This update to the 2007 Interagency Coordination bibliography http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/library/publications/bibliography/interagency_coordination.asp focuses on works relating to elements of interagency coordination between the military and other agencies. Special emphasis was given to interagency coordination at the command level. Items listed in this bibliography are currently accessible (in physical or electronic format) through the Joint Forces Staff College Ike Skelton Library. Each item will have the database it is available from, the URL of the web site it was found on, or the JFSC Ike Skelton Library call number listed in the citation. Our bibliographies and pathfinders are also available through the JFSC home page at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/library/publications/bibliography/.

*Researchers from outside this institution should contact their local library about obtaining items in this bibliography.

Reference Librarian, Compiler
Interagency Coordination

Update - September 2010

“The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and humanitarian assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution.”


Suggested Keywords

- Interagency Cooperation
- Unity of Effort
- Interagency Operations
- Pol/Mil planning
- Joint Interagency Task Force
- Interagency Reform
- Interagency Failures
- Complex Contingencies
- Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGS)
- Unity of Effort

| - Geographic Combatant Commands | - “Interagency Command” and control |
| - Operational Level Interagency | - “Combines Military and Civil” AFRICOM |
| - Unified Combatant Command | - Interagency Cooperation |
| - CONUS Based Task Force | National Level |
| - Operation Just Cause, Panama | - Joint Interagency Organization Post-Conflict |
| - National Level Interagency, CINC | Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) |
| | Operations |

Or Try These Terms With Other Search Terms (Coordinates, Cooperated, Ad-Hoc Solutions or Efforts; Command Level)
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General Information

Books, A/V Materials, Reports and Student Papers


**Abstract**: "The contemporary challenges underpinning interagency cooperation within the U.S. Government are not entirely new. For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services—all those involved in providing for the common defense—have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. This new century’s post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), international system and security environment have placed additional strains on the U.S. Government’s interagency processes. U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success. While the present volume represents a significant effort towards addressing the current interagency problems, much more discussion is required. The baseline goals of this partnership effort between the Bush School and the Strategic Studies Institute are to generate knowledgeable interaction and chart a way forward for government, private sector, and academic actors to reexamine interagency reform as a precondition for achieving real change. Such an initiative could not be more relevant or time sensitive."


**Abstract**: "The thesis of this paper is that the United States must develop and implement organizational and structural reform to ensure unity of effort in complex contingencies overseas. It requires new organizations and leaders empowered with the authority to integrate and direct interagency resources in ways that employ all the elements of national power in a coordinated, comprehensive strategy. Based on an analysis of common problems in recent interventions, this paper identifies desirable organizational characteristics to ensure greater unity of effort. Then, from an examination of current proposals to change the way the United States organizes for complex contingencies, the paper recommends a new structure based on regionally aligned organizations led by senior civilian representatives of the president empowered..."
with directive authority over all departments and agencies involved in complex contingencies."


**Abstract**: “Interagency coordination organizations at the combatant command level contribute significantly to irregular warfare (IW) planning and execution but need reform. The challenges presented to the United States by IW are substantial and persistent. National level interagency reform is necessary to manage IW threats, but is impeded by numerous considerations. Interagency improvement at the Combatant Command level is more practical and offers immediate benefit to national strategy. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are charged with applying IW doctrine in order to accomplish United States policy in their areas of responsibility. As configured, the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) serving the CCDRs require improvement in organization, resourcing and training. Study of three specific interagency organizations at USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM offer examples of JIACGs coping with the issues of IW. Congressional legislation should establish minimum levels of budgetary and personnel support from the whole of government to JIACGs. Congressional legislation should also stipulate training requirements for interagency members who serve in JIACGs. Finally, CCDRs should introduce an IW Directorate to assist JIACGs with the conduct of IW.”


