannot be done quickly or cheaply. However, the relative cost of training a single FAO who can then maximize the effective synergy of the interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners in comparison to the cost of large scale military formations, which could make situations worse, is bearable. Currently, the services pay lip service to the need for JIIM expertise, but they do not

assess or promote an adequate number of FAOs to fill the growing demand.

Without identifying FAOs specifically, the traits McCauley discusses as required for Joint Force Leaders in GIO already exist in the FAO community and, often, the Special Forces community. McCauley highlights the need not just to understand the culture of the other JIIM members, but also one's own culture in order to fully comprehend the different context each partner has when viewing a situation.²⁸ The environment these leaders must operate in will often be complex, ill-defined and multi-cultural, requiring a leader who is adaptive and innovative.²⁹ To deal with these situations, McCauley proposes three competencies for leaders of GIO. First, they must understand current and future conditions that make strategic sense. Second, they must understand global trends and implications to the U.S. and other global and local actors. Third, they must strive to see information that is contrary to the strategy or trends.³⁰ To be able to do this, the JTF leader must have advisors in the staff who understand the JIIM environment.

Sustaining GIO

As the Department of Defense executes GIO, the Department must also determine how the implementation of this concept will be sustained. The ability of the joint force elements to purposefully combine quickly with each other and their mission partners in order to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations is

extremely demanding logistically. As warfighters change how they fight, logistics organizations also need to be transformed. GIO is unattainable without a strong logistics system. GIO calls for joint forces to be spread widely across the world, often in relatively small units conducting a wide assortment of missions with different support requirements, ranging from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions to major combat operations. For example, one military command could have five units operating in five different areas utilizing five different lines of communications. Logistic organizations must provide an enduring organizational structure built on responsiveness and flexibility to support GIO.

The Joint Logistics Enterprise recommends the concept of globally integrated logistics (GIL) as an answer to support GIO in this environment of demanding requirements with severe fiscal constraints. The Joint Concept for Logistics defines GIL as "the capability to allocate and adjudicate logistics support on a global scale to optimize effectiveness and responsiveness, and to reconcile competing demands for limited logistics resources based on strategic priorities."³¹ If implemented, GIL could improve the ability of the joint force to rapidly aggregate, reconfigure, and disaggregate anywhere in the world; enhance the ability to accurately collect and analyze logistic information; improve the ability to rapidly move forces, supplies, and equipment; and leverage operational contract support. These few enhancements of the

logistics force should provide GIO future success.

Not only does GIO need to be sustained by restructuring the joint logistics force, the Department of Defense must also look at sustaining GIO through changes in joint leadership, education and training. “Joint Force global leaders must be adaptive, innovative, and critical thinkers capable of operating in complex, ill-defined, and multicultural environments as demanded by the globally integrated operations concept.”³² In order to sustain GIO critical leadership competencies, the GIO concept must be institutionalized into Service and Joint education and training programs.

The Department of Defense must grow leaders that are adaptive, innovative, and critical thinkers. Therefore, military education must incorporate the GIO concept at the lowest (i.e., military academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps) to the highest (i.e., PINNACLE, CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE) levels of military schools. Leader education must also include advanced studies at civilian colleges and universities. This education must provide a baseline understanding of the GIO enterprise that leaders can leverage in tactical, operational, and strategic assignments. When training leaders for the future it is imperative that the training replicates the future globally integrated operations environment as fully as possible. It is imperative that the training is realistic, challenging leaders’ knowledge, skills, and critical thinking in situations as close as possible to the conditions of future operations. Combatant Command exercises, functional training and combat training

should be utilized to train leaders to adapt to a diverse set of circumstances and become experts in a range of different mission (i.e., combat, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) types. In addition, this education and training must include other government and non-government organizations.

Conclusion

The Joint Force faces a world of continuing challenges and these challenges present themselves in real-time with global connections. The Joint Force must evolve, retaining the fundamental principles of joint operations, while shedding the bureaucratic vestiges of a bygone era that prevent rapid global connection, coordination, and employment. The core of this new approach will be the JTF. JTFs are the key to employing the Joint Force in GIO against transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain threats. How we organize, build, and sustain these JTFs will determine their ultimate success.

USSOCOM provides a successful model for the evolution of the Joint Force for GIO, and also illuminates focus areas that can lead to true effectiveness for JTFs: persistent forward presence, the relationship network, and the information technology network. As we build JTFs, to optimize the chances for success in GIO, the JTF must be able to coordinate with JIIM partners and leverage their strengths. This requires that JIIM expertise be built into the JTF structure and training from the beginning. Finally, not only does a change need to occur in the operational construct to support GIO, the Joint Force

needs to consider making significant changes in the logistics, education, and training environment in order to sustain the GIO concept. The logistics community has developed the GIL concept to complement GIO. In addition, our education and training must restructure to grow the adaptive, innovative, and critical thinking leaders required for the future.

There are no simple solutions for the transregional, multi-dimensional, multi-domain threats, but there are simple choices we can control as we organize to address these threats.

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¹ Colin Clark, "CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic Shifts; 'At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient'", *Breaking Defense*, September 21, 2016, accessed October 15, 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunford-calls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-is-insufficient/>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Dan McCauley. "Globally Integrated Operations: A Reflection of Environmental Complexity", *Joint Force Quarterly* 71 (2013): 64, accessed November 7, 2016, <http://dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-71.pdf>.

⁵ *ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve: Lessons and Best Practices*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), March 2016), 1, <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-10.pdf>.

⁶ Ibid. 7, 8.

⁷ Ibid. 8.

⁸ *ARCENT*, 11.

⁹ Ibid. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid. 12, 21.

¹¹ US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, Commander, United States Special Operations Command*, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016.

¹² Jim Garamone, "Dunford: Command, Control Must 'Keep Pace' in 21st Century," *Defense Media Activity*, January 4, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/639844/dunford-command-control-must-keep-pace-in-21st-century>

¹³ US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, Commander, United States Special Operations Command*, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016.

¹⁴ Ibid.

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¹⁸ "Maersk Line Limited, Success Stories, Working with US Military", modified 2016,

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¹⁹ Kyle Mizokami, "A Quick and Cheap Power Projection Alternative for Japan," *Japan Security Watch: New Pacific Institute*, January 26, 2012, accessed October 25, 2016.

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²⁰ *Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2011), ix.

²¹ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2012), iii.

²² Dan McCauley. "Developing Joint Force Leaders for Globally Integrated Operations," *Small Wars Journal*, (January 29, 2013),

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/developing-joint-force-leaders-for-globally-integrated-operations>, 1.

²³ *ARCENT*, 14, 32.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 17.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 11.

²⁶ The Army, Marine Corps, and Navy refer to their regional/interagency specialists as FAOs. The Air Force calls its specialists Regional Affairs Specialists (RAS). For this essay, FAO refers to this specialty in all services.

²⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Interorganizational Cooperation*. Joint Publication 3-08. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 12, 2016, xiii.

²⁸ Dan McCauley. "Developing Joint Force Leaders for Globally Integrated Operations," *Small Wars Journal*, January 29, 2013, 3-4.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 5.

³¹ *Joint Concept for Logistics*. September 25, 2015.

³² Dan McCauley. "Developing Joint Force Leaders for Globally Integrated Operations." *Small Wars Journal*, January 29, 2013.

Countering Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort Model

by

Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata,
LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer

Understanding networked adversaries and countering threat networks (CTN) is an increasingly common challenge for joint force commanders. This challenge is likely to grow as asymmetric approaches and hybrid warfare become standard for those adversaries who are weaker and search for legitimacy in achieving their objectives. The implications for commanders is that they must be armed with a generally accepted means to understand these threats and prepare plans to thwart them.

This network phenomenon is not entirely new to U.S. and allied military forces, as joint force commanders have confronted terrorist networks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world before and since 9/11. U.S. Southern Command has been fighting criminal threat networks for over 20 years through Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). Insurgent threat networks are an even older phenomenon—as old as nation-states and those who have sought to overthrow them. These are all valid examples of threat networks; however, a critical, relatively recent development is the convergence of criminal, insurgent, and/or terrorist capabilities into hybrid networks that leverage their respective strengths to create a synergistic threat effect.¹

With the release of Joint Publication (JP) 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, on 21 December 2016, the joint force now has

official doctrine to guide joint force commanders and their staffs as they formulate plans to oppose these most challenging problems. JP 3-25 provides a number of operational level considerations, including the importance of interagency integration, planning to counter threat networks, and assessing progress towards victory against threat networks. It also covers the finer details of CTN activities, such as fundamentals and best practices for analyzing network structure, counter threat finance, CTN in a maritime domain, identity intelligence activities, and exploitation to support CTN. However, doctrine provides very few specifics for a commander or staff considering how to develop an operational approach, and specifically what lines of effort (LOEs) best achieve operational and strategic end states against threat networks. Finally, JP 3-25 only briefly considers CTN outside of conflict zones, where the full range of friendly military actions will usually be severely restricted.

JP 3-25 is deliberately broad, and, in fact, is a very good document for exposing personnel to concepts and orienting thought against these complex threats. This essay attempts to refine the guidance found in JP 3-25 by proposing a methodology to employ JP 3-25 doctrine through recommended lines of effort to counter threat networks. Specifically, we intend to prove the following thesis: In an Outside Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict (ODTAAC)² environment, a whole of government solution leading to a judicial (i.e., rule of law) end state is best achieved through lines of effort aligned with threat network functions. In examining this thesis, we will attempt to

define an optimal end state and supporting operational conditions, and consider potential lines of effort that align along the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure Systems)³, DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement)⁴, and Threat Network Function models.⁵ Ultimately, we attempt to identify a template with the optimal lines of effort along which to carry out military operations, actions, and activities that contribute directly to, or support, achievement of objectives to counter threat networks.

Background

Threat networks are not new. They have always existed in various forms, activities, and degrees of power. They are, per JP 3-25, those networks whose size, scope, or capabilities threaten US interests.⁶ Common types of threat networks are terrorist, criminal, and insurgent networks.⁷ Criminal networks can include narcotics, human trafficking and human smuggling (to include the movement of special interest aliens), and weapons smuggling (potentially including weapons of mass destruction, WMD) amongst other illicit activities. The relatively recent convergence of these kinds of threat networks is what poses an increasingly significant threat to U.S. interests. We have already seen the merging of all three in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. What began as an insurgent movement gradually adopted terrorist tactics, and then after funding themselves through

narcotics trafficking, this became a *raison d'être*.⁸ Likewise, the ability of criminal networks to utilize established trafficking routes to wittingly or unwittingly move terrorists and/or weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious threat. Finally, Hezbollah uses the drug trade and other illicit activities around the world to fund terrorist activities in the Levant.⁹

These kinds of threats, and the environments in which they operate, naturally drive friendly networks towards whole-of-government solutions due to the complexity of the problem and the requirement for a comprehensive approach.¹⁰ To combat threats such as these, the U.S. Government has undergone a significant increase in interagency cooperation since 9/11.¹¹ The use of Title 10 forces under a Title 50 lead and authority is one area in particular that has been utilized to leverage the strengths of participating agencies to a greater overall effect.¹² Likewise, detailing Title 10 personnel to other Federal agencies for a specific mission or purpose is another way DoD can contribute to an other-than-military effect.

These efforts are commendable, but they are niche efforts, usually isolated in nature, and limited in achieving the overall end state. They don't constitute a comprehensive approach, or provide a "best practice" for lines of effort that a joint force commander could use to organize operations to counter threat networks.

This is particularly true when considering the differences between a conflict zone and an ODTAAC environment. Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), which conducts detection and monitoring

missions to combat illicit trafficking and is widely considered an example of successful interagency action, is still largely focused on one kind of commodity (narcotics) of one type of threat network (criminal) and does not function cross-domain (it is almost entirely limited to the Air and Maritime domains).¹³ While its function concentrates on network disruption through evidentiary seizures and criminal prosecution, it is limited by charter from leveraging all elements of national power to achieve a comprehensive approach and strategy. However, one thing is clear from the JIATF-S example, and that is the fact that a judicial end state is the de facto “approved solution” for the Western Hemisphere (WHEM) when combatting threat networks.

The WHEM is not alone in this respect, and serves as a good example of an ODTAAC environment. In this environment, the Military element of national power is de-emphasized, creating greater reliance on the remaining diplomatic, economic, and information instruments. This is representative of any ODTAAC area, considered diplomatic or “Title 22” environments. Although the military is used to great effect in these theaters, it is usually through soft power and influence, and not kinetic strikes as used in theaters of conflict.

The DIME construct, however, ignores some very powerful instruments of national power that are utilized not only in the U.S. Southern Command AOR, but around the world. These include law enforcement, intelligence, and financial entities that can achieve effects against threat networks and which don’t easily fall into one of the “DIME” bins.¹⁴ For example, a Homeland

Security Investigations (HSI) agent is not an instrument of diplomatic, military, economic, or informational power but the authorities and potential effect that HSI can bring to bear against transregional actors is significant. Likewise, the financial effects that the U.S. Department of the Treasury can apply to threat network finances presents a considerable threat to a network’s resources. The DIMEFIL construct better captures the full range of instruments of national power. This construct first appeared in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism in 2006 and, although not official doctrine, does serve to address an expanded view of applicable national capabilities.¹⁵

This concurrent de-emphasis of military power and expanded consideration of other instruments of national power has resulted in a preference within ODTAAC environments for what is commonly referred to as a “judicial end state” for threat networks. But why should a judicial end state be desirable over any other? Is this just a political ploy, an effort to make US activities more palatable? While there is value in reinforcing the rule of law during CTN activities, there are also some good reasons why a judicial end state is desirable outside of a conflict zone.

