Featured Essays

Surrounded by Doctrine...and Losing
Project the False and Protect the Real

Operational Assessments and the Commander’s Decision Cycle
Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown

"That All May Labor As One"

Spring 2015
Guest Editor’s Corner:

Hello and welcome to the Spring 2015 version of Campaigning. I’m confident you’ll find this edition interesting as it takes on several issues highly pertinent to today’s joint warfighters.

Reflecting the composition of the staff at the Combatant Commands, the vast majority of joint professionals in our student body at the Joint Forces Staff College are the O-4s and O-5s responsible for translating strategic guidance to tactical actions. The messy and difficult task of functioning at the operational level of war takes a great deal of expertise, which emphasizes the importance of joint education specific to this mission.

To understand the value of education at the operational level of war, we must appreciate that service members on our combatant command, component, and service staffs start their military careers at the tactical level. They are evaluated and promoted to senior leadership positions mostly due to their accomplishments at the tactical level. When they are placed in billets at the operational level, they often have to learn how to translate policy and strategy into tactical actions through on-the-job training. Once promoted to Flag or General Officer, these joint leaders no longer work as tacticians - they become strategists and policy experts so they can best advise senior military and civilian leaders.

Many of our greatest military leaders were experts at the operational level of war. In World War II, the strategy of “Germany First” and “Unconditional Surrender” gave operational level commanders the necessary national-level intent to develop activities to accomplish those broad objectives. Led by their commanders, who were heavily involved in the strategy discussions, operational staffs accomplished the required work that put the Allies’ training, supply, and logistics machines into action. Operation DESERT STORM was successful because General Schwarzkopf and his staff translated President George H. Bush’s statement, “This will not stand” into a well-planned, well-sustained, and well-equipped force able to swiftly defeat the Iraqi military and return sovereignty to the nation of Kuwait.

In contrast, not fully appreciating the role and complexity of operational level efforts adversely affected Phases IV and V during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Properly translating policy and strategy to unit actions became all the more difficult for our combatant command planners when the Iraqi military was disbanded and Baathists were removed from government positions. Had strategy and policy decisions been influenced more by operational activities, a different outcome may have been possible.

Skill at the operational level of war relies on joint professionals that can understand the lessons of history, can systematically break down complex issues, and can make informed projections of broadly-defined future events. It takes a team of joint professionals, collaborating with a shared understanding of the environment (adversary, friendly and neutral) and a shared understanding of higher guidance, to accomplish these tasks effectively. Only then can that team - and the Joint Force Commander - articulate the right problem to be solved and then come to a reasoned approach to solving it.
The challenges we face across the military are far too complex for rote actions that are not informed by history, current events, and future predictions. Excellent policy, coherent strategies, and effective strategic communications are vital to successfully meeting our national objectives. Naturally, we spend time and effort educating our future senior military leaders because of the importance we place on the strategic level of war. It is also just as crucial to have logical and rational approaches that align the actions of tactical-level operators with national policy and strategy. Critical and creative thinkers are responsible for providing these approaches and plans; let’s make sure they are properly educated to take on this task.

Enjoy this version of Campaigning - and let us know what you think.

Very respectfully,

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Surrounded by Design…and Losing
(Or the Tao of the Alternative View)

By Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis

Who believes that doctrine is your friend? That doctrine is liberating…that doctrine will set you free…that doctrine will cast a light unto your path? That you have to know it to violate it? Or do you agree with Gen James N. Mattis, USMC that “doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative?” “Channeling” your “inner Mattis” will lead you to Oscar Wilde and Ralph Waldo Emerson, where, ultimately, “To be great is to be misunderstood.” Mattis’ zinger is related to Wilde’s “consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative” as well as Emerson’s “a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.” How can we determine the appropriate balance of doctrinal “best practices” and creativity, of “method” and “no method”?

Current joint doctrine attempts to walk the tightrope between creativity and the “consistency” mentioned above. “Joint doctrine is not dogmatic – the focus is on how to think about operations, not what to think about operations. It is definitive enough to guide operations while versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations. Joint doctrine should foster initiative, creativity, and conditions that allow commanders the freedom to adapt to varying circumstances.” Joint doctrine states that it is not policy, but authoritative guidance. In addition to providing guidance for joint operation planning and execution, it also “standardizes terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all US forces to free JFCs and their staffs to focus efforts on solving the complex problems confronting them.” The doctrine expresses an aspiration - it “should foster creativity” - but is that aspiration achievable? What drags doctrine down to the “unimaginative” realm?

The language we use, the questions we ask, reveal the paradigm in which we work. In “The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for Design,” Klaus Krippendorf states:

“Language is a cultural artifact that enables humans to coordinate their conceptions, engage in joint action, and construct and reconstruct the realities they see. In the use of language, languaging, acting, and perceiving are inseparably tied to a constructive understanding. It is a truism that one cannot know what exists without conceptualizing it as such. Language is the primary source of conceptions.”

Joint doctrine provides a language of operational art that has its historical, paradigmatic roots in the Great Captains of military strategy. Yet if “…the very premise of doctrine, which is to draw a common picture through the use of a common language, is the limiting factor in being able to develop new concepts, to build new frames, to confront new challenges” then how can joint doctrine foster the creativity required to solve complex problems without also imposing semantic limitations that hobble the creative effort? And if “joint education is based on joint doctrine,” and doctrine stifles creativity, then how can joint doctrine mediate between a legacy prescriptive institutional mindset and the education required to address current and future complex challenges?

Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” provides an expanded description
and explanation of operational design, but paradigms that inform joint doctrine development create anomalies within the doctrine, especially in terms of doctrinal language. “...doctrine attempts to fix language with specific meanings. Fixing language, viewing the world through our doctrinal lens, actually works to fix our ability to conceptualize, and this fixation, or stagnation, keeps us from being able to see as far as we could.”10 Joint doctrine is developed through consensus from the services and combatant commands, among others, and this consensus struggles to synthesize a new pragmatic doctrinal paradigm that retains the best of traditional principles and incorporates current best practices from the field.11 “New paradigms offer new ways to think about the world – new questions to ask and new ways to pursue them.”12 These tensions are institutionalized in joint doctrine, and this is carried into joint education and ultimately into operational decision-making. Arguably, this has always been the case.

Second Seminole War

Now, imagine receiving a mission, with compelling moral and ethical implications, against a motivated, adaptive, unconventional foe, in the toughest terrain imaginable, under horrible weather conditions, with a joint force ill-trained, educated or even desiring to fight this kind of war, hindered by limited sustainment and strained force structure, on an uncertain time-table driven by Presidential policies, with fractured Congressional and American public support. Is this Vietnam? Afghanistan? Iraq? Syria? Iran? No. It is Florida during the Second Seminole War from 1835-1842.

Why study the Second Seminole War? Who can distinguish it from the First Seminole War, or the Third? What is the relevance of the Second Seminole War to the wars we are in now, or the ones we need to be prepared to fight (or avoid) in the future? In the case of Native Americans, a national policy of Indian removal predated President Andrew Jackson’s by some three decades. The policy was as hotly debated then as it would be now. Our goal is to understand how commanders of the time attempted to implement the policy through military action. What was their understanding of what was going on? How did things work, why were things happening the way they were? Why did they get the guidance that they got? Why did they think the way they did?

The Second Seminole War, specifically the period from December 1835 to December 1836, is one of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) Satellite Program’s historical vehicles to illustrate the aspects of joint doctrine’s “design” methodology, with specific attention to the elements of operational design. In earlier versions of joint doctrine, the design methodology looked strikingly similar to the process for conducting a strategic estimate, and the elements of operational design were called “facets of operational art.” The number and names of the elements have varied slightly over time and circumstance, but they still capture enduring aspects of operational planning, much like the principles of war and joint operations. They also reflect the language, logic and paradigms of generations of military operational artists. The commanders in the Second Seminole War estimated the situation by trying to understand the strategic direction and the operational environment and define the problems as they saw them. If joint doctrine from 2006 was still in force this sentence would read: “CCDRs develop strategic estimates after
reviewing the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction.” What is not apparent is the theory and logic behind design as a deliberately (or necessarily) structured way of learning, and the insidious institutional paradigm that drives operational artists and planners to formulaic solutions, i.e., template-based “products.”

The Second Seminole War also provides opportunities to study leadership at various levels, from tactical to operational and strategic. In discussions about decision making and paradigms, Dr. Vardell Nesmith was apt to say during scores of staff rides to Gettysburg, “men do what they do for what to them are good reasons at the time.” In October 2013 the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute published a study of leadership using Dade’s Battle in December 1835, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s desired leader attributes are woven into this segment of the JCWS curriculum. The commanders led operations that reflected the logic of their operational approaches using a paradigm heavily influenced by the Napoleonic wars, and exposed flaws in their concepts of operations, integration of joint functions and application of elements of operational design. Additionally, their actions illustrated their critical abilities or inabilities to:

understand the security environment and the effect of all instruments of national power, to anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty, to recognize change and lead transitions, to operate on intent through trust, empowerment and understanding, to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms, and to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations.14

Our ability to understand what they faced is complicated by numerous limitations, including our use of contemporary doctrinal terms to frame our understanding of their understanding. Nevertheless, to understand the Second Seminole War, it is necessary to be familiar with what preceded it, and this retrospective will challenge our “institutional” paradigm of the Seminole wars.

Indian Removal

It is not surprising that the Seminoles would resist removal to “Indian Country.” What is surprising is how long it took for the United States to accomplish that goal. President Thomas Jefferson provided an early perspective of the national policy when he said, “Should any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our final consolidation.” 15 Indian removal became a matter of law with the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Second Seminole War was “responsibly ended” in August 1842 and a third war was fought from 1855-1858. No peace treaty was ever signed and thus the Seminoles remain “unconquered.”

National strategic goals evolved over time. Starting in the 1790s, the fledgling United States negotiated with the Native Americans over the myriad relationships between the two bodies, including the issue of slavery. As white settlers pushed south and west, Spanish Florida became a destination for runaway slaves. Americans were beginning to feel the pull of “Manifest Destiny” and
there were numerous clashes over cattle and slaves between settlers along the Florida border and Indians living in the Spanish territory. In the late 1820s, the Adams administration decided upon full Indian removal as they were leaving office. In his first annual message to Congress, President Jackson “recommended that land west of the Mississippi be set apart, and that the Indians in the East be encouraged, but not forced, to trade eastern for western land. If they failed to do so, they would be obliged to come under the harsh jurisdiction of the states.”

The Seminoles

The indigenous Indians of Florida were decimated due to war and disease during the period of Spanish colonial rule, and their depopulated lands were later reoccupied by various tribes that migrated into Florida due to European colonial wars and Indian expansion. Various migrating bands, such as Tamathli, Chiahas, Ocone, Yamassee, Talassee, Yuchi, Apalachicola, Lower Creek and Upper Creek were the constituent elements of the Alachua and Mikasuki bands of the Seminole tribe. The Alachua was the principle band, and the Mikasuki were considered the most militant. With their migration and growing sense of separateness from the Creek Confederation, the Seminoles asserted their autonomy in Florida. The Creek Confederation (so called by whites because the Indians lived near creeks) was a loose association of “Upper” Creeks located in the valleys of the Tallapoosa, Coosa, and Alabama Rivers, and “Lower” Creeks from the lower Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers.

“Red Stick” War during the War of 1812

After the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, President Jefferson led efforts to increase overland access to New Orleans. Opening this line of communication resulted in more frequent settler and Indian interactions. The migrations of various Creek groups and interaction with Spanish and American culture contributed to a social fracture within the Creek culture: Upper Creeks who had less interaction with whites adhered more closely to tribal traditions than did the Lower Creeks, who had more interaction with the white culture and thus were more accommodating to it. The butchering of two white families near Nashville, TN, escalated into the “Red Stick” war that engulfed the entire Creek Confederation and included raids against Spanish and United States settlements, such as the massacre at Fort Mims in Alabama. The U.S. response was a three-pronged invasion into Upper Creek territory, and on 27 March 1814, Andrew Jackson destroyed the combat power of the Red Sticks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River. Jackson imposed a severe treaty on the Creeks at Fort Jackson; the vanquished Red Stick Upper Creeks (and also some allied Creeks) ceded 23 million acres in Alabama and Georgia. Jackson followed this victory with one over the British at New Orleans in January 1815.
Army Reorganization and the First Seminole War

With the victory over the British, Congress immediately downsized and reorganized the Army, and MG Jackson was given command of the “Division of the South.” Attempting to protect settlers in the ceded area, Jackson directed BG Edmund Gaines to build a fort near the confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, just north of the Florida border. Resupply of Fort Scott required naval vessels to navigate the Apalachicola River through Spanish Florida. In July 1816, when these vessels were fired upon, as expected, by a formerly British fort now controlled by runaway slaves and called “Negro Fort,” LTC Duncan Clinch destroyed the fort with a barrage of cannon fire from his gunboats, including “hot shot” that hit a powder magazine. In 1817, border incidents continued with Spain powerless to restrain the Seminoles and Seminole tribes refusing to abide by the terms of the Fort Jackson treaty. In November 1817, when Maj David Twiggs attempted to bring in Mikasuki chief Neamathla, the ensuing fight initiated the beginning of what became the First Seminole War.

The Seminoles struck back after the attack and burning of Neamathla’s Fowltown by ambushing and massacring a resupply party on the Apalachicola River that included soldiers’ wives. The War Department’s initial response on 2 December 1817 was that “it was not politic to enter Spanish territory to chastise the Seminoles.”21 When John C. Calhoun became the Secretary of War a week later, he gave BG Gaines permission to cross into Spanish territory and “carry retribution to the savages” as long as they did not take refuge in a Spanish fortress, and directed MG Jackson to “take command in person and bring the Seminoles under control.”22 Jackson was directed not to take possession of any Spanish towns or forts so as not to jeopardize negotiations then being conducted between the U.S. and Spain.23

Jackson’s Campaign against the Seminoles and Spanish Florida

Jackson’s campaign was delayed getting started from Fort Gadsden (erected at the site of the Negro Fort) for two months due to an inefficient supply system (mainly a failure of operational contract support), lack of adequate geographic knowledge of the area and few guides. Once started, Jackson destroyed Mikasuki towns and broke the strength of Seminole resistance while simultaneously scouring the countryside for supplies. He reported that the Spanish were supporting the Indians and he forced the surrender of St. Marks in April 1818. Jackson’s letter to the Spanish commander there stated, “To chastise a savage foe, who, combined with a lawless band of Negro brigands, have for some time past been carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United States, has compelled the President to direct me to march my army into Florida.”24

Jackson continued his movements to contact, attacking and burning towns and seizing crops and cattle. At “Bowleg’s Town” on the Suwannee River, Jackson captured and subsequently hung two “British adventurers from the Bahamas” that had been instigating the Indians against the Americans.25 With these victories, Jackson returned to Fort Gadsden. The next month Jackson captured Pensacola with the following justification: “The immutable laws of self-defense, therefore, compelled the American government to take possession of such parts of the Floridas in which
Spanish authority could not be maintained. Pensacola was found in this situation, and will be held until Spain can furnish military strength sufficient to enforce existing treaties.”26 As part of the terms of capitulation, Jackson offered full military honors, transport to Cuba, property rights, religious toleration and free trade. Jackson’s maneuvers provided the Madison administration diplomatic cover and the leverage it needed to force a treaty with Spain, the Adams-Onis treaty of 1919, which acquired Florida and defined the southern border of the United States all the way to the Pacific Ocean.

Seminole Containment and Slavery

After the treaty with Spain, Congress immediately downsized and reorganized the Army and MG Jackson was “RIF’d” (reduction in force) out of the service. “Old Hickory” had upset too many in the Madison administration and Congress with his brand of foreign policy; as a sop, he was named the first Governor of the Territory of Florida. The treaty took two years to be ratified, and the transfer of land from Spain to the U.S. created many land title issues. The Seminoles occupied the land that was transferred but did not participate in the negotiations. Jackson recommended that the Seminoles be concentrated along the Apalachicola River near the borders of Alabama and Georgia, and sealed off from trade with Cuba. His goal was containment of the Seminoles away from white settlements and away from the line of communication between Pensacola and St. Augustine.27

Jackson resigned in October 1821 and William P. Duval was commissioned to be Territorial Governor. The Seminoles were hesitant to plant crops because they feared the white men would take their lands, and Duval requested that the War Department increase their allowance for food, but his longer-term solution was to send the Seminoles west of the Mississippi. After Florida was organized as a territory, land speculation became rampant and white settlers moved in, bringing with them African slaves and a hunger for Indian land.28 “Slave catchers and strife followed, and by 1823 the Seminoles were eager to sign a treaty guaranteeing them a refuge in central Florida.”29 President Monroe said the Seminoles must either be moved out of Florida or moved to a smaller area. If the Seminoles were moved out of Florida it would reduce the tendency for slaves to seek sanctuary in Seminole areas. But the government had yet to identify lands west of the Mississippi River for that purpose.

Treaty of Moultrie Creek and Establishment of the Reservation

In September 1822, the Seminole bands selected Neamathla to represent them in negotiations at Moultrie Creek (a few miles south of St. Augustine) for a reservation within Florida. In the Moultrie Creek Treaty, the Seminoles surrendered all claim to land in Florida except for the reservation which comprised about four million acres between the latitude of Tampa Bay and the Caloosahatchee River further south. The reservation would be no closer than 20 miles to the coast, and the Seminoles would try to prevent concentrations of runaway slaves from forming in their area. In return, the U.S. would protect law-abiding Indians, keep unauthorized white men off of the reservation, and provide subsidies for livestock, equipment and an annuity for 20 years, among other incentives. When the Senate ratified the treaty in December of 1823, the Indians that moved became the responsibility of Governor Duval, and he now had to feed daily over 1500 Seminoles.
The War Department sent LTC George Brooke to establish a military post on the flank of the reservation in the vicinity of Tampa Bay.

The Seminoles argued that the reservation would not sustain them, and it was enlarged in 1824, but this did not reduce the settler and Indian interactions. Duval could not stop the Indians from spending their annuity on alcohol or enforce the law to keep shopkeepers from selling it to them. As the 1 October 1824 deadline passed for all Indians west of the Suwannee to be on the reservation, more Seminoles were off the reservation than on it. On 27 January 1825, President Monroe sent a message to the Senate saying that an area west of Arkansas should be made into Indian Territory, and Indians would receive these lands in exchange for lands they would lose in the east. Another temporary expansion of the Seminole reservation was approved in December 1825; each expansion generated lawsuits due to Spanish land titles that had transferred with the Adams-Onis Treaty.

Management of the Reservation

Drought and other food supply problems caused the Seminoles to leave the reservation in search of food. The government-issued rations were expensive and state-issued currency was depreciated by Federal banks. The government rations were insufficient to live on and Seminoles were starving to death. It was easier to raid existing farms and cattle than to plant food and raise their own. By late 1826, there had been so many requests to place soldiers closer to the reservation that the War Office decided to open a second post, “Cantonment King,” and Duval placed it in the vicinity of the Indian Agency near Silver Springs (just outside present day Ocala). The Florida Legislature passed several measures in early 1827 to stop the atrocities against white settlements and prohibit whites from trespassing on the reservation or trading with the Seminoles. In January 1827, the federal government centralized military control by making COL Clinch the commander of regular military forces in Florida. In 1828 Brevet MG Winfield Scott attempted to close Cantonment King, but Floridians protested and Scott’s order was overruled until a new General of the Army, MG Alexander Macomb, agreed with him and closed it in 1829. Brevet BG Clinch protested, but Macomb said, “I cannot see that any danger can be apprehended from the miserable Indians who inhabit the peninsula of Florida.” Fort King would be resurrected in 1832.

Jackson’ Election and Slavery Issues

With Jackson’s election in November 1828, Indian removal continued to gain momentum. From Jackson’s perspective of the problem, the only way to save the Indians from annihilation within the states was to remove them from those states and put them outside of state jurisdiction. After the Indian Removal Act was signed in May 1830, Congress appropriated $500,000 to do whatever was required to move the Indians. As 1831 proceeded, starving Indian bands preyed upon white herds and supplies. There were also numerous fugitive slave settlements among the Seminoles. White settlers were to be given opportunities to identify their runaway slaves and pay the territorial government for repatriation. The problem was that both sides, Seminole and white, held slaves belonging to the other. The Seminoles continued to deliver runaways to their former owners, but Floridians still felt they were holding back. The Seminoles grew to believe that the whites intended to take away all of their slaves.
Treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson

In January 1832, the War Department appointed James Gadsden to negotiate with the Seminoles to relocate to Indian Territory. Gadsden had built Fort Gadsden during the First Seminole War and was a commissioner during the Moultrie Creek treaty negotiations. He had also conducted the survey to define the boundaries of the reservation and commented on the fugitive slave settlements. Gadsden’s talking points were that the government could not continue to feed the Seminoles year after year and that the Seminoles would prefer life west of the Mississippi compared to a harsher situation in Florida. The treaty stated that the Seminoles would send seven of their chiefs to inspect the lands west of the Mississippi, and “should they be satisfied with the character of that country, and of the favorable disposition of the Creeks to reunite with the Seminoles as one people” then a deal would be binding. Little is known directly of the meeting except that the chiefs signed the treaty at Payne’s Landing. Later, the chiefs would claim that they did not sign the treaty or that their marks were forged, and that a key sentence was deliberately mistranslated to ensure that the Seminoles would agree to go.

In March 1833, a treaty at Fort Gibson, Arkansas Territory was signed by the seven chiefs, which indicated that they were satisfied with the land and the Seminoles would move as soon as the government could make the arrangements. A dispute arose over whether the Seminole chiefs actually signed the treaty, or if they did sign were they coerced. President Jackson submitted the Treaty of Payne’s Landing and the Treaty of Fort Gibson to the Senate after the Seminoles signed the latter treaty; with Senate ratification in April 1834, the Seminoles had three years to relocate. The Seminoles argued that the Treaty of Moultrie Creek was still in effect, giving them at least nine more years on the land and annuities. This impasse would lead ultimately to war.

Road to War

In August 1833, former Congressman and Major General of Georgia Militia, Wiley Thompson, was named Indian Agent. In December 1833, Thompson took charge of the Indian Agency near Fort King. He assessed that the most influential group was the Indian-Negroes, who “had everything to lose and nothing to gain by a change, and their influence over their “masters” was decisive.” Thompson received an appropriation to distribute the annuity and pay claims to the Indians, mainly for stolen slaves. Final removal of the Indians was projected for spring 1835. At a meeting with the Seminoles in October 1834, Thompson observed that the Seminoles did not waste the annuity on alcohol but bought a larger-than-normal share of powder and ball. The Seminoles pushed back against relocating, and Osceola took center stage in rejecting the treaties and asserting Seminole claims to the land. When these reports reached Jackson, he directed that military forces be sent to protect the citizens and enforce the treaty. BG Clinch was given central command in Florida and Fort Brooke was reactivated.

By early 1835 it was clear that the Indians did not want to move. Among the sticky issues was the ownership of Indian-Negroes. Slave holders lobbied the President – could the federal government buy the slaves? This could solve the problem of black influence over the Indians and remove the potential
problem of the Creek Indians in the new Indian Territory taking the Seminoles’ slaves. Governor John Eaton, who replaced Duval in April 1834, reported that “if force was used against them they would fight. Should the government decide on violence, he recommended a ‘strong imposing force,’ not volunteers.” BG Clinch requested more forces and the timing of Seminole removal was left up to the officers on the ground. ‘Previous plans for removal had gone awry so often that the agent and the general were authorized to delay it as late as spring 1836.’

In March 1835 Thompson read a letter from President Jackson, “the Great White Father,” to the Seminoles telling them that they must move as they had promised.

...If you listen to the voice of friendship and truth, you will go quietly and voluntarily. But should you listen to the bad birds that are always flying about you, and refuse to move, I have then directed the commanding officer to remove you by force. This will be done. I pray the Great Spirit, therefore, to incline you to do what is right.