**Abstract**: “The contemporary strategic and operational environments increasingly rely on the full range of interagency participation and management. This is especially important during post-conflict stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. However, most interagency organizations have no surge capability and respond slowly with the required number of qualified personnel and resources to meet the contingency operational demands. Consequently, military units are forced to use combat forces to assume the functions of interagency departments and nongovernmental organizations. In the recent past, the U.S. military and interagency SSTR efforts have been ad hoc, disjointed, and ineffective with generally overall dismal results. A major cause of the post-conflict breakdown in performing governance tasks is the lack of an adequately trained, equipped, and expertly manned central authority to quickly assume control of reconstruction and transition tasks. Needed is a strategic expeditionary headquarters, manned with trained interagency professionals, easily augmented and deployed to assume the SSTR governance role. This paper proposes a long term organizational solution that accounts for the current operating environment and recommends the transformation of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters into a
Strategic Expeditionary Command structure that provides effective unified command, resources interim interagency capabilities, is modular in concept, and adaptive in function.”


**Abstract**: "The informal and ad hoc construct of the interagency process at the operational, specifically regional, level of command is insufficient to meet the changed security environment of the post-Soviet world. Attempts to formalize the process through creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the Regional Commands are likewise inadequate. To ensure unity of effort across all levels of command, the U.S. Government must create unified interagency staffs at each of the regional commands to augment or replace the present military-centric Combatant Commands, mandate mechanisms to ensure adequate staffing and resources are directed to the regional staffs, align interagency operating areas, and utilize existing interagency planning documents across the interagency process. This paper examines the development of interagency operations in the past decade and Presidential Directives issued to govern the interagency process. The present response to the interagency, the JIACG, will then be evaluated along with the reform proposals of the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Based upon the analysis, suggested reforms and the conditions necessary for implementation will be proposed and counterarguments addressed. The United States will remain heavily engaged in crisis mitigation, humanitarian assistance, counter-proliferation, and counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. As such, the institutions that serve at the front lines of U.S. efforts in the global community must adapt. The present construct of the Regional Combatant Commands and the ability of the interagency process to successfully meet the ever-changing security environment have proved inadequate throughout the past two decades. The JIACGs lack directive authority, adequate resources, and unity of effort. The interagency process must be reconfigured to ensure an optimal response that solidifies unity of effort across all agency boundaries."


**Abstract**: "Despite the complexity of the Contemporary Operating Environment, the United States is still wedded to a national security system created in 1947. The United States places itself in jeopardy by using a system created at the end of World War II for a world where state actors were the primary threat, with the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and nuclear deterrence taking center stage. The National Security Council (NSC) is no longer capable of efficiency. The advisory body created by congress and President...

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6 Joint Forces Staff College – Ike Skelton Library  ●  www.Jfsc.ndu.edu  ●  Norfolk, VA
Truman has been overcome in recent years by the complex environment evolving from the end of the Cold War. The NSC’s efficiency began to falter in Vietnam, and its failed policies have resulted in numerous interagency failures throughout the last 40 years. Compounding the issues at the national policy planning level is the current regional policy execution system. The United States has militarized its foreign policy. It has done so out of circumstance vice design. The evolution of the Department of Defense since 1949 has led it to create Geographic Combatant Commands, which are staffed and capable of regional policy execution. Recent inclusion of other agency personnel into the commands to enable them to plan in an "interagency" fashion has given them even more capability to act as the regional foreign policy arm of the United States. Adding to this militarization of policy execution is the lack of regional capability within the Department of State. The evolution of the State Department has led it to create an ambassador-centric organization, which engages single countries in diplomacy instead of approaching diplomacy regionally. Without a systemic change at national and regional levels, the United States runs the risk of improperly identifying future problems, and creating policy that when implemented may exacerbate global tensions.”