First, there is the question of jus ad bellum, or the theory of just war. If a non-state actor happens to reside within a particular state that is friendly to the U.S., what exactly is the right of the U.S. to conduct military operations against that adversary? If we conduct clandestine warfare across regional and country boundaries, our actions no longer fit the status quo of justified use of force based on the law of armed

conflict and theaters of armed conflict.¹⁶ Second, there is ambiguity regarding what level of violence rises above criminality to that of armed conflict. Without clear definitions of what constitutes a significant enough threat to warrant military action, a law enforcement solution is preferred.¹⁷ Third, we should consider the impacts to accepted norms of proportionality in an ODTAAC environment. Current rules regarding proportionality arose from conflicts in which civilians were deemed a part of the enemy, and could share in the hardships of war.¹⁸ In an environment in which the threat network hides amongst civilians who may have no allegiance or even awareness of the threat network, a reassessment of the legal framework governing hostilities may be in order.¹⁹ Ignoring this consideration, and the potential for collateral damage, risks alienating the indigenous population and US legitimacy. For these reasons and others, there is a current of thought that emphasizes limiting or abandoning the use of military detention, limiting the use of lethal force, and a preference for criminal prosecution over military detention.²⁰ This effectively constitutes the judicial end state.

This, like any policy or generally accepted norm, is bound to run into occasional conflicts. For example, within law enforcement, one such source of tension is between disruption and dismantlement. Investigative entities are tasked, and are naturally inclined due to the nature of their work, to lean towards caution when considering disruption activities. They generally prefer to delay disruption in order to gain greater knowledge of an entire

network, and thereafter achieve complete dismantlement. On the other hand, other law enforcement entities are tasked with disruption of criminal activities and are quick to move against threat network activities in order to disrupt imminent threats. Therefore, “judicial end state” implies a wide range of law enforcement and judicial/prosecutorial activities that achieve the desired end state and reinforce the rule of law within ODTAAC environments.

If we accept that the judicial end state is preferred in an ODTAAC environment, then we must be concerned about how to design an operation to achieve it. Operational design is “the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.”²¹ It results in the operational approach, “which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the desired state.”²² Some of the components of an operational approach (particularly specific contributing factors or intermediate military objectives) cannot, and should not, be determined until faced with an actual problem and development of a proper understanding of the environment, the precise threat networks and their capabilities, and friendly network.


Notwithstanding this, the lines of effort for CTN within an ODTAAC environment should be relatively stable and applicable regardless of the specific environment or threat network.

Threat networks are formed at the confluence of a catalyst, a receptive audience, and an accommodating environment. The removal of any or all of these is necessary to eliminate the threat that

any network poses, and to achieve an acceptable end state. Therefore any articulation of an end state should at a minimum reflect a satisfactory achievement of effects against these three conditions (See Figure 1):²³

End state #3 – Unaccommodating Environment. The environment is inhospitable to the organization and activities of the threat network. (In an ODTAAC environment, law enforcement activities are critical to achieve this.)

The accomplishment of these three




End state #1 – No Catalyst. The catalyst for establishment of the threat network is eliminated or sufficiently addressed to reduce the perceived need to assemble or take action.

End state #2 – No Receptive Audience. Potential threat network audiences have more to gain by not participating, are not motivated to participate, or do not have the means to conduct actions that address the catalyst.

end states constitutes success vis-à-vis

countering a threat network. A joint force commander may add to these to meet a peculiar additional environmental condition that they have been tasked to resolve, but cannot take away if they want to address the threat network completely.

In order to reach the end state, certain operational conditions must be achieved. In the case of countering threat networks, it is possible to backwards plan conditions that support the end states listed previously, and



that are applicable to any kind of threat network. The following conditions must be met; each is listed with the end state(s) that it will support (see Figure 2).

- Friendly network narrative or option seen as more legitimate and less risky than threat network practices or ideologies (End states 1, 2, 3).
 - o In order to achieve this condition, the risks associated with the threat network outweigh the benefit or profit; threat ideologies are seen as bankrupt; a narrative alternate to the threat network is developed and accepted; and the threat network, its objectives, and its actions are seen as illegitimate. These may constitute intermediate

factors (potentially along with others) that fall along lines of effort to achieve this condition.

- Effective governance presents a safer environment and greater economic opportunities than a threat network. (2, 3)

To achieve this condition, a comprehensive approach will assist host nation development of available economic opportunities; promote effective and equitable governance including the rule of law; and establish a safe and secure environment through successful detention and prosecution of threat network members.

- Threat network operations, intelligence, and sustainment degraded. (3)
 - o To achieve this condition, joint forces should consider degradation of threat network freedom of movement; disruption of their ability to gather intelligence or resources; and disruption of threat network operations, actions, and activities (OAAs).

The emphasis on the rule of law, the establishment of a safe and secure environment, successful prosecution, and disruption of threat activities all are areas where law enforcement and judicial processes will contribute heavily. The likely “judicial end state” desired given current policy and common practice, as well as compelling reasons given an ODTAAC environment, is reflected in a number of these conditions.

The precise actions that will fall along these lines of effort are too specific to be considered in this paper, and instead must be developed and refined once confronted by a specific threat network scenario. These can subsequently be tailored and scaled based on analysis of the peculiarities of the specific environment and threat network.

The key question that remains is how a joint force commander should select lines of effort that will support achievement of a judicial end state, articulate an appropriate DOD role in a whole-of-government solution, and provide an ideal application of instruments of national power to counter

threat networks. The following description of models and analysis intend to provide a broad answer for future application.


Description

This paper considers three potential LOE models –the DIMEFIL, PMESII, and Threat Network Function models. Before examining these models there are a few notes on considerations that should be common to any LOE model adopted by the joint force commander. Any solution will have to take into consideration conflicting priorities and determine a method for resolving such conflicts. The Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide provides a useful tool to guide operational-level planning and development of conflict resolution procedures between departments/agencies.²⁴

One area in particular that will have to be taken into account during planning is the tension and balance required between the desire (and sometimes requirement) to disrupt imminent threats versus the desire, particularly among investigative and intelligence entities, to leave certain threats in place in order to facilitate a longer-term dismantlement of a network. Clear triggers and acceptable levels of risk must be identified to guide this decision making.²⁵ All three pillars of “network engagement” must be considered when developing specific actions along whatever LOE construct is adopted. That is, while countering the threat network, the whole-of-government must also partner with the friendly network and engage with the neutral network.²⁶ Finally, a comprehensive approach should always be pursued and incorporated. Other military partners, the Interagency, partner nations,

intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners, and the capabilities they all bring to bear should be incorporated when and where

environment considered, and the desire for a law enforcement oriented approach. In this model, lines of effort are aligned directly



they are willing and able in order to achieve a comprehensive approach.


The first Line of Effort model considered is Friendly Network oriented; the DIMEFIL construct (see Figure 3). DIMEFIL consists of Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement instruments of friendly national power. DIME is well established, but as discussed previously in the Background, the additional FIL instruments are appropriate given the nature of the threat, the ODTAAC

with (and are named for) each of the seven DIMEFIL instruments of power. DOD has its own Military LOE, and can support each of the other LOEs to varying degrees.

The second LOE model considered, a Threat Network oriented model, was PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure). This is a systems-based model intended to define the structures of an adversary through examination of the PMESII characteristics of the state.²⁷ This can be applied towards threat networks that exhibit these

that can meet the desired end states. (See Figure 5.)

state”, and 3) Alignment with end state conditions.



Analysis and Discussion

In developing criteria to evaluate the proposed LOE models, we considered first the thesis and what criteria would lead us to an optimal model for CTN in an ODTAAC environment. Based on this analysis, we selected the following criteria: 1) The maximization of whole-of-government coordination and a comprehensive approach, 2) Applicability to the ODTAAC environment and a desired “judicial end

First Criterion. Our previous discussion of threat networks showed that CTN naturally requires a whole-of-government solution due to the complexities and multifaceted underlying problems that give rise to threat networks. Therefore, the first criterion is: Maximization of whole-of-government coordination (all instruments of national power) and a comprehensive approach. At first glance it would appear the DIMEFIL model is preferred because it captures in dedicated lines of effort a broad

range of instruments of national power. In reality, this is counterproductive because in building lines of effort along narrow roles, agencies may become myopic in focusing only upon “their” line of effort, and tend to ignore how they might contribute to the other lines of effort. This can lead to stove-piping of thought and action, and the comprehensive approach will suffer as a result.²⁸ This is considered in Joint Publication 5-0, which even goes so far as to recommend against this approach.²⁹

PMESII is threat- and result-oriented, which should drive greater collaboration amongst instruments of power to arrive at better coordinated activities along the LOEs. However, it doesn’t completely eliminate the potential organizational “lane” problem, in that the Military LOE remains and may drive military contributions unnecessarily along a sole line of effort. The Threat Network Function model doesn’t establish these organizational lanes, and instead encourages cross-cutting application of the instruments of national power across all the lines of effort (See Figure 5). A potential disadvantage of this model is that this requires a significant effort to coordinate in order to integrate, de-conflict, and synchronize interagency contributions. But on balance, this process will result in more deeply analyzed and coordinated results. For this reason, the Threat Network Functions model is preferable under this criterion.


Second Criterion. Considering the ODTAAC environment and the desire to reinforce the rule of law, we determined that an operational approach and associated lines of effort should lead a joint force commander toward a framework which supports

successful prosecution and other law enforcement activities. Therefore, our next criterion is: Applicability to the ODTAAC environment and a desired “judicial end state.” PMESII provided no apparent advantage in the ODTAAC / judicial end state environment. DIMEFIL dedicates an entire LOE to law enforcement activities, which have a clear tie to the judicial end state. The Financial LOE in DIMEFIL includes Counter Threat Finance activities, which would also support law enforcement and prosecution. Threat Network Functions avoids a specific LOE for law enforcement, instead intending that each instrument should integrate activities within each LOE. This is slightly more difficult in that it requires a concerted effort to coordinate, much as with the first criterion.

Third Criterion. Any line of effort model should naturally align with end state conditions, not crosscut across most or all of them. In this way, there should be an alignment between cause and effect. Therefore the final criterion is: Alignment with end state conditions. DIMEFIL fares the worst against this criterion, precisely because DIMEFIL are the “means” for carrying out lines of effort, and LOEs are the “ways”. As such, the DIMEFIL instruments should be applied across all lines of effort. As a result, DIMEFIL is not a good model for demonstrating a flow from lines of effort, to conditions, to end state. While the DIMEFIL elements will certainly support achievement of conditions and end states, they do not align or “flow” towards the end states. This became painfully obvious when creating a diagram of operational approaches, creating a spider web of contributions from every

LOE to each operational condition (see Figure 3).

condition; the Information LOE aligns with the Legitimacy and Threat



PMESII aligns somewhat better with the conditions in that there's an exact alignment between the Social LOE and the Legitimacy condition, and the Infrastructure LOE and the Good governance/economic opportunities condition. (See Figure 4.) Two LOEs (Political and Economic) support two conditions. Only two LOEs contribute to all three conditions – the Military and Information LOEs. (There is some overlap in these two LOEs, as potential military information support operations exhibit characteristics of both). The Threat Network Functions model also aligns with the identified conditions and end states. The Operations and Sustainment/Logistics LOEs align well with the Threat Network

Ops/Intel/Sustainment conditions, and the Host Nation Development and Information LOEs align with the Good governance / economic opportunities condition. This is overall a much cleaner, straightforward alignment than the other two LOE models offer.

After considering these criteria, the Threat Network Functions model is the best model identified for lines of effort that lead to end state achievement. The other two models simply had deeper flaws when compared against the evaluation criteria. The problem with the PMESII model is that it's based on a tool designed to analyze an adversary and its "system of systems" in order to identify critical capabilities,

requirements, and vulnerabilities for center of gravity analysis – not to themselves become lines of effort. DIMEFIL is usually considered the “means” of achieving operational and strategic objectives, and making them lines of effort (i.e., the “ways”) is potentially problematic and should be carefully considered during planning. DIMEFIL should cut across all LOEs, not define LOEs. Its potential for stove-piping along organizational/authority lines makes this model less than ideal. While DIMEFIL arguably dedicates an entire LOE to a core interest – that of the primacy of law enforcement and rule of law – the Threat Network Functions model better aligns with conditions and end states, and if properly implemented will foster better whole-of-government solutions including support to achieving a judicial end state.

Conclusion

In an ODTAAC environment, a whole of government solution leading to a judicial end state is best achieved through adopting lines of effort aligned with Threat Network Functions of Intelligence, Operations, and Sustainment/Logistics, together with Host Nation Development.