Your Friend
A. Jackson

In April, key Seminole leaders refused to sign a document acknowledging that the Treaty of Payne’s Landing was valid and Thompson removed their names from the list of chiefs. In June, Thompson humiliated Osceola by throwing him in chains and making him certify that the treaty was binding. With the increasing violence, Thompson forbade the sale of ammunition to the Seminoles. In July, Jackson endorsed a rule that prohibited unauthorized persons from entering the reservation. In August, Army courier PVT Kinsley Dalton was scalped and disemboweled on a mail run between Fort King and Fort Brooke. In October, the War Department rejected BG Clinch’s request for mounted volunteer militia to “prevent the continuous and dangerous intercourse between the Seminole-Negroes and the slaves on the plantations.” In November, Osceola murdered Charley Emathla, a Seminole chief who was planning to move to the west. Other Seminoles who agreed to move west were camped at Fort Brooke, and the post commander provided food for these 500 displaced persons. Communication between Fort King and Fort Brooke was effectively broken, and Governor Eaton enlisted 500 horsemen under MG Richard Call (western Florida militia commander) and 250 under COL John Warren of Jacksonville.

The Dade Massacre and beginning of the Second Seminole War

December 1835 was a month a chaos and tragedy. On 7 December, a mounted scouting party rode through a hammock and was ambushed. On 18 December, a wagon train was ambushed by Osceola. On 20 December, militia scouts located the hostile Indians and dispersed them. During Christmastime many east coast sugar plantations were wrecked, and by the end of the year the entire industry was destroyed. The Indians were roaming freely and whites crowded into settled areas and near the forts. MG Call reported that whites had deserted the area from the Suwannee River to the St. Johns River for 50 miles north of the Indian boundary.

With the growing violence attributed to the Mikasukis, BG Clinch decided to attack them at the forks of the Withlacoohee River, hoping “it would drive terror among the timid and wavering, and perhaps effectually silence the efforts of others in creating disaffection among them.” Clinch
repositioned five companies from Fort King to Fort Drane (site of his plantation) and ordered two companies from Fort Brooke to move to Fort King.

On 23 December Brevet Major Francis Dade led the two companies from Fort Brooke toward Fort King. Tracked by Seminoles the entire way, on the morning of 28 December, 40 miles south of Fort King, Dade’s column was caught in ambush and 105 out of 108 soldiers (including eight officers) were killed in the day-long battle. “Only when they had withdrawn did a swarm of Negroes come to kill the wounded and loot the dead.” The same day, Osceola led a war party to Fort King to riddle Wiley Thompson with bullets and take his hair. Halpatter Tustenuggee (aka war chief Alligator) said the Seminoles had worked on this plan for a year. The Seminoles would resist removal by terrorizing the Florida countryside with raids and atrocities, assassinating the Indian Agent, and “strik[ing] an effective blow at the meager American force.”

Even before the nearly simultaneous massacre and assassination, regular Army forces under BG Clinch were committing to take the fight to the Seminoles. On 24 December, Clinch’s force was joined by Call’s mounted territorial volunteers, whose term of service ended 1 January 1836. It is certain that they did not know of Dade’s fate, and it is not clear that they knew about Thompson’s, regardless, on 29 December 1835, BG Clinch began his movement to attack the Seminole stronghold. After putting his regular force across the Withlacoochee using a single leaky canoe and leaving the mounted volunteers on the other side of the river, the Seminoles, led by Osceola, attacked the regulars and Clinch was forced to execute a hasty defense and withdrawal to Fort Drane. Dr. John Mahon made the following assessment of the result:

*This battle probably did more harm than good. First, it created in the army the erroneous impression that the Indians could be brought to the fight in large groups, more or less white-style. Second, it gave the savages confidence in the leadership of Osceola. Finally, when the column withdrew without trying to strike at Seminole settlements, the Indians reached the conclusion that they could stop any white force.*

**Subsequent Operations in the Florida Theater, 1836**

The Jackson administration, Congress, territorial and military leaders took various actions to address the problem. Secretary of War Lewis Cass gave BG Clinch permission to call up the state militia and arranged for the cooperation of three Revenue Cutters from the Treasury Department. While not declaring “war,” Congress appropriated money in increasing amounts to fund the growing contingency operations, and the Adjutant General reported that the War Department, “perhaps under the influence of the President, was determined to protect the property of slaveholders. No terms would be offered to the hostiles...as long as one slave belonging to a white man remained among the Seminoles.” The Florida legislature increased the size of the militia, instituting a draft in counties with a low number of volunteers. In addition to requests for patrols by the West Indies Squadron of the Navy, on 19 January, 1LT Nathaniel Waldron, USMC, departed Pensacola for Fort Brooke with 57 Marines. The combat zone in Florida overlapped two areas of responsibility, and SecWar Cass ordered MG Winfield Scott, commander of the Eastern Department, to
take command of the Florida Theater – his strategic guidance was specific: “he might not open negotiations with the Indians until he had first reduced them to unconditional surrender.”

Meanwhile, MG Edmund Gaines, commander of the Western Department, upon hearing of Dade’s battle in his area of responsibility, proceeded to raise volunteers and embark on transports from New Orleans to Tampa.

**Gaines’s Operation: February – March 1836**

MG Gaines’s operational idea was to move to Tampa with maximum combat power, retrace Dade’s march, and seek contact with and destroy the Seminoles. While enroute to Fort Brooke, Gaines received orders from SecWar Cass directing him to proceed to the border with Texas and take command (the Alamo battle will occur two months later), but Gaines continued on to Tampa. On 20 February, Gaines found the massacre site, and proceeded to Fort King and then Fort Drane for supplies. Gaines departed Fort Drane for Fort Brooke via BG Clinch’s battlefield and made contact with approximately 1100 Seminoles. Surrounded, MG Gaines sought assistance from BG Clinch at Fort Drane: Gaines would fix the Seminoles and Clinch would take them in the flank. MG Scott ordered Clinch not to relieve Gaines’s force; this contributed to an already-fierce rivalry between the two generals. The Seminoles had started a parley with Gaines when Clinch, acting on his own authority to relieve Gaines, surprised the Seminoles and caused them to disperse.

**Scott’s Operation: March – April 1836**

MG Scott viewed Gaines’s uncoordinated offensive as disruptive to his elaborate campaign plan, especially Gaines’s force eating up Scott’s rations. Scott’s operational idea was to envelop the Seminoles from three directions in a tightly synchronized pincers, compressing and then destroying them near the Cove of the Withlacoochee so that they did not escape to the south. This effort failed for a variety of reasons, including Scott’s grounding in Napoleonic tactics and doctrine. Next, based on naval intelligence that the Seminoles had escaped to the south, he sent columns there to move to contact. On 21 May, Scott was directed by SecWar Cass to pick up the offensive in Alabama against resurgent hostile Creeks. After a month of discussions about who should next command the theater, Governor Call was given command.
Call's Operations: September – November 1836

On 16 March 1836, Richard K. Call was confirmed by the Senate to be the Territorial Governor of Florida. He had served as a regular army officer for eight years before becoming a lawyer and general of Florida militia in 1823. A friend and former roommate of Jackson’s, Call sold Jackson on a concept to defeat the Seminoles in a summer campaign. On 21 June, Call was given operational command: “Rarely before had a civil governor been given command of a field army made up, not only of his own militia, but of militia from other states and units of the regular army.” Call’s operational idea involved operating from four logistics hubs close to the Seminole stronghold to seek decisive battle and quick victory. Due to delays in receiving sufficient troops and sustainment, his initial effort to bring the Seminoles to battle failed. After reconstituting his force, his second operation also culminated in failure despite heavy contact with the Seminoles. Jackson’s stinging criticism of Call created an estrangement between them, and Call relinquished command to MG Thomas Jesup on 9 December 1836.

Second Seminole War – The End of the Beginning

The Second Seminole War historical case presents opportunities to practice joint doctrine’s design methodology and glean examples of elements of operational design. From BG Clinch’s initial attack into the Cove of the Withlacoochee River to MG Gaines’s marching to the sound of the guns, and MG Scott’s textbook doctrinal approach to Governor Call’s repeated efforts for quick decisive victory, the leaders attempted to implement national policy through military action. The commanders demonstrated, to varying degrees, the current CJCS’s desired leader attributes. Their understanding of strategic direction guided their actions even as the operational environment changed through the year of 1836. Their operational approaches reflected different conceptions of the problem they faced. But it was MG Jesup who saw the war in a fundamentally different light: “this…is a negro, not an Indian war.” The tide of war seemed to change for the better when MG Jesup began operations in late December 1836.

Unfortunately, after MG Jesup, the war would continue under the commands of BG Zachary Taylor, BG Walker Armistead and COL William Worth, until changes in political leadership and policy, legislation and public support, and Seminole attrition enabled COL Worth to declare the war at an end on 14 August 1842. The problems of Indian removal did not go away in 1842, however…in 1855 a Third Seminole War was fought, concluding in 1858 on the eve of the American Civil War.

The doctrine of the time may have adversely affected the creativity required to address the complex problem represented by Seminole removal. The general officers in the Florida Theater had not attended the U.S. Military Academy, although most of the junior officers had. Many of the general officers had been in fights with the Indians before, while most of the junior officers and enlisted men had not been trained in Indian fighting, which was one of Jackson’s criticisms of the professional standing army. Major Leigh Read of the Florida militia publicly criticized MG Scott, who had been studying Napoleonic doctrine and producing army manuals since 1815, for applying “the shreds and patches of the obsolete system of European tactics where they could not possibly work.” If the leaders in 1836 had been familiar with current joint doctrine,
would they have used it? Would it have mattered?

The Tao of the Alternative View

A goal of joint professional military education phase II is for joint field grade and senior officers to think critically and creatively, analytically and synthetically, at the operational level of war and higher. A concern is that students are mired in a service-centric, tactical-level mindset, and for some students, breaking out of that paradigm is difficult business. Another concern is that leaders who will operate at the operational level may not be creative enough to “embrace ambiguity” because their thinking is constrained by adherence to joint doctrine. Is it true that the language of doctrine prevents development of extra-doctrinal conceptualizations and frames? Do we develop these concepts outside of doctrine, or in spite of doctrine? If performance on JPME II pre-course assessments is a valid indicator, this concern is unwarranted. Student thinking is not constrained by joint doctrine because they do not know the joint doctrine. Students do have a tactical bias, based on their experiences; this is the paradigm that JPME II seeks to break using historical cases such as the Second Seminole War. Officers have not had the time or inclination to read and reflect on joint doctrine (“it’s only a lot of reading if you do it”). In their joint assignments, they have not had to find the best practices unless an emergent situation calls for it or they will be teaching it to others. Officers are seldom able to complete the doctrinal and other reading assignments, and reflect on them, in the manner intended by the JPME II institutions; this is borne out by years of post-course student surveys.

An interesting result of this shallow treatment of doctrine is that because the students do not know the joint doctrine and are not wedded to it, the joint doctrine actually challenges their institutional service-centric tactical-level paradigms. Joint doctrine (and by extension, joint education) provides an alternative frame of reference to challenge what they have learned at the tactical level. Students are not constrained by the language of doctrine because they do not know the doctrine. A few more generalizations: where Army and Marine officers may know service doctrine, to the extent that joint doctrine differs from service doctrine, joint doctrine provides an alternative viewpoint. The Army and Air Force officers experience this when trying to understand the role of “conditions” or “effects” as elements of operational design. Joint doctrine developers attempt a synthesis of service doctrines through the consensus development of joint doctrine; however, there are internal logical inconsistencies in the doctrine which carry over into operational decision-making.

Joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0, struggle to synthesize current best practices and legacy (“institutional”) time-tested principles such as the integration of joint functions, elements of operational design, and principles of joint operations. One source of friction is the juxtaposition of the paradigm of “ends, ways and means” with the abductive reasoning that is required in a complex world. Doctrine is goal-oriented and depends heavily on the relationship of action to result, cause and effect. Current joint doctrine provides a glimpse into this challenge when it states: “The proximate cause of effects in complex situations can be difficult to predict. Even direct effects in these situations can be more difficult to create, predict, and measure, particularly when they relate to moral and cognitive issues (such as religion and the “mind of the adversary,” respectively).
Indirect effects in these situations often are difficult to foresee. At the philosophical level, this relates to issues of teleology, ontology and epistemology. The logic that manifests itself in joint doctrine describes a tension between an Aristotelian perspective of cause and effect and a Heraclitian perspective of constant flow and change. Joint doctrine may be leaning more toward Heraclitus as it emphasizes “red teaming” and says things like:

...the commander must empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine if modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation. This requires continuous assessment and reflection that challenge understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem.

Is joint doctrine the right venue, or Joint Publication 5-0 the best place, for explicating the philosophy and theory behind operational design? If so, is the description of operational design sufficient?

...you showed students a guitar, showed them a few cords, let them strum a few minutes and now they are going to walk out the door thinking they are musicians. Those of us who depend on OD [operational design] for planning on a daily basis will now have to deal with the monsters you have created for the rest of our careers. And since they passed a test...there will be no way to convince them.

The problem is not necessarily the well-intentioned attempt to infuse Joint Publication 5-0 with more design-oriented aspects. This has been a trend since 2006, when mission analysis included some design elements, to 2011, when these elements and mission analysis were broken out more discretely. The real issue is that legacy terms like the elements of operational design reflect an older logic that no longer fits contemporary conditions. Concepts like conflict termination are arguably more important than ever, yet seem to have dissipated in the current doctrine. The continuing cottage industry of debate about “center of gravity” in deliberate planning for contingencies and theater campaign planning reflects a discontinuity that begs for appropriate synthesis. “Lines of operation” are giving way to “lines of effort” that reflect a transition from an older logic geared toward linearity to a newer logic that acknowledges non-linearity. The Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, developed to complement Joint Publication 5-0’s efforts, highlights the paradigmatic conflict with its attempt to write “effects” out of the vernacular and blurs the distinction between conditions, objectives and end states. Historical cases such as the Second Seminole War are developed to teach the elements of operational design; to the extent that effort is successful, paradoxically, the risk of constrained creativity may be increased.

What should cause more concern is where the institutional paradigm of doctrine is really in force: within the cadre of JPME II instructors. JPME II instructors seldom have actually used joint doctrine, except when they teach it. The group that may be most constrained by doctrine is the civilian educators, those who retired from active duty military jobs teaching joint doctrine and now teach it as civilians. They may have the most difficult time breaking out of the paradigm. One challenge is the requirement to produce a JPME II-certificated officer on an assembly-line model that tends toward a vocational emphasis vice an educational emphasis and yields “products.” All is not lost on the
front line of instructors, however; these instructors, through years of experience teaching new students, have generally become masters of their craft. This mastery enables them to step outside of the joint doctrinal paradigm and look at situations from different perspectives. If the purpose of operational design is to create better understanding, and the Tao of design is to look, deliberately, at situations differently in order to increase that understanding, to the point of uncovering problems with the structure of thinking about situations at a theoretical level, it is these instructors who will lead the way to determine the appropriate relationship between doctrine and design, consistency and creativity.

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3 (“Self-Reliance” 1847)
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15 (“President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison: February 27, 1803” 2000)
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32 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 67)
33 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 61)
34 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 75)
35 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 76)
36 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 76)
37 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 67)
38 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 76)
39 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 67)
40 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 94)
41 (Jackson, ”Message to the Seminoles” 1836)
42 (Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, Florida, 28 December 1835 2013, 31)
43 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 99)
44 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 1967, 102)
45 (The War in Florida: Being an Exposition of It’s causes, and an Accurate History of the Campaigns of Generals Clinch, Gaines and Scott 1836, 99)
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Project the False and Protect the Real: Deceiving Hitler in FORTITUDE SOUTH

By CDR Michael M. Posey

Operations Security (OPSEC) is often relegated to an afterthought. Do not leave your security badge on outside the building. Do not throw personally identifiable information in the trash. Do not discuss deployment information at the bus stop. Through ubiquitous training, have we lost our understanding of the tenets of OPSEC? Have we taken a discipline designed to blind and deafen our adversary and turned it into standard operating procedure (SOP) while ignoring its value at the operational level? When paired with deception, the value of OPSEC as a complementary discipline becomes evident. Through the most complex and successful case study of deception, FORTITUDE SOUTH, we can see how the Allies applied proactive OPSEC as countermeasures to operational vulnerabilities.

FORTITUDE SOUTH, the WWII operation designed to convince Hitler that an Allied invasion of Europe would land at Pas de Calais instead of Normandy, was one of the most successful military deceptions (MILDEC) in history. However, it could not have occurred without the essential secrecy afforded through strict OPSEC. FORTITUDE SOUTH not only set favorable conditions for the initial “D-Day” landing on June 6, 1944, but the operation convinced the Germans that the Normandy invasion was just a feint while the main attack would occur several weeks later at Pas de Calais. MILDEC planners often study FORTITUDE SOUTH as a classic example of an ambiguity-decreasing military deception, which caused the adversary to be increasingly certain, decisive, and grossly incorrect about the friendly course of action. However, it is also a textbook example of how planners can combine the disciplines of MILDEC and OPSEC by emphasizing and protecting key indicators. Control of indicators, bits of information that can be pieced together to create evidence of friendly actions, proved instrumental in selling the deception story to Hitler and his German high command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Actual Allied disposition of forces and intentions were proactively guarded. OPSEC played a vital role in ensuring that only the desired, misleading indicators, like the existence of the fabricated one-million soldier-strong 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) were presented to Hitler, while actual invasion preparations remained hidden. By carefully projecting certain indicators using various MILDEC means, and protecting others with carefully controlled OPSEC measures, the Allies were able to shape Hitler’s perception of the operational environment, causing him to misallocate resources, notably keeping the Fifteenth Army fixed at Pas de Calais. Hoodwinking Hitler required the Allies to correctly portray false indicators while protecting key truthful indicators.

An indicator is information that is characteristic of an activity. Adversaries piece indicators together like puzzle pieces to create evidence of friendly activities,
intentions, or capabilities. Vulnerabilities exist when adversary decision makers gain the initiative based on the indicators they can piece together, process, analyze, and subsequently act upon in a timely manner. However, by sowing the seeds of deception, indicators can become a friendly advantage. How? Uncertainty pervades all military operations because it is impossible to gather enough information in time to create certainty. Human beings, being unable to understand the entire complex, real environment, must create situational awareness, or representative pictures in our minds by “selecting, rearranging, tracing patterns upon and stylizing” key bits of information, e.g. indicators. As such, friendly decision makers must vigilantly ensure the right intelligence exists to build a picture of the adversary so that friendly forces can plan and conduct operations. For example, without ULTRA, the Top Secret decryption tool that allowed the Allies to decipher the German’s technical communications, Allied forces would have been unable to assess FORTITUDE SOUTH’s effectiveness as they executed the deception. Likewise, by controlling indicators, friendly forces can exploit an adversary’s imperfect picture of the operational environment. This proves especially useful when friendly forces know an adversary decision maker’s pre-existing biases well enough to ensure he sees what he is predisposed to already believe.

In this case, Hitler was predisposed to believe the Allies would attack at the Pas de Calais. He believed its beaches to be ideal for an amphibious assault, being closest to the British shore. Additionally, Hitler knew success at Calais would allow the Allies to quickly advance to Berlin via Paris, a mirror-image of how Hitler advanced west. OPSEC and MILDEC both seek to limit the adversary’s ability to derive useful information by observing friendly activities, and disrupting the adversary’s decision-making process. OPSEC protects certain indicators “to create an information vacuum” that can be filled with deception. Examining FORTITUDE SOUTH, one can see how the Allies misled the adversarial military decision maker, Hitler, to believe the deception story.

FORTITUDE SOUTH’s deception story suggested that Allied forces would invade Pas de Calais in July. The Allies created the imaginary FUSAG, led by the swashbuckling, well-respected Patton, through a variety of MILDEC means. These transmission means included double agents, part of the Twenty Committee (or Double Cross, XX Committee) whose agents fed the Germans misinformation. One XX member, Von Loop, informed the Germans of the influx of U.S. soldiers, all phantom, into Dover. Another double agent, Popov, gave German intelligence the FUSAG’s order of battle. The most famous of all the double agents, Garcia, known by his codename GARBO, fed the Abwehr the actual date and time of OVERLORD’s amphibious assault, yet did so too late for the Germans to act upon it. With his credibility established, GARBO’s future messages misled the OKW to believe that the Normandy invasion was merely an Allied feint. Additionally, pictures of British officials visiting the area along with letters about women in Southern England corrupted by foreign troops were “leaked” to local British newspapers that eventually made their way to the German high command through neutral ports like Lisbon.

The Allies furthered the masquerade by visualizing every way the FUSAG could be observed by German intelligence and providing visual and auditory indicators of its existence. They filled the electromagnetic
They created tent cities, used smoke machines to simulate cooking, and constructed a staggering number of false tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft—creating the most costly, in economic terms, MILDEC in history. They crafted sound tracks played through loudspeakers that filled the air with a cacophony of action. During the night, the Allies used deceptive lighting to further their ruse. Additionally, the Allies employed a version of “detainee seeding” to the ailing, unwitting Nazi General Cramer, who was being released from Britain to Germany. General Cramer toured southwestern England, the actual Allied staging area, while his “talkative and friendly” British escorts “carelessly” told him they were driving past Dover and seeing the FUSAG. The ruse continued, even during D-Day. As the assault ships bound for Normandy set sail, a large-scale diversion headed for Pas de Calais used overhead chaff, false radio transmissions, and enough dummy ships to concoct two “ghost armadas” as the MILDEC means to overwhelm and confuse German radar operators. To confuse the Germans further, the size of the false FUSAG was equal in size to the actual invasion force.

Leveraging these MILDEC means, the deception goal of FORTITUDE SOUTH was to mask the real invasion of Normandy on D-Day, increasing OPERATION OVERLORD’s probability of success. Success of the invasion on Fortress Europe hinged on the deception objective: the German Fifteenth Army remaining fixed at Pas de Calais for several days to allow the Allied invasion force to land amphibiously and be resupplied. FORTITUDE SOUTH efforts continued for over a week, until Hitler realized the ruse and moved the Fifteenth Army south from Pas de Calais. As Hitler dictated complete command of all Nazi forces, specifically the Panzer tank divisions, he was the deception target for FORTITUDE SOUTH. Although many of these deception means would be uncovered by today’s technology, like space-based intelligence assets, the Allies considered the capabilities of German reconnaissance and applied OPSEC measures accordingly.

OPSEC supported the deception story by ensuring that unclassified information, in the form of indicators, remained protected from “Hitler’s eyes,” German intelligence. One OPSEC measure was air defense. Fighters allowed German reconnaissance missions to fly over the FUSAG at high altitudes to see the elaborate visual display (not at low altitudes where details could be seen) while Allied fighter aircraft vigorously intercepted any German aircraft flying over the actual staging grounds and ports in southwest England. To protect the invasion location, the Allies conducted twice as many bombing and reconnaissance missions over Pas de Calais as they did over Normandy. Neither the pilots flying these missions nor the soldiers who would storm the French beaches were told where the actual invasion would occur. The soldiers were issued ambiguous maps and confined to their sausages (staging areas) before the invasion. The Allied soldiers’ French “invasion money,” which could have let the German’s know of an impending invasion, was not given out until just a few days prior. By not disclosing invasion specifics to the troops, the Allies mitigated the risk of accidental disclosure. For the same reason, while simulated radio communications blared in the vicinity of the FUSAG, the actual sausages for the invasion were on radio silence. The Allies even tailed Eisenhower’s alleged “fling,” Ms. Kay Summersby, as part of the effort to ensure no one disclosed the deception plans. Finally, the Allies needed to keep quiet about the intentions of
man-made harbors that would resupply the invasion force until a major port could be taken. By not adding any tell-tale resupply paraphernalia to the makeshift Mulberry harbors, the Germans interpreted the giant concrete blocks at sea to be anti-aircraft staging areas.\textsuperscript{28} If the Germans knew the true purpose of these structures, it would be an indicator of the Allies’ actual invasion plans. Other security protocols were enforced alongside OPSEC to achieve essential secrecy. For instance, physical security placed the entire FUSAG staging area off limits to all civilians. Further, information security demanded the highly vetted, centralized group of MILDEC planners employ electronic “scramblers” on any telephonic communication.\textsuperscript{29} So secret were the identities of MILDEC planners, they referred to themselves as “Bigots” to confuse any Allies without a need to know about the deception, as well as any potential German spies.\textsuperscript{30} While physical and information security aided in protecting the plan, carefully construed OPSEC measures controlled key indicators that would have revealed the Allies’ intentions for FORTITUDE SOUTH to Hitler.