**Abstract:** “U.S. government success in its prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) depends on an interagency approach. The U.S. government must "organize for combat" less parochially at both the national and regional level to effectively defeat terrorism. Paradigms within the Washington, D.C. security apparatus must change. A joint interagency organization focused operationally and located regionally must be institutionalized for the U.S. to succeed against the violent extremists dedicated to destroying the Western way of life. This interagency organization must be given the responsibility to develop counterterrorism plans and most importantly the authority to execute them. The events of 11 September 2001 energized the Secretary of Defense to mandate the implementation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at Combatant Commands. Each command organized somewhat differently as defined by the regional threat. The U.S. Joint Forces Command developed the JIACG concept under the rubric of "Full Spectrum" with the intention of participation from representatives of organizations that include all the elements of national power. This model can serve as the template for interagency cooperation at the national level and form the basis for a regional interagency organization to execute the Global War on Terrorism.”

**Abstract**: “Issued by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 2000, Joint Vision 2020 represents the transformation blueprint of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to a predictable focus on service component jointness, DOD transformation relies on a functioning, flexible interagency process in order that the military participates “effectively as one element of a unified national effort.” Insofar as the Department of State (State) plays a key role in integrating the diplomatic and military elements of US national power, this shift beyond jointness underscores a clear and compelling need to increase the effectiveness of the DOD-State partnership. DOD and State must overcome three impediments before the required partnership can flourish at the operational level: first, the military’s hesitancy to allow itself to be controlled by State; second, State’s inability to fully execute its mission as the “quiet, steady voice of diplomacy”; and third, the current trend toward allowing the military to craft foreign policy of its own accord. DOD and State can, however, overcome these impediments through increased interagency liaison, training, and personnel exchange. Without these efforts to build an effective interagency partnership, however, Joint Vision 2020 is imperiled.”


**Focus**: Understanding the interagency process; 1947 National Security Act; national security policy process; Interagency coordination; America’s engagement with the world in the 21st century; Integrating national security strategy at the operational level; role of State Department political advisors; Practice of policy coordination inside the government; Stability operations; Educating national security leaders.


**Abstract**: “USPACOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism (J3-JIACG/CT) has successfully pursued the mission given it by the Commander following a decision by the Pentagon to establish JIACGSs in order “to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.” JIACG/CT, in fact, moved beyond that mandate to draft, implement or supervise the implementation of the CT Campaign Plan.”

**Abstract**: "A permanent seam exists between homeland security (law enforcement) and homeland defense (military). After the 9/11 attacks two organizations were created, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, one on each side of the divide. After over two years, U.S. Northern Command is still not being fully empowered and utilized as a combatant commander of the U.S. homeland."


**Abstract**: “This presentation outlines interagency efforts between NORAD and USNORTHCOM. It has a hierarchical schematic of the N-NC Interagency Coordination Directorate. The N-NC IC Directorate mission is to: facilitate the integration and synchronization of interagency activities to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and full spectrum support to and from NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The IC Directorate: provides interagency context to Commander's decision making process; provides interagency perspective to N-NC staff and DoD perspective to external agencies; anticipates N-NC requests for assistance through National Response Plan (NRP) framework; administers Commander's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG); and operates the Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) "Battle Cell". The ICG is the focus point for Agency reps during exercises or contingency operations, provides the non-DoD perspective/picture to the Commander, and anticipates the gaps/seams that may lead to DoD missions. Interagency partners include: National Guard, 32 DoD agencies, N-NC JTFs and Components, Combatant Commands, academia (NPS, NDU, HSDEC, etc), NGOs and private sector, law enforcement (USSS, US Marshals, Park Police, LE Assns), and national laboratories.”


**Abstract**: “The United States contends that it is in a 'Long War' against terrorism on a global scale and had made several governmental organizational changes to deal with the changing transnational nature of terrorism. These changes include creating the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice's National Joint Terrorism Task Force system led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our regional combatant commands, however, continue to use an ad-hoc approach to finding and engaging terrorists and their organizations. The RCC is the logical focal point for integrating Interagency (IA), Intergovernmental Organization (IGO), and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) coordination because it has a senior military commander with requisite authority over assigned forces, a robust planning and
execution staff, and standing forces to respond to actionable intelligence. This paper addresses the need to adapt our current strategies to meet the changing nature of terrorism, examines the proposed Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) approach for improving interagency coordination, and concludes that creating a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) is the best approach for synchronizing interagency capabilities for combating terrorism at the regional combatant command level.”