Our analysis shows that when confronted by a threat network, adopting lines of effort that conform with Threat Network Functions is advantageous as a standardized template for developing operational design. (See Figure 6.)

There will always be local conditions and factors that cause planners to reevaluate their understanding of the environment, assessment and definition of the problem,

what conditions constitute acceptable end state(s), and how to achieve them. Likewise, a joint force commander may face a scenario in which countering a threat network is not the only challenge. This is very likely in the real world. Besides the threat network, there probably will be other environmental conditions that force a hybrid approach to developing end states, conditions, and lines of effort. In that case, the recommendation we make in this paper will serve as a base from which to develop a more complex, tailored operational approach to address other challenges within the OE.

Based on current policy and practice, as well as conformance with the various criteria identified in this document, organizing elements of national power along the Threat Network Function lines of effort will best serve a joint force commander searching for an effective approach to counter threat networks.

Authors Biographies

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Lieutenant Colonel Tim Payment, USA. LTC Payment is currently serving as the Secretary of the General Staff in United States Army Europe. He earned his undergraduate degree from Kentucky Wesleyan College in 1997 and Masters from Webster in 2008. Prior to his current assignment, LTC Payment commanded an Infantry Squadron in 2D Cavalry Regiment in Europe.

1. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-25, Countering Threat Networks* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), B1.

2 ODTAAC does not appear in any official establishing doctrine or policy documents. However, it is in wide use as a term of art to refer to any region or area outside of “hot” conflict zones. These regions generally are marked by the predominance of the Department of State, little kinetic activity, and cooperation with sovereign partners.

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4. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 6.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-25, IV3*.

6. Ibid, I1.

7. Ibid, III8.

8. Ibid, B3-B6.

9. Ibid, B6.

10. Ibid, I3.

11. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), III-22-III-

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13. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-25, V19*

14. Ibid, I5.

15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 6.

Col Martin Wetterauer III, USMC. Col Wetterauer was commissioned in 1992 after graduating from Louisiana State University. Col Wetterauer just recently gave up Command of 8th Marine Regiment, 2d MARDIV. That tour included a deployment as the Commander of the SPMAGTF-CR-AF. Col Wetterauer is headed to Bahrain to serve as the Deputy Commander of 5th MEB.

16. Robert M. Chesney, “Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” *Michigan Law Review* 112, no. 163 (2013): 205-211.

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22. Joint Forces Staff College, *Joint Forces Staff College, Student Text 1, 6th Edition, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide* (Norfolk: NDU Press, 2017): 3-33.

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-25, II2*.

24. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7 Future Joint Force Development, *Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide* [Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2013], 6.

25. Ibid, 11.

26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-25, I2*.

27. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, IV3*.

28. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0, III28*.

29. Ibid.

U.S. needs to “Get Smart” vs Russia

by

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Maj Ryan A. Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony P.
Newman

As technology advancements have made the world appear smaller, the effects, or ripples, of national and international actions have changed the global environment in which we live and operate. These changes, often rapid and sudden, are not always apparent until assessed in combination with other, sometimes climactic, events. The actions of the Russian Federation specifically, considered by some to have been dormant for a time, are having a profound effect on the geopolitical landscape in ways that challenge U.S. and Western partner interests.

Politically downplayed by both the U.S. and Germany, Russian actions have been written off as regionally aligned and comparatively childish.¹ Whether these messages were true statements or verbal political fisticuffs, ignoring the indications that Russia as a re-emerging international actor is foolish. Russia is and has been using its own brand of smart power differently from those of traditional Western powers and thus has led some nations to assume the country's leadership is incapable of exercising such a strategy.² Understanding how Russia uses this strategy is critical and requires a whole of government(s) approach that overcomes existing barriers and obstacles and that is adaptive to meet future challenges.

Political scientist and the pioneer of soft power theory, Joseph Nye, differentiates

between two types of power. Soft power refers to those instruments of national power that entice or attract other countries to your own country's point of view or objectives.³ There is no forcing mechanism with the use of soft power. Soft power can, however, be a powerful instrument to promote national interests if it is skillfully used and focused appropriately. Hard power, on the other hand, is the application of those instruments of national power that employ forcing mechanisms. Typically military or economic⁴, these instruments compel or coerce other actors.

Nye further refined and introduced the balance of soft and hard power as “smart power”.⁵ While most national actors use a semblance of smart power, the Russian application manifests as somewhat unique. Whether described as smart power or hybrid warfare, several authors have attempted to define or characterize Russian applications of national power. Royal Air Force Officer, Andrew Chisholm, argues that Russia's use of smart power goes through several distinct phases. These phases, once identified, can provide insight on Russian intentions and objectives, especially during a crisis.⁶ Russia's unique smart power strategy, previously undefined and unacknowledged, has resulted in a shift of regional and international power.

Russia has a recent history of its own brand of smart power focused on deception. This deception has caused Western powers to miss opportunities to react. Referring to Russia, Chisholm states “A critical and essential element of this smart power approach is the use of a deception strategy to minimize the Western reaction and create

time and space, albeit limited, to allow coercive hard power to work.”⁷ Russia’s combined use of soft and hard power, intertwined with deception is apparent in recent history.

In its conflict with Georgia in 2008, Russia used a distinct smart power strategy. This military struggle began after a long period of tensions between the two countries over the sovereignty of several pro-Russian regions in Georgia. On the soft power side, Russian propaganda painted Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili as dangerously unstable and, if successful in his ambitions, a threat to the entire Caucasus region.⁸ Russia also painted Saakashvili as a brutal dictator who had taken draconian actions against the indigenous Russian population in the pro-Russian regions in Georgia. Thus, Russian citizens were led to believe that military action against Saakashvili was morally justified and necessary. Russia has also used the increasingly conservative and nationalist Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of soft power, both in Georgia and in the broader region.⁹ The Russian government uses the Russian Orthodox Church’s religious rhetoric and authority to push back against Western ideas and governments. On the hard power side, Russian military forces invaded Georgia during the 2008 crisis and physically secured the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹⁰ The Georgian government has had to accept the de-facto loss of these areas to Russian control.

Another prominent example of Russian smart power is Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014. On the soft power side, the Russian government promotes the false

narrative of Ukraine being threatened by neo-Nazis who seek to establish a fascist, anti-Russian regime in Ukraine.¹¹ This narrative plays deep into the Russian historical mindset since the greatest threat faced by Russia in modern times was Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II. Painting Ukrainian forces as a straw man neo-Nazi threat enticed the Russian public to support the military efforts both in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The straw man neo-Nazi threat also played well with the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine who generally mistrusted the Western regions, especially after the Orange Revolution in late 2004 caused the fall of the pro-Russian government in Kiev.¹²

Russia also successfully used hard power tactics in Crimea in 2014 with the successful deployment of Russian military forces to key bases across Crimea, creating a fait accompli for either Ukrainian or possible Western intervention.¹³ Ukraine would risk a broader war against Russia if it decided to forcibly re-claim the Crimean bases and key lines of communication that were quickly seized by the Russian military. Additionally, in the Donbas region, Russian military forces provided direct support to Ukrainian rebel forces, allowing the rebels to seize key terrain and defend against lopsided Ukrainian counter-offensives.¹⁴ Similar to Crimea and Georgia, the Ukrainian government was forced to accept the Donbas rebel gains otherwise it would risk a broader war with Russia. Russia has also used other hard power instruments, such as cutting off natural gas and raising tariffs of Ukrainian-produced goods to apply pressure on the Ukrainian government.¹⁵

In Syria, Russia has used smart power to justify its military intervention and protect its Middle East interests. Russian soft power tactics tried to promote a narrative of the Syrian fight as a fight solely between the legitimate government of Assad and “terrorists”.¹⁶ According to Russian and Syrian regime press releases, everyone that was fighting the Assad regime were classified as “terrorists”, and thus justified the use of Russian military retaliation. The Russian government needed to sell the narrative that the Syrian intervention was justified, especially as the government faced an economic downturn and the prospect of Russian military casualties. On the hard power aspect, the Russians successfully used their military to prevent Assad’s collapse and reverse Syrian rebel gains. Additionally, through military action, Russia has ensured a lead role in resolving the Syrian Crisis. This will allow Russia to protect its interests in Syria that primarily revolve around its warm water naval base at Tartus.

Unfortunately for Russia, their soft power efforts in Ukraine, Georgia, and most recently Syria, have had little effect in the broader international community. Russia has not expanded its list of friendly countries or populations beyond those who have traditionally supported Russian or Soviet actions. The one exception has been Russian cultivation of hard-right, populist, social conservatives in several Western countries such as France and the U.S.¹⁷ These new relationships, however, have yet to translate into any pro-Russian policies in Western countries. Additionally, Russian soft power efforts in Syria suffered a serious blow when worldwide audiences recognized and

condemned Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. Russia lost significant credibility when it claimed that Assad’s regime didn’t have chemical weapons and that the April 2017 attack was a result of Syrian rebel actions.¹⁸

Despite these soft power setbacks, there are several reasons why Russia will continue to use a smart power strategy in the future. First, using smart power allows Russia to effectively leverage its existing capabilities and expertise while minimizing the risk and possible escalation that could come from using hard power exclusively. As recently assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community, Russia has a strong soft power capacity in many television, media, social media, and cyber venues.¹⁹ In particular, Russia knows how to tailor its social media and cyber capabilities to exploit the inherent open information societies of the West. This is a critical advantage, as Western democracies pride themselves on the free flow of information and capital that Russia cleverly exploits. In combination with this soft power approach, Russia will continue to use its hard power capabilities in the future. While it does not have a strong economic instrument of power, it does have some levers, such as natural gas, which Western Europe relies on. Additionally, Russia continues to modernize its military despite its economic challenges. For nearly all the countries bordering on Russia, this military capability represents a destabilizing and sometimes existential threat.

Another reason why Russia will continue to use a smart power strategy in the future is that this strategy has been effective in achieving short-term Russian strategic

objectives.²⁰ Russia has ensured the de-facto sovereignty of Russian enclaves in Georgia, eastern Ukraine, and Syria all while preventing a Western military response. While Russian actions have triggered economic sanctions by the West, they have yet to reverse any of Russia's territorial gains. Given Putin's objective of restoring Russia's influence to the days of the Soviet Union,²¹ it is a reasonable prospect that Russia will not willingly give up any of these acquisitions.

Countering Russian use of smart power requires a whole of government approach that overcomes existing barriers and obstacles and that is adaptive to meet future challenges. It is important to recognize the existence of bureaucratic and institutional barriers, along with cultural barriers, within the U.S. interagency in order to help us comprehend where the whole of government approach is lacking in its capacity to be both adaptive and agile in the pursuit of effectively countering the conspicuous threat of Russia's calculated and successful use of smart power.

Barriers or obstacles create significant friction in contesting Russia's smart power. While serving as a professor at Harvard, social and political scientist Karl Deutsch defined power both as "the ability to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles" and as a "symbol of the ability to change the distribution of results, and particularly the results of people's behavior".²² One barrier or obstacle when dealing with Russia has to do with the lack of a centralized entity that analyzes information and collectively works towards identifying a calculated response. An August 2016 report

from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) stated that, "In the United States, some are calling for the reconstruction of the US Information Agency, an institution abandoned after the end of the Cold War. Such a center could analyze Russian information warfare efforts; establish a framework for the integration of critical data into national strategy; develop, plan and synchronize a response across different government bodies that would expose foreign information operations, and pro-actively advance fact-based narratives."²³ In addition, legislation with regards to the "Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act", was introduced in the United States Congress in the Spring of 2016 (initially entitled "Countering Information Warfare Act"), approved by the House of Representatives and Senate in early December 2016, and signed into law by President Obama on 23 December 2017; thereby declaring the establishment of a "Center for Information Analysis and Response" in the near future. The intent of this center is to analyze and collect data on the efforts of foreign (Russian) government information warfare and to expose and counter such (Russian) foreign information operations.²⁴ The question is, when this center is fully established, will this center encompass all of the necessary interagency entities required for the performance of its charter and will this center effectively address Russia's continuous propaganda efforts?