The proactive, operational tasks devised by the Allies during FORTITUDE SOUTH went far beyond the basic OPSEC programmatic-level. Instead, these measures focused on blinding the adversary sensors, controlling adversary conduits, and weaving falsehood into the OKW’s operational picture. In other words, the Allied planners built OPSEC into the operational plan to ensure that Hitler was misdirected during the largest amphibious invasion in history.

FORTITUDE SOUTH hoodwinked Hitler, enabling the successful Allied invasion of Normandy. OPSEC played a vital role in ensuring that only the desired, misleading indicators, were presented to German intelligence, while actual preparation for the invasion remained hidden. Meanwhile, a carefully crafted deception story was conveyed to the German high command by cleverly projecting certain indicators using various MILDEC means. By manipulating and protecting key indicators, the Allies shaped Hitler’s perception of the operational environment. Ultimately, incorrect situational awareness caused the German military leader to misallocate his resources. General Bradley, in an after-action report to General Eisenhower, noted the overwhelming success of FORTITUDE SOUTH in fixing at least 20 German divisions in the vicinity of Pas de Calais,\textsuperscript{31} enabling the Allies to establish a beachhead in Normandy. By controlling the indicators in FORTITUDE SOUTH, the Allies misled Hitler until it was too late to act, creating an operational advantage enabling the successful Allied invasion of Europe.
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Operational Assessment and the Commander’s Decision Cycle

By Mr. Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, and Lt Col Richard Collins

In the 2000 National Football League Draft, Tom Brady was the 199th pick overall. He was the 7th quarterback picked that year. None of the quarterbacks picked before him have demonstrated the leadership and capabilities he has through his career; in fact, only two of those six are still in the league today and those as back-ups. Why did Tom Brady go so low in the draft yet his subsequent performance clearly demonstrated that he was the best quarterback available? The pre-draft report stated he had a poor build and was very skinny. Even after gaining 16 pounds since the end of his senior season at Michigan, the report said he looked frail and lacked physical stature and strength. It further stated that he could get pushed down easily, lacked the mobility and ability to avoid the rush, lacked a strong arm and a tight spiral, and couldn’t drive the ball down the field. Essentially the teams evaluating Tom Brady looked hard at the statistics, what we refer to as the Measures of Performance in operational assessment. However, these teams didn’t look at how well he played and how he continually led his team to comeback victories. They failed to base their assessment on the Measures of Effectiveness, another key component in operational assessment.

Operational Assessment is a key input and component of the Joint Force Commander’s Decision Cycle. The operational assessment process helps commanders see a direct linkage between the missions they assign to subordinate commands and the effects and objectives laid out in the plan. The process helps commanders to determine not just if they are doing things right but, more importantly, if they are doing the right things. Commanders can view these assessments against their operational vision and intent to adjust operations to meet their objectives and end state.

Current joint doctrine discusses assessments but provides no defined process or tool for the conduct of these assessments nor does it discuss the requirement to devote resources to the conduct of the assessment. This statement has been reinforced in recent joint publications and articles:

“Planning processes supporting design do not resolve problems identified within today’s assessment practices ...”i and “...the current operational assessment process in joint doctrine is inadequate for the joint force commander to conduct adequate assessment....”ii

Therefore, the current commander’s decision cycle and the operational assessment process must be reassessed to ensure consistent, repeatable assessments.

Background

The word “assessment” means many different things to different people, dependent upon the context. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definitions from Joint Publication 3-0 (Operations):

“1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.”iii

The operational assessment can help the commander know the answers to four critical questions: 1) “Are we meeting our objectives?” 2) “Do we need to change what we are doing tactically to achieve our effects and objectives?” 3) “Do we need to change
what we are measuring & observing to see if our actions are correct?” 4) “Are we nearing the culmination point that allows the Joint Force to disengage, and/or to re-focus our efforts towards different objectives or missions?”

An assessment mechanism built on a defined and repeatable methodology with a mix of observable qualitative and quantitative indicators adds credibility to the process and the product. Both Commander Robert Michael, in his paper: “Effective Operational Assessment: A Return to the Basics”iv and Army Field Manual 5-0 recommend that an effective assessment combines, “…quantitative and qualitative indicators … using informal assessment methods with formal methods.”v

The Assessment Process

Operational assessment is not a new concept; commanders have always sought to understand how well they were progressing towards mission accomplishment so they could either reinforce success or refocus efforts to gain the initiative. As the operational environment has become more complex and the need for integrated military operations has become more prevalent, the assessment process has also become more complex. Normally, the tactical commander can assess operations based upon almost instantaneous feedback from tactical actions, e.g., “did the bomb hit the target?” or “did the force seize the defined objective?”

However, commanders at the operational and strategic levels must look beyond “doing things right” to help determine if their operations are successful. Not only did the bomb hit the target, but by hitting the target the electrical grid was shut down preventing an enemy armored force from moving on railcars to attack a key city. Thus, the city safe from attack, the government protected, and the people and their economic livelihood unthreatened.

The commander’s decision cycle has four distinct steps: Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess (Figure 1).vi Operational assessment is a commander-centric process designed to support the commander’s decision cycle. The process entails three distinct tasks: continuous monitoring of the situation and the progress of operations; evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance to determine progress relative to the mission, objectives, and end states; and developing recommendation/guidance for improvement.

Planning for the Assessment

Operational assessment is a continuous process and requires continual review of the assessment plan—to include validation of the measures and indicators—to provide timely and appropriate feedback to the commander and the planning staff (Figure 2). For the assessment process to support the commander, the assessment must be planned...
for as part of the overall planning process. Assessment planning is normally conducted during the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) by the Joint Planning Group/Operational Planning Team (JPG/OPT). As the JPG/OPT develops the approved objectives and effects for the joint force they will begin to examine how the operation should be assessed. The planning effort lead may direct the formation of Effects Development and Assessment Cells during the planning process. The Effects Development Cell will consider the objectives and develop effects which will help to achieve them; they will also examine and define the undesired effects which may be created in the operation.

During the planning process the Assessment Cell will develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for each of the identified effects (desired and undesired) to determine if actions taken are having an impact (effect) on the system intended. In short, they help determine if the command is “doing the right thing.” Measures of Performance (MOP) are used to determine if tactical actions taken are taken properly. They are a measure of the success of a particular action—i.e., “doing things right.” Typically MOPs are used by the current operations staff (J33) to track successful completion of missions while the MOEs are used by the Assessment Cell to help track progress towards achieving an assigned effect and objective.

OEs measure or identify the trends and should be expressed in terms of increase or decrease. Using this format eliminates the common error of confusing an MOE-Indicator for an MOE at this level. Additionally, MOEs do not measure “Blue” or Coalition actions; they are focused on the system behavior, state or capabilities. When building an assessment, it is important to remember to measure the things that need to be measured, not everything that can be measured. As a general rule of thumb staffs should develop 3-5 MOE per effect.

For each MOE, a set of indicators (MOE-Indicators or MOEI) are developed by the Assessment Cell. These indicators are the “metric” used for a specific activity. The assessment may use a mix of qualitative (opinion based) and quantitative (observation based) indicators. These indicators help to determine if the MOE trend supports achieving the desired effect. The assessment team may also need to find country specific or focus area expertise when selecting indicators to makes sure they are appropriate.

Indicators help identify assessment-based collection requirements and need to be integrated into the collection plan. Forces deployed in the operational environment can help the assessment process by gathering information in their normal observations that help to answer specific indicators. Examples: “# of hospital beds in use at local medical facilities,” “# of hospital beds available for use at local medical facilities,” or “# of local business operating.”

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**ASSESSMENT PLAN STEPS**

| Step 1 | Gather tools and assessment data. |
| Step 2 | Understand current and desired conditions. |
| Step 3 | Develop assessment measures and potential indicators. |
| Step 4 | Develop the collection plan. |
| Step 5 | Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations. |
| Step 6 | Identify feedback mechanisms. |

**Figure 2: Assessment Plan Steps**
These inputs, when compiled with other observations for the same indicator (or coupled with other indicators), help to develop a picture of the environment that serves to show a trend. That trend may support an objective Effect—“Medical facility capabilities are able to provide essential services without US military assistance” or a subjective Effect—“Local government improves the security environment allowing restoration of daily life.” See Figure 3 for the relationship between indicators, MOEs, effects, and objectives. viii

After building the assessment, it is important to periodically revalidate the MOE and MOEI to balance the changing measures with the requirement to establish a consistent measure that follow-on analysis can be based upon. Figure 4 provides a graphic view of how high performance on tactical tasks may not lead to achievement of operational effects and objectives. Conversely, low performance on tactical tasks can still achieve excellent results towards achievement of the effects. Using this example, it becomes apparent where resources are needed or being wasted on tactical tasks. In addition, it depicts the relationship of how the tactical tasks affect overall mission accomplishment and the achievement of the desired effect. Since there is not a direct correlation between performance on tactical tasks and mission accomplishment, the assessment process must look at all aspects of performance to develop an overarching view for the commander.

For the assessment process to support the Commander’s Decision Cycle, resources must be dedicated to development of the assessment framework and to the conduct of the assessment. These resources come from across the staff for the development of the framework and for the tracking of inputs from the indicators and trends for each of the MOE. In addition to staff elements involved in the assessment, other elements within the command will be involved in the process through the indicators.

Organizing for Assessments

There are a number of people from across the command with key roles in the operational assessment process. The most important of these, as stated previously, is the commander. The Commander leverages staff recommendations and inputs as well as subordinate command assessments along with his own circulation across the operating
environment, discussions with the varied stakeholders and his own experience and instincts to formulate his personal assessment of the situation.

The Chief of Staff guides the staff work in the assessment effort to help the commander with his decision making process. Although the quantitative expertise of an operational research officer is critical to the assessment team, a team chief with recent operational experience and a broad operational perspective is necessary to align and guide the assessment activities to support the commander.

Many commands have recognized the importance of broadening stakeholder inputs into the assessment process. Commands have included members of the interagency community, coalition partners, non-governmental organization members, and local representatives to enrich the inputs and quality of the assessment. During the execution phase of operations a cross-functional team from across the staff may need to be brought together to collect the assessment inputs from the assigned indicators, track the trends for the MOEs and formulate the staff’s assessment inputs. This team may have to brief the commander on the recommended assessment inputs and participate in the deficiency analysis to support the “what’s next” discussion with the planning staff.

**Decision Cycle Review**

Presented with the results of the assessment, the Commander provides guidance to the planners to determine the future course of the operation. It is imperative operational and strategic level staffs and commanders recognize when they develop the assessment framework that progress towards achieving the effect may be neither instantaneous nor constant. The trend tracked by the MOE may show continual progress in a positive direction then stall or even temporarily reverse. This does not mean that the joint force is not doing the right thing; it may indicate temporary changes in the environment have stalled progress and the positive trend may begin again.

When the trend analysis indicates the desired effects are being achieved, the commander may direct that actions or tasks continue as planned. When the trend analysis indicates that there is insufficient progress towards achieving desired effects (or that friendly actions are resulting in undesired effects), the assessors may initiate a deficiency analysis with the planners, analysts and relevant subject matter experts that will result in recommendations to the planners and ultimately the commander. The plan may then be adjusted following the recommendations derived from the assessment processes.

**Assessment Capabilities in the Joint Force**

Beginning in 2007, United States Joint Forces Command fielded the Global Synchronization Tool (GST) for use by the combatant commands as an assessment tool. The first operational use of the GST was in the spring of 2008 for the conduct of the Integrated Assessment of Supporting Plans (IASP) conducted by SOCOM to support the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Campaign Assessment (GCA). Each Geographic Combatant Command used GST to facilitate input of its data and rationale in conduct of GWOT in its region. Global analysis of this information led to recommended changes in GWOT planning and operations. The GST continued to evolve to meet the growing need for a robust, global, web-based planning and assessment capability. It soon became the primary assessment tool for Joint Task Force and

The GST was originally designed as a suite of tools to assist planners in developing a systems perspective of the operational environment. The tools would assist the commander in examining likely adversary objectives and to promote consideration of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic actions against key relationships, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the adversarial systems. Since that early development, the tools were later expanded to include the steps of the Joint Operations Planning Process and an operational assessment capability to provide the commander input from multiple sources in formulating his assessment.

The GST was a web-based set of tools, owned by the US Government and hosted on SIPRNET servers at US Joint Forces Command and accessible by all joint commands. Extensive field testing and instruction took place at each of the geographic combatant commands; so much so that the commands began looking for new ways to use GST to assess their plans. On occasion, the GST was loaded onto “stand alone” laptop computers to allow use of the tool in a disconnected, degraded, or coalition environment. xi

Unfortunately, the GST program was cancelled when United States Joint Forces Command was disbanded. Since that time, commands are using internally built Excel spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides to build their assessment frameworks and track the inputs from the indicators to provide assessment recommendations to the Joint Force Commander. These common tools may provide a view for the commander but the development of the product is tied to the capabilities of the individual staff officer, not a repeatable process and format.

Recommendations for Future Assessment Efforts

The Department of Defense should develop a defined and easily understood assessment process that is repeatable across commands, geographic areas and the range of military operations. This process should address both the individual elements of the assessment framework and the requirements for assignment of appropriate resources to build this framework in conjunction with the operational planning process. The personnel assigned to assessment efforts must understand the process, the operational approach, and the specifics of the plan. Assessors need access to the planning team to best understand how the operation is envisioned, and to the commander to relate their findings and recommendations.

To support this process, the Department should field a tool to support the assessment process with the capability to tie together the understanding of the operational environment, the operational planning process, and operational assessments while taking inputs from across the staff and multiple organizations within the joint force. The Global Synchronization Tool, which is already owned by the United States Government and has received significant field testing, could be rapidly activated and fielded for use in the field to support this effort.

Assessments are ultimately a commander’s tool to synchronize efforts across the command and ensure mission success. It should include functionality for both subjective and objective measures as well as the ability to display results via graphical or as a table. This tool must have the ability to conduct operational assessments and merge...
them with higher HQ campaign plan assessments. Plan and assessment integration provides combatant commanders and subordinate commanders a shared and more complete view of their AOR and their operations.

In addition, Robert Michael’s recommendation in “Effective Operational Assessment,” xii highlights key recommendations. Using various historical examples, Michael stresses the following:

- Avoid measuring activities and collecting metrics just because it can be collected; they must be applicable to the operational objectives and desired effects
- Combine quantitative and qualitative indicators
- Use informal assessment methods with formal assessment methods
- Avoid excessive and overly detailed collection of metrics

The main premise of the paper is well captured in the last sentence of this paper: “…the Joint Staff must institutionalize these basic principles in a well-defined process through joint doctrine.”

Conclusion

Assessment is essential to the successful execution of planning since the environment in which the plan was developed is constantly changing. Every operational commander, regardless of level, wants and needs to know how the command is doing in terms of mission accomplishment. The staff should develop a method for collecting information required to provide the commander an assessment recommendation for the operation. The operational assessment is the commander’s view of how the mission is progressing; the commander must make the decision to either continue the operation according to the current plan or to alter the effort in some manner—be that in the tools and organizations used to accomplish tasks in support of the mission or if the mission must be altered.

By building effects and MOEs for each objective, commanders can see a direct linkage to the tasks they assign to subordinate commands. It helps them to determine not just if they are doing things right but, more importantly, if they are doing the right things. Building an assessment on a defined and repeatable method adds credibility to the process and the product. It also gives the Commander confidence in the recommendations received from the staff before making operational decisions.

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iv Michael, 29.
v Ibid.
vi Joint Staff, J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting. Commanders Handbook for Assessment Planning and
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Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown

By COL Jerry A. Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, and LTC Gregory S. Trahan

The operational artist who best applies the key attributes of mission command—understanding, intent, and trust—is more likely to win the day. The United States military is attempting to codify “mission command” into joint doctrine and practice. To those outside of the military or uninformed by history, it may appear that mission command is a new concept based on modern technology and the complexity of the current environment. This is simply a matter of presentism and is unjustified. The truth is that those great captains, throughout history, who have practiced mission command, have largely been successful while those who have not are largely doomed to failure. An analysis of the battle of Yorktown, and the application of mission command by the generals on both sides of the fighting will test this hypothesis.

The current definition of mission command in the Department of Defense simply does not accurately depict current thought on mission command for the Joint Force. The definition is overly simplistic: “The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders.”[1] This type of oversimplification does not get to the heart of mission command and provides little understanding. In addition to the simple definition, JP 3-31 does further describes mission command: As joint land operations tend to become decentralized, mission command becomes the preferred method of C2. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. It empowers individuals to exercise judgment in how they carry out their assigned tasks and it exploits the human element in joint operations emphasizing trust, force of will, initiative, judgment, and creativity. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Orders are focused on the purpose of the operation rather than the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Essential to mission command is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command and a command climate of mutual trust and understanding. Under mission command, commanders issue mission type orders, use implicit communications, and delegate most decisions to subordinates wherever possible.[2]

Although this is a much better description than the DOD definition, the key attributes of mission command are buried under an avalanche of words and ideas on command and control, resources, and sustainment. General Martin Dempsey’s White Paper on Mission Command more effectively lays out the key attributes of mission command. In a few pages, General Dempsey describes the future operational environment, the commander’s role in mission command, the key attributes of mission command, how to instill mission command, and the way ahead. Although all are equally important to understanding mission command, it is really his discussion of the key attributes of mission command that provides the heart of understanding: understanding, intent, and trust.[3] Using these three key attributes of mission command, the Battle of Yorktown is examined.
Mission Command Among the Allies?

The movements and decisions of the Allies (American Colonial, French, and Spanish forces) culminating in the strategic allied victory at Yorktown effectively illustrate the application of the principles of mission command. Even without a unified military command structure, the ability to conduct successful joint operations against the forces of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown was facilitated by the unity of effort of Franco-American forces. By developing a common understanding and shared context of the type of engagement for victory against the British forces, General Washington, and his subordinate leaders, were able to develop a clearly defined intent. Coupled with the careful development of trust among these nations’ military leaders, a time-constrained, yet highly successful joint campaign at Yorktown and in the waters of the Chesapeake Bay and the Virginia Capes occurred. The success of the allies in applying the key attributes of mission command allowed the decentralized execution of a joint operation, which yielded a strategic victory that brought a successful end to the American Revolutionary War.

Understanding

In mission command, a bottom-up and top-down understanding must be obtained through a co-creation of the operational environment. This shared context will set the stage for intent. The Allies worked tirelessly in the lead up to Yorktown to establish a solid shared understanding of their operational environment and operational approach to defeating the British. Critical to the development of understanding was a conscientious effort to meet in person, to use letters to inform each other of changes in situation, to debate strategy, and to converge on an answer that would ultimately align joint efforts for victory. From these deliberations, the Allied leadership gained shared context on the Necessity of Naval Supremacy, the importance of Survival, Timing, and Command and Control.

Necessity of Naval Supremacy. The foundations for the Allied victory at Yorktown in 1781 were being laid as early as 1759 when the French King, upon recommendations of his advisors, set out upon a strategic investment establishing French Naval supremacy. In March of 1759, the Duc de Choiseul wrote in a letter to the French Ambassador to Sweden, “The true balance of power really resides in commerce and in America…” and that naval supremacy and fighting “the true war, the war upon the seas and in America…” was the only way to restore French prestige. His arguments led to an unprecedented investment in building a large, capable French naval force. The return on this investment occurred over two decades later when the leaders of the Allied forces developed a strategy for victory that was completely dependent upon the interruption of Britain’s command of the sea off the coast of America.

Throughout the first five years of the War, the American Revolutionary armies under the command of General Washington executed a strategy of survival, avoiding direct conflict that could result in the complete defeat of the fledgling army. Washington and his generals had a shared understanding that they did not have the forces capable of meeting and defeating the British in a decisive battle. However, while holding these forces together through sheer will and sense of purpose, he continually sought for the right circumstances to win such a decisive battle. Observing the British advantage of maneuver because of their
command of the sea, Washington developed a contextual position that the Allied armies would not prevail until the balance of power at sea could be shifted. Washington considered naval superiority “as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.”

General Marquis de Lafayette echoed this shared understanding in his reports to Comte de Rochambeau, the assigned leader of a French expeditionary force of 6,000 soldiers being sent to America to fight under the direction of General Washington. Lafayette informed the Count that there would be no success until and unless the Allies controlled American waters. In 1780 Lafayette wrote to his French ministers, “Situated and disposed as America now is, it is essential to the interest as well as the honor of France that our flag reign on these seas, that the campaign be decisive, and that it begin next spring…With naval superiority we can do everything, without it we can do nothing…With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America.” The allied leadership agreed that the formula for ultimate victory was a decisive battle that entailed sufficient land forces attacking a British Army blocked from escape by the sea due to Allied naval superiority. While developing a vision for a battle for New York that never took place, Washington and his generals generated a common understanding of how success was to be attained if the circumstances presented the right opportunity.

Survival. While diplomatic efforts to obtain French and Spanish support continued for the first years of the war, General Washington’s ability to convince his generals that survival of the armies was paramount in all engagements enabled the Colonial Armies to survive a series of early setbacks while obtaining the occasional victory against the British. These early victories ultimately provided the French and Spanish Governments reason to believe the Revolution could actually survive and succeed. This belief allowed the French and Spanish to risk supporting the rebel cause in the hopes an American victory would set the British Empire back and restore a balance of power to Europe. Washington was the supreme commander of the colonial armies, but it was extremely difficult for him to exercise his authority over large distances with poor means of communication. As a result, his generals exercised a considerable amount of independent authority based on what today is called mission command.

Setting the example for his generals, Washington led multiple daring escapes that established the shared “can do” mindset among his generals. This mindset ultimately proved vital right up until the siege of Yorktown, when Lafayette used this mindset to avoid a major engagement with superior British forces under Lord Cornwallis in Virginia, while keeping the British landlocked in Yorktown as he awaited the combined forces of Washington and Rochambeau. As Larrabee stated, “…as long as Washington and his army were in the field and not dispersed or annihilated, the core of the independence movement lived and endured; and no amount of British victories in detail could add up to a winning of the war.” This shared principle of survival allowed time to present the opportunity for a decisive victory to the Allied forces.

Time is of the Essence. After over five years of war in which the colonial forces had survived but attained no comparative advantage, the leaders of both the American and French forces started realizing that time was of the essence. In May and June of
1781, the Count de Rochambeau, General of the French armies in America, wrote a pivotal series of letters to his colleague, Admiral de Grasse, operating his French squadron of warships in the Caribbean. In these letters, Rochambeau emphasized the importance of de Grasse’s timely arrival off the East Coast of America and that “the state of affairs and the very grave crisis in which America, and especially the states of the South, finds herself at this particular time. The arrival of M. le Comte de Grasse would save this situation, all the means in our hands are not enough without his joint action and the sea superiority which he is able to command…that the Americans are at the end of their resources…I am quite persuaded that you will bring us naval superiority….”

In late summer, highlighting the importance of this critical window of opportunity, Rochambeau again described the decisive land battle against the British to Admiral de Grasse, and emphasized the British requirement of naval superiority for any chance for success. He offered the Hampton Roads region and New York as options from which de Grasse could choose to establish local maritime superiority and that the Allied land forces would act upon this decision. In subsequent correspondence between de Grasse and the Allied Generals, de Grasse made it clear that he could not stay one day beyond the end of October 1781 due to his higher priority obligations in the West Indies. The stage was now set for a window of opportunity from July to October of 1781 for a decisive battle either in Virginia or New York. This shared understanding of the strategic posture of the Allied forces facilitated a sense of urgency among the Allied leaders to make a decision culminating in a battle at Yorktown.