Abstract: "Interagency cooperation has been a recognized deficiency for many years. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 helped to streamline military operations and chains of command; however reform is still needed to affect similar change across the breadth of the Executive Branch. While this national debate is beyond the operational commander's ability to control, it often falls to regional combatant commanders, with the bulk of resources and personnel, to execute national policy decisions and integrate that execution with other Federal agencies. This paper defines the current policy decision-making process at the national level and identifies the deficiencies in translating those decisions into operational action. It identifies Africa Command as a unique chance to improve interagency coordination at the operational level and recommends tasks, specifically command structure, leveraging expertise, and capturing best practices, that AFRICOM needs to accomplish in order to improve interagency coordination. The paper also identifies challenges to operational interagency coordination, specifically cultural, budgetary and authoritative. Finally, the paper draws conclusions on the importance of effective interagency coordination for the future of operations in Africa as well as on a global scale."


Focus: “The scope of this Report is to analyse the recent developments in EU Civil Military Coordination (CMCO), with a particular focus on the establishment and role of the new Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell): an issue that is likely to be of great interest in European and Transatlantic (NATO) debates in the next few years. The Report is divided into two parts: the first reviews the main stages and obstacles in the process of establishing an EU CivMil Cell in the current European and Transatlantic security and defence context; and the second examines its particular impact on Italian policy and planning.”
**Abstract:** “The current structure of the United States elements of national power creates significant interagency coordination problems, leading to a less efficient unity of national effort. The primary hurdle to interagency coordination lies not in the grand strategic formulation of policy, but in the theater-strategic and operational implementation of such policy. The National Security Council lacks the political will and the current capacity to handle the volume of interagency coordination required. The lack of interagency coordination creates significant deficiencies in national effort during periods of transition from military to civil control and vice versa. The Department of Defense has instituted Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in an attempt to solve these deficiencies; however both solutions have significant limitations and are not fully effective. This paper provides a five step process of reform that standardizes regional department alignment, creates an IA command and control structure, eliminates bureaucracy and redundancy, shifts funding to deficient capabilities, and develops IA education, career placement, and planning, which could significantly reduce interagency coordination issues and more effectively harmonize the instruments of national power.”

**Focus:** “This essay is based on his presentation at the February 12, 2009, Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration conference (http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/showstoppers/index.html), sponsored by FPRI and the Reserve Officers Association, held in Washington, D.C. Quote: “The last job I had with the Bush administration was coordinator for police training, judicial reform, and counternarcotics in Afghanistan. When I got the job, the National Security Council said, “It’s got three parts. First, you have to go to Afghanistan and try to coordinate among their agencies for police reform, judicial reform, and counternarcotics. Then you fly to Europe to coordinate with the EU on the same issue. Finally, you come back to Washington and coordinate U.S. interagency.””

**Abstract:** “The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether or not the current doctrine for the inclusion of interagency coordination in a Joint Task Force or equivalent headquarters is adequate. The analysis engine used is two case studies that highlight the different aspects of interagency coordination between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other United States Government agencies. The first case study is an analysis of the United States participation in the international relief operation in the wake of the Asian tsunami in 2005. This operation demonstrates an example of an operation outside
the United States in which the DoD was not the lead agency, and one that is largely regarded as a success. The second case study used is the federal relief operation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This operation demonstrates an example of a domestic operation in which the DoD was not the lead federal agency, and which is largely regarded as a failure. These case studies demonstrate that current interagency doctrine in inadequate to the task of coordinating large-scale national or international crisis, and that reform is needed in order to fully integrate United States Government efforts at home and overseas.”


*Focus*: Integrated operations (military science); Combined operations (military science); Interagency coordination; Unified operations; Military education; Stability operations.


*Focus*: Civil defense, United States; National Guard.