Cultural barriers can certainly impede progressive efforts towards seeking peace and stability between two opposing nations such as the U.S. and Russia. Svetlana Ter-

Minasova, a leading foreign language specialist and teacher, said, “The better, quicker and easier international communication is becoming technically, the more irritating are the obstacles, namely, linguistic and cultural barriers, undermining the possibilities of communication among nations.”²⁵ Although the U.S. and Russia do indeed have cultural and linguistic barriers that help undermine clear and effective communication it is also important to note that one side (Russia) is certainly benefiting from reflexive control. Specializing in contemporary Russian and Ukrainian history, political scientist Andreas Umland eloquently talks about the fact that the political and military leaders of the West are addressing short-lived threats whereby Brussels and Washington are inadequately cautious and responding incompetently to prevailing new challenges in Eastern Europe. This bears a causal relationship with regards to Russia’s aggressive posture towards the West. He goes on to say that the concrete nature, risks, and final resolution of Russia’s emotionally antagonistic posture toward NATO continues a Cold War stance. In lieu of assessing Russia’s challenges and entertaining new options to respond, this is serving (vice containing) Russia and increases insecurity throughout Eastern Europe.²⁶

Some barriers to building cultural relationships could be a lack of daily communication, a lack of clear strategic communication, and a lack of any development with regards to long lasting relationships. This coincides with Joseph Nyes’ three dimensions (or stages) of public diplomacy: (1) *Daily communications*

involve the explanation of decisions along with dealing with crisis, and if an event occurs, and there is a lack of initial information provided, others will jump in to provide their own spin of the story; (2) *Strategic Communication*, which focuses on the development of simple themes; and (3) *Development of lasting relationships* with key individuals over a long period of time which fosters credibility, especially during face-to-face engagements. Regardless of the institutional framework, cultivating the efficacy of U.S. government public diplomacy efforts in the field requires an advanced degree of cultural understanding and awareness by American diplomatic officials.²⁷

The whole of government approach lacks in its capacity to be both adaptive and agile in its pursuit of effectively countering the conspicuous threat of Russia’s calculated and successful use of smart power. Retired Senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Dr. James Stephenson, experienced firsthand the difficulties of whole of government as the Mission Director in Iraq. In his chapter entitled, “*Whole of Government in Diplomacy and Development: Whole or Hole?*”, he touches on this important aspect and his perspective is worthy of consideration. He emphasizes the point that ambassadors are basically Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of multifaceted interagency missions, and that the military is ever more engaged in stability operations that have become mostly indistinguishable from civilian reconstruction and stabilization efforts. A successful whole of government approach, should set out to streamline efforts

whereby agency representatives initially team up to serve the overall mission objectives prior to deliberating on any individual agency interests. Stephenson goes on to state that expanding civilian capacity and taking on a more broadening set of responsibilities for development, diplomacy and most importantly, smart power projection can in turn, provide collective offsets regarding the continual strain on military resources.²⁸ Another point regarding the need to counter Russia's use of smart power via a whole of government approach comes via the Christian Science Monitor's Washington Editor, Peter Grier. He states that both U.S. lawmakers and officials alike claim that countering Russia's attacks will require a comprehensive use of all levels of national power whereby Cyber Defense makes up part of the calculation. Grier's article emphasizes that the U.S. suffers from shortfalls in the areas of defense, detection and deterrence. The U.S. is deficient in using two-factor authentication for computer access, security within aging legacy systems, and good network visibility to spot intrusions.²⁹

Understanding that the U.S. faces some fairly entrenched, systemic obstacles in efficiently and effectively bringing all elements of its national smart power to bear in preempting or countering Russian competition, it would be beneficial to explore an approach that might be taken in overcoming some of those obstacles. One option, that will no doubt stimulate much rich debate, is a national level realignment of the executive agencies that wield this power. Conceding that it may be an overly simplistic conceptualization, the application of U.S.

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) "smart" power, originates as policy from the President in consultation with the National Security Council (NSC), is detailed by the various executive departments, and implemented by U.S. ambassadors and executive department representatives abroad. While the NSC and the associated National Security Staff are a codified means of promoting U.S. government unity of effort for the application of national "smart" power in pursuit of national interests, there are very few legislatively established mechanisms below this strategic-level organization that provide continued support through execution. The inevitable outcome is that, despite the numerous formal and informal coordination and synchronization mechanisms that have been implemented over the years, the various departments of the executive branch are largely left to their own devices in determining how they will align themselves in achieving national strategic goals.


An exception to this assessment is exemplified by the country team construct employed at U.S. embassies and diplomatic missions around the world. These teams represent, in effect, a microcosm of the executive branch. The ambassador, as the President's personal representative to the host nation, is the lead executive that manages all the elements of national "smart" power being applied in the host nation by leveraging the support, expertise, and legal authorities provided by the individual executive departments based on the national interests associated with that country, and to a certain extent, the geographic region to which it belongs. The ambassador, though

always subject to Presidential direct intervention, is vested with the executive authority to coordinate, synchronize, and align the whole-of-government application of U.S. “smart” power within the host nation.

In the NSC and embassy country teams, the U.S. has well-established means for the coordinated application of national “smart” power. The NSC provides this at the global/strategic level, while the ambassador and country team do the same at the local, host nation level. In the former, the obstacles of executive branch institutional and cultural biases, along with bureaucratic friction, can be overcome, or at least mitigated by direct interaction between leadership at the highest levels of government. In the latter, individual department and agency influence are subordinated to the ambassador’s singular Presidentially appointed authority, driving unified direction and effort in the application of “smart” power. If the coordination of “smart” power application is occurring at the global and country levels, the question then becomes: what, if anything, is being done at the regional level? Its inherent and necessarily broad perspective will

always challenge the responsiveness and adaptability of the NSC. Conversely, the country team can be responsive and adaptive in its application of power because, even though its actions are aligned with global strategic end states, its focus is necessarily narrow, constrained primarily to the host nation with subordinate emphasis placed on regional imperatives that lie outside its authority.

A proposed way ahead is the implementation of a regionally aligned organization that can approach the responsiveness and adaptability of the country team model but whose focus is on coordinating and aligning the application of regional “smart” power in the pursuit of global strategic goals. The executive departments have various regional structures that seek to meet this objective to one degree or another. The most prominent examples



being the Department of Defense (DOD) geographic combatant commands that are stipulated in the Unified Command Plan, and the Department of State (DOS) geographic bureaus. However, the regional alignments captured in these two models do not match and there is no formal mechanism to drive unity of effort between them below the level of their respective secretaries. The associated resources of these existing organizations should be reorganized into a new construct that merges departmental authorities and capabilities to achieve more effective and efficient DIME “smart” power management. For simplicity, this new model can be labeled as the “DIME Manager” concept (see figure above). Similar to a country ambassador, the DIME Manager is a civilian Presidential appointee vetted and approved by Congress that assumes authority over the application of U.S. “smart” power on a regional basis. The DIME Manager is supported by a staff of senior executive department representatives that provide the means, in terms of expertise, capabilities, and capacity that are necessary to achieve the national security goals directed by the President and the NSC. The specific authorities that reside within the individual departments are subordinated to the executive authority of the DIME Manager; this unity of authority allows for greater responsiveness and adaptability at the regional level. The regional DIME Managers will work collaboratively with the NSC to inform the development of national security strategy and policy end states and the DIME Manager staffs will coordinate with the NSS and executive departments on the ways in which those end states will be realized. While the DIME Managers cannot assume an

intermediate position between individual country ambassadors and the President, both the ambassadors and the DIME Managers derive their authority from the same source. That being the case, it is imperative that both work closely with one another to ensure that regional and global strategic goals are not jeopardized by too narrow a focus on host nation requirements, nor that individual country team efforts are derailed by regional demands.

This proposal is not meant to be definitive but rather a prompt for further discussion. One concern with the model is that it continues a trend of “smart” power application on a national rather than multinational basis. It is certain that partner nations, no matter how friendly, will rarely have national interests that are in exact alignment but the future points to an environment where “smart” power must be inclusive of partnership rather than exclusive as unilateral action may dilute or even negate its potency. The DIME Manager model is supportive of this in that a single regional authority invites coordination for collective advantage. Second, while this proposal may be a step in the right direction for improving the U.S. “smart” power game against Russia and other competitors, it does not directly address the global challenges of responsiveness as it focuses on improving regional performance. The requirements for interregional coordination, though perhaps somewhat streamlined, still remain leaving action and reaction at the global level somewhat wanting. One further weakness of the DIME Manager proposal is the extent of the reorganizational efforts that will have to occur in the face of the aforementioned

institutional and departmental cultural barriers as well as the historical inertia of the current bureaucratic system. Nevertheless, the need for change to a more responsive and adaptive approach seems apparent.

It is safe to assume that cultural barriers are difficult to change, and some would argue they are necessary to our current Western values. Using this assumption, institutional adaptation is necessary if the international community is to understand the changing environment we live in. Russia is evolving and demonstrating an astute and effective model for the application of national smart power. Her end states and timeline for achievement are unclear as are the international community's willingness and ability to challenge these methods and objectives. Understanding the indicators and use of Russian smart power is critical and requires institutional change at the regional and international level. An adaptable and responsive integration and synchronization of all aspects of national power is required if the U.S. and its partners are to successfully counter Russia's strategic progress.

Authors Biographies

Commander David P. Wolynski, United States Navy, is currently serving with the Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center, in Washington D.C. Commander Wolynski's experience includes multiple joint and

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Lieutenant Colonel John R. Cuva, United States Army, is currently serving as the Director of Personnel, Administration, and Support for the United States Military Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Lieutenant Colonel Cuva's experience with coalition and joint partners includes assignments as the J1's lead strategic planner for United States European Command, multiple tours to Iraq supporting United States Forces Iraq, and six months supporting Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.

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Transregional Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow's Fight

by

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Bob West

Train the way you fight because you will fight the way you train. Just about every U.S. military commander will tell you that they embrace this time-honored military mantra. In his first “From the Chairman” column for JFQ, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joseph Dunford described how he sees the current and future fight. Noting the significant implications for how the Joint Force will fight he writes, “...it [is] probable that future conflicts will most often be transregional and fought across multiple domains and functions. Driven by this assumption, one of my highest warfighting priorities is to improve our ability to integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional fight.”¹

To realize one of the Chairman's highest warfighting priorities, the joint force must institutionalize a Transregional Capstone Exercise Program (TCEP) incorporating all geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and functional combatant commands (FCCs). While the joint force has shown steady progress toward exercising in multiple domains and across multiple functions within regional theaters, transregional exercising is virtually nonexistent. This article will highlight the transregional threat that the exercise should address, delineate some basic exercise requirements, propose four training

objectives, and address three potential challenges to implementation.

Transregional Threats and Response

Militaries must now operate in a complex and extraordinarily dynamic world where several multifaceted real-world threats may exert a cumulative effect on the ever-growing battlefield. Not only do state actors such as Russia, China, and Iran have the capability to conduct transregional operations, but a variety of non-state actors such as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and a multitude of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) also threaten to disrupt the international order across traditional combatant command boundaries. While globalization trends have connected countries around the world, they have also enabled threat networks and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to operate on the global stage. In Admiral Kurt Tidd's 2017 posture statement for U.S. Southern Command, he states that some criminal networks in his area of responsibility (AOR) are globally-integrated enterprises with profit margins that rival *Fortune 500* companies. These networks smuggle precursor chemicals and fentanyl from China into Central America and Mexico in order to make extremely potent heroin that causes overdose epidemics in the U.S. There are networks that transport large cocaine shipments to the U.S., West Africa, Europe, and Australia, while others make tremendous profits by illegally mining gold in Guyana, Peru, and Colombia. Other networks kidnap, money launder, and extort—all while moving illicit goods across the globe.²

The majority of combatant commanders recently testified before congress that they face some subset of five key challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and VEOs), commonly referred to as the “4+1”, in their geographic region or functional area.³ Speaking at the annual Air Force Association conference in 2016, Chairman Dunford observed that such threats increasingly operate across the regional combatant command structure.⁴ For managing these threats he recommended improving the ability of the Secretary of Defense to work across both geographic and functional combatant commanders and strengthening of the Joint Staff (JS).⁵

According to the JS J7, leadership often discusses the benefits of cross-Combatant Command (CCMD) activities; however, the U.S. military has not fully understood or addressed challenges in cross-CCMD coordination. Specifically, how the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will establish authorities, responsibilities, and processes with required JS support required for globally-integrated operations outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) has yet to be tested.⁶ The J7 clearly views reallocation processes for critical resources such as munitions, intelligence, support, strategic lift, and cyber assets as limiting to mission success in a global fight.⁷ No doubt there are many other challenges DoD has not considered that a transregional global exercise could reveal.

The TCEP involving all GCCs and FCCs would give Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) James Mattis and Chairman Dunford a realistic, in-time transregional training platform to prepare for conflict

against the five key challenges. One transregional capstone exercise (TCE) per challenge: TCE-RUS, TCE-PRC, TCE-IRN, TCE-NK, and TCE-VEO, would allow focused training and sufficient time for planning. Currently there are a handful of exercises that do, in fact, attempt to exercise transregionally with more than one CCMD. In February of 2017, the three-week Austere Challenge exercise included four combatant commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.⁸ U.S. European Command Commander, Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, described the exercise as a complete success stating that the exercise validated these CCMDs’ ability to rapidly respond together with decisive and overwhelming success in Europe and to enable other CCMDs.⁹ Austere Challenge is a good initial step to transregional exercising; however, there has never been a U.S. military exercise that encompassed all GCCs and FCCs working collaboratively against a truly global challenge.

Exercise Program Requirements

As part of the Joint Training Policy, the Chairman’s Exercise Program (CEP) is designed to improve capability and the readiness of U.S. military forces to conduct joint operations through the conduct of regularly-scheduled strategic, national-level exercises that look at plans, policies, and procedures under different simulated crisis situations.¹⁰ The CEP further stipulates that Department of Defense (DoD) entities conduct exercises for a multitude of purposes to include joint training, theater-engagement

activities, mission and plan rehearsal, concept analysis, lessons learned evaluation, doctrine validation, and interagency integration.¹¹ The TCEP would fall under and embrace all facets of the CEP with special emphasis on joint training, concept analysis, and doctrine evaluation.