Command and Control. Following significant struggles with Allied command and control (C2) during the early years of the war, General Washington had established a very clear and orderly C2 structure by 1781. Key to this structure was the voluntary subordination of senior, more experienced French officers to the command of General Washington. Marquis de Lafayette emphasized the importance of this C2 principle when requesting assistance from the French. He asked for “a decided naval superiority for the next campaign” and pointed out the importance of Rochambeau and any other French forces being under Washington’s orders without any accompanying secret instructions. Rochambeau himself made it clear that Washington “may do with him what he pleased.”

This clear C2 structure enabled the leaders to debate, make decisions and efficiently communicate over long distances with slow means of communication to obtain shared understanding of their overall approach to their operations. It also allowed subordinate officers and troops to understand clearly who the decision makers were, freeing them to act when operational decisions were made. French and American allies achieved harmonious teamwork among their leaders in large part due to the way French officers of high rank agreed willingly to accept orders from generals and admirals to whom they were technically superior.

Intent

Once the foundation of common understanding was established, General Washington firmly outlined the commander’s intent for operations prior to and leading up to the Battle of Yorktown. The intent he articulated to his leadership was to Survive Until Circumstances
Provided Opportunity for a decisive battle and to execute a Model for Victory that was essentially firm at a Time and Place as circumstances and opportunity allowed. This framework of intent enabled his leaders to maneuver and utilize their forces both on land and at sea in a decentralized manner to accomplish his strategic and operational objectives.

Survive Until Circumstances Provide Opportunity. In General Dempsey’s discussion of mission command, he stated, “Commanders will be required to understand intent to the level of effect; that is, strategic to tactical and across domains.” The Allied forces exemplified this understanding of intent during the years leading up to and the months directly before the Battle of Yorktown. The Allied leaders repeatedly had to make tactical decisions to avoid major combat, pull out of combat and even give up potential tactical victories to ensure survival to accomplish the strategic goal of avoiding destruction of the Army until a decisive strategic victory could be assured. Early in the war, shared understanding was attained within the Allied force leadership and the intent carried out by all of Washington’s generals. This intent was executed up to the final skirmishes between Lafayette and Cornwallis in Virginia in the months leading up to the Battle of Yorktown.

Model for Victory Firm. Mission command says that intent provides a “clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state.” After the first several years of fighting, the Allies realized there would be no ultimate victory against the superior British forces without gaining naval superiority in at least a limited region. Washington and his generals decided on a Model for Victory that was firm in structure but flexible in time and place of execution. The Allied intent was to mass a land army with siege equipment around a British Army that was blocked from escape and re-supply from the sea by a superior naval force provided by either the French or the Spanish. This model was originally attempted on a smaller scale in a battle where General Washington directed General Lafayette in February of 1781 to attempt to surround Benedict Arnold’s British Army in Hampton Roads. Although this attempt failed to trap Arnold’s army due to a failure of the French to take command of the sea in Chesapeake, it proved to be a dress rehearsal for the Battle of Yorktown.

Flexible Time and Place. With a firm Model for Victory established by the Allied leadership, the next key to the ultimate strategic victory at Yorktown was ensuring the intent maintained flexibility in the Time and Place of execution. The prevailing thought throughout the war was that a decisive battle would be fought against the British in New York, a British stronghold. Even up until the summer of 1781, General Washington was very focused on executing his Model for Victory against the British in New York. The French general, Rochambeau, played a critical role at this juncture in the war by convincing Washington and the American leadership that although the Model for Victory was right, they should not focus on New York as the place for a decisive battle. In May of 1781, Rochambeau wrote the first in a series of letters that were to change the course of history.

Upon his learning that Lord Cornwallis was now in Virginia, he wrote his colleague the Count de Grasse about Washington’s plan to attack the British in New York once naval superiority had been established by the French. However, he also highlighted that Lord Cornwallis’ Southern army was in
Virginia and that French naval superiority in the Chesapeake Bay area may also present an option to execute their battle plan in Virginia. Ultimately, in his letter to de Grasse, Rochambeau gave de Grasse the option of where to establish naval superiority in lieu of directing him to New York. This flexibility set the stage for Admiral de Grasse to determine where naval superiority was most likely attained so the land forces could respond and maneuver as necessary. Ultimately, although Washington was set on a decisive battle in New York up until the late summer of 1781, he, too, remained flexible to circumstances that presented the best opportunity for success. His diary on 14 August states: “Matters having now come to a crisis-and a decisive plan to be determined on-I was obliged, from the shortness of Count de Grasse’s promised stay on this coast-the apparent disinclination in their naval officers to force the harbor of New York…to give up all idea of attacking New York” and to mass troops in Virginia for an attack on Cornwallis.

Trust

General Dempsey rounds out the final element of mission command with stating that trust informs execution of intent and is the moral sinew that binds the force when couples with shared understanding and intent. In the victory at Yorktown, trust at multiple levels proved to be that vital element that enabled the shared understanding and intent of Washington to be realized.

French Subordination to Washington. The willingness of proud and more experienced French officers from a major European power to subordinate them to the command of a young General from an unrecognized country rebelling against their colonial masters took tremendous trust and strategic vision. The French officers’ ability to understand the importance of the rebellion being led by American officers was an essential element of establishing the shared understanding of a clear C2 structure for the Allied forces.

Superior Officer Subordination to Junior Officers. Many cases existed in both the American and French forces in which superior and more experienced officers subordinated themselves to more junior officers to accomplish the right team dynamics for success. Early in the war this caused significant problems for Washington within the American army; however, Washington learned from this and made character and trust a key component of his selection of officers to serve under his command. This selectivity of officers created an environment where trust could enable senior officers to subordinate themselves for the right reasons at the right time. Examples of this presented themselves within the French forces as well. Admiral de Barras, a senior French Officer, subordinated himself to Admiral de Grasse during the operations in the Chesapeake to ensure continuity of the established C2 structure. De Barras wrote, “No one is more interested that I in the arrival of M. de Grasse in these seas. He was my junior…As soon as I know that he is within reach of this place, I shall set sail to serve under him….”

International Trust. During the early years of the Revolution, the French and the Spanish stayed on the sidelines waiting to see what the American revolutionaries were made of and all about. Slowly, through their operational approach of Survival, the Americans gained the trust of the French and the Spanish that their effort was worth the risk of inciting British aggression. This trust allowed an alliance to be established.
which was vital to the success of the Americans in their war for independence. Other examples of this trust exist which enabled the operational maneuvers required to obtain the victory at Yorktown. One key example was the willingness of the French to trust the Spanish navy to protect French interests in the Antilles while the French navy supported Allied land operations off the coast of Virginia.24

Trust in De Grasse—Key to Victory. Ultimately, the Key to Victory rested in the trust that Rochambeau directly and Washington indirectly placed in the Count de Grasse. After providing him the intended Model for Victory and emphasizing the need for more troops and cash, Allied leadership trusted de Grasse to make the decision that maximized the probability of establishing conditions for a successful decisive battle. The political tact and strategic vision that de Grasse displayed resulted in achieving a concentration superior to that of the enemy at the right time and place. He wrote to Washington and Rochambeau that the Chesapeake was “the point which appears to me to be indicated by you...as the one from which the advantage you propose may be most certainly attained.”25 He fulfilled this trust by establishing naval superiority in the Chesapeake by early September, setting the conditions prerequisite to the Allied Model for Victory.

Mission Command Among the British

The British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown can be attributed to several events of “chance” (to borrow from Clausewitz), but two were decisive in sealing their fate. The first event to ensure the demise of the British was the decision by General Cornwallis, in direct contravention to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in America, General Clinton, was to depart South Carolina for Virginia. The second event that contributed to the American victory was the defeat of Vice Admiral Graves, the acting commander of the British Fleet by the French Admiral De Grasse. While several chance events aligned against the British in the summer of 1781, both the decision of Cornwallis that led him to initiate operations in Virginia and the defeat of the British Fleet in September 1781 were preventable. Infighting and jealousy within the British chain of command, political gamesmanship within the British Parliament, unquestioned assumptions about the nature of the conflict with the colonists and poor awareness regarding British naval capability all conspired against the British ability to exercise the elements of mission command.

Understanding

The Chinese general and philosopher, Sun Tzu said, “If you know your enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a thousand battles.” At the strategic and operational levels during the British expedition to subdue its rebellious colonists, they failed to understand their enemy and to a lesser extent their capability. At the strategic level, the British chain of command, key ministers in parliament and most notably King George III all underestimated colonist resolve to resist the British (Larrabee). The king found it inconceivable that the nascent Continental Army and colonial militia could withstand the British Army. King George III perpetuated group think of British primacy in any engagement with the fledgling colonial forces within his closest advisors. The king fostered the misunderstanding of colonial determination and capability by selecting and elevating to positions of authority only those who agreed with the king’s perception.26 The nepotistic method of selecting ministers, generals, and
admirals favorable to the crown deprived King George III and the British Government of leaders capable of orchestrating a complex strategy and limited dissenting opinion about the prosecution of the war.

Notable examples of where the criteria of agreeing with the king’s strategic direction were placed above capability were the selection of Lord Frederick North as First Minister and Lord Sandwich as the Minister of the Admiralty. In the case of Lord North as First Minister, he was intrinsically unable to compel the other ministers of the British Government to work in any concerted way toward achieving victory in the colonies.27 Larrabee states, “Given North’s personal qualities, his well-known indolence, his conciliatory disposition, his disinclination to make decisions,” the result was a fatal amount of sheer inaction at a time when action was imperative.”

Nowhere did the elevation of the “Kings Friends” do so much damage as the selection of Lord Sandwich as Minister of the Admiralty. Under Lord Sandwich’s administration the British Navy languished, “Offices were bought, stores were stolen, and worst of all, ships unseaworthy and inadequately equipped, were sent to fight the battles of their country.”28 In addition to his administrative mismanagement, Lord Sandwich misrepresented the readiness and capability of the British Navy to his fellow ministers, ““Offices were bought, stores were stolen, and worst of all, ships unseaworthy and inadequately equipped, were sent to fight the battles of their country.””

Compounding the compilation of sycophants at the strategic level to manage the conduct of the war with the colonies was the manner in which strategy was developed. Ultimately, strategic direction emanated from King George III. Undermining the development of a strategy capable of defeating the colonists was the weekly consultations between the king and from his ministers. The consultations were routinely discussed with each minister individually instead of in a concerted manner so that all ministers understood the current situation and strategic direction.30 The manner in which ministers were selected and the method in which strategy was developed provided considerable friction against shared understanding at the strategic level that also hindered understanding at the operational level.

Nowhere was the lack of shared understanding of the Allied situation more evident than when juxtaposed with the British situation, specifically the chasm that existed between General Cornwallis, commander of the British Army in the South, and General Clinton. In fact, it is the very lack of operational level understanding that contributed to General Cornwallis’ decision to depart the Carolinas for Virginia. In the spring of 1781, Cornwallis and his army were recovering from their battle at Guilford Court House in Wilmington, North
Carolina, a victory that exacted a hefty toll on the British forces. Far from believing that the colonists had been defeated in the South, Cornwallis could not force colonial forces under General Greene to a decisive battle. He believed Greene’s forces were receiving considerable support from the North, particularly from Virginia. Furthermore, Cornwallis believed the terrain in South Carolina favored Greene and his forces whereas Virginia, with its many rivers, was ideal to support land operations by the British Army. Additionally, Cornwallis believed that a victory in Virginia would prevent General Washington from reinforcing the South.

These factors constituted General Cornwallis’ understanding of the operational picture in April 1781 and were considerably different from how General Clinton viewed the situation from his headquarters in New York. Cornwallis wrote in a letter to General Phillips in Virginia: “If we mean an offensive war in America, we must abandon New York and bring our whole force into Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us America.”

Fundamentally, General Clinton disagreed that a decisive battle with the colonists could be achieved in the Chesapeake, calling Virginia “the graveyard of armies” and supposing a complete British defeat in the region. Clinton saw as the primary threat the combined forces of Washington and Rochambeau in New York along with de Barras in Rhode Island. Clinton foresaw a decisive battle against the allies in New York and failing that a combined land and sea engagement against Philadelphia. The disjointed understanding of the operational environment added a layer of misunderstanding at the strategic level. Prior to departing Charleston and installing General Cornwallis as commander in the South, General Clinton authorized Cornwallis to communicate directly with Lord Germain. This direct communication between a subordinate commander with civilian authority separate from the commander-in-chief contributed to a lack of unity of command which prevented clear articulation and understanding of intent from the strategic down to the operational level.

**Intent**

If it was not written or explicitly communicated, it is certain that most British ground and sea operational commanders understood the intent to defeat the Colonial Army was the strategic end state that would bring the American Revolution to an end on British terms. It is questionable whether or not within the British command structure of the late 18th century whether there was an overarching vision of how to deal a decisive blow to the colonists. The British lacked an articulated clear intent from the strategic to the operational level that meant tactical actions would likely never be tied to the strategic end state of bringing the American colonies to yield to British authority. The command arrangement from the British
Secretary of State to the army and navy and poor communication between General Cornwallis and General Clinton specifically inhibited articulation of clear intent in the summer of 1781. This poor communication, perhaps more than any other factor, led to the events culminating in British defeat at Yorktown.

For any sustained operation in the American colonies, the British were dependent upon their connection back to England by sea. Naval power was a critical capability for the British, and it was the means by which the Army conducted operational maneuver, was supplied and reinforced. Most importantly, the navy had the critical responsibility of isolating the colonies from outside sources of support. However, the command arrangement employed by the British during the prosecution of the American Revolution did not reflect this critical link between the army and navy. The navy took its strategic direction from the Minister of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, and the Army from the Secretary of State in America, Lord Germain. In the American theater of war, no formal command authority existed between the Army and Navy to ensure each of their efforts were harmonized to achieve the strategic end state. The commander-in-chief directed the ground forces and the chief of the North America naval forces directed naval operations. The two commanders only once operated in a concerted effort and that during the battle of Charleston and “forthwith proceeded to quarrel furiously and for many months afterward.”

Given the Army’s dependence on the Navy, what was required was an operational commander with authority to direct both the ground and naval forces jointly.

Despite the ground and naval forces working independently, General Clinton convoluted his unity of command by authorizing General Cornwallis to communicate directly with Lord Germain in England. Lord Germain, perhaps spurred on by the belief in the superiority of British forces on the battlefield, desperately desired General Clinton to take offensive action. In the spring and summer of 1781, General Clinton was reluctant to initiate such an operation believing that New York would be retaken by General Washington’s forces. In late July 1781, Lord Germain ordered General Clinton “that no troops were to be withdrawn from Virginia and that the main operation was to be an advance through that colony.” It is unlikely Germain would have given General Clinton those instructions had Cornwallis not been corresponding separately with him. General Clinton’s direction to General Cornwallis lacked a clear vision of how he saw the prosecution of the war. In May 1780, after the fall of Charleston and reports of a French Fleet underway for America, Clinton departed Charleston for New York issuing Cornwallis the following order:

“To regard the safety of Charleston and the tranquility of South Carolina as the principal and indispensable objects of his attention. Only when those goals had been reached, and in a proper season of the year, was His Lordship at liberty, if he judged proper, to make a solid move into North Carolina.”

In the aftermath of the British victory at Guilford Court House in March 1781, General Cornwallis had not heard from General Clinton regarding any concerted operations the army should undertake. General Cornwallis wrote to General Clinton regarding his desire to begin a new campaign in Virginia. General Clinton’s response back to Cornwallis was deferential regarding his intent for Cornwallis’ Army to be used to pacify South Carolina. General Clinton’s tone and tenor of his
correspondence seemed to elevate General Cornwallis to that of an equal rather than a subordinate commander.\(^{40}\) The lack of clear intent by General Clinton left open for interpretation by General Cornwallis whether to proceed with a Virginia campaign.

In June 1781, General Clinton’s direction to Cornwallis became even more convoluted and desperate. General Clinton was made aware of a possible combined offensive against New York by the combined American and French Army supported by a French Fleet. General Clinton sent General Cornwallis four letters with conflicting orders between June 8 and June 19.\(^{41}\) As before, General Clinton’s direction to Cornwallis was differential regarding these latest orders and provided no clear intent regarding the British Army in the South.

**Trust**

General Dempsey states that “Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action a commander will perform.”\(^{42}\) The nature of the relationships within the British command acted as a countervailing force toward any positive momentum achieved. Larrabee put it, “the principal reasons that England failed to subdue her rebellious American colonists was the internecine strife that prevailed among her principal commanders on both land and the sea.”\(^{43}\)

Nowhere did the lack of trust manifest itself more clearly than in the relationship between Cornwallis and Clinton. The antipathy between the two generals began almost immediately when Cornwallis was installed as Clinton’s subordinate. Clinton found out that Cornwallis possessed a letter from Lord Germain he would eventually succeed Clinton as commander-in-chief. According to Germain, the intent of the letter was to prevent a German General from assuming the role of commander-in-chief. The fact that Germain had communicated his preference for the next commander-in-chief without consulting Clinton was an insult. The matter proved an embarrassment to Cornwallis as well. Clinton noted that after the incident Cornwallis only visited Clinton headquarters when it was necessary. Clinton feared he would be relieved by Germain for the smallest mistake and became even more cautious in his actions. Clinton was hesitant to issue decisive orders to Cornwallis fearing that if the matter turned out badly, he would have to defend his actions from Germain.

Lord Germain contributed to a general lack of trust with General Clinton through his constant directives for troop movements and the initiation of campaigns. As General Dempsey explains, the relationship between providing direction and trusting subordinates “will be required to clearly translate their intent to their subordinates and trust them to perform with responsible initiative in complex, fast-changing, chaotic circumstances.”\(^{44}\) In May 1779, frustrated with the constant direction from Germain, Clinton fired off a letter stating, “For God’s sake, my Lord, if you wish me to do anything, leave me to myself, and let me adapt my efforts to the hourly circumstances.”\(^{45}\)

The lack of trust between Germain and Clinton and Clinton and Cornwallis most directly contributed to the British defeat at Yorktown. Those relationships were part of a larger system of patronage that pitted officers against one another for favoritism from the British aristocracy. Officers in the navy and army would rise to increasing levels of responsibility not so much for their military prowess as their connection and
favoritism, either by birth or marriage within the aristocracy. Another factor contributing to the lack of trust within the British military was that frequently a commander would be court-martialed for loss in a battle. If there were any question regarding the commander’s courage, competence or adherence to the strict instructions for naval combat a subordinate or superior could level charges against the responsible commander. Both the method of promotion and potential ramifications for losing in battle created an underlying level of mistrust in the British military.

**Comparison of Allied and British Mission Command**

In comparing the Allied and British operations through the lens of mission command, one cannot help but interpret that the French and American forces enjoyed significantly more shared understanding, clear intent and trust. The combined French and American Forces understood the necessity of naval supremacy, the survival of the American Army, the critical nature of time and the importance of a clear command relationship. The British, on the other hand, were hampered by an overestimation of the capabilities of their land and naval forces, the resolve of the colonialists, the nature of the conflict with the colonies, and how to achieve victory. General Washington established clear intent for his subordinates that were fairly well executed by his operational and tactical commanders. Washington stressed the survival of the Army and that the revolution would not continue should the Army suffer a decisive defeat. Secondly, Washington developed a model to defeat the British that proved effective at the battle of Yorktown. Intent within the British Army was challenged due to a command relationship that prevented naval and ground forces from working in concert, micromanagement of tactical actions by strategic leaders, and poor directives from the British commander-in-chief to subordinate commanders. Finally, the level of French and American trust in comparison to the British was substantial and perhaps more than any of the other elements of mission command led to the American victory at Yorktown.

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2 JP 3-31, 3.
5 Dempsey, 5.
6 Harold A. Larrabee, *Decision at the Chesapeake* (New York: Charles N. Potter, 1964), 70.
7 Ibid, 78-79.
8 Ibid, 78.
9 Ibid, 80.
10 Ibid, 89.
11 Ibid, 89.
13 Ibid, 262.
14 Ibid, 80.
15 Ibid, 82.
16 Ibid, 249.
17 Dempsey, 5.
18 Ibid, 5.
19 Larrabee, 130-131.
20 Ibid, 243-244.
21 Ibid, 252.
Team Biographies

Colonel Jerry Turner, USA. COL Turner entered the Army in 1986. He has served in positions from Scout to Section Sergeant. He received his commission through the Green to Gold program at the University of Texas at El Paso in 1994. His past assignments include Scout Platoon Leader, Troop Executive Officer, Squadron Maintenance Officer, Brigade S1, and Company and Troop Commander. After attending the Command and General Staff College he served as Division Planner, Squadron S3 and Brigade S3 prior to assuming command of the 3rd Squadron 4th U.S. Cavalry. COL Turner earned a Bachelor of Arts degree majoring in Political Science from the University of Texas at El Paso and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from the Air Command and Staff College. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and the Air Force Command and General Staff College. He has had tours of combat in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Commander Seth Burton, USN. A 1994 graduate of the University of Alabama in Huntsville with a degree in Chemical Engineering, CDR Burton reported in 1996 for his first at-sea duty aboard USS JEFFERSON CITY (SSN 759) in San Diego, California. In 2005, he was assigned to Freiburg, Germany to study as an Olmsted Scholar in International Relations at the Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg. Following completion of studies in Freiburg, CDR Burton reported to the USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750) as Executive Officer in 2007, and subsequently served in position of Executive Officer of the Tactical Readiness Evaluation Team at Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, VA. From January 2012 to August 2014, CDR Burton served as Commanding Officer of USS SCRANTON (SSN-756).

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Trahan, USA. LTC Trahan is an Infantry officer with over twenty years of service and has commanded at the O-5 level. He has served at multiple Joint and operational commands conducting contingency and campaign operations. Lieutenant Colonel Trahan is currently serving as an Observer / Trainer assigned to the Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training Division. In his capacity as an Observer / Trainer, Lieutenant Colonel Trahan participates and provides feedback to combatant commands on staff process associated with Joint Operations.
Weaponizing Social Media: What We Can Learn From Our Adversaries

By CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and MAJ Kevin Thaxton

During their spring 2014 invasion of Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) manipulated social media like no other terrorist organization. They employed an array of slick anti-Western videos, time-phased beheadings to instill terror, and global on-line recruiting. As they advanced on Mosul, Iraq, they saturated the Internet with more than 40,000 tweets in one day,\(^1\) drawing immediate support from radicalized youth and condemnation from the free world. Their command of social media to inflate terror and recruit was nothing short of superb, not to mention that they did this while seizing half of Iraq.

ISIS’s success raises questions about America’s ability to strike back in the social media battle space. Specifically, how did the United States let ISIS dominate social media? And what is the United States doing to prevent it from happening again? The answers to these questions are key because the United States should expect future terrorists—indeed, any future adversary—to use social media as part of their battle plan. The Chinese government is years ahead on this point. With an army of low-paid social media manipulators\(^2\) and a world-class cyber and propaganda machine,\(^3\) the Chinese government waged a massive social media war against Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution, introducing a variety of new techniques not previously seen. From a U.S. perspective, there is much to be learned from ISIS and Chinese social media tactics. Notably, the United States is losing the social media arms race and needs to master some of its adversary’s tactics to seize the initiative. The United States must pursue a comprehensive social media strategy to collect intelligence, infiltrate adversary organizations, and communicate a strategic message.

A thorough analysis of social media warfare by ISIS and the Chinese in 2014 reveals five core maxims for social media war fighting. First, censorship rarely works; second, social media provides good intelligence; third, social media will become increasingly resistant to intrusion; fourth, social media enables individuals to threaten nations; and fifth, if done right, social media can influence target audiences. To seize the initiative, therefore, the United States needs to incorporate these maxims into three wings of social media warfare: intelligence collection, infiltration, and strategic messaging.