*Abstract*: "The terrorist attacks of 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina have resulted in millions of dollars in damages, thousands of lives lost, and thousands more left suffering. The government's collective efforts left much to be desired in many areas, especially in the first few days and weeks following the event. Much of the failure in the response effort is due to the confusion between the various levels of government agencies as to who had authority to make critical decisions and confusion over who was in charge over the response efforts. This paper presents three courses of action to answer the question of command and control of catastrophic incidents. The first COA is to retain the status quo of the states in the lead role with federal agencies such as the DHS and the DOD providing support when, and where, requested. The second course of action is one in which DHS has the lead from the beginning with states providing the usual first responder support but subordinate to the direction of DHS/FEMA directives. Finally, the third scenario is one in which the DOD assumes the lead role for disaster response."

**Abstract**: “The nature of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led the United States to execute war with all elements of the national security apparatus. Because the United States Government (USG) fights this war with the interagency, it has maintained a strategic leadership framework conducive to unified action. Unity of effort, a military principle normally held for Operations Other Than War, has become the lead concept for exercising national power against today’s threat. Unfortunately, history has proven that this concept does not work in time of war; inherent prejudices and jurisdictional safeguarding within large institutions such as the USG hinder and sometimes fail to achieve national objectives. This project examines the characteristics of the GWOT, how the USG is currently organized to fight it, why it cannot succeed without change, and what additional measures are needed to correct the situation. The research reveals unity of effort without unity of command cannot achieve the decisive action required in war nor the efficiency and effectiveness demanded by the American people. Recommendations are made to establish an executor of the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism, an individual that can be held accountable for the execution of the GWOT."


**Focus**: Interagency coordination; Military planning; Decision making, methodology.

**Abstract:** “Today, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Vic Snyder (D-Ark.) and Ranking Member Rob Wittman (R-Va.) convened a hearing to receive testimony from independent experts on pragmatic, near-term steps that can be taken by Congress to improve interagency coordination and collaboration on national security matters.”


**Abstract:** “Examines the complexities of humanitarian operations and the many organizations that respond to them to reveal how the U.S. Armed Forces and these organizations can work better together to achieve a common goal. Information on complex emergencies; Background on humanitarian assistance organizations (HAO); Values and standards of HAO.”


**Abstract:** "The U.S. government can draw on the talents of more than two million civilian employees. Five out of six work out of sight of the Capitol. These employees are joined by almost three million in uniform around the world and a Congress backed by a staff of over 20,000 on Capitol Hill. That gives Washington a bigger workforce than any corporation in the world. Yet it is amazing how often this workforce lets us down in the moment crisis- simply because its components do not work well together."


**Abstract:** “Since the end of the Cold War, the national security environment has changed in five significant ways: * First, today’s environment is both less structured and more interdependent, making it less amenable to management through conventional military force alone. * Second, the shared threats of the Cold War (including the threat of nuclear war) resulted in fixed alliances which, with the end of the Cold War, no longer constrain state behavior as they did in the last century. * Third, states are often less susceptible to diplomatic pressure alone and the United States needs a wider array of tools to avoid resorting prematurely to major military force. * Fourth, non-state actors and individuals wield influence that is far greater than any other time in human history. * Fifth, globalization creates potential for transfer of disease, technology, ideas, and organization that never existed before.”

**Abstract:** “If anything came out of September 11, it was the revelation that our ability to collect and process intelligence has become the foundation of our national security infrastructure. The internal war between the CIA and the FBI has existed for decades, and has severely hampered our nation's ability to provide for defense. The reasons behind this war involve aspects of each organization's chartered responsibilities, the culture within each organization, and the channels of communication that have seemed to restrict rather than nurture effective sharing of information. In this study, these aspects will be explored in a historical context, through the breakdown of significant communication failures that led to disasters as a result of a weakened national security. Through analyzing the reasons behind selected interagency failures, the paper is able to expose not only the primary areas where the structural integrity of communication channels failed, but also able to suggest solutions to support the current channels. Further, the study suggests solutions for facilitating improved interagency communication, with a focus on technological solutions. Intelligence, our national intelligence community, and our national security are all vital concepts in a new age of warfare. This study, along with those to come, will hopefully enable the eventual progression toward a more effective defense.”