Implementing the Joint Training Policy, the annual Chairman's Training Guidance, released in January of 2017, is a clear call for leadership to shift their way of thinking about training and exercising. It directs the joint force to conduct "exercises involving multiple CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and appropriate CSAs [Combat Support Agencies] oriented on the priority strategic challenges [4+1] and homeland defense." It also notes that these exercises will "strengthen the 'connective tissue' between leaders and organizations, validate assumptions, examine globally integrated operations and other mature concepts, test key ideas, and confirm the joint force can execute assigned missions."¹²

The 2017 Chairman's Training Guidance lists four essential characteristics that joint training should incorporate. First, the training must reflect the strategic environment and its respective challenges. Second, training must emphasize global integration across the five key challenges. Third, training must span the range of military operations. The fourth and final essential characteristic is that training must enable innovation.¹³ The TCEP should include all of the Chairman's four essential characteristics of joint training for maximum benefit.

The same guidance also describes eight required joint training elements to

address the current environment and essential characteristics. One of these elements is Transregional Joint Training. The guidance states, "Every priority strategic challenge is transregional in nature, as potential adversaries' interests, influence, capabilities, and reach extend beyond single geographic regions. Joint training must specifically address the higher-level collaboration of the Joint Staff with OSD, as well as horizontal coordination among CCMDs, to achieve desired effects."¹⁴ The TCEP epitomizes the transregional joint training element and, if designed properly with concrete objectives, can strengthen the "connective tissue" between key leaders that will be needed in crisis.

TCE Objectives

To realize the Chairman's transregional training guidance, a TCE should accomplish four specific training objectives directed toward supporting one of the five key challenges to give GCCs and FCCs realistic training against a benchmark competitor. These objectives include: 1) exercising command and control constructs, 2) improving situational awareness on transregional problems across GCC boundaries, 3) improving cross-CCMD coordination, and 4) stress testing communications systems.

Global Command and Control

Exercising command and control as a training objective in a global scenario is needed to address shortfalls in DoD's ability to integrate operations under the current

regional command construct. Chairman Dunford does not believe the current organizational and command and control constructs are ready for the current or future fight.¹⁵ He says what is truly required is global integration.”¹⁶ In attempting to address mission command and synergy challenges, the JS J7 recommended incorporating the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) into exercises as a best practice. He writes, “Where applicable, exercise the agility of OSD as the establishing authority together with the JS under crisis conditions to plan and direct responsive and synchronized cross-Combatant Command Operations.”¹⁷

To best train for this objective, a TCE’s primary training audience should be at the Tier One level and include the SECDEF, CJCS, JS, and all CCMDs. The Tier One level of training is designed to prepare national-level organizations and CCDRs and their staffs at the strategic and operational levels of war to integrate interagency, non-governmental, and multinational partners in highly-complex environments. The Joint Training Policy advocates integrating a diverse audience into exercises in order to identify “core competencies, procedural disconnects, and common ground to achieve U.S. unity of effort.”¹⁸

Understanding that the SECDEF and CJCS will likely be unable to clear their schedules for the entire exercise duration, a global command and control objective will also test the ability of these leaders, as well as combatant commanders, to synchronize and coordinate information while traveling or attending to real-world schedules. This would differ sharply from current exercises

where typically a role player is appointed to play the SECDEF and Chairman and updates occur at regular intervals, an unlikely scenario during a major crisis.

Common Situational Awareness

Global participation would test not only command and control, but also coordination between nine unified combatant commands as the joint force strives to meet the second objective of improving situational awareness on transregional problems across GCC boundaries. This second objective would be useful to determine how the joint force will collectively contribute to shared awareness amidst a multitude of defense and commercial options for building a common operating picture (COP) or common intelligence picture (CIP). While Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) is the program of record intended to provide a one stop shop for joint planners to build awareness, most CCMDs gravitate toward some sort of tailored system for their region for a variety of reasons. Google Earth, All Partners Access Network (APAN), CENTRIXS, and BICES are all examples of systems currently in use to build a COP or CIP. Classification, bandwidth, manpower management requirements, and compatibility considerations can be evaluated in an exercise environment and lessons learned applied to doctrine development or acquisition programs.

Cross Combatant Command Coordination

Once common awareness is established, the joint force should be stressed

to use that information in a coordinated fashion against the adversary. Hence, a third training objective to improve cross-combatant command coordination is needed to bridge the gap from information to action. In the joint concept on rapid aggregation, the JS J7 recommends that CCMDs become increasingly collaborative and interdependent in both planning and execution. “They must expand virtual and physical collaboration among commands to allow for shared situational understanding and for the collective capacity of multiple commands to quickly combine and solve problems.”¹⁹

Communications Systems Stress

Finally, a TCE should stress communication systems as a fourth training objective. An exercise could then validate communications systems architecture, including satellites, information servers, multinational collaboration networks, and email services, when all CCMDs are straining communications infrastructure simultaneously. U.S. Southern Command Commander, Adm. Kurt Tidd, capitalized on a unique opportunity to stress test communications when he found himself required to travel for other obligations during PANAMAX 2016, an exercise that brings together sea, air, and land forces in a joint and combined operation focused on defending the Panama Canal. The staff coordinated multiple video teleconference calls that patched into HQ, Joint Training Center Norfolk, and CENTRIXS systems from a variety of locations, including one occurrence while airborne. This unintended

inject, though fraught with challenges, provided great realistic training and lessons learned to the CCMD.

A proposed TCE can satisfy the four proposed training objectives only with full participation from the primary training audience. Full participation is needed to test a variety of dilemmas that leaders may face such as how the CJCS and SECDEF will prioritize assets to CCMDs when every CCMD would be making requests at the same time for the same challenge or threat. Conducting this exercise once every two years would efficiently train key leaders and their staffs during their command tenures and provide valuable lessons learned to improve the ability to fight transregionally.

Challenges

Too Hard to Integrate With Existing Exercises

Some may say a biennial exercise which includes all GCCs and FCCs is unrealistic given the often times frantic operations tempo and fiscal constraints that burden the DoD. At present, this is true. However, reevaluating existing exercises and either cancelling or integrating them into the capstone exercise could alleviate much of the additional burden of a new mandatory requirement for the JS and CCMDs. Development of a TCE should follow the lessons learned from NATO. In the wake of the Crimea crisis, NATO quickly went from about 100 exercises to 300 exercises per year and reached the capacity of allies to support. Instead of adding additional exercises, NATO is now focused on increasing their

realism, flexibility, and robustness. This change in thinking has allowed for NATO to plan and execute faster.²⁰ Likewise, a TCE provides an opportunity for CCDRs to set aside redundant training exercises while keeping the intent of higher guidance providing a “less- is-more” training option for the CCMD.

The first full biennial capstone exercise should not be executed until 2020 to provide planners adequate lead time to plan and schedule the exercise across the DoD. Further, a TCE would have to be assigned priority event status to ensure prioritization throughout the DoD. Once scheduled far in advance, planners should be able to schedule other events around an established battle rhythm that runs a TCE every other year, on even years, starting in 2020.

Scheduling and Resources

Others might argue that a TCE is just another exercise requirement that takes away time they could spend on real-world issues and that there is not enough time and resources to do both. The DoD and other agencies are indeed faced with fiscal challenges that have resulted in the U.S. having the smallest Army and Navy since World War II.²¹ At the same time, with the plethora of exercises already being executed, finding a time window that would work across the joint force would be difficult. To address this concern, the JS and CCMDs should first establish a culture that recognizes the value of a TCE, and set it as a top training priority in order to solidify support for aggressive exercise participation. Rotating through the five key challenges in a variety of

scenarios can further validate the legitimacy of the exercise as it would allow CCMDs assigned synchronizing responsibilities to exercise against a variety of benchmark threats. Despite the resource challenges, ensuring the SECDEF, JS and all GCCs and FCCs participate in the exercise is central to achieving proposed training objectives, especially command and control and communications stress testing. Each GCC and FCC’s unique capabilities and geographic expertise should be represented in the exercise and this will indeed pose the greatest challenge to scheduling and execution.

To address the resourcing issue, it will be important to put a mark on the calendar as soon as possible to enable Global Force Management processes time to allocate any shift in resources. JS and CCMDs will also need to quickly determine required staff to serve as role players and determine how best to meet this need. Options for building the necessary training elements could include assigning select staff TDY, employing modular training teams, hiring short-term contractors, or creating computer system simulations. For an exercise of this scale, new collaboration mechanisms between training elements may be required as physical space to house a training element of this magnitude will likely not permit complete co-location. Sufficient time for planning will be the key to addressing all of these challenges.

Not Enough Doctrine to Exercise

Another argument against incorporating a TCE into all GCCs and FCCs training schedules is the lack of transregional

joint doctrine. The Joint Training Policy for the armed forces of the U.S. states that training must be based on approved joint doctrine unless the training is being used primarily for concept development.²² Currently, there is not a sufficient amount of cross-CCMD doctrine. When combined with the need to determine resourcing described above, this will indeed be a formidable challenge for joint force planners. It is important to note, however, that this exercise could be a firestarter to generate and/or validate joint doctrine in development.

Each successive TCE could aid doctrine development by feeding a cycle of assessment. As a starting point for development, exercise planners could aim to test some of the ideas put forward in the Globally Integrated Operations CCJO. This concept advocates eight key elements among which mission command, global agility, and flexibility in establishing joint forces could be tested in a TCE.²³

While mission command may be preferable in most situations, complex conflicts with near-peer adversaries may require integrating mission command with centralized control mechanisms required for employment of nuclear weapons or other national capabilities. Training objectives on global agility could test the joint force's ability to shift resources between CCMDs as strategic dilemmas emerge and help validate existing posture. Lastly, the CCJO insight on flexibility in establishing Joint Forces should be tested. It notes that while current joint forces are typically organized around geographic or functional considerations, the future force may have to consider that "this might be done globally" or as a "joint task

force operating across multiple non-contiguous geographic areas to accomplish its mission against a single threat."²⁴

Conclusion

The CJCS has stated that his warfighting priority is to improve the military's ability to integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional fight. While the joint force has shown steady progress toward exercising in multiple domains and across multiple functions within regional theaters, transregional exercising is virtually nonexistent. The joint force needs to institutionalize the TCEP incorporating all GCCs and FCCs as a key element to realizing the Chairman's highest warfighting priority. A TCE should test command and control constructs, improve situational awareness on transregional problems across GCC boundaries, enhance cross-CCMD coordination, and stress test communication systems as primary training objectives. These objectives reflect current shortfalls and are needed to prepare the joint force to face any of the "4+1" challenges.

Though implementation of a TCE will be met with challenges from competing priorities, scheduling, resourcing, and nascent transregional doctrine, overcoming these challenges will set the joint force on a trajectory to defend the U.S. against the transregional threats of tomorrow. Without this exercise or another like it, critical shortfalls in joint force capability to address these threats will persist. Adopting the TCEP will help realize the Chairman's vision for the future joint force and help him fulfill his

statutory responsibilities to advise, direct, assess, and execute joint operations against the most challenging transregional threats. Using a TCE, we can train the way we fight so we will fight the way we train.

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Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding Critical Aspects of the Environment

by
Thomas J. Snukis

This essay is the third in a series of essays that focus on the transition from war to peace through stabilization, reconstruction, and development. The first essay identified and summarized the essential US governmental strategic guidance, concepts, and doctrine surrounding stabilization, reconstruction, and development. The second essay examined other relevant literature on the subject and highlighted several areas that the US national security policymaker, diplomat, joint warfighter and other governmental agencies must account for as they seek to understand an emerging post-intervention environment. This essay focuses on a critical challenge resident in the international environment that impacts the US ability to stabilize, reconstruct, and develop nations before, during, and/or after armed intervention. That challenge is the ever increasing number of fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states and the state-building requirement within these nations.

The Problem

Ashraf Ghani, the current president of Afghanistan, and Clare Lockhardt, co-founder and director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, counsel that the international

community has a mutual challenge. “Forty to sixty states, home to nearly two billion people, are either sliding backward and teetering on the brink of implosion or have already collapsed.”¹ They concisely capture an ongoing and ever expanding global issue, “in a period of unprecedented wealth and invention, people throughout Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are locked into lives of misery [and] politicians, generals and business leaders are beginning to realize that we must arrest and reverse state failure... in order to overcome the effects of these weak, failing, and failed states.”² As the United States has been recently involved in two state-building efforts following combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and anticipates potential involvement in similar situations, it is imperative to understand the intricacies and nuances of these environments and handle them with more sophistication and skill than we have in the recent past. To do this we must gain a better understanding of the environment and possible approaches to the problem.

Understanding the Environment

Francis Fukuyama captures the essential nature of state-building and the international dilemma when he emphasizes, “state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism...while we know a lot about state-building, there is a great deal we don’t know...We need...more thought, attention, and research on this area.”³ Robert Rotberg echoes Fukuyama’s

counsel, “In a time of terror awareness, moreover, appreciating and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure motivate critical policy debates. How best to understand the nature of weak states, to strengthen those poised on the abyss of failure, and to restore the functionality of failed states, are among the urgent policy questions of the twenty-first century.”⁴ While we will not explore this topic in great depth, we present and emphasize several crucial points for practitioners as they deal with this challenge, especially following some sort of armed intervention.