ISIS Social Media Warfare

The 2014 social media battle in Syria and Iraq was a seminal event in modern warfare. As Defense Secretary Hagel noted, “This is beyond anything we have seen.”\(^4\) For the first time in history, individual ISIS fighters documented their exploits in unfiltered real time, providing detailed information on what was happening on the ground.\(^5\) Defense Secretary Hagel was particularly impressed with ISIS’s use of social media “to increase its global profile and attract tens of thousands of fighters.”\(^6\)

To be sure, most modern terrorist groups use social media to promote their aims. They no longer need television intermediaries to broadcast their information – they simply publish it directly on social media within minutes. What separated ISIS from others was...
their sophisticated information campaign involving high-end, audio-visual marketing, and their ability to manipulate social media to inflate their message.

Prior to their advance on Iraq, ISIS launched a media branch called Al-Hayat Media to target Western and non-Arabic audiences through social media. Al-Hayat Media produced videos, speeches, and images in multiple languages and placed them on a variety of social media networking sites to avoid censorship. When their Twitter accounts were shut down, they simply created new Twitter accounts or used other free social media venues such as Archive.org or Justpaste.it to get their message out. 7 Notably, not all ISIS media content was intended to shock the West or to highlight their fighting credentials. They also projected themselves as capable governors with professional-quality videos and images of fighters helping children, aiding the infirm, and handing out ice cream cones. 8

During their June 2014 advance on Mosul, ISIS encouraged supporters to download their Arabic-language Twitter app, The Dawn of Glad Tidings. This app allowed ISIS to post news content, such as audio and video clips, on the personal Twitter accounts of its entire subscriber base. To avoid triggering Twitter spam detection, content was metered out at careful intervals. Eventually, the content would start to “trend,” which, as a unique social media phenomenon, increases the chance that it will achieve a “viral” condition and gain greater exposure. This technique enabled ISIS get out 40,000 tweets in one day. 9 ISIS also organized hashtag campaigns to train supporters on how to make their content trend and pop up on trend-tracking websites, such as @ActiveHashtags, which likewise results in even more retweets. 10 To counter enemy intrusion, they even produced a training guide to help supporters maintain operations security with instructions on how to remove metadata from tweets and avoid photographs that would identify their location. 11

With viral content and battlefield success, ISIS was probed by thousands of interested young radicals. On sites such as Ask.fm, ISIS members interacted with potential recruits to answer questions covering everything from what socks to wear in battle to what flights to take to get into Syria. 12 By September 2014, these techniques yielded more than 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 nations; 13 and as the United States led strikes against them, ISIS recruiters were still able to enlist as many as 1,000 foreigners per month. 14 Never before had social media been used to replenish troop strength on the battlefield.

**Chinese Social Media Warfare**

As the United States fought ISIS, another social media battle emerged in Hong Kong. One of the most technologically advanced cities in the world, Hong Kong has a vibrant Internet culture with data cables and wireless routers that—unlike those on the mainland—are typically not under the direct control of the government. On one side were members of the Umbrella Revolution who harnessed smart phones to organize protests and report their progress to audiences in China and the world. On the other side was the Chinese government, whose sophisticated counter-information apparatus was controlled by a cadre of more than two million operators who regularly monitor and manipulate the Internet in support of the Communist Party. 15
Hong Kong’s Internet culture is not entirely free from government control. Although China’s constitution permits freedom of speech and the press, its media regulations have been amended to punish those whose news content endangers the country. China also requires anyone wishing to post on China’s main social media networks to register with real names so that users, in essence, can be tracked, fined, or arrested for posting unfavorable content.

In 2014, the Chinese government censored networks in Hong Kong and the mainland using bandwidth throttling, keyword filtering, and website blocking. Search words like Tiananmen, Hong Kong, or Occupy Central were either blocked or rerouted to sites favorable to the Communist Party. And as the protests picked up steam, the Chinese government blocked highly popular social media sites such as Sina Weibo, Instagram, and Flickr. Activists fought back through the use of mobile messaging apps such as WeChat since these apps effectively exist outside the Internet. Indeed, in recent years, mobile messaging apps have evolved to include group chat, video conferencing, and content sharing. The Chinese were able to block access to these, too, by eliminating activist user accounts, so many activists simply switched to another app called FireChat, a product developed by the San Francisco-based company Open Garden. FireChat incorporates Bluetooth technology and Apple Multi-peer Connectivity Framework, connecting phones without a cellular network or Internet connectivity. The only drawback of FireChat is that it lacks encryption so it is still susceptible to Chinese government monitoring.

Chinese government infiltration was also common. In June 2014, they initiated “bomb-scare” tactics during a Hong Kong vigil commemorating the 25th anniversary of Tiananmen. By creating fake Twitter accounts and posing as activists, Chinese infiltrators posted a police report declaring that six terrorists had just escaped from a prison and were heading into Hong Kong. Meanwhile, another false activist posted that he was at the vigil and saw an individual fitting a fake suspect’s description. His post was retweeted 315 times by a number of other Twitter accounts of dubious origin—all likely created by Chinese government infiltrators. While this particular tactic failed to stop the vigil, it is impossible to know the extent of Chinese government infiltration throughout the Umbrella Revolution, although this example does demonstrate Chinese government intent.

Cyber warfare and social media warfare also converged in this online war. Aware that protesters had a tendency to download software to circumvent censorship, the Chinese government targeted several iPhone users with a virus that steals text messages, photos, call logs, passwords and other data. Masquerading as a regular software download for mobile messaging apps, the virus was injected by an email phishing scam. Even now, countless phones are likely providing data back to the Chinese government.

Despite continuous censorship and deep infiltration by the Chinese government, the Umbrella Revolution activists mobilized, coordinated activities, and gained support from people outside of China. In one notable case, the activists even used drones to produce videos for social media to illustrate the sheer size of their protests to a global audience.
Altogether, this battle demonstrated a number of emerging tactics—to include covert accounts, viruses, subterfuge, and digital countermeasures—which any state or non-state actor can expect to encounter when it goes to battle in the social media domain.

**Five Maxims for Social Media Warfare**

These two social media battles reveal five core maxims that explain today’s social media warfare paradigm (Table 1).

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<thead>
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<th>1. Censorship is rarely effective</th>
<th>2. Social media provides good intelligence</th>
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<td>3. Social media will become increasingly resistant to intrusion</td>
<td>4. Social media enables individuals to threaten nations</td>
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<td>5. Social media can influence target audiences</td>
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*Table 1. Maxims for Social Media Warfare*

1. **Censorship is rarely effective.** Due to technological advancements—often produced by American companies—it increasingly possible to circumvent tactics such as bandwidth throttling, IP blocking, wireless blackouts, and firewalls. When blocked from access to one social media venue, users move to another. When blocked from access to the internet, users move to wireless-enabled mobile messaging. Encountering blocked cellular networks, users move to Bluetooth.

Notably, the United States private sector is the world’s largest producer of anti-censorship technology. For example, when Twitter and YouTube deleted the beheading video of journalist James Foley, ISIS simply switched to a more secure social media site called Diaspora—a social media site created in 2010 by New York University students concerned about Facebook privacy issues. There are also a number of non-governmental organizations that build apps to hoodwink repressive regimes. The Guardian Project, for instance, is one private organization that creates free software for mobile devices to help individuals “communicate more freely” and to protect them “from intrusion and monitoring.” Despite the fact that The Guardian Project receives unspecified funding from the U.S. State Department, they are adamant about not creating back-door technology that would allow for government intrusion.

Still, censorship—both comprehensive and limited—will, if anything, temporarily slow down social media use, but such tactics guarantee an acceleration of new countermeasures, or worse, inhibit good intelligence collection.

2. **Social media provides good intelligence.** The United States, through dedicated collection and analysis of social media networks, can not only track what adversaries are saying on open-source social media, but may be able to predict human behavior. According to recent news reporting, there are several nascent efforts to exploit this concept. For example, in early 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started development on a social media monitoring capability—described as a "geospatial alert and analysis mapping application"—to predict future events. Elements of the Department of Defense (DoD) use “population-centric” technology to provide “global and persistent indications and warnings capability that complements and enhances conventional sensors.” The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Open Source Center even has a dedicated staff of several hundred “Ninja Librarians”
who scour social media for intelligence. The CIA also has been known to partner with marketing companies like Attensity to analyze the entire Twitter network and evaluate “sentiments, hot spots, trends, actions, intent.”

The bottom line is social media provides a wealth of information on people, networks, and intent, but as demonstrated in recent social media wars, not all of its content is expected to remain open source indefinitely.

3. **Social media will become increasingly resistant to intrusion.** Advances in encryption technology for mobile devices, mobile messaging apps, and traditional social media sites will increasingly disrupt intelligence collection efforts. Recently, FBI Director James Comey noted that his department is “struggling to keep up with the changing technology and to maintain our ability to actually collect the communications we are authorized to collect.” This trend is likely to impact other United States intelligence agencies as well.

   Another way to get around technology is to compel private social media corporations to disable the accounts of offenders or to provide information on terrorist social media accounts. However, these efforts have largely been futile since the material that needs to be blocked may have already gone viral—having already leapt to other social media sites—or the perpetrator may have switched to a new account under a different name. Thus, much of the terrorist’s online information operations go unchecked; or his tactical plans end up locked inside an encrypted mobile device network.

4. **Social media enables individuals to threaten nations.** Not all nefarious social media activity is a threat to the United States, but some of it is. As discussed, social media is used by individuals and groups as a tactical tool to organize local events, whether they are battlefield maneuvers or protest vigils. It is also used as a strategic messaging platform to radicalize populations, fundraise, and recruit thousands of fighters. Especially dangerous are hackers who blend cyber-warfare expertise with social media. In 2013, for instance, the Syrian Electronic Army sent malware in a “phishing” email to members of the Associated Press and gained access to an account. On the main Associated Press Twitter page they sent a tweet to more than two million followers that said, “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured.” Within three minutes, the Dow lost $136 Billion, but quickly recovered after it was determined that the tweet was fake.

The challenge for the United States is to balance passive intelligence collection on these threats—which effectively allows adversaries to continue radicalizing, recruiting, and coordinating activities—with adopting Chinese-style tactics to go after threats by either shutting down individual accounts and servers or by infiltrating social media networks with undercover agents. At present, the balance leans towards intelligence collection.

5. **Social media can influence target audiences.** Social media sites bombard users with endless news, humor, advertisements, and the day-to-day musings of friends. To break through the noise and influence viewers, strategic messengers must follow certain rules. First, they must have the ability to
connect globally. This requires a multilingual staff, the ability to produce high-quality content quickly, a strong presence on a variety of social media sites (including thousands of “friends”), and the technical ability to make a message go viral.

Second, once connected, the messengers must choose the audience they can realistically expect to influence. For example, ISIS did not expect the West to rally to its side; although, they did hope to inspire Western radicals to help fight. Similarly, the United States government cannot expect to meaningfully change the minds of radical ISIS sympathizers, but they might be able to have an impact on Middle Easterners who are increasingly fed up with extremist activity.38 A messenger’s credibility also matters because it increases the chance his content will be viewed, and thus enables the messenger to communicate ideas which resonate within a target audience. The United States, for example, is not likely to achieve widespread success in changing radicalized minds because it lacks credibility in most Middle East and North African countries.39 Local imams and religious leaders, however, might be more effective.

The third way to influence the targeted audience is to ensure that the message elicits an emotional reaction. High-quality videos and images that either shock or inspire are, according to studies, more likely to be shared and gain viral traction,40 and therefore more likely to incite action. ISIS was exceptional in this regard.

An American-style social media fight should focus primarily on three wings of social media warfare: intelligence collection, infiltration, and strategic messaging. Success depends not only on understanding the five maxims listed above, but also on discarding techniques that conflict with American values. Censorship as a fourth wing, for example, is out of the question. Not only is it ineffectual (Maxim 1); it is also violates freedom of expression.

**Intelligence Collection.** The U.S. intelligence community has made modest strides in exploiting the data resident in open-source social media streams, and is even making progress on the production of algorithms that can predict future events. Indeed, the intelligence available in social media is quite good (Maxim 2). As noted in Maxim 3, however, it will become increasingly difficult to access non-internet social media forums, such as mobile messaging apps, due to advances in encryption technology and the creation of other non-internet-based social media networks. These challenges are a problem domestically, as noted by the FBI, and a problem for the broader U.S. intelligence community.

**Infiltration.** One way to get around encryption (Maxim 3) is to infiltrate social media with undercover on-line personas and to make “friends” with adversaries (Maxim 4). Agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and DoD require this capability, not only for passive intelligence collection and early warning (Maxim 2), but to potentially influence human behavior (Maxim 5) – that is, if they can establish a large enough presence and friend base. There have been a number of attempts to do this, but the overall scope and lessons learned are

**An American Style of Social Media Warfare**
not yet known. The FBI retains a number of online undercover employees, for example, who evidently befriend and nab potential terrorists in the United States. The Agency for International Development (USAID) even developed a “Cuban Twitter” on mobile messaging apps—distributed through non-U.S. front companies—which Cubans can use to share news and avoid government censorship. In this effort, USAID established an undercover subscriber base to help move news content through the network, and when the time was right, to introduce political content to inspire Cubans to organize a “Cuban Spring.” The viability of this plan remains to be seen. There are also reports that the DoD created software that enables operators to create multiple online personalities—or “sock puppets”—to counter the extremist narrative on social media and be the "first with the truth.” Again, the success of this effort and many others are not known. Outside of physically going undercover and joining the adversary, however, these efforts are still the best way to understand one’s enemy and influence real threats one-on-one. Embedded social media infiltrators may even be able to discourage an enemy course of action, or as the FBI demonstrated, encourage them to take a course of action that facilitates capture. Such infiltration projects, however, are expected to come under tough public scrutiny. Free speech, particularly the right of social media users to be free from government intrusion, is sacrosanct in the United States. In the social media world, large networks inevitably contain U.S. citizens, on whom the intelligence community is prohibited from collecting, unless federal authorities can demonstrate that the subject is involved in terrorist activities. The legality of fake social media accounts has also come into question. If deemed “covert,” such accounts require direct presidential authorization and must include Congressional oversight. In the Cuba case, President Obama has insisted that USAID’s Cuban Twitter is not a covert operation and that it has actually helped information flow freely to Cubans. Still, the risk for the U.S. government, as it is with any intelligence program, is balancing individual liberty—especially when a U.S. citizen is involved—with the real threat of terrorist use of social media to radicalize, recruit, and organize (Maxim 4). Oversight and transparency are essential, and abuses of intelligence gathering must be addressed. As Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg noted, “The U.S. government should be the champion for the internet, not a threat. They need to be much more transparent about what they’re doing, or otherwise people will believe the worst.” Due to the real national security threats presented by groups such as ISIS, however, the intelligence community must establish a much more robust undercover presence in social media.

**Strategic Messaging.** The most transparent arm of an American-style social media war is its strategic messaging wing—that is, its public social media campaign to engage key audiences while promoting the benefits of American values and countering the enemy’s message. In this wing, the State Department has the lead. The Department of State’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication, for example, has the task of developing “highly focused social media campaigns” to target violent extremism and terrorist organizations. As part of this effort, they established a social media presence...
called “Think Again Turn Away,” which engages directly with terrorists and their supporters in multiple languages. Although the concept is a step in the right direction—at least as far as establishing an active presence and attempting to counter terrorist propaganda—the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication has been plagued by a lack of support and messaging blunders. While intended to be the linchpin of a whole-of-government social media approach, it has suffered from low funding (approximately $5 million annually), a lack of interest from the National Security Council, and turf concerns from the National Counterterrorism Center. Additionally, critics argue that its guerrilla campaign is a “gaffe machine” that “provides jihadists with a stage to voice their arguments—regularly engaging in petty disputes” with terrorist supporters “and arguing over who has killed more people while exchanging sarcastic quips.”

Altogether, the campaign does not fully meet the standards of Maxim 5—that is to say, the overall intent is on track, but the target audience and tactics need work. For example, menacing videos of dead ISIS soldiers—intended by “Think Again Turn Away” to frighten young, radicalized individuals from joining ISIS—are more likely have the opposite effect on this type of audience, encouraging them instead to join the ISIS campaign. Indeed, to some, martyrdom or the opportunity of martyrdom can be motivational.

Moreover, the State Department should not be the only strategic messenger. An alternative is to encourage private efforts to engage in online strategic messaging. One such effort is the Counter Extremism Project, which includes a number of former U.S. officials including Senator Joseph Lieberman. Based on the assumption that “we’ve been kind of absent” in the social media sphere, the group intends to “expose the architecture of support for extremist groups and their ideology and combat their spread by pressuring their financial support networks, countering the narrative of extremists and their online recruitment, and advocating for strong laws, policies and regulations.” Another idea is to mentor Muslim scholars on establishing a large social media presence in order to counter terrorist ideology, while enabling them to build trust with vulnerable populations. There are risks indeed with helping private efforts engage in social media warfare—much the same as arming radical insurgent groups to overthrow governments—but this might be the only way to significantly expand America’s army of digital diplomats and social media influencers.

Some experts suggest that America’s online strategic messaging should not refrain from using propaganda and deception. As discussed in Maxim 5, however, credibility is a key component in influencing target audiences. The State Department in particular can increase its credibility by concentrating its social media message on promoting truth and countering untruth—similar to Voice of America radio programs across the world. In this sense, America should not be like the Chinese government.

**Who Must Lead Social Media Warfare? (Figure 1)**

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), whose stated mission is to “lead intelligence integration” and to “forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible,” must be responsible for intelligence...
collection and infiltration. This ensures unity of effort across domestic intelligence agencies (including the FBI) and overseas entities, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all Service intelligence organizations, CIA, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the State Department, and the National Security Agency. In accordance with traditional missions and under the direction of the DNI, the CIA and FBI should have the lead in implementing a government-wide army of undercover social media warriors.

Figure 1. Social Media Warfare Coordination

As stated, the strategic messaging wing must fall under the State Department, with the additional responsibility to train and promote the efforts of other governmental and civilian entities to engage global audiences, while leveraging lessons learned from its own social media campaign. Training should not be limited to U.S. organizations and various citizen groups. Allies can also play a significant role in social media strategic messaging.

In all three wings, the Defense Department and DIA will play an active supporting role to ensure that relevant data makes it to the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commanders. Indeed, intelligence collection, infiltration, and strategic messaging can supplement information operations and provide predictive analysis relevant to the physical battlefield.

The biggest problem, however, is that there is no formal organization that can unite the efforts of the State Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in social media warfare. Intelligence collection, infiltration, and strategic messaging cannot operate in individual vacuums, nor should they focus on countering only terrorist threats. Indeed, social media warfare has application across the spectrum of threats—conventional, criminal, terrorist, etc. Thus, on direction from the President of the United States, the National Security Council must prioritize the development of an interagency coordination task force to, first, produce a relevant social media strategy, and second, to synthesize efforts across all three wings of social media warfare.

Conclusion

The United States admits it has fallen behind in the information war against groups like ISIS. Intelligence collection and infiltration efforts are in their infancy and appear stove-piped across agencies. Strategic messaging is underfunded and clumsy at best. Worst of all, the entire effort lacks leadership and a coordinating infrastructure to synthesize activities.

In this new fight, however, the United States can still learn from its adversaries and regain the initiative in social media. Success begins with applying the five maxims learned from ISIS and Hong Kong. Success continues with beefing up intelligence collection, infiltration, and
strategic messaging efforts, and wherever applicable, incorporating techniques already used by adversaries.

Social media is a fascinating new phenomenon. While it exists partly inside cyberspace and partly outside it, it is an outlet for all kinds of information, and for the first time, a means by which any information provider—individual, non-state, or state actor—can interact personally on a global scale. Organizations that see social media as a one-way news provider are missing the point. Those who use it as an interactive forum and embrace its “social” characteristics are much more likely to influence target audiences and succeed in their information goals, whatever they may be. Finally, the term “weaponize” was chosen not to sensationalize, but to emphasize the dominate role the United States must play in this new battle space in order to achieve global social media superiority.

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Team Biographies

Commander Christopher F. Hill, USN. CDR Hill is currently assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare Branch. He was commissioned through ROTC in 1996. CDR Hill earned a BA in Political Science from Tufts University and an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Prior to his current assignment, CDR Hill served as Commanding Officer of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE TWO FOUR.

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Decision-Making Models and the SS Mayaguez Crisis

By LTC Thomas M. Feltey

On May 12, 1975, the SS Mayaguez, a United States flagged merchant container ship, was fired upon then subsequently boarded and seized by Cambodian gunboats near the island of Poulo Wai in the Gulf of Thailand approximately 60 miles off shore from Cambodia. This event set in motion an intense iteration of American decision-making led by the most senior leaders in the United States Government. The SS Mayaguez incident provides the policy maker and military planner an excellent opportunity to analyze and understand the dynamic nature of executive governmental decision-making. Ultimately, the United States arrived at a rational decision to rescue the SS Mayaguez as a result of choosing an option that best achieved the goals and objectives of the United States Government. However, some evidence also reveals governmental politics influenced the United States’ decision.

To analyze and assess the United States’ decision-making during the SS Mayaguez incident, Graham Allison’s rational actor and governmental politics models are used. In concluding his book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison offers the decision-making analyst a series of “cookbook questions” to assist in unpacking or searching for the underlying determinants for his three models. Allison expertly analyzes and conclusively details the decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis by examining a Soviet action, followed by an American reaction, and further by Soviet counteraction. He uses this method through all three models to arrive at the most accurate representation of both American and Soviet decision-making. As result of the prescribed brevity and limited information regarding Cambodian decision-making, this essay focuses solely on the American reaction—or more precisely the question; how did the United States arrive at the decision to launch a rescue operation after Cambodian forces seized the SS Mayaguez?

To begin this analysis, it is first useful to appreciate the incident from the perspective of the Cambodians since their decision-making is not assessed with Allison’s models. Although detailed data regarding Cambodia’s decision-making is not currently available, there is enough information to construct a plausible explanation to Cambodian actions. Less than a month prior to the seizure of the SS Mayaguez, the United States-backed government of Cambodia fell to the Communist Khmer Rouge. Within that confusion, it is likely traditional and functional governmental apparatus were not fully operational. Nonetheless, Khmer Rouge gunboats began seizing and releasing a number of various foreign flagged ships in the vicinity of the Gulf of Thailand in an effort to assert territorial control. Circumstantial evidence suggests the Cambodian gunboats were not directly targeting the American SS Mayaguez, but once central authorities learned Americans were captured, they, in fact, took control of the incident via radio from Phnom Penh. Cambodian forces initially sought to bring the American crew to the Cambodian mainland. It cannot be certain what ends the Khmer Rouge were pursuing by moving the SS Mayaguez crew to the mainland; however, some potential gain through negotiation was certainly a possibility.

As the situation rapidly unfolded, the Cambodians definitely grew concerned over
the presence of United States airplanes and were even more distraught over the destruction of a number of their gunboats. One could assume that the Cambodians weighed the consequences of a conflict with America versus some potential negotiated prisoner settlement and decided to release the crew. This release of the SS Mayaguez crew by Cambodian central authorities in Phnom Penh in response to building American military pressure is indicative of “hypothetical Rational Actor perspective.”

Rational Actor Model

To understand how the United States arrived at its decision to launch a rescue operation in response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS Mayaguez crew it is necessary to answer five core questions:

1. What are the objective circumstances that the United States conceived as threats and opportunities?
2. What are the United States’ goals?
3. What are the objective options for addressing the seizure of the ship and crew?
4. What are the objective strategic costs and benefits of each option?
5. What is the United States’ best choice given these conditions?

Fortunately, there is ample evidence to support this analysis.