**Abstract:** “The Pentagon calls AFRICOM a “unified combatant command,” meaning a command that combines military and civil functions. Though AFRICOM will be led by a top-ranking four-star military general, unlike other regional commands, its deputy commander will be a State Department official. The current transition team of about sixty people—which is largely military—will form the core of AFRICOM’s headquarters staff, but Moeller anticipates there will eventually be several hundred personnel when the command becomes operational in September 2008. AFRICOM aims to bring together intelligence, diplomatic, health and aid experts. Staff will be drawn from all branches of the military, as well as USAID and the departments of state, agriculture, treasury, and commerce. These nonmilitary staff may be funded with money from their own departments as well as the DOD. The Pentagon has touted the new interagency structure of AFRICOM, but experts question whether the command will be any different than other regional commands in execution.”

**Abstract:** “House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO), House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard L. Berman (D-CA) and State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) offered an amendment to the defense authorization bill which would create an advisory panel to improve the interagency process. The Skelton-Berman-Lowey amendment to H.R. 5658, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives by voice vote.”


**Abstract:** “The purpose of this paper is to examine the various cultures of disparate agencies in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and identify areas of overlap and barriers to efficacy. Its intended audience is the senior level civil affairs practitioner.”


**Abstract:** “By enhancing the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commands, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act created a major impetus for the military to operate more efficiently and effectively. There have been broad discussions about similar legislation for the Federal Government over the last year. In September 2004, General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked whether we needed a Goldwater-Nichols-like change for the interagency process. "Might we, at the national level, ask our Cabinet-level individuals to give up some of their day-to-day prerogatives and authority in a way that they will pick up in spades at the National security Council level?" He proposed a "lead agency concept," in which the President would designate a department or agency that "would have the authority to tell folks in the Government in various agencies to get this job done."


**Abstract:** “Getting the multiple international organizations, dozens of nations, numerous development organizations, myriad U.S. departments and agencies, and even diverse U.S. military units to pull in the same direction is a monumental challenge.”

**Abstract:** “Land power success in stability operations will require interagency command structures at the operational level and the concurrent development of a more effective interagency 'culture' for these missions. The future probability of military engagement in stability operations is high. Land power, broadly speaking, bears the brunt of the planning and execution of such missions. Stability operations are military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Land power plays a leading role in stability operations, which concentrate on population control, security, and development activities. Military forces drawn heavily from the U. S. Army engage in stability operations to establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly and in support of government agencies. Stability operations often involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They lead to an environment in which the other instruments of national power can predominate. The very definition of stability operations raises the problem of how to command and control endeavors that are by nature Joint, interagency, and often multinational. Since the U.S. government will continue to conduct stability operations, the U. S. defense establishment must develop a comprehensive view to integrate military land power with its interagency partners for these deployments. Although stability operations are an interagency and intergovernmental effort, challenges and shortcomings in coordinating and resourcing efforts across executive branch departments often result in the U.S. Army carrying a disproportionate burden in conducting these operations.”


**Abstract:** “As a whole, the Department of Defense is well practiced and effective at planning at the operational level. The same can not be said about the national interagency community. Often seen as a dysfunctional organization or effort, the interagency community typically lacks the unity and focus to provide long term solutions to the problems often confronting it. The reasons for this are many but a significant factor contributing to this deficiency is the lack of an organization and the accompanying doctrine devoted to an operational level focus of interagency activities designed to provide lasting effects on the post-conflict landscape.”

**Abstract:** "The Interagency Operations Centers (IOC/Command 21 project is a major acquisition that will transform Sector Command Centers into Interagency Operations Centers by improving facilities, information management, and sensor capabilities in an action oriented, proactive security environment. IOC/Command 21 will satisfy the mandates of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and reflect the successful characteristics of current Coast Guard interagency pilot projects."