In 1950 Richard Hartshorne published his *The Functional Approach in Political Geography* where he added to the understanding of weak states with his concepts in the context of state effectiveness. He proposed the following, “The fact that a country has a name and a government, that an international treaty recognizes its existence as a state and defines its territorial limits—all that does not produce a state.”⁵ Hartshorne recognized two forces within a nation that contribute to or detract from state effectiveness. “We have been considering a variety of centrifugal factors in the regional geography in a state-area which make it difficult to bind those regions together in an effective unit...[to produce a state] it is necessary to establish centripetal forces that will bind together the regions of that state, in spite of the centrifugal forces that are always present.”⁶ A deep understanding of these forces becomes essential in developing a coherent approach to catalyze state-building under any circumstances. Hartshorne’s research emphasized, “The basic centripetal force must be some concept or idea justifying

the existence of this particular state...; the state must have a *raison d’être* – reason for existing.”⁷ Understanding the centrifugal and centripetal forces resident within a country becomes an essential prerequisite to generate a positive outcome. Without this understanding we will fail every time as Richard Helms, CIA director during the Vietnam era, noted regarding US involvement in Vietnam, “At the root of this failure of intelligence was “our national ignorance of Vietnamese history, society, and language.”⁸

Volumes of literature evaluate the basic US state-building approach in both Afghanistan and Iraq as ineffective and extremely costly. Addressing the extreme cost and effort required by outside entities in state-building, especially that following an armed intervention, several scholars and practitioners offer alternative approaches for those weak and failing states that struggle to become contributing members of the international community. Ghani and Lockhardt propose a strategic framework that “argues for a citizen-based approach to state building: a new legal compact between citizen, state and the market, not a top-down imposition of the state.”⁹ This approach has promise in some areas but what happens when the basic centripetal force described by Hartshorne a “*raison d’être*” is absent or so inextricably blurred by competing views or imposed fracturing that progress is next to impossible?

Jeffery Herbst also offers an approach that addresses this issue, “let states fail: allow new forms and centers of political authority to emerge through conflict and cooperation without outside direction or

intrusion...redraw national boundaries to reflect these new arrangements, rather than seeking to perpetuate the untenable fictions of many existing states.”¹⁰ This approach may have utility but in the process of failing many of these states become safe havens for terror groups or perpetrate great crimes against their population which cannot be ignored by the international community under the UN responsibility to protect (R2P) mandate. Jeremy Weinstein offers a strategy of “autonomous recovery” as an alternative, whereby states reach “a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention.”¹¹ Under better scrutiny and deeper analysis, the pros and cons of each will emerge. Regardless if one or the other or a hybrid would work in a given circumstance, they must, at a minimum, be considered with other available alternatives in a discourse contemplating the use of force or other extreme measures. Although the Marshall Plan receives high praise from most for jump-starting European Recovery, there are several scholars who question whether it was economically necessary. “The historical guild sitting in judgement [almost seventy years later] has yet to render its final verdict.”¹²

Considering the above we clearly recognize that state-building is not only a critical issue globally but is also an acute issue in the Middle East. Difficult, costly, manpower intensive, and time-consuming under the best of circumstances, in areas that require forceful intervention to enact change, force alone may not be sufficient to build what we want. Additionally, in populous

countries it is even harder, “the effort needed to stabilize Bosnia and Kosovo has proved difficult to replicate in Afghanistan or Iraq, nations that are eight to 12 times more populous.”¹³ Moreover, “the more sweeping a mission’s objectives, the more resistance it is likely to inspire. Resistance can be overcome, but only through a well-considered application of personnel and money over extended periods of time.”¹⁴

We also recognize that our understanding of state-building remains incomplete and potentially flawed. “The deeper problem is insufficient understanding of state-building’s complexities – in particular, its intrinsic tensions and contradictions.”¹⁵ Fukuyama cautions that there are “grave limitations to the ability of external powers to create demand for institutions...” necessary to generate effective state-building.¹⁶ He argues that the international community, or whatever entity has intervened with the intent of building a state, is “not simply limited in the amount of capacity it can build” but even more worrisome, Fukuyama argues, “It is actually complicit in the *destruction* of institutional capacity in many developing countries.”¹⁷ Ultimately depending on how the U.S. and the international community approach state-building whether before, during, or after an armed intervention, it is highly possible that with the best of intentions and despite an exceedingly large investment the effort may make the situation worse as we experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As joint operational commander’s and staffs think through these issues and prepare plans and orders for similar environments in the future they must fully

account for the nuances and intricacies of these complex issues resident in many struggling nations throughout the international community! They cannot overlook the requirements and tensions inherent in these fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states.

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Polarity Management in International Relations

by

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and
Dr. Sadi S. Sadiyev

A nation's grand strategy is a product of the state, its society, and political values.¹ It is essentially "the use of power to secure the state."² In general, when discussing grand strategy, scholars argue that three conditions must be taken into account: the nation's interests, priorities, and the instruments of power.³ A national interest is defined as, "...a public good of concern to all or most [citizens]..."⁴ Priorities allow decision-makers to "rack and stack" competing objectives based upon the situational factors. The instruments of power are those resources that nation states use to promote their interests, such as diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) means.

In a great deal of literature describing the current international system, the benefits of a uni-, bi-, or multipolar world permeate national security discussions. The concept of polarity management, however, and the dynamic interplay of the poles is rarely discussed and understood. Therefore, a discussion of polarity management is undertaken from which key "takeaways" are identified. According to the definition in the paragraph above, three major characteristics of a grand strategy emerge: economic, political, and socio-cultural. Although these are identified as individual characteristics, the three are intrinsically related. For the purposes of this argument, international relations problems are viewed as social problems⁵, which encompass the political and economic characteristics or variables.

Within the international system, polarization can be described as a process in which several groups or nations merge into one larger unit under an agreed upon coordinated direction for an economic, social, or political purpose. In international relations, a nation or group of nations, are always trying to maximize the international system in a manner that best serves its citizens, which, in one school of thought, comes at the expense of other nations or groups of nations. Russian expansion efforts in Georgia and Ukraine are recent examples, and Armenia's expansion and occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan, originating in the early Twentieth Century, is a historical example. In each example, one nation or group thinks one way and another nation or group thinks the opposite.

Nations are societies that are a moving complex of overlapping and nested structures and situations of conflict, power balancing, balances of powers, and structures of expectations.⁶ What emerges from this dynamic is a type of polarization between the two nations or groups of nations in which neither group is willing to subvert (compromise) its own interests to another. The ongoing conflict within Iraq and Syria is an example. With neither group willing to change, the dynamic becomes intractable. International relations problems, just like many social problems, therefore, become polarities to manage, not problems to solve.

After World War II, European countries and America founded NATO to merge and unite their political, economic, and military force against the Soviet system. Just as communism and capitalism needed each other to show the merits of their respective ideologies during the Cold War, polarities are sets of opposites that cannot function well

independently. As the two sides of any polarity are interdependent, a solution for one side cannot be made without considering the other side.⁷ The experiences of these organizations reveal basic factors that, with varying force, affect religious, ethnic, cultural, and social polarization.

Polarities in international relations are chronic, ongoing, unavoidable issues that are also unsolvable. The need to manage these types of polarities increases or decreases as the system or relationship changes in complexity, diversity, speed of change, and resistance to change. In most academic problems, the definition of solving a problem posits that there is only one right answer or two or more right answers that are independent. In reality, virtually almost all academic problems are problems with one right answer. In problems with polarities, as in most social problems, by definition, polarities have 2 or more right answers that are interdependent.

Managing polarities in international relations requires analysts who understand that these types of problems have 2 or more right answers that are interdependent. Managing polarities in international relations is essential for one generation to pass key elements of its culture on to the next generation. When typical problem solving skills are used to address polarity issues, there is a high likelihood that the problem will be made worse.⁸

Polarity is managed well when you capitalize on the inherent tensions between the two poles. You get the benefits of both upsides and the synergies between them. Polarity is managed poorly when one pole is focused on to the neglect of the other. This is likely to occur when the issue is seen as an either/or problem.⁹

As international relations are tied to a nation's grand strategy with the intention of shaping the global environment for the benefit of its own citizens, a polarity dynamic is automatically put into place that consists of an "us versus them" mentality. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001, President George W. Bush stated that, "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror."¹⁰ The idea was that there were only two sides to the conflict and each side was the extreme opposite of the other. More recently, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the concept of 'America First' loud and clear throughout his campaign and his inauguration speech setting the stage for a polarity dynamic between America and the rest of the world.¹¹

The key to understanding and managing international relations polarity issues is to get past the idea that "I'm right and my opposition is wrong." If either pole were allowed to "win out," the downside of either extreme would eventually undermine the positive aspects resulting in a problem worse than the original one. Just as both poles have positive aspects, they also have negative components that would manifest themselves if given the time and lack of opposing constraints. Rather, the necessary approach is to understand that both opposing parties are not only right, but that they are dependent upon each other's truth over time. The two opposite poles serve as a counterbalance to the other, while not allowing the most positive aspects of either pole to come to fruition, the most negative aspects are mitigated as well.




Figure 1.




Figure 3.




Figure 2.




Figure 4.

An example of polarity management is shown in Figures 1 through 4. In Figure 1, the two poles are identified which sit at the extreme opposite of each other. In Figure 2, the relationship between the two poles is represented by the oval tying the two poles together.

In Figure 3, there is an inherent tension between the two poles in the system that results in some sort of equilibrium between the poles. In Figure 4, that equilibrium is changed when Pole 2 tries to increase its influence over the status quo. Pulling the equilibrium nearer to Pole 2 requires energy and creates a tension required to keep the new equilibrium in place.

Pole 1 does not simply allow Pole 2 to create a new equilibrium at its expense. As a natural result of Pole 2's action, Pole 1 develops a counter-tension or energy that acts in an opposite direction as Pole 2's as shown in Figure 4. In most cases, the counter-tension required to move the equilibrium back to its original position requires even more energy, which results in an overshoot or even more extreme position than the original state. Over time, these tensions and counter-tensions either go back to the original status quo or a new equilibrium is reached.

Managing polarity is more complicated than simply managing tensions. In the context of international relations, each

pole represents a school of thought or ideological framework that best supports that nation's interests. In theory, two nations could have ideological frameworks that are polar opposites. A historical real-world example would be the ideological battle between communism and capitalism during the Cold War. Each side believed they were right and the other side wrong. As a result, each tried to force the other side to capitulate through various means in which the great powers of the contemporary system have been joined by a few regional groupings-Europe, NATO, Warsaw Pact, European Trade Union, etc. There were, and are, however, pluses and minuses to each ideological pole. For the Cold War period, some of the positive aspects of the communist ideology are identified in the upper left-hand quadrant of the diagram (Figure 5). The negative aspects of communist ideology is located in the lower left-hand quadrant. Likewise, the positive and negative aspects of capitalism are listed in the upper and lower right-hand quadrant respectively. All things being equal, the tension between the two poles is equidistant to both.




Figure 5.

In theory, if in the natural course of environmental interactions the positive aspects of capitalism started to pull the equilibrium to the upper right, many of the

positive aspects of capitalism would start to be realized Figure 6.




Figure 6.

Over time, however, without a counterbalance, the natural tendency would be for the negative aspects of capitalism to begin to come into play (Figure 7.) As a result, the equilibrium would start to shift to the lower right-hand quadrant.




Figure 7.

Once the negative aspects of capitalism came to the fore, the natural positive aspects of communism would become more appealing. The equilibrium would start to shift into the upper left-hand quadrant (Figure 8).

Once the equilibrium established itself on the left-hand side of the quadrant, over time, the negative aspects of the ideology would come into play, creating the dynamics for an equilibrium swing in the opposite direction (Figure 9).




Figure 8.




Figure 9.

The positive aspects of capitalism would come back into play and the equilibrium would start to shift back to the right (Figure 10). Over time, the system's equilibrium would develop a continuous figure eight pattern reaching a balance that might not eliminate the negative aspects, but does provide for a constant "refresh" by not staying in any one quadrant for very long. In addition, within a bipolar system, a result of the natural dynamic systemic balancing, secondary states were able to play one superpower off against the other providing opportunities that would not normally be available.¹²

Normally, one would think that removing a polar counter-balance would be good. Unfortunately, without the counter-tension, the system usually stays in one quadrant with the negative aspects becoming

reinforced over time (Figure 11). The United States and its concept of capitalism has experienced a similar phenomenon since the demise of the Soviet Union and the natural counter-tension of communism. Over time, the negative aspects of capitalism come to the fore and the other actors and stakeholders in the environment then equate those negative qualities to the Americans themselves, undermining both the ideology and the legitimacy of the United States.




Figure 10.

In any unipolar environment, the specific characteristics of any unipolar system depends on the behavior of the unipolar state. Global incentives, constraints, and restraints associated with the unipole's position within the international structure can affect behavior. In addition, the unipole's domestic institutions and processes, intrinsically linked to the international system, might undergo significant change based upon the immediate effects of its behavior within the international system.¹³

In the case of the two decades immediately following the Cold War, the U.S. used its economic and military resources to dominate the international environment. This domination, however, came at a price as the U.S. bore the preponderance of costs while first




Figure 11.

attempting to shape the world in its image, and then underwriting global security. Initially, the U.S. had an interest in bearing these costs as it directly benefitted from promoting its values and interests within the international system.¹⁴ Just as the theory assumes, however, given that the U.S. was unchallenged by any peer competitors during that time period, U.S. interests became more parochial at the expense of international order and state and non-state actors.