Threats and Opportunities

The SS Mayaguez incident occurred at a particularly sensitive time for the United States’ international and domestic image and reputation. The Khmer Rouge completed its takeover of Cambodia on April, 17 1975, and soon afterwards, on April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, South Vietnam. These two incidents were clearly threats to worldwide freedom and democracy, and were indicative of the validity of the domino theory. Moreover, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “made it clear he believed the Southeast Asian debacle would inevitably lead other nations to test the will of the United States.”

Kissinger and many in Congress thought North Korea would be the most likely candidate to test American resolve. In essence, this ostensibly small incident of state sanctioned piracy now threatened to shift the balance of power from the United States to one or more Communist countries. In addition, the United States’ diplomatic efforts to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Middle East were rejected by Israel—another sign of weakened American leadership since Nixon’s resignation only nine months earlier.

In many ways, threats to American interests present opportunities, and this is exactly how American leaders viewed the Mayaguez incident. After the rapid-succession of setbacks and threats to American credibility, President Ford saw this incident as an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate its “power and resolve in the face of challenge.” This desire to demonstrate to the world that American power still mattered underpinned the development of American goals. The goals for American action were simple and straightforward: “to recover the ship and its crew; and to do so in such a way to demonstrate firmly to the international community that the United States could and would act with firmness to protect its interests.”

Options

The National Security Council produced various options and proposals during a series of lively crisis action planning sessions that ranged along the diplomatic to military
spectrum. These proposals included the following:

- “Use diplomacy with the People’s Republic of China, the Cambodian government, and the United Nations in an attempt to have the ship and crew returned.

- Conduct a military show of force.

- Seize a Cambodian island in retaliation. Authorize a helicopter landing on the Mayaguez.

- Order a landing on the USS Holt, with a subsequent seaborne approach to the Mayaguez.

- Assault Koh Tang with marines.

- Attack the port of Kompong Som with navy tactical aircraft.

- Authorize B-52 bombing of Kompong Som.”13

The National Security Council debated the efficiency of each of these distinct actions, but it was President Ford who grouped these potential actions into three distinct options: (1) diplomatic only; (2) diplomacy first, then, if necessary, strong, decisive military action; and (3) diplomacy first, then incrementally imposed military action.14

Costs and Benefits

Each option the United States explored possessed its own unique costs and benefits. With the diplomacy only option, the United States immediately recognized the difficulties associated with it. The Khmer Rouge represented a fledging government still trying to gain complete control of its country, and its administration was neither mature nor practiced. While diplomacy is always prudent and beneficial, the feasibility of this option was questionable. President Ford equated the diplomacy only option to doing nothing and viewed the consequences of not reclaiming the ship and crew, and further damage to international reputation as “very, very bad.”15 The seizure of the USS Pueblo by North Korean in 1968 and the ensuing long-term hostage situation provided clear historical context for the United States’ aversion to pursing a diplomatic solution only. The cost of not acting to secure the ship and crew was high.

The next option available to the United States was diplomacy first then decisive military action. The benefits of this option included an attempt to resolve the incident diplomatically before resorting to military action; justification to use military force because diplomacy failed; a strong United States strategic message of “power and prestige” to its friends and enemies; and the rapid rescue of both the ship and the crew before they could be moved to mainland Cambodia.16 The greatest downside of this option was the potential failure of the military action to secure the crew and ship. Such a failure would manifest itself with a strategic message opposite of what the U.S. desired: lack of power and prestige.

Finally, the last option for consideration by the United States was diplomacy first then incremental use of force. The benefits of this option included initiating prudent diplomatic means to avert military action; a gradual escalation of military force as a signal of the United States’ strong commitment; and an off ramp for Cambodia to de-escalate the crisis. The downsides of this option included the perception of a weak response by the United States, and the potential of a long-term Pueblo-like hostage crisis due to slow ineffective military action.
Choice

As a result of the threats, opportunities, options, and cost/benefit of each of these options relative to its desired goal, the United States rationally chose the diplomacy first then decisive military action option. This option best accomplished the goal of securing the ship and crew while sending a robust strategic message to the world that the United States would not tolerate this type of behavior. The associated decisive military actions were selected from a menu of military actions discussed in earlier NSC meetings. Once this option was selected, the United States National Security Council further developed the course of action by sequencing these proposals in time, space, and force prior to handing over the detailed planning and execution to the Department of Defense. While the rational actor model seems to answer the questions, there are indicators to suggest governmental politics may have influenced the decision.

Governmental Politics Model

To understand if governmental politics influenced how the United States arrived at its decision to launch a rescue operation in response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS Mayaguez crew, it is obligatory to investigate five questions. The answers to these questions strive to limit facts only pertinent to this particular model of Governmental Politics. Allison poses the following questions:

Who plays?
Whose views and values count in shaping the choice and action?
3. What factors shape each player’s perceptions, preferred course of action, and thus the players’ stand on the issue?
4. What factors account for each player’s impact on the choice and action?
5. What is the action channel that is the established process for aggregating competing perceptions, preferences, and stands of players in making decisions and taking action?

Players

Unlike many other Governmental Politics models in which key players are numerous and span the spectrum of government policy making, the key players for the Mayaguez incident decision-making are limited to the principles of the National Security Council. The key players were as follows: President Gerald Ford; Henry Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State; Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs; and James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. Other important players include William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence; and General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unsurprisingly, President Ford along with his views and values played a prevailing role in decision-making. As the leader of the United States, his views were unique and reflected the office of President, and that of a career politician. President Ford was inaugurated only nine months earlier as a result of President Nixon’s humiliating resignation. President Ford certainly felt the office of the presidency’s reputation was damaged and that confidence must be restored. President Ford also realized he was not elected by the people and therefore possessed no clear mandate. President Ford personally took charge of leading the efforts to resolve the crisis. Arguably this was an opportunity to restore confidence in the presidency that had been severely shaken with Nixon’s resignation. In addition, President Ford was confronted with the War Powers Act that legislatively restricted his
authority as commander-in-chief and directed consultation with Congress. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger viewed the War Powers Act as an obstacle to acting decisively to rescue the crew, and necessitated quick action while informing Congress along the way.\(^{18}\)

Henry Kissinger was the next key player associated with the *Mayaguez* decision-making process. His views and values dominated the other players in the National Security Council. Kissinger was a brilliant historian, strategist, and an experienced statesman. He was supremely self-confident and possessed an exhaustive knowledge of defense capabilities, and crisis management.\(^{19}\) Most significant to his influence on the Mayaguez decision-making was “his grand strategic framework of “geopolitics”.”\(^{20}\) Kissinger approached this crisis within the following framework: opportunity, executive management, symbolic effect, firmness, deterrent effect, use of sufficient force, force as an instrument of diplomacy, the American role in the world, and domestic consensus.\(^{21}\) Kissinger’s framework captured his deep views and values, and irrefutably exemplified the decisions made during the crisis.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was in position for approximately two years as the *Mayaguez* crisis unfolded.\(^{22}\) Schlesinger was a proven academic of international affairs and a military expert. His values and views also suggest prudence, restraint, and proportionality as indicated through his dissenting debates with Kissinger regarding the use of B-52s on the Cambodian mainland.\(^{23}\) His recommendations were reflective of his views regarding domestic and international opinion.

Finally, the last key player within Ford’s National Security Council was Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft. General Scowcroft served as the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and as a valued and trusted agent of President Ford. Scowcroft’s most essential contributions to the NSC were his intellect, temperance, and prudence.\(^{24}\) Fundamentally, Scowcroft agreed with Kissinger’s geopolitical framework. However, in addition, Scowcroft focused in on core American interests like a laser and would counter Kissinger’s aggressive presentations of opinion with insightful counter points. Moreover, it was General Scowcroft’s view and historical comparison of the *Pueblo* incident that greatly influenced the NSC decision to act strongly to avert another damaging hostage situation for the United States.

*Perceptions, preferred actions and stands*

As illustrated, each of the key players’ views and values offered distinctive contributions to the *Mayaguez* decision-making process. However, as the Governmental Politics model suggests, a certain group process emerged that appreciably effected decision making. Ultimately it was the group’s overall perceptions, preferred course of actions, and stand on the crisis that drove the *diplomacy first—strong military action* option. Fundamental was the perception that United States’ power and prestige was damaged. The resignation of President Nixon, the fall of Saigon, and the failed American diplomatic efforts to barter an agreement between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai were all indicators that America’s strength and influence were on the decline.

There was also a prevailing perception that the North Koreans would soon test the United States and that America would lack
the will to respond.\textsuperscript{25} The perception that the Mayaguez incident was an opportunity to regain some domestic and international credibility was on the forefront of every key player’s mind involved in the decision. Re-establishing credibility became the NSC’s central goal. Since gaining power and prestige was framed as the main strategic outcome of the Mayaguez crisis, swift and decisive military action was essentially the default decision of the group. As Graham Allison describes in his discussion of the Governmental Politics Model, use of military force increases as the number of decision makers have an initial personal preference for military force.\textsuperscript{26} This approach was especially true in the Mayaguez incident. In fact, none of key decision makers truly considered a diplomacy only option. The face of the issue was always presented from a position that necessitated military action—to stop another Pueblo incident. Additionally, the threat of the Mayaguez crew, as hostages, moving to the Cambodian mainland raised the stakes and created an artificial deadline to act fast. All these factors are indicative of the Governmental Politics Model.

\textit{Factors and impact on choice and action}

Since the NSC was a small decision-making group within the framework of the Governmental Politics Model, the factors impacting each player were minor. Power and influence over decision is the pivotal factor impacting choice and action. President Ford, at the helm of the NSC, held all the power. Other key players were relegated to influencing the decision by bargaining the degree and timings of military action. For example, Henry Kissinger supported the President’s desire for strong and quick military action; however, his desired course of action was much harsher and occurred along a faster time line than that supported by Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through skillful bargaining and a monopoly on the details of military action and preparation timelines, Schlesinger was successful in delaying the rescue operations by twenty-four hours and in using surgical military strikes on the Cambodian mainland instead of Kissinger’s preferred B-52 firepower demonstration. Another potentially significant factor affecting choice and action was the President’s decisions relative to the War Powers Act. The President deliberately excluded Congress from the decision-making process to preserve his freedom of action as the Commander-in-Chief. Despite legislation, the President only informed Congress of his actions after decisions were already made and, in some cases, military action was complete. This is another clear signal of Governmental Politics at play.

\textit{Action channels}

This model concludes with exploring the question of action channels as a means of aggregating competing positions. Normally, it is through the bureaucratic action channels that seemingly irrational decisions are explained; however, the Mayaguez incident presents the analyst with an action channel purposely designed to limit government bureaucracy. President Ford demonstrated his keen understanding of bureaucratic government by deliberately containing the debate and decision-making to the National Security Council, despite the availability of other standard decision-making organizations. This early action by the President exemplified a mastery of governmental politics. Leading the NSC himself, the President ensured only the most trusted of likeminded advisors were part of the process and guaranteed a favorable decision. This technique also ensured the President himself could take much of the
credit as a way to restore confidence in the leadership of the United States.

The United States arrived at a rational decision to rescue the SS Mayaguez as a result of choosing an option that best achieved the goals and objectives of the United States Government. However, the influence of governmental politics played a major role in the United States’ decision to launch a rescue operation in response to the Cambodian seizure. Furthermore, the preceding analysis reinforces Graham’s view that to really understand the myriad aspects of decisions, multiple decision-making models must be used to gain a more complete understanding. As Dr. Greg Miller discussed during a Joint Forces Staff College lecture, the decision-making models are like search engines. They help the analyst identify the significant causal factors and the resultant is a strengthening of the explanations and understanding of the issue.
Biofuels and the Defense Department: A Push Toward a Greener, More Secure Force

By LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and Maj Mark Enriques

Imagine a future conflict in which a deployed Marine purchases fuel for the unit’s light armored vehicles (LAVs) and power generators from a nearby village farm.Procuring local fuel strengthens counter-insurgency efforts by bringing prosperity to the village and reducing the number of fuel convoys and associated IED-casualties. Several months later, the Marine will return home on military and contract aircraft, all-consuming half the JP-8 traditionally burned and with reduced CO2 emissions. In another region, a formation of F/A-18s will return to its Carrier Strike Group, whose non-nuclear ships and helicopters will also consume half the traditional fuel amounts. The formation’s fuel burns so efficiently, the jets will take off with enough ordnance to negate a second formation, saving fuel and flight hours while reducing risk.

These scenarios are possible through continued military investment in sustainable biofuels. Biofuels provide the Department of Defense (DoD) an opportunity to reduce demand and improve the efficiency of operational energy in order to enhance combat effectiveness, and reduce risks and costs across the range of military operations. Therefore, the DoD must seek the comparative advantages afforded by biofuels and lead public and private sector efforts for the nation. To overcome the fiscal and political pressures preventing these realities, the DoD must expand current initiatives, garner Congressional support, and enable private sector and international investment.

The Problem

The Department of Defense is the largest single consumer of petroleum products in the world, although it only accounts for about one percent of the energy Americans use. In 2010, the DoD consumed more than five billion gallons of fuel in military operations at a cost of $13.2 billion, a 255 percent increase over 1997 costs. These high energy costs siphon resources away from training and equipping the Armed Forces. As the demand for energy grows, the reliability of global energy supplies is increasingly at risk. Transit and oil-producing nations, including those hostile to the interests of the United States and its Allies, can drive market and political volatility.

Likewise, the increase in demand for fuel increased vulnerabilities for logistics personnel. Potential disruption of fuel transport and supplies threaten battle space freedom of maneuver. Over 3,000 Army personnel and contractors were wounded or killed during attacks on fuel and water resupply convoys in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, ground convoys were attacked 1,100 times.2 Future adversaries, including those armed with precision weapons, may be even more capable of targeting military supplies.

The DoD Strategy

Energy availability costs and security are at the forefront of the challenges faced by the United States and the DoD. Prior to 2011, the DoD tended to treat energy as a commodity that would always be readily available, overlooking strategic, operational, tactical, and opportunity costs. In 2011, the DoD released an Energy Strategy outlining three principles to enable a stronger and
independent energy force: reduce the
demand for energy in military operations;
expand and secure the supply of energy for
military operations; and build energy
security into the future force. These goals
seek to improve military combat capability
and increase energy security by addressing a
significant military vulnerability:
dependence on foreign oil.

Energy security is the assured access to
reliable supplies of energy and the ability to
protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet
warfighting and installation needs.
Strategically, the goal is to reduce reliance
on fossil fuels. Tactically, the goal is to use
energy sources available on location and
improve energy efficiency. Both goals
increase military capability per energy input
and improve military range and endurance,
which will lead to increased force protection
and savings.

Flexibility and sustainability link directly to
energy access. Heavy fuel dependency is a
concern for every warfighter whose tactics in
the battle space are limited by the range
and endurance of ships, aircraft, or tactical
vehicles. As previously stated, the need to
provide fuel to tactical forces requires a
long, and often vulnerable, logistics tail.
This support requirement draws forces from
combat operations and potentially exposes
them to hostile action. These additional
requirements for securing and transporting
fuel to tactical forces effectively increase the
cost of fuel to what is called the “fully-
burdened cost of fuel.” Although fuel
constraints may not be eliminated entirely,
targeted investments in energy efficiency
lengthen the “fuel tether,” enhancing combat
capability, and providing more options to
Joint Force Commanders. In a networked
alternative fuels chain, significant potential
exists to improve partner nation capabilities,
reduce the risk to forces, and improve the

Navy

The Navy successfully showcased its
alternative fuels program during the Rim of
the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise
demonstration in 2012. This “Great Green
Fleet” operated with no degradation of
performance or mission using a “drop-in”
biofuels blend. The two-day demonstration
premiered the first biofuel-powered carrier
landing and first biofuel refueling of an
underway destroyer. The fuel was a 50/50
mixture of biofuels (derived from cooking
oil and algae) blended with traditional fossil
fuels. As drop-in alternatives become more
readily available, the Navy will make them a
regular part of its bulk fuel procurement.

The RIMPAC exercise was the initial
stepping-stone to a future Great Green Fleet,
which will continue using alternative energy
sources, including biofuel blends and
nuclear power. Significant energy
conservation measures will be a part of
regularly scheduled deployments throughout
2016. The exercise also demonstrated other
energy-saving initiatives, such as the use of
solid state lighting, changes to engineering
maintenance procedures to increase fuel
efficiencies, a shipboard energy dashboard,
smart voyage planning decision aids, and
structural changes to ships to reduce drag
and hull resistance. Although biofuels did
not drive these efficiencies, their
advancements represent investments into
future operational energy savings.

Building upon the success of the RIMPAC
exercise, the Departments of the Navy,
Energy, and Agriculture, as directed by a
2011 Presidential Directive, awarded three contracts to construct and commission bio-refineries capable of producing drop-in biofuels to meet the transportation needs of the military and private sector. In total, the projects will produce more than 100 million gallons of military grade fuel beginning in 2016 and 2017 at a price competitive with their petroleum counterparts. The 2020 goal is to use alternative sources for half of all energy consumption afloat, which will require nearly 300 million gallons of biofuels.

The Department of the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture subsequently entered into a 20- to 30-year public-private initiative that builds upon the synergy of developing a competitive, advanced biofuels industry compatible with the military infrastructure. Each agency plans to provide $170 million, for a total of $510 million to support this initiative. It is predicted the shift to synthetic fuels will result in the most significant step in jump-starting the manufacture and use of synthetic fuels within the broader U.S. economy and partner nations.

**Marine Corps**

Although the Marine Corps defers to the Navy as the lead for the DoD’s Operational Energy Strategy target to promote the development of alternative fuels, they are pressing forward with Secretary Mabus’ vision. The Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office examines alternative fuels and ways to reduce operational energy requirements, critical to expeditionary operations from combat to humanitarian assistance.

While the MV-22 has flight-tested biofuels successfully, Marine biofuel testing has focused on light armored vehicles (LAVs) and power generators. In 2010, the Naval Surface Warfare Center began measuring LAV performance using biofuels. At nearly 500 vehicles, LAV fleet represents a significant part of the Marine Corps motor pool. The year-long test proved the 20/80 biofuel and diesel or jet fuel blends did not cause long-term damage, even after sitting for extended periods time.

During the same period, the Expeditionary Energy Office successfully tested power generators using cottonseed oil blended with JP-8 at Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan. While using the least amount of fuel of the services, Marines used 200,000 gallons per day in Afghanistan. Procuring fuel from local sources to power their vehicles and generators could significantly reduce resources, both lives and dollars, required to transport, store, and protect fuel.

**Air Force**

Within the DoD, the Air Force consumes 48 percent of the petroleum procured. Of that, 81 percent goes to aviation. Acknowledging how the volume of consumed fuel impacts operations, the Air Force set a goal in 2006 to reduce aviation fuel usage by 10 percent by 2015. Efforts to promote awareness, innovation, and adopt commercial airline efficiencies were extremely effective as they reached that goal in early 2013, saving $1.5 billion in 2012. Future efforts and associated savings require more emphasis on the Air Force’s strategic approach to assure supply through the increased use of alternative aviation fuels.

The Air Force has completed certification that all of its aircraft can operate on a 50/50 biofuel blend. The Thunderbirds demonstration team performed a full show in May, 2011 using a biofuel blend, showcasing the ability to fly on biofuels.
without a loss of performance.\textsuperscript{21} Air Force investment has advanced biofuels development with several other milestones: the first supersonic flight, first transcontinental flight, and first air-refueling using biofuels blends.\textsuperscript{22}

The next step could be encouraging partner nations to certify their aircraft to use biofuel blends, particularly those who fly American-built aircraft, air-refuel with U.S. tankers, or heavily rely on U.S. fuel during expeditionary operations. This certification would be in line with objectives to ensure interoperability with international partners,\textsuperscript{23} and would enhance future planning for air-refueling and basing. Some foreign militaries, such as the Royal Netherlands Air Force, have already certified biofuel aircraft, and a technical review may be the only requirement for interoperability approval.\textsuperscript{24}

A potential future military advantage biofuel could provide aviation is in the area of “super-fuels” such as JP-10. JP-10 is 11 percent more efficient than JP-8, but it’s hard to produce, which increases costs. As a result, JP-10 is currently restricted to air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles only. Last year, however, Naval Air Warfare Center researchers reported synthesizing “a fuel that had JP-10esque [thermal munits] properties from a blend of biobased terpenes” (hydrocarbons found in aromatherapy plants).\textsuperscript{25} Increasing the production and lowering the price of JP-10 is not viable in the near-term. However, if terpenes can be engineered to improve the storage of and release of fuel, and proponents estimate a potential to produce 500 gallons of JP-10 per acre,\textsuperscript{26} the military advantage for aviation would be considerable. For example, an 11 percent increase in efficiency would provide a fully-fueled F/A-18 an extra 3,200 pounds of carrying capacity, the equivalent of 16 additional Sidewinders, five Mavericks, or two stand-off land attack missiles (SLAMs).\textsuperscript{27}

**Army**

Like the Marine Corps, the Army is not as platform-centered as the Navy and Air Force, and thus presently focuses its green initiatives toward installations. This focus on installations makes sense as the Army is the largest facility energy consumer in the Federal government, spending $1.25 billion in FY2012.\textsuperscript{28} In February, the Army “began its long-awaited process for signing up to $7 billion in renewable energy contracts over the next 10 years.”\textsuperscript{29} With these contracts, the Army Energy Initiatives Task Force (AEITF) aims to derive at least 25 percent of the electricity consumed by renewable energy by 2025. The AEITF focuses on five categories of renewable energies: solar-photovoltaic, wind, geothermal, biomass (that makes biofuel), and other alternative energy technologies.

Through a promising public-private initiative, the Army has agreed to long-term land lease to the Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) to build, operate, and maintain a 50 MW biofuel-capable power generation plant. The plant could begin operations in 2017 using blends of liquid biofuels and natural gas, reducing dependence on oil and coal-based electricity.\textsuperscript{30} The plant would give Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Airfield, and Field Station Kunia, whose combined load averages 22.4 MW, priority in the event of a grid outage. Additionally, its “fast back-up” capacity will allow for quick start-up and shut-down, improving integration with intermittent solar and wind facilities around the island. The plant will also have a “black start” capability, meaning it does not rely on the external power grid during a blackout.
This feature is especially important in supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and municipalities during natural disasters.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, while not focused on developing aviation biofuels, the Army is posturing to use them. Earlier this year, the Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center completed flight tests of a UH-60A Black Hawk using a 50/50 alcohol-to-jet biofuel and JP-8 blend. In September, the CH-47 Chinook completed its first successful flight.\textsuperscript{32} These flights, like the other Services’, showed neither loss of performance nor ill-effects to engines.

Startups

One of the many beneficiaries of the DoD’s biofuel initiatives is the continued growth of biofuel technology startup companies. History reveals that military necessity has often been the driver of innovation in technology: from the beginning of mass production and metallurgy through the nuclear age and into the Internet age. There are several startups in the biofuel field that are using military necessity to drive further research. Funded with $85 million from Bill Gates and other investors, plus $104 million in Government cash and loan guarantees, Sapphire Energy is the world’s only commercial outdoor algae biorefinery.\textsuperscript{33} Sapphire’s initial goal is to extract 1.5 million gallons of crude oil from algae and to be price competitive by 2018.

Another startup is Solazyme, which helped produce some of the 450,000 gallons of biofuel used during RIMPAC 2012. Growing algae in bioreactors with sugar and excrete crude oil, the biofuel produced by Solazyme produced aviation quality drop-in fuel already in use. In May [2012], Dow Chemical said it would tap a strain of Solazyme algae oil for use in electrical transformer insulating fluids. In addition, a “spin-off” of Solazyme’s biofuel research led to the discovery of additional strains of algae that provide food sources that could replace eggs and butter in a variety of foods.\textsuperscript{34}

Opposition

Despite the substantial investment the DoD has made into biofuels, the recent progress in the industry, and potential military benefits, opponents wish to curb further military investment. Critics repeatedly cite a 2011 RAND monograph, sponsored by the Defense Logistics Agency, stressing that biofuels “offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts.” The monograph argues that current fuel supplies will not expire in the foreseeable future, and during a crisis, price increases would cause consumers to use less, and supplies would remain available. The RAND argument centers on three reasons: cost, supply, and politics.