**Abstract:** "This report outlines the organizational structure of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), explains how NORTHCOM contributes to homeland security through the interagency process, and summarizes NORTHCOM's international relationships with Canada and Mexico. Some issues for Congress involving NORTHCOM include DOD reorganization and the Unified Command Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM's increased reliance on reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions."


**Abstract:** “The daunting challenges that face the nation in the 21st century establish the need for the transformation of government and demand fundamental changes in how federal agencies should meet these challenges by becoming flatter, more results-oriented, externally focused, partnership oriented, and employee-enabling organizations. This testimony addresses how the long-term fiscal imbalance facing the United States, along with other significant trends and challenges, establish the case for change and the need to reexamine the base of the federal government; how federal agencies can transform into high-performing organizations; and how multiple approaches and selected initiatives can support the reexamination and transformation of the government and federal agencies to meet these 21st century challenges.”

Abstract: “Thank you for inviting the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) to share with you the Department of State’s perspectives and direct experience with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). I am pleased to be seated next to colleagues from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense with whom our Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro meets almost weekly to review security assistance policy and reform. Let me note that, in my 20 years of working with DoD in various capacities, I have never seen a better level of communication and cooperation between State and DoD. This is not only led from the top – by Secretaries Clinton and Gates – but extends through all levels of both organizations, nurtured by our common experience on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Abstract: “Recognizing the limits of military power in today’s security environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal agencies to achieve its missions around the world. DOD’s combatant commands, such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort. Both aim to build partner nation capacity and perform humanitarian assistance, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. As DOD’s newest command, AFRICOM works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities such as maritime security and pandemic response efforts. Today Government Accountability Office issued reports that the subcommittee requested on SOUTHCOM (Government Accountability Office-10-801) and AFRICOM (Government Accountability Office-10-794), which in part evaluated how each collaborates with U.S. interagency partners. This testimony summarizes that work and provides observations from ongoing work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts by focusing on 3 key areas essential for interagency collaboration.”
Focus: Postwar reconstruction; Interagency coordination; Civil-military relations.

Focus: Special operations (Military science); Counterinsurgency, planning; Interagency coordination; Stability operations.

Focus: Postwar reconstruction, Afghanistan; Postwar reconstruction, Iraq; Interagency coordination, government policy.

Abstract: “As I noted during the first hearing in this series, even with the amazing amount of money and energy expended -- and, more importantly, the lives lost -- so far our military engagement and homeland security and intelligence since September 11, 2001, there remains an inescapable sense that ours is a national security policy adrift.”

Focus: Department of Defense; Netcentric computing, Government policy; Interagency coordination; Computer security; National security.

**Abstract:** "When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in 2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and prioritizing activities with its four military service components, special operations command, and task force. Some activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting, requiring collaboration with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other interagency partners. Government Accountability Office's prior work has identified critical steps and practices that help agencies to achieve success. For this report, Government Accountability Office was asked to assess AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and implementation. To do so, Government Accountability Office analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance; observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa."


**Abstract:** "In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in and around the United States. It is important that NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. Government Accountability Office was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. To do this, Government Accountability Office surveyed the state adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency coordination plans and guidance. To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, Government Accountability Office recommends that NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states. To improve the command's coordination with NGB, Government Accountability Office recommends that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their agreement to more fully and clearly define how they will coordinate and the responsibilities each will have. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and suggested ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the intent of the recommendations."

**Abstract:** "U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) exercises to test preparedness to perform its homeland defense and civil support missions. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which NORTHCOM is consistent with Department of Defense (DOD) training and exercise requirements, involving interagency partners and states in its exercises, using lessons learned and corrective actions to improve preparedness, and integrating its exercises with the National Exercise Program (NEP). To do this, GAO reviewed NORTHCOM and NEP guidance and postexercise documentation, assessed NORTHCOM compliance, and compared DOD and NEP exercise requirements. GAO is making recommendations to DOD to direct NORTHCOM to consistently involve the states in planning, executing, and assessing exercises and improve oversight of corrective actions. GAO is also recommending that DOD define when NORTHCOM should use NEP planning and documentation requirements. DOD agreed or partially agreed with the recommendations and cited ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the recommendations' intent. DOD did not fully address a recommendation on training to NORTHCOM staff on specific state emergency management structures. GAO believes such training would benefit NORTHCOM personnel in advance of a crisis and for exercise planning."