Over time, the cost of bearing the disproportionate expense naturally inclines the unipole, in this case, the U.S., to seek the economic and security assistance from others within the global environment who have benefitted to varying degrees from the promotion of its national interests. As such, the unipole leverages its position of privilege to force these adjustment burdens on other states. These other states naturally develop a sense of resentment of the forced coercion, especially in light of the unipole's efforts to maintain its position at the expense of others within the international system.¹⁵ In addition, the now visible manifestations of the negative outcomes inherent within any unipolar system, serve as an opportunity for other international actors to attribute all of the negative conditions on the unipole whether it has anything to do with them or not.

In international relations, polarity management posits that the poles are necessary to act as natural counter-balances to the development of extreme ideology or extreme effects from taking place. The tension between opposite ideologies, however, can be lessened through an understanding that both poles represent truth and that neither is wrong. To lessen the tension, and eliminate the more detrimental overshoot response, some middle ground, or for some that very unsatisfying word 'compromise,' must be reached.

Of course, tension is increased even as the middle ground is sought; however, each polar system is likely to manage the smaller amounts of tension required over time as opposed to a huge one-time requirement.

Whereas national interests are in a sense unipolar, the manner in which these interests are ultimately pursued in the international system would benefit greatly from a bi- or multipolar approach. In the case of the U.S., an economic or military counterbalance would naturally lessen the negative aspects that would develop over time from a purely American approach. A purely unipolar approach creates a sense of "us versus them," which tends to create a system marked by antagonism. A unipolar system also tends to make the unipole the adversary of all other system actors leading them to focus almost entirely on the unipole—to counter, contain, or exploit it—at the expense of other threats that may be more severe. A bi- or multi-polar international environment would provide other international actors a sense of choice or opportunity while providing a sense of system balance.

In the current international environment in which the U.S. is still the dominant military and economic power, U.S. national interests must be pursued in a

manner that supposes there are counterpoles even when there are not. To do otherwise will undermine all of the good that the U.S. brings to the world.

Authors Biographies

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Strategic Foresight Tools and the Russia National Security Strategy: US Policy Implications

by

MAJ Kent E. Justice

Despite the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, the follow-on manifestation of Russia, the Russian Federation, remains a powerful and influential actor in the international arena. It maintains a seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council with requisite veto power, and is a leading nuclear capable nation. With such stature, it remains paramount for the United States (U.S.) to thoroughly understand the security strategy and national interests of Russia in order to devise an appropriate policy approach for furthering U.S. interests. The government of Russia published an updated National Security Strategy (NSS) in December of 2015.¹ It allows for insights into how Russia sees the world, its place in it, and sources of concern / perceived threats. Russia published this document in the midst of having a litany of national level concerns such as a stagnating economy, declining birthrate, weak institutions, and weakening social cohesion. Analysis of this document can provide perspective to U.S. policy makers in how to approach Russia, and how to achieve desired effects. Understanding how Russia perceives causes and effects in a variety of areas such as the economy and national defense can provide U.S. officials an awareness of potential policy levers. This work utilizes a variety of analytical strategic foresight tools

to dissect the 2015 Russian NSS, and concludes with a recommended way ahead for U.S. policy.

Elements and Relationships within the NSS

The first tool utilized in examining the Russian NSS is a causal loop diagram (CLD). The CLD presents the elements of the NSS and the relationships between them. It allows for a clear reflection of what Russia considers to have bearing on its national security, and presents what Russia understands it needs to do in order to improve or maintain certain areas.

Figure 1 is a summarized CLD for the NSS as a whole. The summarized CLD shows the core relationship of the NSS, which is the central association of national security and socioeconomic development. As provided in the NSS, each has a positive effect on the other. As national security improves, or is guaranteed, the socioeconomic development of Russia improves. As the socioeconomic development of Russia improves, so improves the national security.

With the balance between national security and socioeconomic development residing at the center of the CLD, the graphic reflects various elements present in Russia that have bearing on either national security or socioeconomic development. The major elements reflected in this summarized diagram are:

- strong state and public security;
- improvement of the quality of life of Russian citizens;




Figure 1.

- economic growth;
- improving science, technology, and education;
- development of the population's health / development of health care;
- culture;
- preservation of environmental security and rational environmental management;
- strong national defense;
- strategic stability.

Key elements, along with some influencing elements, are grouped by color for clarity. Additionally, some key negative influencers are reflected in red font. As this is a summary graphic, there are other negative influences which can be seen in detailed CLDs for each major element (not included in this publication). Some negative elements reflected in Figure 1 are:

- Corruption;
- Imposition of restrictive economic measures against Russia;
- Decline in the quality of education;
- Low standard of qualification for medical personnel;
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military activity near Russian borders.

Anytime Russia identifies a negative element in the NSS, it provides a listing of countermeasures. The conclusion of the document provides a listing of indicators that Russia views as valid evaluation criteria for its NSS. Presumably, Russia intends to monitor such figures as citizen satisfaction, proportion of modern arms used in the military, life expectancy, and per capita

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (among others).

Relative Strength of NSS Elements

Not all elements reflected in the CLD bear equally on Russian national security and socioeconomic development. To gain an appreciation of which factors may bear more weight than others, the Force Field Diagram (FFD) in Figure 2 contains the elements from the CLD that had a positive effect on national security and socioeconomic development, as well as some primary factors that work against those positive effects. The numbers reflect relative strength, demonstrating the overall relative importance of each element in achieving national security and socioeconomic development. Assigned values are subjective, based on perceived and understood influence.

National defense remains a primary concern for Russia. It is arguably the strongest factor towards protecting national security. Besides encapsulating the Russian military organization itself, it also represents Russia's strategic deterrence capability manifest in its nuclear readiness. One primary factor working against the national defense of Russia is the military activity of NATO. Russia remains critical of NATO activities in Eastern Europe, and views them as a direct threat against the Russian Federation.




Figure 2. Force Field Diagram for Safeguarding the Russian Federation's National Security and Socioeconomic Development.

The second strongest factor in improving national security is state and public security. Strong border protection and effective law enforcement remain important in ensuring the security of the nation. Working counter to internal security are the activities of terrorist or radical groups. Russia keenly monitors the activities of extremist groups around the world, particularly in its region, and is forced to maintain vigilance against any potential activities within Russia. The April 2017 metro blast in St. Petersburg provides a recent example of the internal security concerns of Russia.²

Improving citizen quality of life is the third strongest factor listed on the FFD. Russia believes that developing the potential of its population, providing for needs, and increasing income will have a positive impact on socioeconomic development. Economic sanctions, however, continue to have a negative impact on quality of life. These measures negatively impact the availability of goods and capital, which can have secondary and tertiary effects on other areas, such as science and technology development. The quality of life of the Russian people continues to slip in the face of slow economic growth.




Figure 3. Russia’s GDP at Purchasing Power Parity chart. This graphic reflects the negative effect of sanctions in 2014, and negligible growth forecast into the future.³

Economic growth remains a priority for Russia, and Russia believes this factor has a positive impact on socioeconomic development. However, in recent years, Russia’s economy has stagnated, and the positive impact of economic growth on national security is diminished (Figure 3).³ Significantly impacting this, along with other areas, is corruption. Cited in numerous areas in the NSS, corruption appears to permeate throughout society to the point where it is perhaps a part of the culture. This has significant impacts given the precarious position in which it places government budgets, along with the negative effect it can have on state security.

The remaining elements listed, both positive and negative, in the FFD do not appear to weigh significantly on Russian national security or socioeconomic development relative to the other factors. Of note is the mention of culture in the NSS, and

the concern about an erosion of traditional morals. The government is taking a keen interest in maintaining a sense of Russian identity. A fracturing of what it means to be a Russian could inhibit the government’s ability to muster the population’s support around policy approaches to resolving Russia’s problems moving forward. Furthermore, the government is battling to reduce the ‘brain drain’ of professionals, as trust in public officials, systems, and institutions is wavering (Figure 4).⁴

Implications for the Future

The use of a Futures Wheel (FW) (Figure 5) allows for structured brainstorming in order to gain an appreciation of potential first and second order effects about trends for Russia. Given the results of the analysis from the CLD and



Figure 4. Worldwide Government Corruption Perception Index graphic. Russia’s rating of 2.39 places it on par with or below some African nations, making it one of the most perceived corrupt nations in the world.

FFD, a FW that examines increasing NATO buildup and continuing economic sanctions provides insights into potential impacts of these policy decisions.

Increasing NATO military buildup in NATO’s ‘Eastern Flank’ is a stressor to Russia’s national defense and overall strategic stability. Increasing buildup could reflect any enhanced military activity from increasing troop numbers in the vicinity of Russia’s borders, to the deployment of improved equipment that provides an advantage over Russian equipment, such as enhanced radar. This is of particular concern to Russia, as its domestic technology industries that support military systems development will be taxed to retool and develop in the face of challenges from the international arena.⁵ Given this concern, the deployment of new capabilities would cause alarm, as Russia would perceive itself

as outmatched and unable to catch up in the near term.

Second order effects of a NATO buildup could see a negative effect on diplomatic relations with NATO member states and Russia, a reciprocal military buildup by Russia, and a domestic Russian population that feels increasingly unsafe. Any negative effect on diplomatic relations could see short to long term diminishing relationships between Russia and NATO members, a loss in reciprocal tourism (as Russia may ban travel to certain countries, or hike visa fees), and a reduction in trade. For Russia’s military buildup in response, this will drive a demand for an increased security and defense budget, require innovation to counter any new NATO system capabilities, and require a continued heightened level of military readiness. Lastly, if the population begins to feel unsafe, this could result in a




Figure 5. Futures Wheel for Increasing NATO Military Buildup.

loss of national pride for the Russian people, a general questioning of the competence of the Russian government, and a demand by the people for a government response.

The continuation of economic sanctions on Russia has direct effects on the economy and other aspects of its national security. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, a slew of nations imposed punitive sanctions with a focus on energy related trade on Russia. Russia responded by applying responsive sanctions, including the

total banning of food imports from select nations and the European Union (EU).

This aided in precipitating the collapse of the Russian ruble, and plunged Russia into a financial crisis. An Austrian study indicated that the sanctions could cost the EU over 100 billion euros in lost trade, as well as potentially putting approximately two million jobs at risk. The U.S. further sanctioned Russia in 2016 over allegations of Russian involvement with election related hacking. These sanctions have had a tangible effect on the Russian economy, as




Figure 6. Futures Wheel for Continuing Economic

they partially contributed to a contraction of the GDP of around four percent in 2015, and will have reciprocal stressful effects on EU and other nations' economies as well.⁶ Second order effects of the sanctions are the inability for Russia to import or export certain goods, damage to Russian prestige, and future Russian invasion plans being deterred. The inability to import and export certain goods will result in a decline in tax revenue, reduced demand for production, an increasing backlog of goods across the board, a lack of essential goods in critical industries, and a negative impact on Russian quality of life. However, this can also serve as a stimulus for Russia's domestic industry, as it seeks to fill gaps where goods are not being

imported. For Russia's international prestige, this will result in a loss of international status and influence, a loss of public confidence in the government, and a possible decline in foreign investment. If the intent of the sanctions is achieved and future Russian invasions are deterred, then Western powers successfully demonstrate their resolve, Russia is forced to respect Western influence, and stability is increased in Eastern Europe.

Policy Implications

While the intent of the sanctions is to alter current and future behavior, what are the




Figure 7. Implications Tree for the Impacts of the US Maintaining

enhances that it will actually do so? The use of an Implications Tree (Figure 7) allows for an examination of potential policy implications for maintaining sanctions on Russia. Russia remains a proud nation, drawing on its historical influence as the USSR and its current regional influence.

While Western perspectives may rationalize that by punishing behaviors it will reduce the likelihood that they will be repeated, it remains to be seen how far Russian resolve and determination will aid in overriding negative impacts of the economic sanctions.

In terms of economic decline, there remains a high probability that this will occur due to the sanctions. The immediate effects were rather significant. However, over time,

Russia may be able to compensate by drawing on domestic sources, such as energy resources, and relying on friendly foreign partners for lines of credit. Depending on the severity of the sanctions, and how they may be adjusted in the future, it is possible to have a continued negative impact that may be lessened as Russia's domestic industry adjusts. In the short to near term, with economic decline comes certain negative effects on domestic employment and quality of life.

There remains a high probability that Russia will see its international prestige negatively affected. In many ways, this is already the case. Continued application of sanctions demonstrates that Western countries continue to judge Russia's behavior

as unacceptable, which could have continued impacts on how the world views Russian activities. As a result of this, it remains likely that Russia will see a decline in its status and a loss of public confidence. While foreign investments will likely drop from those countries that apply the sanctions, Russia could petition to non-sanction applying allies for support.