Currently, cost is the most significant hindrance to biofuels. Although the RAND monograph concludes with the curious remark that, “As long as the military is willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to have a problem getting the fuel it requires,”\textsuperscript{35} the U.S. military is neither willing nor able to absorb higher prices without strategic or operational risk. With that in mind, however, present fiscal constraints mean that for each dollar spent on emerging biofuel technology or research is a dollar that cannot be spent on training, readiness, and other acquisitions. Notably, the RIMPAC exercise consumed one million gallons of the 50/50 blend, at a cost of $13 million, nearly four times the cost of petroleum.\textsuperscript{36} Air Force tests used biofuels
costing up to $150 per gallon. While these initial biofuels costs are staggering, such “fuels premiums” are also affected by the volatility of petroleum. For example, from FY04 to FY05, Navy expenditures for fuel increased by 55 percent while consumption only increased by one percent over the same period. That $912 million single-year increase in Navy fuels expenditures could cover the funds for 7,000 personnel or three littoral combat ships.

The cost of the drop-in biofuel is considerably higher than its petroleum counterpart, for now. Securing a fuel source at a consistent price and in high supply will provide strategic and tactical advantages, such as reduce foreign oil dependency, decrease supply line vulnerability, and increase operational capabilities. Regardless of the cause of high prices, it is clear that the DoD would benefit from price stable domestically produced biofuels for today and in the future.

Limited supply and production of biofuels is another argument against further military investment. The 2011 RAND monograph states, “Because of limited production potential, fuels derived from animal fats, waste oils, and seed oils will never have a significant role in the larger domestic, commercial marketplace. Algae-derived fuels might, but technology development challenges suggest that algae-derived fuels will not constitute an important fraction of the commercial fuel market until well beyond the next decade.” Specifically, animal fats and waste oil feedstocks are likely limited to 30,000 barrels per day. Vegetable oil feedstocks would be limited to 200,000 barrels per day and require an area equal to 10 percent of croplands currently cultivated in the U.S. Algae feedstock would require “large investments in R&D” before determining cost and environmental impacts.

Production quantity is an important consideration and will likely prove prohibitive for some types of biofuels. However, limited production potential of biofuels should not deter the DoD from exploiting a possible opportunity. The DoD must commit to large investments in technology R&D, especially for technology beyond the next decade. If the United States can develop algae-derived biofuel, there will literally be oceans of sustainable fuel for military and commercial consumption.

The last argument by opponents is politics. In a somewhat strange twist, the military’s push for greener and less dependent energy sources has put them at odds with some of their staunchest allies in Congress. Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee assess the directive to the Navy, Energy and Agriculture Departments as undermining Defense priorities, and trying to “use our military as a piggy bank to fund the President’s domestic energy agenda.” As evidence, they point to bankrupt solar-panel maker Solyndra. Still, “more than 70 percent of insiders say the DoD’s move to use more biofuels will survive congressional opposition, arguing lawmakers will have trouble saying no to the Pentagon.”

Draft Defense spending bills in each of the past two years have included language cutting biofuel expenditures and research though that language has been removed each time during final negotiations and voting. The DoD military and civilian leaders will likely continue pushing Congress for continued research and expenditures into biofuels for the foreseeable future.
Final Thoughts

Perhaps the greatest impediment to biofuel acceptance is the skepticism often associated with emerging technologies. The Navy’s shift from coal to oil over 100 years ago is an example of dangerous skepticism of emerging technology with respect to cost, supply, and politics. In 1897, the Navy began testing marine engines using oil fuel but was very slow to adopt them for remarkably similar arguments presented against biofuels. In his 1902 annual report, Engineer in Chief of the Navy stated the following:

It may be regarded as a certainty that, except wherein unusual conditions prevail, the cost of oil for marine purposes will generally be greater than that of coal […] As regards to the question of supply, it may be more expensive if not difficult to transport and to store oil than coal […] The mining and railroad companies have invested so heavily in the coal industry and the transportation facilities have been so perfected that it is now possible to quickly deliver a cargo of coal at any point in the world […] Since it will require progressive development to perfect the transportation and the storage of oil, and as the world’s supply is still an unknown quantity, it will leave some time before there may be a reserve supply of oil at the principle seaports […] The military aspect of the establishment of fuel stations may prove to be a serious problem, since it may not only necessitate heavy expenditures, but may involve the greater political question as to the wisdom of maintaining a complete chain of fuel stations between country and colony.43

In addition to the increased infrastructure and decreased cost, oil could be stored throughout the ship and eliminated stokers and half the required engine tenders. Yet even after accepting the use of oil by all navies as “inevitable,” Navy Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering expressed “fear of a failure of the supply,” the uncertainty of which “might develop into condition menacing the mobility of the whole fleet and safety of the nation.”44 History and the world’s current dependence on oil prove how wrong these leaders were and should guard present leaders’ reliance on potential estimates of cost and supply.

Private sector investment is another indication that biofuel development is not a DoD folly. In 2008, Virgin Atlantic flew the first commercial aircraft using a 20/80 biofuel/kerosene mixture in one of four engines. In 2009, Continental Airlines demonstrated the first U.S. biofuels flight using a 50/50 blend of algae-derived biofuel. 2011 saw United complete the first commercial revenue flight on biofuel.45 As well as uncertainty about future fuel costs, expected carbon-emission caps drive commercial airline actions. As such, the “industry as a whole has set for itself two goals to address emissions and fuel use: Achieve carbon-neutral growth beginning in 2020 and reduce carbon dioxide emissions 50 percent by 2050 compared with 2005 levels.”46

Energy is essential for developing and employing U.S. combat capability in support of national security interests. Energy security provides the Joint Force with the ability to assure access to reliable supplies of energy, and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.47 Volatile oil markets and shrinking U.S. Defense budgets call for a balancing of missions and resources. Biofuels present a path to reliable, cost-effective, and sustainable alternatives to stabilize fuel costs and provide military operational advantages. While biofuel technology has a way to go before cost and supply are equivalent to
fossil fuels, it is clear the DoD can, and must, continue to research and develop innovative ways to fuel the force. Domestically-grown or locally-sourced sustainable fuels creates a stabilizing effect for the DoD in a dynamic, fiscally-austere environment.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Office of the Chief of Information. *Departments of the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture Invest in Construction of Three Biorefineries to Produce Drop-In Biofuel for Military.* 2014.
17 Lombardo, "Corps Tests Biofuels in Vehicles, Generators.*
18 Lawlor, "Marines Go Green.*
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
39 Bartis and Van Bibber, *Alternative Fuels for Military Applications*.
46 Ibid.

Team Biographies

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The Conventional Force and Irregular Warfare: How the Conventional Force Can Relieve Mission Pressure on Special Operations Forces

By LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas

The American military has a habit of forgetting the lessons it learns in irregular warfare (IW). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the United States to learn, or in many cases relearn, how to wage IW. The Department of Defense (DoD), in envisioning a post-Afghanistan military, must inculcate the lessons learned from 14 years of fighting IW. As the primary IW force provider, Special Operations Forces (SOF) will struggle to source all of the requirements as operations shift from large-scale counter-insurgency operations (COIN), such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, to smaller intra-state IW conflicts. To meet the future demands of IW and COIN, the DoD must use conventional forces to reduce the burden on SOF personnel.

In the decades between the Vietnam War and the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan (OEF) in 2001, IW was a niche mission set for SOF. Today, IW is a commonplace task for conventional as well as SOF forces because of the importance of COIN operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world. With IW becoming an increasingly important mission, conventional forces must maintain their capability to support future IW operations. A greater conventional force role in IW necessitates the clear delineation of the roles the SOF will conduct and the roles conventional forces will assume.

The Environment

Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. military exorcised the lessons of IW as fast as possible in an effort to refocus on force-on-force warfare. The exception to this effort was within the SOF community, which retained its IW focus as part of its broader mission set. For the next 30 years or so, irregular warfare, or more specifically counterinsurgency warfare, was viewed as a niche capability at best by the Services.

During the first decade of the 21st Century, the United States found itself attempting to fight counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan using conventional warfare methods. The lack of IW doctrine and training in the U.S. conventional force’s mission set resulted in the creation of ad hoc elements unable to address the challenges resident in nations mired in insurgencies. These ad hoc elements, such as the Military Transition Teams (MTTs) and Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I), were expected to accomplish the enormous task of creating and training foreign security forces without the requisite training or expertise.

The DoD’s failure to institutionalize previous IW lessons learned came with a high cost of blood and national treasure. This same approach, relying on the creation of ad hoc IW response mechanisms in times of crisis, is not an option for future U.S. security operations. Acknowledging this fact, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, “Although our forces will
no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The DoD must ascertain how the U.S. military will organize following its drawdown in Afghanistan to ensure IW capabilities remain and continue to develop.

Fourteen years of war and the concomitant military spending, along with a sluggish economy, have depleted Government coffers, leaving the DoD to face significant budgetary constraints. In turn, these budgetary constraints are forcing policymakers to determine how and when the U.S. will employ its forces in the future. This fiscal reality has already resulted in a reduction in U.S. military forces as a cost-saving measure. Unfortunately, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) predicts the requirements and demand for SOF will grow following the completion of the Afghanistan mission. Already undermanned, USSOCOM further describes the negative impact of frequent deployments on SOF personnel to maintain their skill set.

This nexus of increased requirements and decreasing budgets sets up a supply and demand cycle that is likely to remain unbalanced if the DoD does not pursue an alternative solution to the status quo. If, as USSOCOM predicts, the demand for SOF increases, who fills the shortfall? If budgetary constraints restrict or preclude the growth of SOF, will SOF continue to provide the responsive force the nation has grown to expect? Although the third SOF truth states, “SOF cannot be mass produced,” not all traditional SOF mission sets requires the same level of training and expertise. Therefore, it follows that if operational requirements will increase and SOF personnel levels will remain the same, conventional forces will be required to cover this shortfall.

In a resource-constrained environment, both SOF and conventional forces gain from this symbiotic relationship. If conventional forces demonstrate a capability to meet increased IW demands, this relieves SOF from the worst aspects of its high operations and personnel tempo. In addition, this increased conventional force capability provides the DoD with an incentive to retain conventional force levels capable of executing both missions. Naturally, the conventional force must remain available in sufficient quantity when a conventional conflict becomes necessary. A properly constructed advisory corps could quickly transition to the structure of a conventional force.

Roles

A review of the relevant doctrine reveals that, while acknowledging some part for conventional forces in IW, there is a dearth of guidance on what specific roles SOF and the conventional force will assume. This specification is important since SOF and conventional forces could find themselves building similar capacity while other capabilities go unsourced. In his 2008 Command and General Staff College thesis, Major Joseph Escandon addressed the issue of IW roles. Escandon observed that a process existed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff (JS) to identify those missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that SOF would conduct while the remaining missions...
would fall to the conventional forces to conduct. Escandon described the process as reactive and dependent upon a “formula” based on criteria and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense.8

Although this process solved the immediate problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not likely to translate into the context of future conflicts. However, the DoD could create a new formula to assign roles during future conflicts, this approach would facilitate the continuance of the current reactive process rather than transitioning to a proactive one. A proactive process prepares conventional forces for IW before a crisis rather than simply backfilling the missions SOF is unable to fill. A clear delineation of roles for SOF and conventional forces in doctrine will provide conventional force leaders the ability to identify training requirements and understand what roles their force will undertake. This approach changes the way in which SOF and conventional forces interact, improving the synergy between the forces, increasing capabilities, and enhancing trust. Another benefit of this approach is that of economy of force. If conventional forces are prepared for IW environments, less SOF may be required, which frees those forces up for other requirements or training opportunities.

To determine how conventional forces can best complement SOF IW capabilities, it is first necessary to understand SOF operations and missions. In short, what makes Special Operations “special”? The Joint definition of Special Operations states, “Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.”9 This definition describes “special” criteria that fall into three broad categories: operations requiring specific equipment; operations requiring specialized skills or training; and operations involving risk. Risk can be further refined into two parts: political risk and risk to forces conducting the operation. These categories highlight the traditional SOF missions of unconventional warfare (risk), training foreign nation SOF personnel (specialized training and, in most cases, specialized equipment), and counterterrorism.

In conflicts characterized by conventional actions, SOF augments and complements the missions of conventional forces. In an IW environment, the SOF and the conventional force need to flip the supported and supporting relationship around in which SOF conducts IW actions with conventional force augmentation. The fifth SOF Truth captures this idea that, “most special operations require non-SOF assistance.”10 This SOF Truth reminds us that SOF actions create the greatest effects when complemented by capabilities provided by others such as conventional forces, host nation forces, or other U.S. government institutions.
Applications for Conventional Forces in IW

How would the practical application of conventional forces in an IW role function? Historical aviation foreign internal defense (FID) presents an interesting case study for analysis. Top U.S. Air Force leaders recognized the need for continuing aviation FID focused on IW capabilities. The former Secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. Donley, and the former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, stated, “…the Air Force must balance the requirements levied upon airpower in IW with the concurrent need to maintain decisive advantage in conventional warfare.” Immediately upon acknowledging the need for IW airpower, the first tension is uncovered at the Service Component level. It is a balancing game; something must give within the Air Force conventional warfare model to meet IW requirements. An additional question arises at the Service level. Is this IW force a standing force or should the Service develop the capability as needed for contingencies? To find the answer, three areas are assessed: requirements; historical precedent; and the shortfalls between those requirements and current force structure.

Requirements

There are two reports providing broad requirements for conventional force participation in IW roles. The first report is from the Joint Staff–J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Section titled Decade of War: Enduring Lessons From The Past Decade Of Operations. This key report identifies several solutions to enhance CF and SOF integration of which solution number two is noteworthy for this discussion. “Establish habitual training and mission relationships: maintain events that will allow SOF–[CF] to train together, expand those events beyond pre-deployment training and develop [CF] with a regional focus and a habitual relationship with corresponding theater special operations commands.” The second report is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) IW Execution Roadmap that states the priority is to “transform the way DOD manages its military and civilian personnel to meet IW operational requirements.” The roadmap elaborates further that general-purpose forces must “rebalance capabilities and capacity to conduct…long duration counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign security forces; and foster the development of civil society and effective governance in ungoverned and under-governed areas.”

Shortfalls

Three categories of struggles reveal themselves when examining U.S. conventional forces: capability, ambiguity, and relevancy. Regarding the struggle with capability, the 2010 QDR identified some consistent capability shortfalls for training partner aviation forces. As a solution, DoD intended to double its current capacity by 2012. The struggle with the ambiguity of the IW environment and the conventional force mindset revealed itself through the Unified Quest 2007 & 2008 concept exercises. The teams noted, “…the challenges of building IW campaigns demonstrated the discomfort and confusion of [conventional force]
players when forced to wrestle with the ambiguity inherent in IW.”18 The teams found that while many of the IW tasks they perform are essentially the same, the conditions under which they perform them are different.19

Finally, and possibly most significant, is the struggle with relevancy. By employing conventional forces to meet IW training requirements, either for a particular skill set or only during a particular phase, the advantage of developed relationships and cultural awareness so significant to SOF success in the IW environment is lost. For example, for ARSOF to conduct its missions, its units receive extensive foreign language training, are regionally oriented, are attuned to cultural customs, values and traditions, and are sensitive to the political implications and national interests that their decisions and actions affect.20 These attributes, amplified by persistent engagement with foreign forces, allow a more interactive relationship to form, enhancing the training of foreign forces and promoting a greater unity of effort within government at all levels.21 These three struggles of capability, ambiguity, and relevancy present a significant challenge in the transformation of applying conventional forces to IW missions and require paradigm shifts in structure, training, and employment.

**Solutions**

The military as a whole must acknowledge that the IW and the capacity-building mission are enduring missions.22 For the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force Donley and Air Force Chief of Staff Schwartz acknowledged this, but this understanding must work its way further down the Service’s chain of command. The Air Force must develop leaders who have a clear understanding of irregular airpower application. That leadership is critical to closing the gap between desire and capability.23 The Service needs permanent solutions to meet the demands of general-purpose forces waging IW.24 An irregular warfare capable force can be developed relatively inexpensively from the existing combat structure within the Service. A standing IW force, equipped with an inventory of inexpensive aircraft, common to the regions SOF are employed in and designed to meet a variety of IW requirements, should be manned by personnel that have proper IW education and language training.25 The training provided to foreign nations should “also emphasize irregular concepts and training…based on the needs of partner nations.”26 Furthermore, “conventional and IW training, to include cultural awareness training, must be taught side–by–side at all levels of professional development.”27

**Identification, Recruitment, Training and Retention**

Establishing an enduring conventional force capability to conduct irregular warfare as directed in the 2014 QDR will require institutional mechanisms to identify, recruit, train and retain conventional advisors.28 Conventional forces provide great value in the irregular warfare realm and can relieve SOF of some of the burden for a growing mission set. It appears clear that the Services, the Army in particular, will face personnel reductions in the coming years. Maintaining a credible IW capability lends additional relevance to
Selecting the right personnel to conduct the IW mission from within the pool of conventional forces has historically been a challenge. It is neither desirable nor realistic to create a SOF-like level of IW proficiency within the conventional force. It takes a great deal of time and expense to create a SOF operator and making the conventional force more “SOF-like” would inevitably make SOF less “Special.” Those in the conventional force who are good fits for the SOF community end up there frequently and diluting the role of SOF would simply make the community less effective. However, there are certain characteristics that make some personnel more suitable for the IW mission than others. As Robert Ramsey points out in a paper for the Combat Studies Institute Press, “Careful selection and screening of advisory personnel is required. Not everybody can or should do advisory duty.”

Conventional forces performing IW missions are typically performing advisory roles that require different skill sets and temperament from those of the combat soldier. An effective advisor should be culturally aware, comfortable operating within the local population or indigenous security forces, exhibit firepower restraint, and possess an ability to train others. IW requires a level of adaptability neither commonly practiced nor valued in the combat arms-focused conventional forces.

Recognizing the importance of advising it is critical that the Services develop criteria by which they can identify those sailors, soldiers, airmen, Marines, and coast guardsman who would be good advisors. Such criteria might be similar but not identical to those used to select SOF. The standards cannot be as stringent and might include experience in training roles, empathy, problem-solving ability, and adaptability. Much of the literature on IW indicates that foreign language proficiency is critical to success in the IW mission. Unfortunately, as often as not, the advisor is not even working with a foreign military that speaks the language in which the SOF operator has trained. Therefore, while foreign language proficiency is certainly desirable, it is not a realistic objective for conventional forces personnel prior to specific training. The Services, however, should identify those individuals who have a moderate aptitude for learning new languages and, more importantly, a willingness to learn. The willingness of the Services to send high performing individuals with the motivation to perform the IW mission is critical to the success of the IW mission. Too often, as pointed out by Andrew Krepinevich during his 2007 testimony before Congress on the future role of ground forces, the “soldiers sent by the Army to serve as advisors are the men it can most easily afford to do without.”

Recruitment and retention within the conventional force must be linked closely to the IW mission. There is a well-documented gap concerning incentives within the traditional conventional force to recruit and retain the most qualified advisors. The perception within the Services, and the Army in particular, is that promotion boards tend to favor those soldiers who serve in conventional U.S. units over those performing advisory roles with...
foreign units. If the conventional force is to sustain a credible and effective IW capability, the Service must change its cultural ethos to value IW capabilities as much as conventional warfighting capabilities. To facilitate promotion and retention, John Nagl of the Center for a New American Security has argued for creating a separate advisory corps within the conventional force that has designated career enhancing key developmental positions.

While the concept of an advisory corps is likely both personnel and cost prohibitive, what if the advisor corps was created from within existing Service organizations? Advisors could come from a BCT, a Navy helicopter squadron, or an Air Force security forces squadron, for example. This approach certainly poses challenges to unit leadership, particularly in the BCT where the unit might lose a sizeable portion of its officer and NCO corps, thus degrading the unit’s ability to deploy in the combat mission. There are several solutions to this problem. First, DoD could create teams from within the pool of advisors within different units, decreasing the impact on each unit. Second, DoD could simply assume the risk that units providing officers and NCOs to serve in advisory roles could be at lower level of readiness. If, as many predict, IW becomes an increasingly important mission set over the next decade, it might be worth assuming the risk in order to build a cadre of advisors who are motivated to join and remain available for the IW mission. While the promotion and evaluation systems differ from Service to Service, the Services could provide direction or policy that would reward performance in IW missions.

Recruiting and retaining the right people is still not going to create the desired effect absent an effective training mechanism to ensure that conventional IW advisors are capable and professional. There are two key aspects to developing this mechanism for acculturation. First, the training curriculum must address the key skills required by a conventional advisor: cultural awareness, language ability, firepower restraint, advisory skills, knowledge of how to interact with civic leaders, and small-unit force protection capabilities. The second is having the right trainers. No doubt, there are experienced trainers within the conventional force; however, the primary expertise for the IW mission resides within SOF. DoD should create a joint SOF-conventional force IW training capability that leverages the expertise of both SOF and the conventional force, and it appears there may be movement in this direction. In a September 11, 2014 speech General Joseph Votel, Commander USSOCOM, discussed the need to improve SOF-conventional interoperability and cited the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, where most COIN training occurs, as an example of improvements.

**Conclusion**

In the end, it all comes back to the fifth SOF Truth, “most special operations require non-SOF assistance.” The IW mission will remain an important one in shaping the security environment across the globe, and will require the combined efforts of SOF and conventional forces. Although, the conventional force has a history of conducting IW, it remains a mission set specific to SOF expertise. As the DoD looks to relieve the IW burden
on SOF, it should look to the conventional force to supplement SOF capability for missions that do not involve unconventional warfare, training of foreign SOF, or counterterrorism. The Services can meet this demand by identifying specific areas in which they can contribute such as aviation FID or SFA. Once the Defense Department has identified relevant mission sets, the Services, working with USSOCOM, should develop policies and programs to identify, recruit, train and retain IW advisors. This approach will not be without some risk and cultural resistance within DoD, but it is an effort worth undertaking to ensure that SOF capability and capacity can meet the future demands of the global security environment.

9 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 2010. In contrast the Joint Definition for Conventional Forces is, 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 3.
16 Ibid.
17 Coons and Harned, 4.
18 Ibid., 5
19 Ibid., 6.
20 O’Brien, 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Hock Jr., 5.
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Coons and Harned, 7.
25 Hock Jr., 2.
26 Ibid., 5.
27 Austin, 1.
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Team Biographies

Lieutenant Commander John Dolby, USN. LCDR Dolby is currently serving as the Basing and Posture Branch Chief,
Putin's Peninsula?
How United States and NATO Policy Paved the Way to Crimea

By CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Joseph Bincarousky Sr., and Lt Col Todd Hoover

It is incumbent on the military professional to constantly assess the strategic environment to inform national strategy, policy, and planning. In the words of Sun Tzu, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” Without a comprehensive, recurring assessment of the environment, the military professional cannot effectively fulfill his or her duties. With this in mind, military professionals in the United States and Europe are asking, “What’s going on in Ukraine, and what’s next?”

Though the United States and Russia are not at war, readers are reminded that conflict exists well before violence begins, driving the military professional to continuously understand and assess the peacetime conflict environment in hopes of preventing and avoiding violent action or war. Following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States and NATO became key players in Ukraine’s development as well as its current unfortunate situation. In understanding and assessing the current situation in Ukraine, the real or imagined role NATO and the United States factor into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision making. When attempting to make sense of the Russia/Ukraine conflict and to frame the situation, the issue must be viewed from the perspectives of four major players: Putin, the United States, NATO, and Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin

Dr. Jerrold Post, Former Director of the CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior described profiling as, “perhaps most important in cases where you have a leader who dominates the society, who can act virtually without constraint.” In the case of Putin, he sits atop a self-created pyramid (or vertical) of authoritarian control, and is surrounded by an inner circle of sycophants “who want to give him only good news.” Furthermore, Putin is the “most experienced leader of a major world power.” One consequence of this experience, as offered by Mr. Dimitri Simes, president of the Center for National Interest, is that Putin’s experience in international affairs coupled with his domestic control makes it so “there are few to whom he will turn for advice.” Understanding his current position within Russia and the world, however, does not tell the whole story. Therefore a closer analysis of this intriguing and infuriating world leader is required.