**Abstract:** "U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have spent billions of dollars to develop Afghanistan. From fiscal years 2004 to 2008, DOD has reported obligations of about $1 billion for its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which enables commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. As troop levels increase, DOD officials expect the program to expand. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office assessed DOD's (1) capacity to manage and oversee the CERP in Afghanistan and (2) coordination of projects with USAID. Accordingly, Government Accountability Office interviewed DOD and USAID officials, and examined program documents to identify workload, staffing, training, and coordination requirements. In Afghanistan, Government Accountability Office interviewed key military personnel on the sufficiency of training, and their ability to execute assigned duties. Government Accountability Office recommends that DOD evaluate workforce needs, ensure adequate staffing, and establish CERP training requirements, and that DOD and USAID collaborate to create a centralized database of project data, including milestones for completion. DOD
concurred or partially concurred with Government Accountability Office's recommendations, citing recent actions taken. Government Accountability Office believes its recommendations remain valid."


**Abstract:** “U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been cited as having mature interagency processes and coordinating mechanisms. As evidenced by the earthquakes that shook Haiti in January 2010, the challenges that SOUTHCOM faces require coordinated efforts from U.S. government agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental and private organizations. This report (1) assesses the extent that SOUTHCOM exhibits key attributes that enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders and (2) evaluates SOUTHCOM’s approach for developing an organizational structure that facilitates interagency collaboration and positions the command to conduct a full range of missions. To conduct this review, Government Accountability Office analyzed SOUTHCOM documents, conducted interviews with the command and a number of its partners, and visited three U.S. embassies in the Caribbean and Central and South America.”


**Abstract:** “This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint civil support operations.”


**Abstract:** “This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the execution of CMO to achieve unified action.”


**Abstract:** "Volume I discusses the interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other US Government agencies, IGOS, NGOs, and regional organizations."

**Abstract**: "Volume II describes key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs - their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States."
Web Sites & Library Resources

Library Resources:

ProQuest
EBSCOhost
Defense Technical Information Center www.dtic.mil
CIAO www.ciao.org
Government Google www.google.com/unclesam

Web Sites:

Brookings Institute. “Programs.”
http://www.brookings.edu/programs.aspx
Focus: “The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. Our mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations...”

http://www.cato.org/
Focus: “The mission of the Cato Institute is to increase the understanding of public policies based on the principles of limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace. The Institute will use the most effective means to originate, advocate, promote, and disseminate applicable policy proposals that create free, open, and civil societies in the United States and throughout the world.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies.
http://csis.org/
Focus: “At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions to decision makers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC, CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.”

Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee.
http://armed-services.senate.gov/

Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee.
http://foreign.senate.gov/
Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.cfr.org/
Focus: “The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries.”

European Union. 
http://europa.eu/index_en.htm

Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
www.gao.gov

http://www.heritage.org/Issues
Focus: “Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.”

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/
Focus: “The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at NDU and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security community. INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), and the Center for Strategic Conferencing (CSC).”

RAND. 
http://www.rand.org/

Small Wars Journal. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com
Focus: “Small Wars Journal facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field.”

U.S. National Strategy Documents Collection 
https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/search_strategy.php
**United States Institute of Peace (USIP).**

http://www.usip.org/

Focus: “The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help: Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts; Promote post-conflict stability and development; Increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide.”

**White House.**

http://www.whitehouse.gov/

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**Appendix A:**

*Additional Related Bibliographies*

**Peace and Stability Operations.** November 2006, Compiled by Glenda Armstrong, Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center, Maxwell AFB, AL.


**MiPAL: National Security Strategy.** Compiled By The National Defense University Library.

http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?secID=116&pageID=3&type=section