The crux of the sanctions' intent is to change behavior. This is unlikely to occur. The severity of the sanctions is not on a level to create any crisis situations within Russia. Rather, they are on a level to force Russia to more seriously consider the implications of its actions. Once Russia completes its survey of the fallout from its activities, and determines methods for recovery (for example, by adjusting domestic industries to compensate or firming relationships with non-sanctioning allies), it probably will determine that the risk is worth the reward. However, on the low probably that Russia decides to change its behavior in the future, this would directly result in a diminished level of Russia intelligence collection activities and hacking offenses (i.e. actions viewed as provocative).

The more likely scenario is that Russia does not change its behavior and continues its escalation of provocations. There is a moderate chance that they could increase in frequency, as Russia aims to continue its advance on whatever strategy it may have for regaining territories that it sees as having a rightful claim over. Should Russia continue on this path, it is almost certain that it will seek to refine its techniques in order to avoid detection or direct criticism. The use of proxy organizations, alternate

methods that do not utilize direct military invasion, coercion, or other activities that may fall below the threshold of international interest would likely be seen by Russia as the effective way ahead for continuing activities seen as provocations by the West.

Potential Future Developments

The execution of policy can yield expected and unexpected results. While not all results can be foreseen, anticipation allows for policy makers to remain cognizant of the possibilities, and take steps to mitigate any potential negative consequences. The Cross-Impact Matrix (Figure 8) compares the potential effects between trends. This approach yields insights into anticipated and potentially unanticipated results. This Cross-Impact Matrix analyzes potential cross effects between declining economic growth; declining quality of life; declining science, technology, and education; NATO buildup; and continuing sanctions.

Declining economic growth, declining quality of life, and declining science, technology, and education are likely to have negative influences upon each other. The areas of interest are in the interplay between the NATO build up and economic sanctions, and the above stated elements. As may be expected, NATO buildup and sanctions will have an overall negative effect on elements of Russia's national security. Of interest is that if sanctions are successful and positively influence Russian behavior, it could undercut the justification for a NATO buildup. Without continuing Russian provocations, NATO members may seek to

Cross Impact Trends	Declining Economic Growth	Declining Quality of Life	Declining Science, Tech, Education	NATO Buildup	Continuing Sanctions
Declining Economic Growth		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment / income reduced - Decrease in government revenue for services - Reduced diversity in goods and services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decreased funding to support S&T, education - Decreased demand for S&T 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decreased government resources available to counter NATO threats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exacerbates intended effect of sanctions - Forced to retool areas of the economy - Forced to rely on allies for assistance
Declining Quality of Life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Individuals unable to reach potential within economy - Decreased consumption 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unable to pursue advanced education - Lack of innovative / creative thinking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO buildup unaffected by declining QOL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Precipitous decline could cause crisis conditions - Forces reduction in severity of sanctions
Declining Science, Tech, Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of experts to drive innovation - Lack of evolutions in S&T can hamper economic growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative influence on QOL (infrastructure, housing, etc.) - Uneducated population has lower QOL 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unable to respond to new NATO capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unable to enable industry to overcome effects
NATO Buildup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military threat can deter foreign investment - Diverts government funds to respond 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diverted resources to maintain military readiness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capability gaps drive requirements for innovation, but unable to keep pace 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deters further provocations - Long term lack of provocation can undercut rational for sanctions
Continuing Sanctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Undercuts access to energy resources - Negatively impacts imports / exports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limits access to goods - Handicaps development of human potential 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limits industry access to essential goods - Negative effect on knowledge growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Could positively alter behavior, undercutting reasoning for buildup - Could negatively alter behavior, requiring increased buildup 	

Figure 8. Cross Impact Matrix of Various Trends and Policies towards Russia.

withdraw forces and capabilities. If this is a moment that Russia is anticipating, then it would create a security vacuum in the exact region that Russia would desire decreased security. Similarly, if the NATO buildup is successful in deterring Russian actions, then it removes the rational for continuing economic sanctions. Given the fallout enduring on the EU from the sanctions, a unified voice may quickly rise calling for an end to the economic measures against Russia. Sanction applying nations must also remain cognizant of the internal effects the sanctions are having in Russia, as they could unwittingly create unintended crisis conditions.

Recommended Policy Approach

Analysis of the Russian NSS reveals how Russia views its national security and socioeconomic development. While understanding that Russia values these two key components, and views them as essential towards furthering its NSS, it remains important to understand what is driving their betterment.

Overall, national defense, state and public security, and improving the quality of life are the strongest elements currently positively impacting Russia. However, there are significant variables acting against these elements, as NATO military buildup, economic sanctions, and corruption erode national security.

The latest U.S. National Security Strategy is from 2015. While this is from the prior presidential administration, it identifies the four main areas of concern for U.S. national security as security, prosperity, values, and international order.⁷ In order to further progress towards these elements, the U.S. can shape policy towards each of Russia's contributing elements of its NSS.

Russia's national defense mechanisms present a clear threat towards the stability of Eastern Europe and NATO allies of the U.S. Recent actions explicitly reflect this, and are in conflict with the security aspects of the U.S. NSS. The U.S., along with other NATO partners, has responded by pursuing a buildup of military forces and capability in the 'Eastern Flank' of NATO. Given the relative weakening of Russia's economy, lack of ability to quickly innovate on newer capabilities, and demand for a military response in kind, this activity presents a significant stressor to the Russian state. Additionally, the action itself can act as a deterrent to future military provocations from Russia, causing it to give pause to its actions so as not to exacerbate the situation to a level beyond its capacity to effectively respond. To counter Russia's national defense element, the U.S. should continue to pursue engaging the NATO capacity to maintain military capabilities forward deployed in areas in the vicinity of locations assessed to be of future interest to Russia.

Russia's capability to maintain state security remains essential for it to combat foreign state intelligence activities, extremist activity, radical nationalist groups, and criminal organizations. Additionally, the ability to respond effectively to natural

disasters mitigates long term negative effects of these occurrences. Russia is struggling to fight corruption in its ranks, as this has an overall negative effect on the capability of law enforcement and internal security. In terms of maintaining security and international order, it is in the interest of the U.S. to cooperate with Russia in the fight against global Islamic extremist organizations. Any successes inside Russia by groups of interest would be detrimental to overall U.S. efforts to reduce the global influence of these groups. Intelligence sharing and security capacity building in this regard could be a point of cooperation, should Russia be willing to entertain such efforts. Cooperation in the area of response and management of natural disasters is also a potential area for the U.S. to pursue, as this can positively reinforce international order, effectively mitigating second and third order effects. One caveat to any cooperative policy recommendation is that until the current stalemate regarding sanctions and Russia's provocative actions is resolved, it may remain politically untenable for U.S. policy makers to pursue overt cooperation with Russia, even in areas where it is in the mutual interest of both nations.

In regards to the improvement of the quality of life of Russian citizens, many of the elements supporting this rely on domestic policy for the Russian Federation and are outside of the concern of the U.S. in terms of U.S. national security. However, content and satisfied populations of nations across the globe can positively support international order. Additionally, the promulgation of U.S. values remains important to ensure that democracies across the world are preserved,

rights for minority groups are maintained, and mass atrocities are prevented. In this light, the U.S. can continue strategic messaging when engaging with Russia to encourage protection for at-risk population groups; displaced persons; and migrant workers. Additionally, the U.S. can continue to advocate to Russia in terms of its support for civil society and freedom of expression.

Russian economic growth has suffered under the recent adoption of economic sanctions. While this was the intent of the sanctions, the U.S. should remain vigilant of the exact effects they are causing in Russia. The intent is to punish Russia for its territorial incursions, not to destabilize the government or Russian society. The U.S. should remain cognizant of the magnitude of the sanctions, and ensure that they do not broaden to a level that would cause undue suffering to sectors of the Russian economy or population. It is a delicate balance to achieve the desired effects of the sanctions, and U.S. policy makers must remain vigilant on metrics associated with the sanctions' effects so as to avoid sparking any internal crises in Russia.

For Russia's advancements in science and technology, and its level of education, progress has been slowed in recent years. The recent sanctions have denied goods and technologies that would aid in development and innovation. While this denies advancements in technologies that can support infrastructure and consumer goods, it also slows progress in military capability advancements. Given Russia's provocative actions, this promotes U.S. security interests. Maintaining sanctions in areas that would positively contribute to military capability

development to help counter NATO capabilities is a plus. The U.S. can also persist in attracting professional talent from Russia, effectively denying them home grown experts that could have contributed in Russia. Maintaining robust employment opportunities in the U.S., while maintaining a lenient visa program in this regard, can also serve to keep Russia in check in this area.

Russia's focus on its health related interests include a desire to increase longevity, lower mortality rates, and increase the size of its population. Doing so would increase an available labor population, while not placing an undue drain on resources for medical care. Of interest in this sector to the U.S. is the ability of Russia to contain epidemics, the spread of disease, and the spread of illicit drug use. The U.S. can pursue cooperative programs with Russia's medical sector to ensure best practices are employed towards the rapid identification of diseases, and containment when pandemics are identified. There is also a common interest in stifling drug trafficking and use. The sharing of information related to the identification of international drug trafficking methods and resources for the treatment of drug addiction are potential policy considerations for the U.S. to pursue.

Culture and the Russian identity are increasingly becoming an area of concern for the Russian government. Professionals are abandoning service in Russia in pursuit of freedoms and income afforded in Western countries. It is a critical point in time for Russia, as it appears to be on the losing side of the narrative of what it means to be a Russian. Drawing top talent from Russia hampers Russia's economy and strengthens

U.S. prosperity. The U.S. can continue to serve as a model for advancing equality at home and promoting equal opportunity. The projection to the world of having an empowered civil society that promotes on merit with little corruption is of tremendous appeal. However, a fractured Russia works against the interest of maintaining an international order. U.S. messaging should avoid inciting any conflicts amongst disgruntled groups in Russia, and should continue to maintain messaging related to the appeal of the values of the U.S.

Russia's environmental security and use of natural resources serve as a platform for shoring up economic security. The availability of raw materials is essential, as it will allow them to proceed without having to rely on imports. Should Russia find itself with a dwindling supply of essential materials, the U.S. can utilize this as a lever in trade relations. In terms of pollution and waste treatment, these are issues that the U.S. can cooperate on with Russia. As seen with China, pollution can present a great number of negative externalities to the region. The U.S. can continue to promote responsible use and management of resources and waste management. Effective sharing of technologies and best practices related to environmental management are in the interest of the U.S. and should be pursued when possible with Russia.

The last element to address is strategic stability. The deployment and maintenance of troop levels in the 'Eastern Front' of NATO provides stability and reassurance to NATO allies. However, this measure can also act to destabilize, as Russia may consider necessary reactions to ensure

its national security. The U.S. should advocate to NATO to continue messaging the troop deployments as a direct action taken in response to Russian provocations, and highlight the non-aggressive nature against Russia in the troop deployments. Russia's NSS proposes pursuing stability of international law, honoring arms reduction agreements, participating in nuclear arms related discussions, and supporting peacekeeping missions. The U.S. advocates for responsible participation in maintaining peace and order in the international arena, and it is in the U.S. interest to advocate the same from Russia. Each of these areas provide potential areas for cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. Should relations come to an impasse, U.S. policy makers can turn to these measures for points of engagement with Russia where trust and cooperation can be restored before venturing into more contentious issues (i.e. trust building).

Conclusion

Once the prime adversary of the U.S. in the Cold War, Russia has slipped from its role as leading world power to that of a declining regional hegemon. Nonetheless, the nation continues to carry great influence, and the U.S. must continue to seriously regard the actions and activities of the Russian government. The NSS provides insights into the mechanisms driving Russia's strategy. Analysis of these elements gives indications to U.S. policy makers of potential policy levers to utilize when seeking to influence Russian behavior.

Economic sanctions have made a significant impact on the Russian economy and the quality of life of its citizens. However, the extent to which they will impact Russian behavior is yet to be seen. As domestic industry in Russia responds, and Russian allies provide aid to Russia, the U.S. and its allies may find themselves at a decision point of how to proceed forward. Shaping sanctions smartly to a level that can influence government behavior while not overtly crippling the economy or the population will require continued monitoring and consideration by policy makers. Additionally, the buildup of NATO troops in Eastern Europe has sent a clear message to Russia that its actions will not go unnoticed. The stressors placed upon Russia by this action require attention and consideration from Russian policy makers. As with the economic sanctions, it remains to be seen if Russian behavior will be influenced long-term by the troop presence. Policy makers should continue to be mindful of potential Russian reactions, and appropriately shape policy decisions going forward.

Despite recent points of conflict, there remain areas where Russia and the U.S. can cooperate. Doing so would further U.S. national interests, but could be politically unpalatable to decision makers in the U.S. This could send contradictory messaging, and cause confusion on how the U.S. could cooperate in some areas, while coming in

conflict in others. Ultimately, the U.S. should continue on a policy path of encouraging responsible behavior by nations in the international arena while not destabilizing regions. Influencing measures should be tailored and carefully considered in coordination with allies. This ‘whole of nations’ can send a consistent and unified message. Continual adjustment of measures as needed will ultimately provide conditioning feedback to Russia while guiding it to its place as a responsible member in both its region and the world.

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