So, who is Mr. Putin? When Trudy Rubin of the Philadelphia Inquirer asked a group of “prominent Russian politicians and businessmen,” he did not receive an answer; instead, he received a long pause. That is perhaps a fitting response, considering Putin has been referred to as “the man without a face,” or the “man from nowhere.” The best person to ask might be Putin himself: In fact, I have had a very simple life. Everything is an open book. I finished school and went to university. I graduated from university and went to the KGB. I finished the KGB and went back to university. After university, I went to work for Sobchak. From Sobchak, to Moscow and to the General Department. Then to the Presidential Administration. From there, to the FSB. Then I was appointed Prime
Minister. Now I’m Acting President. That’s it!10

If only it were that simple! In their book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy analyzed Putin from not only his multiple PR stunts, but also from the remarkable strength he displayed in his first two terms as Russia’s president.11 They concluded that Putin is the amalgamation of six individual identities: the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the Case Officer.12 While none of these identities dominates Putin’s persona, they provide an extremely useful lens to understand his interactions with the Russian people, his near-abroad, and his major competitors/adversaries, both internal and external.

The remarkable and seemingly overlooked factor about Putin is addressed in his Statist identity; he is a Russian at heart—not a Soviet! He does not yearn for the good, old days of the Soviet Union. While he did state, “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century,” in his 2005 annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, his remarks had nothing to do with the impact on the Soviet Union and everything to do with the impact on Russia and Russians. In other words, the bad thing about the collapse of the Soviet Union was the pain it caused Mother Russia and her children.

With that in mind, Putin sees himself as the best option for Russia’s future: “his historical mission has been to assert himself as the country’s singular, irreplaceable leader and to reclaim Russia’s globe-bestriding status.”14 Whether he is in it for personal gain or ego could be logically deduced, it would not eliminate his fervent desire to see Russia reemerge as a global power, and to see the Rus Empire regain its former glory. Putin is sharply focused on the “full restoration of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and recognition by the West that this is indeed Russia’s rightful ‘sphere of privileged interests.’”15 Perhaps most interesting post-Crimea is that Putin may no longer be able to distinguish fact from fiction. Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, puts it quite well: “the frightening thing is that he appears to believe his own propaganda and lies.”16

To understand Putin, one must also address his views of the West, particularly the United States and NATO. Putin, when Acting President of Russia over 13 years ago, summed these views up succinctly, “we cannot forget that NATO and Europe are not one and the same thing. And I’ve already said that Russia is a country of European culture—not NATO culture.”17 Furthermore, Putin opines, “The founding fathers of NATO fear that their organization would change drastically [were Russia to join NATO]. From our perspective, it would change for the better, and from theirs, possibly for the worse.”18 It is possible he harbors lingering animosity toward NATO from the Cold War; or, maybe NATO just is not being led the way he thinks it should.

Beyond his opinions of and feelings toward NATO, lies his relationship with the United States, the “one single power.”19 He sees the United States as economically and morally weak.20 He sees a pattern of hypocrisy as he considers U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria as well as alleged U.S. behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Georgia and Ukraine.21 Moreover, Putin believes NATO and U.S. actions in Kosovo and Yugoslavia were illegal.22 In other words, he does not believe the United States is in any
position to criticize any of his actions. Furthermore, as the United States and the West have humiliated Russia, it is his job to protect Russia “from its geopolitical rivals—above all, the United States and the European Union.” Putin “sees himself as a giant among weaklings,” and the United States and NATO have not done much to convince him otherwise except bombard him with phone calls and levy soft economic sanctions.

**NATO**

While no formal declaration of an enemy or adversary is written into the Washington Treaty of 1949, it is not difficult to determine who NATO’s de facto enemy was, “When we pay our taxes, when we undergo our military training, when we make the sacrifices which we are making to remain free, let us place the blame where it belongs, on the men in the Kremlin.” When the Soviet Union applied for admittance, the response from Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, says it all, “the Soviet request to join NATO is like an unrepentant burglar requesting to join the police force.” Lastly, in a lecture covering what NATO is and how it works, Lord Ismay offered his thoughts on the origin of NATO when he stated that the Soviets “got under their control one by one, the countries of Eastern Europe….It became obvious that unless something was done to restore the balance of military and economic power, there was no reason why the States of Western Europe should not also be gobbled up.” It is clear from the NATO record and the Alliance’s experience with the Soviet Union after World War II that NATO’s de facto enemy was a ground truth of the alliance. Then, somewhat abruptly and perhaps accidentally in November 1989, when “an East German Politburo member bungled the announcement of…limited changes to travel regulations,” the world saw the fall of the Berlin Wall and the thawing of the Cold War.

While the West was celebrating German reunification and the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact struggled with one question: what next? For some, the answer seemed easy: join NATO. For others, the struggle for national identity as a result of newfound independence was significantly more difficult. To further compound the issue, when negotiating the reunification of Germany, the West initially assured the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand, “We are aware that NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east.” There are multiple reports from the Russian side of the negotiation corroborating the German records, as well as statements from then-U.S. Ambassador to Moscow indicating the Kremlin was given a “clear commitment.” Furthermore, the last leader of the Soviet Union and winner of the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize, Mikhail Gorbachev, asserts the United States promised “NATO wouldn’t move beyond the boundaries of Germany…but now half of central and eastern Europe are members….It shows they cannot be trusted.” Gorbachev goes on to say “we squandered” the 10 years after the Cold War, referring to world leaders having not developed a new stability. He also claims the missile defense systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic were, in the words of the Telegraph reporters, “an aggressive act against Russia.” Lastly, Gorbachev points out that NATO’s promise of eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine has been interpreted as “an attempt to extend America’s…influence into Russia’s backyard.” Such membership would be seen as a “direct threat,” and the
Russian War in Georgia in 2008 was a means to prevent it.\textsuperscript{38}

NATO expansion into Ukraine is an ominous suggestion, especially if one agrees that Russia cannot be an empire without Ukraine,\textsuperscript{39} as Putin reasons.\textsuperscript{40} Ukraine is the historical center of the Slavic peoples, and Kyiv “was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus,”\textsuperscript{41} circa 862 AD.\textsuperscript{42} Much of modern Ukraine is widely accepted as the territory of the earliest known nation of the Rus, from whom ethnic Russians and Ukrainians have likely descended.\textsuperscript{43} There has been a close relationship between Ukraine and Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact the Russian empire of the 1700s absorbed most Ukrainian ethnographic territory. With the exception of a brief period of independence from 1917 to 1920, Ukraine was reconquered and forced to endure Soviet rule until independence came upon them once again in 1991.\textsuperscript{44} Based on both ancient and current history, Putin seems interested in bringing into a “civilizational union” the Eastern Slavs Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine comprise, warranting his “protection” against Russia’s strategic geopolitical rivals.\textsuperscript{45} The NATO promise of membership may have perpetuated a no-expansion Russian myth,\textsuperscript{46} but it also fostered a very real geopolitical calculus of the Russian leader.

**United States**

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War could be seen as a simpler problem set than current policy toward post-Cold War Russia. U.S. strategies for the Cold War centered on strong militaries and a determination to win, as made clear by the oft-cited Reagan quotation, “Here’s my strategy on the Cold War: we win; they lose.”\textsuperscript{47} While Cold War strategists, such as George Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, had their nuances, the adversary was clearly defined and a unity of effort existed across the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of power. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of a clearly defined U.S. adversary allowed political, diplomatic, military, and economic agendas to begin competing for influence on Russian policy. The common hoped-for theme is one in which the United States and Russia work together. This approach was recently evidenced in Secretary of State John Kerry’s comments that Russia is a state “with whom we do not seek conflict, with whom we would much rather be working together to deal with the problems of the world.”\textsuperscript{48} Unfortunately, competing political and international agendas and the remnants of Cold War mistrust exacerbate an existing schism that creates friction as opposed to compatible interests.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been three political administrations in the United States. Russia, for all intents and purposes, has only seen one formidable administration. It was during the Clinton administration of the 1990s that Russian President Boris Yeltsin faded, and the handpicked upstart Putin began to rise by 2000. Since then, the only change in leadership was blatantly superficial, when Putin switched places with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. This change of scenery only lasted until 2012, when the Medvedev-Putin “castling move” returned Putin to the presidency.\textsuperscript{49} Given the natural variability of three different U.S. administrations and the general continuity of the Russian leadership perspective, it is easy to see how lack of continuity on one side could cause paths to diverge over two decades.\textsuperscript{50}
During the Clinton administration there was optimism for partnership. Angela Stent describes it well, “a selective partnership, where cooperation and competition coexisted.” The selective piece of this partnership began to reveal itself toward the end of Clinton’s first term, in a presidential speech in October 1996 on the subject of the NATO enlargement timetable. In this speech, the President stated, “That’s why the United States has taken the lead in a three part effort to build a new NATO for a new era. First, by adapting NATO with new capabilities for new missions. Second, by opening its doors to Europe’s emerging democracies. Third, by building a strong and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia.” Clinton follows later with “I know that some in Russia still look at NATO through a Cold War prism and, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it in a negative light. But I ask them to look again. We are building a new NATO, just as we support the Russian people in building a new Russia.”

Adding to these challenges of the Clinton era were international events such as the escalated Kosovo crisis in late 1998 to 1999. The heavily U.S.-influenced NATO intervention, juxtaposed against Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO, gave a strong appearance of Western influence advancing toward Russia, or in the least, the perception that Russia’s considerations in global affairs were of no consequence. To the casual U.S. foreign-policy observer, this coincidence may have all seemed positive, but for the fledgling Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, it was reminiscent of the fall of the Soviet Union’s great-power position in Eastern Europe, as he had witnessed it from his time in East Germany. Despite all efforts, the U.S.-Russia relationship deteriorated at the end of Clinton’s second term.

In the early 2000s, two newly elected leaders, Putin and George W. Bush, attempted to reestablish relations. This endeavor would prove difficult for a number of reasons, including the resulting Russian resentment of actions by which they felt marginalized. At its onset, the U.S.-Russia policy had the appearance of the Clinton-era selective partnership. While a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate Bush in 2000, Condoleezza Rice noted “the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide.” The tragedy of 11 September 2001 provided a resurgence of relations. President Putin was the first to call President Bush with condolences. Thereafter, about a year of generally positive relations followed, including the Crawford Summit where the Bush administration emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship by inviting Putin to President Bush’s personal home.

By 2003, a multi-polar world emerged partly as a result of U.S. operation in Iraq, and the United States began to face diplomatic challenges from allies and Russia. From Putin’s perspective, Western influence continued to move toward Russian borders, as seven more countries joined NATO in March 2004, including the three Baltic States. Further exacerbating tensions, Bush announced the Freedom Agenda in January 2005, specifically supporting the so-called color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia as efforts in democratization. In 2006, U.S.-Russia relations continued to deteriorate as economic tensions rose between Ukraine and Russia, and as the United States negotiated developing missile defense in Poland and Czech Republic. In response to Vice President Dick Cheney’s controversial speech in Vilnius, Lithuania, a war of words...
erupted and reached a crescendo when Putin gave his confrontational speech attacking U.S. foreign policy at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, March 2007. The Munich speech clearly marked a change in the dynamics of the selective partnership that had previously existed. This rhetoric continued when Putin attended the NATO Conference at Bucharest in April 2008, advocating against membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia. Having lost his composure, Putin reportedly told Bush that Ukraine was not even a “real state.” The relationship between the United States and Russia continued to spiral downward in late 2008 with the Russo-Georgian War over South Ossetia, the U.S.-Poland agreement to deploy missile defense interceptors in Central Europe, and the Russian response announcing a plan to install Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.

In March 2009, newly inaugurated President Barack Obama attempted a ‘reset’ of the deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations. Though Putin’s perspective was that a reset was unnecessary and contrived by Washington, speculation is that Obama succeeded in improving “the atmospherics and the substance of the relationship,” especially as it came on the heels of U.S.-Russian geopolitical confrontation the year prior. Recent events of the past year, however, has seen Putin “purge” the remaining remnants of the selective partnership. He has essentially embarked on a course for international multipolarity. As one analyst puts it, “there can be no reset of the reset,” and it is incumbent upon the United States to carefully consider how to respond to Putin’s challenge to the existing international order. Understanding Ukraine’s position in that order vis-à-vis Russia is an integral part to any coherent response.

Ukraine

According to a prominent historian, “the key to the future of the whole of Eastern Europe” teeters on the fulcrum of Ukraine’s handling of Russia. This is especially evident when one considers the demography of Ukraine and the implications for the country’s politics. Ukrainian demography portrays a country divided without a sense of national identity. Demographic splits exist largely along “ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional” lines. Ethnically, there is a preponderance of Ukrainians although there is a large Russian population, most of whom were born in Ukraine. Some of the ethnic Ukrainians are quite nationalist, as are some of the Ukrainian Russians many of whom believe “we haven’t moved, the borders have.” These polar opposites within Ukraine are reflected in the recent political approaches of the party in power: 1) those ethnic Ukrainians who desire a nation independent of Russia (formerly the Soviet Union); 2) those ethnic Russians who live in and identify with Ukraine, but see it as being inseparable from Russia; and 3) others who convey a mix of the influences. These divisions are further supported by linguistic preferences. Inhabitants of Western Ukraine tend to prefer the Ukrainian language and identify with the Ukrainian ethnicity. Eastern Ukraine is home to most ethnic Russians and Russophones and prefer the Russian language. Furthermore, most cities, in contrast to rural areas, prefer the Russian language.

Historically, the geography of Ukraine has played a divisive role. Over the centuries, various parts of Ukraine were subjected to different manifestations of dynasty and empire, which resulted in a dissociative nation. This dissociation harkens to Robert Cooper’s assertion that “you can’t build a
state without a nation.” Nevertheless, as Andrew Wilson has so succinctly opined, “an unexpected nation is still a nation,” despite the historical diversity within it. Therefore, even though independence was thrust upon the Ukrainian people 23 years ago, the current conflict has been the catalyst for many to reconcile the notion of national identity.

To drive home the point, consider that “only half the country had risen up” during the 2004 Orange Revolution. That revolution was a manifestation of the public’s dissatisfaction with overt fraud during the presidential elections that benefitted pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych. Though the courts overturned the fraudulent results, the populace soon grew weary of an Orange government that could not deliver. Yanukovych—the beneficiary of the 2004 fraud—was thus legitimately elected in 2010. Given the clear historical divisions amongst the Ukrainian people and the difficulty their politicians naturally face in trying to balance domestic concerns, NATO and the U.S would have benefitted from a cautious and thoughtful analysis of how to encourage Ukraine’s Western aspirations without disrupting its Eastern counterweight. The leaders of both Ukraine and Russia understood that “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire,” but with Ukraine controlled, “Russia automatically becomes an empire.” As Ukraine continues what has become an even direr struggle of national survival, the United States and NATO should inform a long-term strategic approach toward Ukraine and Russia with an appreciation of the historical and cultural dynamics that define their dependent relationship.

**Recommendations**

The impact U.S. and NATO actions and decisions since the end of the Cold War have had on Putin’s perceptions of the global world order and his foreign-policy calculus cannot be overstated. That the intent of those actions and decisions might not have been to humiliate or marginalize Russia is less important than Putin’s perceptions. Ignoring how that perceived impact has played into the current events in Ukraine will likely only bring about further “unforeseen” geopolitical tragedies similar to the annexation of Crimea, the current separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.

The West may not agree with Putin’s rationale or his decision making, but he enjoys broad popular support and will remain the Russian leader for the foreseeable future. That popular support stems from the fact that Putin is a savvy domestic politician. A good portion of his foreign policy is actually directed toward his domestic audience. Putin understands the history of his people and the priority of his populace: stability. Strength of the economy, strength of Russia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis other powers, and strength of leadership are three manifestations of his savvy that have lent themselves well toward domestic stability in Russia, in turn pushing Putin’s domestic popularity to the highest point in his long leadership tenure.

A sound policy toward Russia should consider not only how the United States and NATO are perceived, but also how Putin is using those perceptions to solidify his monopoly on domestic power. Indeed, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, cites domestic politics as the reason for Putin’s resurgence, couched in anti-Western sentiment to bolster popular
support. As McFaul concludes, “the challenge for the West is how to deal with such behavior forcefully enough to block it, but prudently enough to keep matters from escalating dramatically.”76

There are a number of things the United States and NATO can do to answer such a challenge. The first step might be to develop an actual policy and strategy, openly communicate it, and keep it flexible enough to adapt it to changing realities on the ground. Despite contemporary Russian myths, there really has not been a coherent policy toward Russia since it emerged from Soviet yoke, as multiple administrations and other priorities have come and gone. Deciding long-term goals with respect to Russia would form a foundation on which to act, whether in pursuit of partnership, counterbalance, or some combination thereof. Such a foundation would also work toward closing the perception of a say-do gap in the U.S.-Russia relationship and would be a departure from the short-term transactions that have characterized the relationship over the last decade. A keen understanding of Putin’s mindset and motives must precede any such goal formation, lest the resulting policy be just another reset.

Any attempt to draw Putin back from violence will not be easy. Unfortunately, the environment has already been shaped and conflict has begun, and it is unlikely that any meaningful U.S.-Russia relationship will result until there has been a similarly meaningful transition of Russian leadership. But, there are things that can be done simultaneously with long-term goal formation that can at least move the relationship in the right direction. NATO should endeavor to bring Russia back to the table and reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council. Though NATO cannot control how Putin spins such things for domestic consumption, NATO can control its own efforts to consider Russia’s position in global affairs and to find points of cooperation. NATO members should strongly consider altering Putin’s narrative by taking demonstrative steps back from the foolhardy declaration that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO.”77 Since that declaration in 2008, Georgia and Ukraine have both suffered militant Russian incursion, both have territorial integrity issues, and Ukraine is no closer to garnering popular support for such membership. Future membership for Georgia and Ukraine should be predicated upon the same criteria that every other European aspirant has had to meet; any premature promise of entry into the alliance only serves to feed Putin’s anti-Western public relations machine.

NATO would do well to consider closing the membership “open door” altogether. David Yost, in his most recent comprehensive examination of the alliance, has made clear that the “risk of…overextension has become obvious.”78 But, not only has NATO’s mission transformation from collective defense created risk, so too has its absorption of new members. New allies have not necessarily translated into increased revenue to support the growing alliance. Moreover, the intergovernmental organization necessarily requires compromise of national interests to “reach a workable consensus” in furtherance of collective goals,79 however loosely defined. More members mean more compromises. It would seem the larger NATO gets, the more unwieldy it could possibly become. It might be worth exploring whether compromising with Russia could benefit the security of alliance members as much as compromising with new members might. Yost even concludes
that cooperation with Russia is an essential element “to the future relevance of the Alliance.”

The United States should find points of mutual interest and actually cooperate with Russia toward those ends. No key actor in the current European situation wants to see an escalation of conflict, especially between major powers; the United States might need to compromise short-term interests for long-term goals, or vice versa. The key will be to extract something from Putin in such an exchange. Putin’s perspective has been that the United States is weak and can capitulate rather inexpensively (Syria is a good example). If the United States were to stop the economic sanctions on Russia, for example, the cost to Putin must be clearly defined and well thought out.

Nevertheless, both the United States and NATO will need to consider Putin’s domestic calculus when dealing with Russia. It is unlikely that Putin will accede to any compromises that will diminish his hold on domestic power. He will need to be able to spin any agreements or cooperation in such a way so as to not lose face with his constituents. That is ultimately Putin’s problem, but the U.S. strategist must keep it in mind, and perhaps even try to exploit it. The West has historically leveraged such leaders, despite their lack of democratic ideals, when priorities dictated. Global stability and prosperity currently so dictate, and the United States and NATO should move on from the uninformed Russia policy of the past in order to properly understand how to manage Putin going forward. Sun Tzu discussed the importance of knowing one’s enemy and knowing oneself. The United States and NATO’s lack of understanding of both Putin and the effects of their own policies contributed to the current issues in Ukraine; getting back to fundamental analysis of the problem to inform strategic policy and planning might just pave the right way forward.

**Conclusion**

A lack of appreciation for Putin’s mindset in U.S. foreign policy has contributed to the current Ukraine crisis. In addition to historical examples cited by Patrushev, one can see how Putin was “doubly emboldened” by how poorly the United States handled the Syria problem: “first, because the West looked weak, and second, because Russia had got away with massive arms shipments, many through the Ukrainian port of Odesa. So why not use the same tactics against Ukraine itself?”

As Wilson has surmised, the last decade or so can be summarized by saying “the Russians went ape.” Notwithstanding the chaos Putin has brought to bear, this discourse should be considered an understanding of Putin’s strategic perspective vis-à-vis NATO and the United States, an understanding that seems to have been lacking from U.S. policy considerations. Putin’s perspective is one in which the United States has consistently sought to marginalize Russia in the international order since the end of the Cold War. Instead of defending themselves and their actions against Russia’s “humiliation myth,” the United States and NATO might be better served to incorporate that myth into its strategic planning.
4 Thomas de Waal, as quoted in Susan B. Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” *Politico Magazine*, March 13, 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/put-in-on-the-couch-104647.html. Of note, several references in this paper are from this Glasser article, in which she compiles 22 contributions from “America’s most experienced Putin watchers.” Informed also by Hill and Gaddy’s *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*, the authors understand there is no single, neat, and tidy bin for Putin. He must be analyzed and understood from a multitude of angles in order to determine the best courses of action for U.S. and NATO policy and strategy.
5 Dimitri Simes, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 3.
6 Ibid.
10 Putin et al., *First Person*, xv.
12 Ibid.
15 Angela Stent, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 3.
16 Andrew Kuchins, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 5.
17 Putin et al., *First Person*, 178.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Putin et al., *First Person*, 177-178.
24 Dmitri Trenin, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 4.
25 Andrew Weiss, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 7.
34 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Adrian Blomfield and Mike Smith, “Gorbachev: US Could Start New
Gorbachev-US-could-start-new-Cold-War.html.

35 Ibid.
36 Blomfield and Smith, “Gorbachev.”
37 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Blomfield and Smith, “Gorbachev”; For NATO’s eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine, see “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” *NATO*, April 3, 2008, §23, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”
40 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 6.
44 “Ukraine: Security Assistance.”
46 Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, §Introduction; Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?”
50 Along these lines, Sarotte offers the change of administration as a reason for Clinton staffer ignorance of what discussions with Russia took place under the previous White House regarding NATO expansion. See Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?” §Bribing the Soviets Out.
53 Clinton, “Transcript.”
58 Stent, *Limits*, 212.
60 Ibid.
61 Wilson, *Ukrainians*, xiii.
62 Ibid, 207.
63 Ibid, 217.
64 Ibid, 207-33. There are those who prefer to speak Ukrainian (Ukrainophones), those who prefer to speak Russian (Russophones), and those who have no preference. Though the numbers of Ukrainophones and Russophones are roughly equal, there is a minority of ethnic Ukrainians who prefer to speak Ukrainian.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 161, 101-51, 263-64. Simply looking at some of the maps Wilson has reproduced conveys this idea; cf. table of maps on page ix.
68 Wilson, *Ukrainians*, xi.

70 Dominique Arel, “Ukraine since the War in Georgia,” *Survival* 50, no. 6 (2008): 15.


77 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” ¶23.

78 Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 376.

79 Ibid., 377.

80 Ibid.

81 McCaulay, *Sun Tzu’s the Art of War*, 37.

82 Ibid.

83 Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, §Introduction.

84 Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, §Unfinished Europe.

Team Biographies

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